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This dissertation presents a conjoined and comparative history of astrology and the debate about the 
existence of extraterrestrial (ET) life in the early modern period. These two histories are usually kept 
separate, largely because the same period represents a certain terminus ad quem for the former and the 
terminus a quo for latter. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the decline or marginalisation of 
astrology—the dismantling of the celestial causal chain of Aristotelian cosmology and the dismissal of 
any planetary or astral influence outside of light, heat and gravitation. They also saw the adoption, or 
re-adoption, of the cosmological view concerning the existence of a plurality of worlds in the universe 
(pluralism) and the possibility of ET life. Both these trends are considered as consequences of a 
Copernican cosmology and hallmarks of a modern worldview. The modern and in some sense artificial 
delineation between these two strands of historical enquiry (i.e. the history of astrology and the history 
of pluralism) may be detrimental, both to our understanding of celestial philosophy at any given time, 
as well as to our appreciation of cosmological change over longer periods. The most general and obvious 
similarity is that both these concepts meld astronomy and the life sciences. Astrology is concerned with 
the effect of the celestial realm on terrestrial biology (celestial influence), while pluralism is predicated 
on the possible existence of biological processes in the heavens (celestial inhabitation). 
In the mid 1990s, a new discipline was founded which similarly unites astronomy and biology under a 
common goal. This discipline is astrobiology, an interdisciplinary science which combines the search 
for ET life with the study of terrestrial biology—especially its origins, evolution, and occurrence in 
extreme environments—in an attempt to understand the very nature of life itself within a larger 
cosmological context. This thesis proposes that a history of astrobiology may provide the perfect vehicle 
to connect the more established histories of astrology and the ET life debate. The results of research 
undertaken so far suggest two main hypotheses. The first argument is that, in its infancy, Renaissance 
and early modern pluralism was in fact encouraged by evolving theories of celestial influence. The 
second is that, as the seventeenth century progressed, certain thinkers began to consciously oppose the 
concepts of influence and inhabitation as rival teleological models for astronomical cosmology. The 
demonstration of these arguments will contribute to the history of both astrology and pluralism. The 
marginalisation of astrology can be better understood by appreciating the appeal of pluralism and how 
it came to be placed in juxtaposition to astrology. At the same time, the history of our modern obsession 
with life elsewhere in the universe can be enriched by examining how the new paradigm, to use Kuhnian 
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Introduction: Astrology, Extraterrestrial Life and Astrobiology 
 
Astrobiology recognises that it is difficult to develop a full understanding of life on Earth without 
understanding its links to the cosmic environment.  
Charles S. Cockell1 
 
Research Aims 
This dissertation presents a conjoined and comparative history of astrology and the philosophical 
tradition related to the idea of a ‘plurality of worlds’ in the early modern period. In doing so, it suggests 
a new research direction for the history of astrobiology, the modern scientific discipline which 
encompasses the search for extraterrestrial (ET) life. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the 
decline of the monopoly of Aristotelian physics and Ptolemaic astronomy in the domain of Western 
natural philosophy. The astronomical discoveries and innovations of such figures as Galileo, Kepler 
and Newton laid the foundations for what would become our modern understanding of the universe and 
the place of the earth within it. Part of this transition involved the decline or marginalisation of 
astrology, the dismantling of the celestial causal chain of Aristotelian cosmology and the dismissal of 
any planetary or astral influence outside of light, heat and gravitation.2 Another part involved the 
adoption, or re-adoption, of the cosmological view concerning the existence of a plurality of worlds in 
the universe (hereafter ‘pluralism’). In this instance, pluralism refers to the belief that some or all of the 
celestial bodies are similar in nature to the earth and inhabited by living creatures.3  
These two phenomena are usually dealt with separately in historical scholarship, largely because the 
same period represents the terminus ad quem for the serious study of astrology and the terminus a quo 
for the growing acceptance of pluralism. Nevertheless, both trends are considered as consequences of a 
Copernican cosmology and hallmarks of a modern worldview. The modern—and in some sense 
artificial—delineation between these two strands of historical enquiry (i.e. the history of astrology and 
                                                          
1 Charles S. Cockell, Astrobiology: Understanding Life in the Universe (Chichester: Wiley, 2015), p. 4. 
2 See Rienk Vermij, ‘The Marginalization of Astrology among Dutch Astronomers in the First Half of the 17th 
Century’, History of Science, 52 (2014): 153–77. Although a geographically confined case study, the article by 
Vermij discusses various issues and theories regarding the decline of astrology. See also H. Darrel Rutkin, 
‘Astrology’, in The Cambridge History of Science. Vol. 3, Early Modern Science, ed. by Katharine Park and 
Lorraine Daston (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 541–61; Peter Whitfield, Astrology: A History 
(London: British Library, 2001), pp. 177–87. 
3 The main monograph works on this subject are Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the 
History of an Idea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948 [1936]); Steven J. Dick, Plurality of Worlds: 
The Origins of the Extraterrestrial Life Debate from Democritus to Kant (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982); Karl Siegfried Guthke, Der Mythos der Neuzeit: Das Thema der Mehrheit der Welten in 
der Literatur- und Geistesgeschichte von der Kopernikanischen Wende bis zur Science Fiction (Bern: Francke, 
1983); Michael J. Crowe, The Extraterrestrial Life Debate, 1750-1900: The Idea of a Plurality of Worlds from 
Kant to Lowell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
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the history of pluralism) may be detrimental, both to our understanding of celestial philosophy at any 
given time, as well as to our appreciation of cosmological change over longer periods. While it is of 
course a truism to say that early modern science or natural philosophy was more holistic than 
disciplinary, there are particularly good reasons to consider astrology and pluralism in tandem. The 
most general and obvious similarity is that both concepts meld astronomy and the life sciences; 
astrology is concerned with the effect of the celestial realm on terrestrial phenomena, including 
biological generation (celestial influence), while pluralism is predicated on the possible existence of 
biological processes in the heavens (celestial inhabitation).  
Aristotle, in his work On the Parts of Animals, twice compared the science of the stars to the science of 
living objects. The first comparison argues that mortal animals, just as much as the heavens, are products 
of a defining cause or principle (I.1, 641b13-21).4 Actions in the celestial and the biological world can 
be investigated and understood in the same way, according to the theory that ‘whenever there is plainly 
some final end, to which a motion tends should nothing stand in the way, we always say that such final 
end is the aim or purpose of the motion’ (I.1, 641b24-26).5 That is, both sciences can be approached 
teleologically. Aristotle then juxtaposed the two sciences: the heavens are more divine than plants or 
animals, yet our knowledge of the latter is far more certain. The two sciences thus complement each 
other. The ‘greater nearness and affinity to us’ of living creatures balance ‘the loftier interest of the 
heavenly things that are the objects of the higher philosophy’ (I.5, 645a1-4).6 Aristotle even 
acknowledges the less glamourous nature of biology when compared to astronomy, but reassures the 
philosophical reader that it will provide similar pleasures by revealing the links of causation and the 
artistic spirit that underlies all things.  
In the mid 1990s, a new discipline was founded which similarly unites astronomy and biology under a 
common goal, in which the certainty and nearness-to-hand of the one balances the (arguably) more 
speculative nature of the other. This discipline is astrobiology, a flourishing science which has largely 
replaced the field of ‘exobiology’, an earlier disciplinary label coined by Joshua Lederberg (1925–2008) 
in 1960 to describe the scientific search for ET life.7 Astrobiology operates through a variety of research 
projects, funded primarily by NASA, and as a scientific discipline it benefits from broad appeal and 
exposure, especially in regards to the search for potentially habitable exoplanets and, indeed, the not 
                                                          
4 Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, trans. by William Ogle (London: Kegan Paul, 1882), p. 8.  
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., p. 16. See also Mariska E.M.P.J. Leunissen, ‘Why Stars Have No Feet: Explanation and Teleology in 
Aristotle’s Cosmology’, in New Perspectives on Aristotle’s De Caelo, ed. by Alan C. Bowen and Christian 
Wildberg (Leiden: Brill, 2009): 215–237.   
7 For the modern history of astrobiology, see Steven J. Dick and James Edgar Strick, The Living Universe: NASA 
and the Development of Astrobiology (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2005). 
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yet exhausted search for life within our solar system.8 With the development of a science comes, 
inexorably, the history of that science. This decade has seen a concerted attempt to establish the history 
and philosophy of astrobiology ‘as a research field in its own right’.9 This history, when it searches for 
origins prior to the space age, has largely been equated with the history of the ‘plurality of worlds’ 
philosophy and the ET life debate. If we consider historical usages of the word ‘astrobiology’, however, 
as well as the modern disciplinary description, we can find considerable scope to expand the history of 
astrobiology, and pluralism in general, into related fields such as astrology.10  
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), astrobiology was a term first used in publications 
put out by the Koreshan Unity, an American sect which followed the teachings of the eclectic 
nineteenth-century physician and alchemist, Cyrus Teed (1839–1908).11 In their usage, astrobiology 
was a science which studied the ‘regulation of human affairs by the clock-work of the cosmos’.12 
Around the same time, the French philosopher Henry Lagrésille, who lived between the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, used the term in his metaphysical work Le fonctionnisme universel (‘On Universal 
Functionism’, 1902).13 Lagrésille, who in this work described functions from the atomic to the stellar 
level as creations of the free activity of spirit, used the word astrobiology to mean a ‘qualitative law of 
energy’ (loi qualitative de l’énergie).14 ‘I am afraid that neither the philosopher nor the scientist will 
care much for this book’, remarked one reviewer, ‘but the theosophist may find it edifying.’15  
In the 1930s the term was used with a different meaning by the French historian René Berthelot (1872–
1960), who used it to describe an intermediate stage in human cosmological development. In between 
‘savage animism and modern science’, astrobiology combined a vitalistic (or anthropomorphic) 
interpretation of the heavens with a desire to formulate laws that governed their motion and influence 
on terrestrial phenomena.16 All these historical usages are more closely connected to astrology than to 
                                                          
8 NASA operates in tandem with many partner agencies and organisations. As a starting point, see the NASA 
Astrobiology website. ‘Homepage | Astrobiology’, <https://astrobiology.nasa.gov/> [accessed 10 November 
2017]. 
9 David Dunér, Erik Persson, and Gustav Holmberg (eds), The History and Philosophy of Astrobiology: 
Perspectives on Extraterrestrial Life and the Human Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 
p. 3. 
10 There have been some recent attempts to look at the history of other aspects of astrobiology, such as theories of 
panspermia and the origins of life more generally. However, they contain little discussion of the early modern 
period. See Robert Temple, ‘The Prehistory of Panspermia: Astrophysical or Metaphysical?’, International 
Journal of Astrobiology, 6 (2007): 169–80; René Demets, ‘Darwin’s Contribution to the Development of the 
Panspermia Theory’, Astrobiology, 12 (2012): 946–50; David Dunér, Christophe Malaterre, and Wolf Geppert, 
‘The History and Philosophy of the Origin of Life’, International Journal of Astrobiology, 15 (2016). 
11 ‘astro-, comb. form’, OED Online (Oxford University Press) <http://0-
www.oed.com.catalogue.libraries.london.ac.uk/view/Entry/12240> [accessed 12 January 2017]. 
12 Flaming Sword, 15 Jan. 6/2 (1908), heading. 
13 Henry Lagrésille, Le fonctionnisme universel, essai de synthèse philosophique, Monde sensible (Paris: 
Fischbacher, 1902). 
14 Ibid., pp. 540–41. 
15 Review by David Morrison, ‘New Books’, Mind, 12 (1903): 266–67. 
16 ‘Philosophical Periodicals’, Mind, 43 (1934): 266–74 (269); René Berthelot, La pensée de l’Asie et 
l’astrobiologie (Paris: Payot, 1938). 
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the search for ET life. It was only in the mid-twentieth century that it took on this new meaning. It was 
used in several published works and astronautical conferences in a sense synonymous to Lederberg’s 
‘exobiology’, or a similar now-disused term ‘xenobiology’.17 Yet in French it retained the meaning 
given by Berthelot, and it was used by the historian of philosophy Paul-Henri Michel (1894–1964) to 
describe Bruno’s animistic cosmology.18 Then, in the 1990s, it took on its current scientific meaning, 
defined by NASA as the study of the origins, evolution, distribution, and future of life in the universe.19 
Astrobiology now denotes an expanded and interdisciplinary science, combining the search for ET life 
with the study of terrestrial biology—especially its origins, evolution, and occurrence in extreme 
environments—in an attempt to understand the very nature of life itself within a larger cosmological 
context.20 
It is in this shorter and more general definition, ‘the study of life in a cosmic context’, that astrobiology 
is most obviously connected to the astrological tradition. Consider this passage from a textbook on 
astrobiology: 
Astrobiology recognises that it is difficult to develop a full understanding of life on Earth without 
understanding its links to the cosmic environment. The Earth seems like a tranquil place. However, it is 
subjected to the vagaries of its astronomical environment. For example, a leading hypothesis for the 
extinction of the dinosaurs is an asteroid or comet impact about 65 million years ago. This hypothesis 
underscores the fact that to understand past life on Earth we need to understand how the astronomical 
environment may have influenced life.21 
Leaving aside mention of dinosaurs, this quote could easily be used as an astrological manifesto from 
the ancient, medieval or early modern periods. Indeed, the case of astrology illustrates a simple yet 
profound point: the modern science of astrobiology unites two fields of enquiry, astronomy and biology, 
which in fact only became separated following the Scientific Revolution in the early modern period, or 
perhaps even later still, following the disciplinisation efforts of William Whewell (1794–1866).22 The 
importance of astrology to pre-modern medicine is the most palpable example of this unification, but 
the effect of the heavens on biological processes had much wider scientific, philosophical, agricultural 
and cultural ramifications.  
All this is to say, that the history of astrobiology may provide the perfect vehicle to connect the more 
established histories of astrology and pluralism. The historical coincidence of meanings, with 
                                                          
17 David C. Catling, Astrobiology: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 4. 
18 Paul-Henri Michel, The Cosmology of Giordano Bruno, trans. by R. E. W. Maddison (London: Methuen, 1973), 
p. 216. 
19 The French still use the term ‘exobiologie’. 
20 ‘History of Astrobiology | About Astrobiology | Astrobiology’, <https://astrobiology.nasa.gov/about/history-
of-astrobiology/> [accessed 11 January 2017]. 
21 Cockell, Astrobiology, p. 4. 
22 See Raphaël Sandoz, ‘Whewell on the Classification of the Sciences’, Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science, Part A, 60 (2016): 48–54. Astrobiology prides itself on its trans-, multi- and/or interdisciplinary nature. 
See Charles Morphy D. Santos et al., ‘On the Parallels between Cosmology and Astrobiology: A Transdiciplinary 
Approach to the Search for Extraterrestrial Life’, International Journal of Astrobiology, 15 (2016): 251–260. 
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astrobiology being used in different senses synonymous with astrology, presents an opportunity to write 
a deeper contextual history of attempts to understand life in reference to perceptions of the cosmos. 
This is of course borrowed territory from what we might call the history of ‘cosmology’ or ‘cultural 
astronomy’. Framing it as a history of astrobiology, a modern field, is an attempt to create a compromise 
between relevance and relativism—to risk anachronism in the hope of drawing out meaningful 
associations between modern and pre-modern pursuits of knowledge. The aim of this research project 
is, therefore, to probe the links between theories of celestial influence and ET life in early modern 
natural philosophy. There is rich ground for research, due to the simple fact that most figures in the 
early history of pluralism were either practicing astrologers or wrote about the nature of celestial 
influence. These natural philosophers first began to extend generation and corruption to the heavens at 
a time when those very processes were still causally tied to celestial influence.  
The results of my reading so far have led to two main theses. My first argument is that, in its infancy, 
pluralism was in fact encouraged by evolving astrological theories. This evolution was stimulated by 
elements of Platonic and Stoic philosophy as well as by post-Copernican reforms. A belief in 
extraterrestrial life was thus nurtured by concepts of the ubiquity and necessity of celestial influence 
which survived, at least for a time, the dismantling of the Aristotelian/Ptolemaic cosmos. The twin 
notions of influence and inhabitation could combine to provide significant explanatory power for the 
cosmological alternatives to Aristotle that arose in the time between Nicholas of Cusa and Newton, 
especially in terms of the motion and order of the celestial bodies. This argument will be the focus of 
the first three chapters. Chapter 1 takes the form of a broad survey of the interplay of astrological and 
pluralist ideas from Plutarch to Giordano Bruno, while Chapters 2 and 3 are case studies of William 
Gilbert (1544–1603) and Johannes Kepler (1571–1640) respectively. The point to be made is that 
celestial influence and celestial inhabitation were not mutually exclusive concepts. In the attempt to 
build a new cosmology as robust and descriptive as that of Aristotle and Ptolemy, philosophers in the 
early modern period used both ideas, separately or together, to define a teleologically satisfying world-
view.  
This symbiosis of astrological and pluralist themes will be further explored in Chapter 4, which again 
takes the form of a broad survey, this time for the period between Kepler and Newton. This is partly a 
non-argumentative exploration of the interesting and productive ways that influence and inhabitation 
combined in attempts to create a viable, non-Aristotelian cosmology, but it is also intended to 
demonstrate that no history of celestial physics in this period can be complete without appreciating the 
affinity between these two concepts. Accompanying this survey is a closer look at the philosophical 
systems of Kenelm Digby (1603–1655) and Thomas White (1593–1676), and the refutation of White’s 
cosmology by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). This brief analysis will serve to highlight some of the 
implications of a mechanistic approach to biological and physical forces for theories of celestial 
influence and inhabitation. It will also serve as an introduction to the second argument of this 
12 
 
dissertation—that throughout the seventeenth century certain thinkers began to consciously oppose 
influence and inhabitation as rival teleological paradigms of astronomical cosmology.  
This argument will be progressed in the final chapter, which will look at the enmity towards astrology 
expressed by several prominent advocates for pluralism, finishing with a study of the de-astrologising 
tendencies within the tradition of Newtonian natural theology. The conclusion of this dissertation looks 
ahead, proposing new ways to consider the scientific and cultural trajectory of pluralism over the last 
three centuries up until the present day. In the eighteenth century, it will be suggested, pluralism, and 
the increasing belief in ET life, replaced astrology in a certain sense. That is to say, it assumed many 
of the cosmological, cultural, and psychological functions which were previously performed by 
astrology. It fulfilled the teleological requirements of the New Astronomy. Put simply, God did not 
create the planets and the stars in order to influence the earth but rather as abodes for a myriad of other 
creatures. But more than this, it took astrology’s place as the conjectural or speculative side of 
astronomy. In this sense, it served, and continues to serve, as an impetus for the astronomical sciences 
and a vehicle for popular engagement with the celestial realm.  
The demonstration of these arguments will, it is hoped, contribute to the history of both astrology and 
pluralism. In the medieval and Renaissance periods astrology was considered by many to be the queen 
of the sciences, embodying the ultimate utility of mathematical and astronomical studies. A conference 
in Utrecht in March 2015 on ‘The Marginalization of Astrology in Early Modern Science’ achieved a 
consensus, perhaps unsurprisingly, that this is a process not well enough understood.23 A step towards 
a better understanding can be taken by appreciating the appeal of pluralism and how it came to be placed 
in juxtaposition to astrology. At the same time, the history of our modern obsession with life elsewhere 
in the universe can be enriched by examining how the new paradigm, to use Kuhnian phrasing, grew 
out of the old.24 In effect, this research aims to build a bridge between the ‘antiquarianism’ of the history 
of astrology and the ‘New History presentism’ of the history of pluralism.25  
 
                                                          
23 ‘The Marginalization of Astrology’, Conference hosted by the Descartes Centre, Utrecht, 18-20 March 2015. 
24 See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
1996). 
25 In his review of the English translation of Guthke’s Der Mythos der Neuzeit, David Lux alluded to the dangers 
of treating history as a ‘pursuit of origins’, an approach championed by the ‘New History’ school of the early 
twentieth century: ‘As critics of the New History pointed out all too clearly, an avowed presentism very often 
yields a telescopic effect, one in which the historian's emphasis on modernity and progress can overpower 
important subtleties and nuances of historical action.’ See David S. Lux, ‘Review of The Last Frontier: Imagining 





The history of pluralism, or the ET debate, was the focus of several monograph studies in the twentieth 
century. Arthur Lovejoy’s famous work The Great Chain of Being (1936) used pluralism as a case study 
to advocate his new methodology for a history of ideas. His main argument was that the driving force 
behind the change from the medieval to the modern cosmos was not Copernicanism or scientific 
astronomy, but rather the revival of certain Platonic metaphysical preconceptions.26 One such Platonic 
conception, treated by Lovejoy as a ‘unit-idea’, was the Principle of Plenitude, which dictated, to put it 
briefly, that the infinite power and goodness of the creator must be realised in an infinite creation. 
Whatever can be, is. Alexandre Koyré agreed to some extent with Lovejoy’s emphasis on Platonism, 
but his own famous work, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (1957), placed much more 
emphasis on Copernicus and the improvement of mathematical astronomy.27 
Koyré’s mild rebuttal was strengthened implicitly by Stephen J. Dick in his 1982 book Plurality of 
Worlds: The Origins of the Extraterrestrial Life Debate from Democritus to Kant, which takes its 
approach from the history of science and accentuates the role played by observational evidence. This 
work, insightful and broad in scope, remains effectively the standard text on the pre-modern history of 
pluralism. Its sequel, chronologically speaking, is Michael Crowe’s The Extraterrestrial Life Debate, 
1750–1900: The Idea of a Plurality of Worlds from Kant to Lowell (1986). He disagreed slightly with 
Dick, arguing that the huge gaps between observation and belief in regard to questions of ET life suggest 
that religious and philosophical factors, such as teleology and the principle of plenitude, played the 
primary role. It is unlikely that this disagreement on emphasis can be resolved, as it relies heavily on 
subjective choices of which historical figures, and which parts of their work, to prioritise in the history 
of pluralism. 
In between the works by Dick and Crowe, the German literary and cultural historian Karl S. Guthke 
published Der Mythos der Neuzeit: Das Thema der Mehrheit der Welten in Literatur- und 
Geistesgeschichte von der Kopernikanischen Wende bis zur Science Fiction (‘The Myth of Modern 
Times: The Theme of a Plurality of Worlds in Literary and Intellectual History from the Copernican 
Revolution to Science Fiction’, 1983).28 Guthke’s main argument, and the reason for the inclusion of 
                                                          
26 Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, p. 99. 
27 Alexandre Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957). 
Paolo L. Rossi argued that the history of the dispute about inhabited worlds did not coincide with the narratives 
of either Lovejoy or Koyré, nor with the history of imaginary voyages, but was rather a history sui generis. See 
Paolo L. Rossi, ‘Nobility of Man and Plurality of Worlds’, in Science, Medicine, and Society in the Renaissance: 
Essays to Honor Walter Pagel, ed. by Allen G. Debus, 2 vols (New York: Science History Publications, 1972), 
II: 131–62 (157). The foundational text for histories of lunar voyage literature is Marjorie Hope Nicolson, Voyages 
to the Moon (New York: Macmillan, 1948). 
28 The English translation has an altered title: Karl Siegfried Guthke, The Last Frontier: Imagining Other Worlds, 
from the Copernican Revolution to Modern Science Fiction, trans. by Helen Atkins (Ithaca; London: Cornell 
University Press, 1990). 
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literature, is that the belief in a plurality of inhabited worlds has become, as the title suggests, the 
predominate ‘myth’ of modernity—a ‘new gospel’.29 He identifies many drives towards pluralism, such 
as religious thinking, philosophy, analogy, observation, as well as imagination and fiction. His focus 
on the anthropological dimensions of the belief in pluralism, both in its modern and early modern 
periods, is a welcome addition to the scientific and philosophical histories. 
Guthke’s thesis is a reminder of a very important point. The history of the plurality of worlds hypothesis, 
written in a time when it underpins so much of our cosmology, culture, and scientific endeavour, is 
accordingly written as the history of a winning idea; a ‘truth’. As such it falls victim in some degree to 
the presentism, bias, and telescopic distortion that such historicism entails, although in fairness, this 
narrow focus should be forgiven as a consequence of the grand chronological scope of the principal 
works. There have since been some attempts to contextualise aspects of this long history. An article by 
Nathaniel Wolloch looks at seventeenth-century philosophers who theorised about ET life and 
compares this to the same philosophers’ theories on animals.30 These links between pluralist, 
theriophilic (pro-animal) and anti-theriophilic ideas are valuable, in Wolloch’s view, for a better 
understanding of the issue of anthropocentrism in this period. This paper will replicate his methodology 
to a certain extent for the links between pluralism, astrological and anti-astrological theories, with 
similar implications for our historical understanding of anthropocentrism. 
As for astrology itself, its demise as a scientific discipline in the seventeenth century is usually 
considered as part of a wider development in Western civilisation often called the ‘disenchantment of 
the world’ or the ‘decline of magic’. This latter phrase is of course part of the title of Keith Thomas’ 
seminal work, which focused mainly on the historical situation in England, yet has in many ways set 
the terms of the debate more broadly in the decades since, especially with its integration of scientific, 
religious, and social factors.31 His invocation of political and social influences has since been developed 
further, especially by Patrick Curry, who focuses again primarily on England.32 The story of astrology’s 
demise in these cases obviously involves the identification of a divide, or at least a continuum, between 
low and high astrology, because we see that ‘popular astrology’ in some form has survived up until the 
present day. 
                                                          
29 Ibid., p. 35. 
30 Nathaniel Wolloch, ‘Animals, Extraterrestrial Life and Anthropocentrism in the Seventeenth Century’, The 
Seventeenth Century, 17 (2002): 235–253. 
31 Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Century England (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971). The phrase ‘disenchantment of the world’ comes from 
the sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920). For an introduction to the historiography of disenchantment, see 
Alexandra Walsham, ‘The Reformation and “The Disenchantment of the World” Reassessed’, The Historical 
Journal, 51 (2008): 497–528 (497–505). 
32 Patrick Curry, Prophecy and Power: Astrology in Early Modern England (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1989). 
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High astrology, which would include what we might think of as ‘scientific astrology’, was assumed, by 
traditional histories of science, to have declined simply because it was disproved or discovered to be 
groundless. At the very least it did not conform to the definition of science as it was being developed in 
the seventeenth century. For Popper, astrology failed because it was unfalsifiable; for Kuhn, because it 
didn’t fit the new paradigm.33 Others focus on the anti-astrological impact of certain key works 
disseminated in the sixteenth century, such as Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s Disputationes adversus 
astrologiam divinatricem (‘Arguments against Divinatory Astrology’, 1496), or Copernicus’ De 
revolutionibus orbium coelestium (‘On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres’, 1543). This theory 
must somehow account, however, for the continuation of astrological science well into the seventeenth 
century by prominent philosophers and scientists, including Copernicans. More recent historians of 
science and astrology, such as Curry, have argued that the story of astrology’s scientific marginalisation 
is not complete unless it takes into account how the new science or natural philosophy appropriated 
what were in fact astrological theories, and then made them ‘safe’ by a process of renaming and 
reinterpretation.34 John Henry has written about the contribution of magic and the occult sciences to the 
new philosophies, including especially the notion of action at a distance.35 This was followed by a 
‘fragmentation’ which saw the appropriation of certain aspects and the abandonment of others into a 
redefined category of vulgar magic. 
There are several more general works which have linked astrology and pluralism to some extent, or 
discussed them in a similar context.36 One in particular is worth mentioning here, and that is Peter 
Harrison’s The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science.37 In this work, Harrison discusses 
the dilemma faced by the advocates of physico-theology who wanted to reconcile the new astronomy, 
with its increased dimensions and countless new and distant bodies, with the teleological tradition of 
natural philosophy. He comments that the ‘decline of astrological prognostication and the related 
concept of celestial influences … made the problem more acute’.38 The suggestion is that the invocation 
                                                          
33 Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, 2nd ed. (London: 
Routledge and K. Paul, 1965), p. 37; Thomas S. Kuhn, ‘Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?’, in 
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1970): 1–24 (7). 
34 Patrick Curry, ‘Astrology in Early Modern England: The Making of a Vulgar Knowledge’, in Science, Culture 
and Popular Belief in Renaissance Europe, ed. by Stephen Pumfrey, Maurice Slawinski and Paolo L. Rossi 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991): 274–91 (282–85). 
35 John Henry, ‘The Fragmentation of Renaissance Occultism and the Decline of Magic’, History of Science, 46 
(2008): 1–48. See also Keith Hutchison, ‘What Happened to Occult Qualities in the Scientific Revolution?’, Isis, 
73 (1982): 233–53. 
36 Some examples are Anna Marie Eleanor Roos, Luminaries in the Natural World: The Sun and the Moon in 
England, 1400-1720 (New York; Oxford: Peter Lang, 2001); Robert S. Westman, The Copernican Question: 
Prognostication, Skepticism, and Celestial Order (Berkeley; London: University of California Press, 2011); Pietro 
Daniel Omodeo, Copernicus in the Cultural Debates of the Renaissance: Reception, Legacy, Transformation 
(Leiden: Brill, 2014). 
37 Peter Harrison, The Bible, Protestantism, and the Rise of Natural Science (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). 
38 Ibid., p. 179. 
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of ET life as a teleological principle filled in a gap left by an already marginalised astrological tradition. 
While this was undoubtedly true in certain instances, it is definitely not the whole story. A closer look 
at the historical record will reveal that, beyond the appearance of coincidence or correlation, there are 
positive causal connections linking the trajectories of the astrological and pluralist traditions. 
That being said, the current discussion will not necessarily argue against any of the studies so far 
mentioned. Rather, the addition of astrology to the history of pluralism, and vice versa, suggests an 
extra dimension to the debate which expands on and complements certain existing historical theories. 
For example, the first three chapters, detailing the support given to pluralism by Platonic theories of 
living celestial bodies exchanging mutual and sympathetic influences, can be seen as an extension of 
Lovejoy’s thesis that the transition to a modern worldview was stimulated by a resurgent Platonism. It 
will add to these, however, a suggestion of the importance of Stoic philosophy. At the same time, some 
of the cosmological developments analysed by Dick and Crowe can be better understood contextually 
by reference to the field of astrology, which is under-represented in their studies. Our understanding of 
novel philosophies from the Renaissance and early modern periods which are pro pluralism on some 
level will be enriched by an analysis of theories of celestial influence within those same philosophies. 
It will be shown that astrological ideas were not simply a casualty of the move from the closed world 
to the infinite universe, but in fact an active participant. 
Building on these foundations, the fourth chapter will hopefully demonstrate the extent of common 
ground between the histories of astrology and pluralism in the seventeenth century. Early modern 
celestial physics encapsulated both influence and inhabitation, and so it is no surprise that the two ideas 
formed part of the same intellectual and cultural milieu. The last chapter and conclusion, which argue 
that pluralism was put in opposition to, and then replaced astrology, continue the line of research 
pursued by Guthke, tracing the cultural and anthropological aspects of a belief in pluralism and 
extraterrestrial life. The argument is really a more specific rephrasing of Guthke. Rather than the ‘myth 
of modern times’, this research suggests that pluralism and a belief in ET life are in some ways the 
‘astrology of modern times’.39 This thesis can also be considered in Kuhnian terms, as an example of a 
paradigm shift.40 Lynn Thorndike argued that, prior to Newton, astrology was a ‘generally recognized 
and accepted … universal natural law’, while Dick believes that ‘the idea that abundant life exists in 
the universe is more than another theory or hypothesis; it is sufficiently comprehensive to qualify as a 
worldview’.41 Can we therefore think of a paradigm shift from influence to inhabitation (or, to phrase 
                                                          
39 You could of course say that astrology was the myth of pre-modern times. For an interesting discussion of myth 
and science more generally, see Michael P. Carroll, ‘Le Pensée Scientifique: Myth and the Popularity of Scientific 
Theories’, Structuralist Review, 2 (1980): 49–58. 
40 The concept of paradigm shift as a way to understand scientific change was developed in Kuhn, The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions. The merits of applying the term in this context will be considered in the conclusion. 
41 Lynn Thorndike, ‘The True Place of Astrology in the History of Science’, Isis, 46 (1955): 273–78 (273); Steven 




it more colloquially, from astrology to aliens) occurring in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, with 
its roots in astronomy but branching far afield into society and culture? This thesis, if correct, suggests 
that there was no disenchantment in the early modern period, at least not astronomically speaking. What 
we find instead is the terms of enchantment metamorphosing in step with a changing cosmology. 
Both astrology and pluralism satisfied the teleological requirements of astronomy, but, perhaps more 
importantly, they both provided what Kuhn would call ‘psychological satisfaction’ to their respective 
worldviews.42 This psychological aspect was in itself a motivating force, providing philosophers with 
ever more intriguing and pressing questions and problems. When Crowe argues that the search for clues 
of celestial inhabitation was a primary incentive for the building of large telescopes in the eighteenth 
century, and that embellishing astronomical works with ideas about extraterrestrial life was a way of 
interesting a broader public, he demonstrates that pluralism had taken astrology’s role as the ‘foolish 
daughter’ supporting her wise but poor mother astronomy.43 Rienk Vermij has suggested that astrology 
was abandoned because other scientific and cosmological problems were putting demands on 
astronomy.44 It was the very real possibility of the existence of ET life, and the plethora of questions 
and dilemmas that it raised, which placed those demands and took centre stage, where it remains today.  
This links to another possible approach: that of Gerard Holton’s emphasis on the thematic dimension 
of science. Themata for Holton are ‘non-scientific’ commitments which can provide the source of an 
induction or determine the choice or preselection of theories. ‘One result of this recognition’, argues 
Holton, ‘will be that the dichotomy between scientific and humanistic scholarship, which is undoubted 
and real at many levels, becomes far less impressive if one looks carefully at the construction of 
scientific theories.’45 Taking heed of Lorraine Daston’s lament about the over-historicisation of the 
history of science, this dissertation will at least make suggestions for a psychological, sociological and 
anthropological approach to the history of astronomy.46 Astrology and pluralism, which bridge the 
divide between science and speculation, between the professional and the popular, are perfect 
candidates for such an approach. Stefan Helmreich, in his article on the astrobiological imagination, 
advocated a cultural historical approach which would aid in ‘understanding and uncovering the 
exuberance of such scientific enterprises as astrobiology, which chase after such overflowing objects 
                                                          
42 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 7. 
43 Crowe, The Extraterrestrial Life Debate, pp. 555–56. The depiction of astrology as the foolish daughter of 
astronomy was made by Kepler in his Tertius interveniens (1610). See Johannes Kepler, Gesammelte Werke 
(henceforth abbreviated as GW), ed. under the supervision of the Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 26 
vols published so far (Munich: Beck, 1937–), 4, p. 161. 
44 Vermij, ‘The Marginalization of Astrology’, p. 171. 
45 Gerald James Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought: Kepler to Einstein (Cambridge, MA; London: 
Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 33. 
46 Lorraine Daston, ‘History of Science without Structure’, in Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions at Fifty: 
Reflections on a Science Classic, ed. by Robert J. Richards and L. Daston (Chicago; London: University of 
Chicago Press, 2016): 115–32. 
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as “life”’.47 The centuries-long exuberance of astrological enterprise is perhaps the best model we have 
for such an understanding. 
This dissertation, while focusing largely on the long seventeenth century, attempts to establish patterns 
over an even longer time frame. An apology must therefore be made for the inevitable generalisations 
and cursory treatment of important historical themes and figures. Even though this essay is an attempt, 
in some degree, to contextualise the history of the ET life debate, the large period covered means that 
it is just as guilty of a biased selection and prioritisation of sources. In order to lessen the need for such 
an apology, it should be made clear that this dissertation is only intended to demonstrate that interactions 
between astrology and pluralism formed part of the historical trajectories of both traditions. It will be 
enough to establish that these two particular trends—that questions concerning celestial influence 
stimulated ideas about possible inhabitation, and that the latter contributed to the forces responsible for 
astrology’s decline—were important, but not universal, factors in the history of early modern natural 
philosophy and cosmology. 
 
Terminology 
We have already (over-)defined astrobiology. The anachronistic application of this term will be 
minimised in the body of this dissertation so as not to distract from the attempt to appreciate this history 
in situ. There are several other terms which need clarification before we can proceed. ‘Pluralism’ is 
used in this context only as shorthand for the philosophical doctrine that posits a multiplicity of worlds, 
and so should not be confused with any other sort of pluralism. It should also be noted that this 
dissertation is concerned almost exclusively with that variety of pluralism which theorises about other 
earth-like worlds within this one universe—worlds in which generation and corruption occur in a way 
analogous to the earth. It is not concerned so much with theories of a plurality of kosmoi separated by 
place or time. While pluralism will be the most common and general term employed, discussion will 
also focus on extraterrestrial (ET) or alien life. Both these expressions are anachronisms, and bring with 
them associations from modern popular culture and science fiction. Nevertheless, they are retained 
because this paper, especially in the later chapters, is interested in exactly those broader cultural 
manifestations and ramifications of pluralism. 
This brings up the question of what does and does not qualify as ET life. Like the modern science of 
astrobiology, this dissertation will use terrestrial life as the example to be applied to life as a more 
general concept. That is to say, ET life is considered in the form of plants and animals which are 
                                                          




corporeal and which live (and die) on the other celestial globes. This therefore excludes planetary 
intelligences, planetary souls, angels, demons, daemons, gods, and others of the like. This is not an 
airtight rule, however, and discussion of these forms of life will be necessary from time to time, and 
indeed the distinction is quite often blurred in the sources themselves. There was, with notable 
exceptions, very little discussion of what life on other celestial bodies might look like. We will, 
however, come across interesting and pertinent ideas related to this, such as the tension between 
plenitude and the uniformity of nature, and the question of what it actually is to be human in a universe 
with more than one inhabited planet. 
What exactly is meant by the term ‘astrology’ is quite often debated and confused in the scholarship. 
Many subdivisions were categorised throughout the classical, medieval and Renaissance periods, and 
even more have been applied by modern historians. We have already mentioned high and low astrology, 
which is of course a modern delineation. Isidore of Seville (560–636) distinguished between ‘natural 
astrology’ and ‘superstitious astrology’ in his Etymologies.48 Superstitious astrology is more accurately 
referred to as ‘judicial astrology’, and the division is usually considered to separate the influence of the 
heavens over the natural world from its influence over humans and human events, which impinged on 
free will. A distinction can also be made between practical astrology and different levels of astrological 
theory, that is, theory oriented towards practice and theory concerning celestial influence as a subject 
of natural philosophy.49 It is this last meaning which is the focus of the current discussion. Lemay called 
it theoretical, learned astrology. Others, including Darrel Rutkin in his PhD dissertation, have called it 
‘scientific astrology’.50 Rutkin has since switched his emphasis onto an ‘astrologizing Aristotelian 
natural philosophy’.51 To this list might be added, as we will see, an ‘astrologizing Platonic/Stoic natural 
philosophy’. For the sake of simplicity and brevity, however, this dissertation will often use the term 
‘astrology’ by itself, on the understanding that it does not refer, in general, to practice or practical theory. 
In the light of such possible confusions, both terminological and philosophical, one can see the attraction 
of Lovejoy’s unit-ideas. If we allow ourselves, with an appropriate awareness of the limits of 
                                                          
48 Isidore of Seville, Etymologiae, Bk 3, Ch. 27. 
49 For a discussion of the terminology, see H. Darrel Rutkin, ‘Astrology, Natural Philosophy, and the History of 
Science, c. 1250–1700: Studies Toward an Interpretation of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s Disputationes 
adversus astrologiam divinatricem’ (unpublished PhD Dissertation, Indiana, 2002), pp. 20–22. 
50 Richard Lemay, ‘The True Place of Astrology in Medieval Science and Philosophy: Towards a Definition’, in 
Astrology, Science, and Society: Historical Essays, ed. by Patrick Curry (Woodbridge, Suffolk; Wolfeboro, NH: 
Boydell Press, 1987): 57–73 (60–63); Rutkin, ‘Astrology, Natural Philosophy, and the History of Science’, pp. 
21–22. See also David C. Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science: The European Scientific Tradition in 
Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, 600 B.C. to A.D. 1450 (Chicago; London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 74–80; John D. North, ‘Celestial Influence: The Major Premise of Astrology’, in 
‘Astrologi Hallucinati’: Stars and the End of the World in Luther’s Time, ed. by Paola Zambelli (Berlin; New 
York: De Gruyter, 1986): 45–100; Edward Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs: The Medieval Cosmos, 1200-1687 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), Ch. 19, pp. 569–617. 
51 Rutkin, ‘Astrology’, in The Cambridge History of Science. See also id., ‘Understanding the History of Astrology 
(and Magic) Accurately: Methodological Reflections on Terminology and Anachronism’, Philosophical 
Readings, 7 (2015): 42–54. 
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applicability, to use the same method, we could isolate two such unit-ideas for use in this dissertation: 
the Principle of Influence and the Principle of Inhabitation. The first principle would be the reduction 
of astrology to two basic questions: Are the celestial bodies causes? And if so, what effects do they 
have? The latter principle would be the notion that, simply put, there are mortal living beings on other 
celestial bodies. A comparative history of these notions, beliefs, principles, unit-ideas, paradigms, 
endoxai, however we might like to think of them, is what is attempted here. It begins with an agonisingly 
brief description of the history of each from the classical period to the end of the sixteenth century, and 





Celestial Influence as an Aid to Pluralism from Antiquity to the 
Renaissance 
Certain people have said that there are as many species of things in the earth as there are stars. If the 
earth thus contracts the influence of all the stars into individual species, why does it not happen 
similarly in the regions of other stars, which receive the influences of the others? 
Nicholas of Cusa1 
 
Plutarch and Classical Pluralism 
If one is writing a history of the plurality of worlds tradition in Western thought, the natural place to 
begin is with the Greek atomist school of Democritus and Epicurus, and their Latin champion Lucretius 
(c.99–c.55 BCE). The philosophy of these atomists, however, lends itself more to a belief in a 
multiplicity of more-or-less self-contained kosmoi. That is, the infinity of space and matter suggested 
the reproduction, in another place, of an inhabited earth surrounded by planets and stars. This chapter, 
on the other hand, is more concerned with that particular form of pluralism which asks whether the 
other celestial bodies could be worlds like the earth. Atomism would await reinvention by the likes of 
Bruno, Gassendi and Decartes before it encompassed this latter form of pluralism. More relevant, 
although far less penetrable, are the philosophical contributions of certain pre-Socratics, such as Thales 
of Miletus, and the Pythagoreans, who argued for the earth-like nature of the moon.2 Fragments from 
the writings of these philosophers describe the moon as material in a sense similar to the earth, furnished 
with mountains, valleys, seas, and possibly even plants, animals and inhabitants. They were preserved 
in sources such as Pseudo-Plutarch and Stobaeus (fl. 5th-century CE), whence they found their way into 
the Latin tradition.3 
If one is writing a history of Western astrology, on the other hand, the atomists play little to no part.4 
That story begins with the adaptation of Near-Eastern astrological practices to Platonic astral theology, 
                                                          
1  Nicholas of Cusa, Opera omnia (Leipzig: Felicis Meiner, 1932-), I, p. 109: ‘Dixerunt quidam tot esse rerum 
species in terra, quot sunt stellae. Si igitur terra omnium stellarum influentiam ita ad singulares species contrahit, 
quare similiter non fit in regionibus aliarum stellarum influentias aliarum recipientium?’ 
2 For a discussion of the Greek sources for the pluralist philosophy, see Grant McColley, ‘The Seventeenth-
Century Doctrine of a Plurality of Worlds’, Annals of Science, 1 (1936): 385–430 (385–92). 
3 Pseudo-Plutarch, Placita philosophorum, II, 25–30; Stobaeus, Eclogues, I.17–25. 
4 Consider this quote from Jaki: ‘If there was a saving grace in the cosmological dicta of Epicurus and Lucretius, 
it consisted in the absence of fantasy and astrology.’ Stanley L. Jaki, Planets and Planetarians: A History of 
Theories of the Origin of Planetary Systems (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1978), p. 10. 
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Stoic determinism, and Aristotelian physics.5 In Aristotle’s cosmology, the primum mobile transferred 
motion down through the nested spheres of the planets and into the mutable sublunar world, while the 
friction caused by that motion produced a vital heat, proceeding primarily from the sun. This physical 
form of top-down celestial influence was juxtaposed in the classical tradition by Stoic cosmic sympathy 
and Platonic forms, which created a relationship between the microcosm and the macrocosm that was 
at the same time both symbolic and tangible. Even Aristotle’s natural philosophy, however, contained 
a more direct connection between man and the cosmos at large. In his work, On the Generation of 
Animals, he stated that the physical substance which carries the soul, pneuma, was ‘analogous to the 
element which belongs to the stars’, i.e. ether (GA II.3, 736b38–39).6 There is then an analogy between 
this kind of pneuma and that believed by the Stoics to permeate the entire universe, acting as the 
cohesive agent and indeed as the soul of both the world itself and everything in it.  
The celestial science of Plato and the Stoics was highly teleological and indeed theological, an approach 
which was attacked by Epicurus and Lucretius, leading to the conclusion that these atomists had no 
time for astrology.7 Yet, while a focus on materialistic atheism and the desire to free people from 
superstition does seem to align atomism with an anti-astrological stance, we only have to recall a few 
passages from Lucretius to know that his view of nature was not free from celestial causation: 
 Then be it ours with steady mind to clasp  
The purport of the skies- the law behind  
The wandering courses of the sun and moon;  
To scan the powers that speed all life below…8 
This passage suggests a general effect of celestial influence similar to that found in Aristotle. Platonic 
elements arise, too, as when we read that ‘we all from seed celestial spring’, and further: ‘what was sent 
from shores of ether, that, returning home, the vaults of sky receive’.9 It is true, however, that an 
explication, or even refutation, of astrology was not one of Lucretius’ primary concerns. This point is 
made more pertinent when we consider another cosmological work in Latin verse, the heavily-
astrological Astronomica by Manilius (c.1st century CE). Katharina Volk has argued that while Manilius 
                                                          
5 A good summary of this process is given in Kocku von Stuckrad, ‘Astrology’, in A Companion to Science, 
Technology, and Medicine in Ancient Greece and Rome, ed. by Georgia L. Irby-Massie, 2 vols (Chichester: Wiley 
Blackwell, 2016), I: 114–29. 
6 Aristotle, Generation of Animals, ed. and trans. by A. L. Peck (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1943), p. 171. 
7 James Warren, ‘Ancient Atomists on the Plurality of Worlds’, The Classical Quarterly, 54 (2004): 354–65 (355); 
Nicholas Campion, The Dawn of Astrology: A Cultural History of Western Astrology (London: Continuum, 2008), 
p. 179. 
8 Lucretius, De rerum natura, I, 127–30: ‘…qua propter bene cum superis de rebus habenda / nobis est ratio, solis 
lunaeque meatus / qua fiant ratione, et qua vi quaeque / gerantur in terris.’ English verse from Lucretius, On the 
Nature of Things, trans. by William Ellery Leonard (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2004), p. 4. 
9 Ibid., p. 64; Lucretius, De rerum natura, II, 991: ‘Denique caelesti sumus omnes semine oriundi…’; II, 1000–1: 
‘…quod missumst ex aetheris oris, / id rursum caeli rellatum templa receptant.’ 
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was keen to emulate much of Lucretius’ style and content, the work’s presentation of ‘an orderly cosmos 
ruled by fate’ (i.e. ruled astrologically) was a direct attack on the chaotic and random world of the 
atomists.10 This use of astrology as an instrument and demonstration of cosmic order will become 
increasingly relevant later in our discussion. 
In terms of classical philosophy, then, the relevant starting point for this study is Plutarch (c.46–120 
CE), and in particular his De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet (‘On the Face Which Appears in the Orb 
of the Moon’).11 The interlocutors in this incomplete dialogue discuss the opinions of the various 
philosophical schools concerning the nature and purpose of the moon, dealing not only with its essence 
and potential habitability, but also with issues to do with its motion, gravity and influence. More so than 
the fragments related above, Plutarch’s treatise reveals the depth of interest in the nature of our nearest 
celestial neighbour in the classical period.12 The lunar theories contained therein foreshadow later 
innovations such as those of Cusa, Copernicus and others. One of its central questions is whether we 
can consider the moon to be another earth. Several objections could be raised to this idea. There was 
the Stoic argument, for example, that any earth-like body would have a tendency to the middle of the 
universe, i.e. the earth. In response, the speaker Lamprias argues that the inclination of falling bodies 
‘proves not that the [earth] is in the centre of the cosmos, but that those bodies, which when thrust away 
from the earth fall back to her again, have some affinity and cohesion with her’.13 It follows that other 
bodies such as the sun and the moon have the same ability to call things of their nature back to them, 
and thus to retain completeness in their relative position.14 
Plutarch’s leaning towards Platonic philosophy further supported this assertion, as when Lamprias 
describes the universe as a living creature that may easily contain all the elements spread throughout, 
organised according to a rational order.15 On top of the subject of material elements existing in the 
heavens, there are more objections to be faced concerning the motions of those elements if taken out of 
the terrestrial realm. So, opposed to an Aristotelian physics which asserted rectilinear motion in the 
sublunary and circular motion in the superlunary worlds, Plutarch emphasised a Platonic theory of 
                                                          
10 Katharina Volk, Manilius and His Intellectual Background (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 192. 
See also Nicholas Hardy, ‘Is the De rerum natura a Work of Natural Theology? Some Ancient, Modern, and Early 
Modern Perspectives’, in Lucretius and the Early Modern, ed. by David Norbrook, Stephen Harrison and Philip 
Hardie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015): 200–21 (208); James I. Porter, The Sublime in Antiquity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 486–88. 
11 Quotations are from Plutarch, Concerning the Face Which Appears in the Orb of the Moon, in Moralia, 16 
vols, ed. and trans. by F. C Babbit et al. (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press and Heinemann, 
1927–2 004), XII: 34–226. 
12 Dick, Plurality of Worlds, p. 20. 
13 Plutarch, Concerning the Face Which Appears in the Orb of the Moon, p. 69. Knox argues that Copernicus 
probably didn’t read De facie: Dilwyn Knox, ‘Copernicus’s Doctrine of Gravity and the Natural Circular Motion 
of the Elements’, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 68 (2005): 157–211 (182–89). However, Knox 
mentions two other works by Plutarch which repeat this theory of gravity: Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantiis, 
XLIV, 1054E-55B; De defectu oraculorum, XXVI, 424E.  
14 Plutarch, Concerning the Face Which Appears in the Orb of the Moon, p. 71. 
15 Ibid., pp. 91–93. 
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motion that could apply to the universe as a whole.16 In the beginning, we learn, all matter was separate, 
with each unit performing its own motions, ‘scornful’ of the others. This was until Providence 
introduced desire, affinity and friendship into nature. At this point, motions stopped being ‘natural’ in 
that word’s prior sense, and things began to change place according to what was ‘better’, producing 
harmony and communion through mutual intercourse.17 He stated it thus: 
… no part of a whole all by itself seems to have any order, position, or motion of its own which could be 
called unconditionally ‘natural.’ On the contrary, each and every such part, whenever its motion is 
usefully and properly accommodated to that for the sake of which the part has come to be and which is 
the purpose of its growth or production, and whenever it acts or is affected or disposed so that it 
contributes to the preservation or beauty or function of that thing, then, I believe, it has its ‘natural’ 
position and motion and disposition.18 
When this rationale for motion is applied to the heavenly bodies, it creates a system which is somewhere 
between inanimate physics and planetary intelligences. Motions should be understood teleogically, in 
terms of purpose and intention, or even organically, if the universe be thought of as a living being—yet 
they are definitely ordered according to a notion of desire that is providentially ordained.   
Concerning astrology, Nicholas Campion makes the point that it was Plutarch, rather than his more 
influential (in this field) contemporaries Vettius Valens and Ptolemy, who articulated the moon’s 
planetary qualities, pointing to this passage from Isis and Osiris: 
The moon, because it has light that is generative and productive of moisture, is kindly towards the young 
of animals and the burgeoning plants, whereas the sun by its untempered and pitiless heat, makes all 
growing and flourishing vegetables hot and parched, and through its blazing light, renders a large part of 
the earth uninhabitable. In fact the actions of the moon are like the actions of reason and perfect wisdom, 
whereas those of the sun are like beatings through violence and brute strength.19 
The astrological benefits of the moon become important in De facie when the figure of Theon asks to 
hear about whether the moon is habitable. If it is not, he suggests, then the argument put forward so far 
that the moon is another earth would lose credibility, as the purpose of the earth is to provide an abode 
for plants, animals and humans.20 The first response offered by Lamprias is that the moon being 
uninhabited would not mean it has no purpose, as the earth has many uninhabited areas (such as deserts, 
oceans and glaciers) that are nevertheless helpful to living things (e.g. through ocean breezes and the 
temperate effects derived from melting snow).21 This passage could be seen as a response to the anti-
                                                          
16 This does conflict, however, with Plutarch’s cosmological dualism, which contrasted the changeable sublunary 
realm with the regular celestial realm, as stated in Isis and Osiris, 369b-d. See Radek Chlup, ‘Plutarch’s Dualism 
and the Delphic Cult’, Phronesis, 45 (2000): 138–58 (150). 
17 Plutarch, Concerning the Face Which Appears in the Orb of the Moon, pp. 83–85. 
18 Ibid., pp. 89–91. 
19 Plutarch, Isis and Osiris, in Moralia, V: 6–191 (101). See Campion, The Dawn of Astrology, pp. 218–19. 
20 Plutarch, Concerning the Face Which Appears in the Orb of the Moon, p. 157. 
21 Ibid., p. 165. This extension of terrestrial ‘deserts’ to a cosmic scale would be later echoed by Kant. See 
Immanuel Kant, Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, trans. by Stanley L. Jaki (Edinburgh: 
Scottish Academic Press, 1981). 
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teleological stance of the Epicureans, who used deserts as an argument against the design of the cosmos 
for the benefit of man.22 
One way that a barren moon still retains purpose is astrological. It does this by ‘providing reflections 
for the light that is diffused about her, and for the rays of the stars a point of confluence in herself’.23 
Thus the moon can aid through the qualities that Plutarch had outlined above, with its generative and 
humidifying light which acts to temper the otherwise scorching rays of the sun. This obvious effect of 
moisture from the moon, however, is evidence in itself that it may be habitable. It demonstrates that 
Theon’s arguments of the intense heat and dryness of the moon, based on its long exposure to the sun, 
cannot hold true, as the effects of moisture must follow from the nature of the body itself. Even if the 
moon is hot and without rains, this present moisture would be enough for the growth of plants, and 
Lamprias gives as an example those plants which grow in arid regions of the earth, relishing drought 
and dying from too much moisture.24 Here we see how the teleological response to the Epicurean ‘desert 
argument’ could involve an invocation of a less anthropocentric design argument, which celebrated life 
in all its forms.  
With these arguments, Lamprias proves that those philosophers who think that the moon is made of fire 
are mistaken, as are those who think that animals on the moon would require everything that they have 
here on earth. Nature is not everywhere equal, and there are greater differences between animals, he 
thinks, then between animals and the inanimate world.25 All this prepares him to build a conjecture 
about the men who might live in the moon: 
It is plausible that the men on the moon, if they do exist, are slight of body and capable of being nourished 
by whatever comes their way. After all, they say that the moon herself, like the sun which is an animate 
being of fire many times as large as the earth, is nourished by the moisture on the earth, as are the rest of 
the stars too, though they are countless; so light and frugal of requirements do they conceive the creatures 
to be that inhabit the upper region.26 
So, the men on the moon are capable of living off more frugal fare than we are here on earth. But the 
most crucial aspect of this passage is Lamprias’ final argument for the habitation of the moon: that the 
earth has a reciprocal effect of moisture on the lunar body.  
Indeed, he argues that the sun and all the other stars also partake of this earthly, vaporous influence, 
which sustains each of them as a living being. As much as Plutarch, in this and other works, attempted 
                                                          
22 Paul Coones, ‘The Geographical Significance of Plutarch’s Dialogue, Concerning the Face Which Appears in 
the Orb of the Moon’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 8 (1983): 361–72 (366). On Plutarch’s 
negative attitude towards atomist principles, see Jackson P. Hershbell, ‘Plutarch and Democritus’, Quaderni 
urbinati di cultura classica, 10 (1982): 81–111. 
23 Plutarch, Concerning the Face Which Appears in the Orb of the Moon, p. 167. 
24 Ibid., pp. 171–73. Plutarch’s source is probably Theophrastus, Historia plantarum (iv. 3.7; viii. 1.1, 4; 2.6; 
3.2; 6.6) and De causis plantarum (ii. 1.2-4; iii. 1.3-6). 
25 Plutarch, Concerning the Face Which Appears in the Orb of the Moon, pp. 175–77. 
26 Ibid., pp. 177–79. 
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to discredit Stoicism, this concept is one they had in common. Cicero, in De natura deorum (45 BCE), 
had described the heavenly bodies as animate and divine, and quoted Cleanthes that the sun’s fiery 
nature required nutriment from the moisture of the earth.27 This moisture is drawn in the form of vapour 
from soil and water. The sun, the stars, and indeed the entire body of the ether, ‘after being fed and 
renewed by these, pour the same back and draw them again from the same source’.28 The dialogue also 
outlined the astrological powers of the planets and luminaries, seeing them as a clear demonstration of 
the different parts of the universe working together for the wellbeing of the whole.29 
In Plutarch’s De facie we see how Platonic and Stoic ideas about the nature of and relationship between 
the celestial bodies could build a bridge between astrology and cosmological pluralism. The belief that 
these bodies were living creatures allowed them to be given a passive as well as active role in the 
continuing harmony of creation—a cosmological trend continued by later Platonists such as Plotinus 
and Proclus. Plutarch already took the next step from celestial bodies receiving influence to sustain 
themselves to those same bodies receving influence to support inhabitants. In this ‘curious’ work, the 
projection of life into the larger universe was supported by the reciprocation and mutual interchange of 
beneficical influences—that is, a laterally-expanded alternative to the limited top-down causal chain of 
the heavens found in Aristotle.  
 
The Astrologisation of Generation and Providence 
As it was Aristotelian philosophy, however, that dominated Western science up until the seventeenth 
century, it is worth spending some time at this early stage investigating the development of an 
astrologised Aristotelianism within medieval and Renaissance natural philosophy and theology. There 
are two dimensions of this broad subject which are particularly relevant to the relationship between 
astrology and pluralism. The first is the role of celestial influence in generation, especially of the 
spontaneous kind; the second is the use of astrology as a way to comprehend God’s providence. When 
large swathes of Greek philosophy were reintroduced into Latin-speaking Europe via the Arabic 
translation movement beginning in the late eleventh century, they did not come unattached. The 
commentaries of Ibn Rushd (1126–1198), known to the Latins as Averroes, greatly influenced the 
interpretation of Aristotle’s scientific works, and together with the works on optics and ray theory by 
al-Kindi (c.801–873) and astrological works such as those of Masha’allah (c.740–815), they greatly 
                                                          
27 Cicero, De Natura Deorum (On the Nature of the Gods), trans. by Francis Brooks (London: Methuen, 1896), 
p. 50. 




expanded the scope and importance of celestial influence beyond that found in the works of the Stagirite 
himself.30  
This was complemented by a similar astrological bent in the field of medicine. The works of Ibn Sīnā 
(Avicenna, c.980–1037), which attempted to reconcile the medicine of Hippocrates and Galen with 
Aristotelian natural philosophy, became standard textbooks up until the eighteenth century. It was, 
arguably, the practice of medicine that most fully integrated astrology into both natural philosophy and 
society. It was a concrete manifestation of the philosophical affinity between the life sciences and the 
science of the stars, and it was also the last scientific discipline to jettison astrological tenets from its 
curriculum.31 The theory of critical days linked the phases of the moon to the regulation of the four 
bodily humours.32 Natal horoscopic astrology was premised on the influence of stellar and planetary 
configurations on the body and mind of a new born. Doctors also asked astrological ‘questions’, basing 
their diagnoses and prognoses on a horoscope cast at the time of consultation.33 What interests us here, 
however, are more general questions of the role of celestial influence in generation. 
Aristotle was very limiting in his theories of celestial influence. He considered the heat transmitted by 
the motion of the celestial spheres, especially the sun, as a general but not specific cause in the process 
of generation. It is in this more general sense that we should probably interpret his famous saying that 
man is begotten by man and the sun (Physics, II.2, 194b13). His writings on the subject were more 
suggestive than definitive, as for example in the analogy between pneuma and the ether mentioned 
above. The stress here should be placed on ‘analogy’, as his general position emphasised the disconnect 
between the ethereal and elemental realms.34 There was also Aristotle’s assertion that ‘in all air there is 
a vital heat, so that in a sense all things are full of soul’ (GA, III.11, 762a18-27). When this was 
expanded upon by commentators such as Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 CE) and later Arabic 
philosophers, it was Platonic and Stoic elements that filled out the picture.35 The idea, common to 
Platonism and Stoicism, that the celestial bodies were living and ensouled creatures, changed the 
interpretation of their influence. Avicenna believed that they affected the terrestrial realm both through 
                                                          
30 It must be noted that works on astrology and magic were those most eagerly searched for and translated by the 
Latin translators. See Charles Burnett, Arabic into Latin in the Middle Ages: The Translators and Their 
Intellectual and Social Context (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). 
31 For a comprehensive study of Avicenna’s synthesis of cosmology and medicine, see Jacques Jouanna, 
Hippocrates, trans. by M. B. DeBevoise (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001). 
32 On the tradition of critical days, see Concetta Pennuto, ‘The Debate on Critical Days in Renaissance Italy’, in 
Astro-Medicine: Astrology and Medicine, East and West, ed. by Anna Akasoy, Charles Burnett and Ronit Yoeli-
Tlalim (Florence: Sismel - Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2008): 75–98. 
33 For an example of this practice, see Lauren Kassell, Medicine and Magic in Elizabethan London: Simon 
Forman, Astrologer, Alchemist, and Physician (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005). 
34 Gad Freudenthal, ‘The Medieval Astrologization of Aristotle’s Biology: Averroes on the Role of the Celestial 
Bodies in the Generation of Animate Beings’, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 12 (2002): 111–37 (111). 
35 See id., ‘The Astrologization of the Aristotelian Cosmos: Celestial Influences on the Sublunary World in 
Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Averroes’, in New Perspectives on Aristotle’s De Caelo: 239–281. 
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their natural and volitional powers.36 To the ‘physical’ dimension, therefore, was added the theory of 
the emanation of forms, which had been suggested by Themistius (317–c.390) in his commentary on 
Aristotle.37 
The question of heavenly intervention became especially important when philosophers and 
commentators on Aristotle came to the question of spontaneous generation. This was a widely 
recognised phenomenon, where living beings were deemed to be generated without seed or copulation. 
The usual examples were worms from decaying bodies, frogs from mud, and other such things. While 
it may now seem bizarre, it is central to the history of astrobiology as a precursor to abiogenesis—the 
idea that, under the right circumstances, inanimate matter can give rise to living organisms.38 Aristotle 
had said little on the subject. His theory involved some sort of material, along with air and its vital heat, 
being enclosed in something and then forming a ‘frothy bubble’, which in turn developed into a living 
organism.39 The type of organism generated was based both on the material and the place or situation 
in which it was enclosed (GA, III.11, 762a18-27). In comparison to the usual method of generation, the 
material was the female principle, while the male or motive principle was supplied by the vital or soul-
heat.  
Avicenna found this explanation insufficient, and added to this process the action of both the heavenly 
bodies and the so-called Active Intellect.40 These were responsible for the imposition of form onto the 
suitable and harmonious mixture of the elements. Remke Kruk has linked Avicenna’s theory of 
spontaneous generation to the ‘chain of being’, citing the idea that there was no clear demarcation 
between the realms of nature, and that there was a gradual improvement in living creatures connected 
to the supposed hierarchy of beings.41 Thus, the elements could turn into plants, plants into animals, etc. 
In the philosophy of Averroes, we see the role of the heavenly bodies obtaining even more prominence 
in the wake of his rejection of Avicenna’s reliance on the Active Intellect.42 In the Commentator’s 
treatment of spontaneous generation, we clearly see how Platonic his interpretation of Aristotle was. In 
                                                          
36 Liana Saif, The Arabic Influences on Early Modern Occult Philosophy (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 75. 
37 Amos Bertolacci, ‘Averroes against Avicenna on Human Spontaneous Generation: The Starting-Point of a 
Lasting Debate’, in Renaissance Averroism and Its Aftermath: Arabic Philosophy in Early Modern Europe, ed. 
by Anna Akasoy and Guido Giglioni (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013): 37–54 (46). 
38 On the subject of astrobiology’s engagement with questions about the origin of life, see Dick and Strick, The 
Living Universe, pp. 224–26; Adam Świeżyński, ‘Where/When/How Did Life Begin? A Philosophical Key for 
Systematizing Theories on the Origin of Life’, International Journal of Astrobiology, 15 (2016): 291–99. 
39 James Lennox, ‘Teleology, Chance, and Aristotle’s Theory of Spontaneous Generation’, Journal of the History 
of Philosophy, 20 (1982): 219–39; Allan Gotthelf, Teleology, First Principles, and Scientific Method in Aristotle’s 
Biology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 145–49. 
40 Remke Kruk, ‘A Frothy Bubble: Spontaneous Generation in the Medieval Islamic Tradition’, Journal of Semitic 
Studies, 35 (1990): 265–82, pp. 273–74; Bertolacci, ‘Averroes against Avicenna on Human Spontaneous 
Generation’, p. 42. 
41 Kruk, ‘A Frothy Bubble’, p. 276. 
42 Bertolacci, ‘Averroes against Avicenna on Human Spontaneous Generation’; Hiro Hirai, Medical Humanism 
and Natural Philosophy: Renaissance Debates on Matter, Life and the Soul (Leiden: Brill, 2011), p. 39. See 
Averroes, Long Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, 7.31. 
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his Epitome of Metaphysics, he asserted that in cases of generation without a seed, there was need of a 
‘principle from without’, and explained that ‘the ultimate mover is, in Aristotle's system, the celestial 
bodies though the mediation of soul-powers emanating from them’.43  
Later in the same work he made a clearer connection between the life of the celestial bodies and the 
life they engendered on earth: 
…some of the blended substances are ensouled owing to the heavenly bodies. This is why Aristotle says 
that man is generated by man and the sun. The reason for his holding this view is that a man is generated 
by a man like himself and that because those [celestial] bodies are alive they can endow with life what is 
[down] here [in the sublunary world]. For only a body whose nature is to be ensouled can move matter 
to the animate [i.e. soul-] perfection.44 
The writings of Avicenna and Averroes, therefore, skewed the interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of 
generation in the direction of astrology. This is what Gad Freudenthal describes as the ‘astrologization’ 
of Aristotle’s cosmos, and is part therefore of the formation of Darrel Rutkin’s ‘astrologizing 
Aristotelian natural philosophy’.45 It was the addition of Platonic, Stoic and also magical dimensions to 
the question of celestial influence that made Arabic Aristotelianism so attractive to Latin philosophers 
in terms of its explanatory and practical powers, and at the same time so problematic and controversial. 
The celestial science of Mash’allah, al-Kindi, Avicenna and Averroes was highly influential on such 
giants of medieval science and philosophy as Robert Grosseteste (c.1175–1253), Albertus Magnus 
(c.1200–1280), Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) and Roger Bacon (c.1219–c.1292).46 Al-Kindi, who 
maintained that terrestrial diversity was the result of the diversity of matter coupled with the varied 
action of stellar rays, was a crucial source for Grosseteste and Bacon in their development of theories 
on optics, light metaphysics, and the ‘multiplication of species’.47 Albertus Magnus was influenced by 
Avicenna’s Platonic cosmology of emanation, in which the One proceeds to the earth through the 
intermediary stages of the planetary spheres.48 He was deeply interested in astrology, and in its role in 
generation—an interest shared by his student Thomas Aquinas.49 For Thomas, the heavenly bodies 
cooperate in the creation of perfect animals, such as men, but cannot be the sole cause, as Avicenna had 
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thought. In the case of certain imperfect animals, however, the power of the celestial bodies is a 
sufficient cause for the informing of the substance.50  
The ideas of these medieval natural philosophers maintained a strong influence throughout the 
Renaissance and early modern periods. Astrology was taught at many of Europe’s largest universities, 
such as Padua, Bologna and Paris, as an integral part of mathematics, natural philosophy and medicine. 
In this last field, the programme of astrological medicine developed by Pietro d’Abano (1257–c.1316) 
was particularly important.51 Brian Copenhaver has demonstrated the direct impact of scholastic 
astrology on the magic and philosophy of Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499).52 On the issue of spontaneous 
generation, Ficino took Aristotle’s theory in a different Platonic direction. Averroes had quoted 
Themistius, who had linked Aristotle’s pneuma or soul-heat to the idea of a World-Soul. Ficino, inspired 
at the same time by Plotinus’ Enneads and Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus, took this popular 
idea of the World-Soul and refined it down to a soul of the earth itself, and in doing so inspired later 
thinkers such as Gilbert and Kepler.53 It is important to note that Ficino is talking about a soul of the 
element earth, which is differentiated from a separate soul of elemental water, both of which produce 
imperfect creatures in their own environs. This earth-soul, containing the seminal principles within it, 
can then swap places with the celestial bodies as the informing agent in spontaneous generation, with 
these higher bodies reverting to general or cooperative causes. 
For Ficino, the earth truly is a living creature, with stones for teeth and plants for hair. He also makes 
an argument akin to that which Averroes had made for the ensoulment of the celestial bodies. ‘Who 
would say that the womb of this mother lacks life’, asks Ficino, ‘when of her own accord she brings 
forth and nourishes so many offspring?’54 A similar argument about the generative capacity of the earth 
was made by Cicero, who directly linked the action of the earth in sustaining vegetative life, as well as 
its own sustenance from the upper elements, to the nourishment given to the heavenly bodies by the 
earth’s exhalations (De natura deorum, II.33). We see, therefore, Aristotle’s imprecise statements about 
the role of the sun in generation, and the ubiquity of a certain soul-heat, taken in two partly distinct, 
partly complementary, directions. The first portrayed abiogenesis as the formative action of an animate 
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celestial realm on suitably arranged terrestrial matter; the second gave the credit to the animate nature 
of the earth itself. In their own way, both perspectives, as will be shown in this and following chapters, 
encouraged speculation along pluralist lines. 
Another feature that linked astrology to pluralism within early modern natural philosophy was the 
question of providence. In terms of astrology, we see this simply posited by Averroes in the Epitome of 
Metaphysics mentioned above: ‘Therefore a truthful general statement must be adopted, according to 
which all [heavenly] motions [were so designed as to] exercise providence over what is below them in 
this world.’55 This was followed by medieval philosophers such as Albertus, whose Speculum 
astronomiae (written after 1260) depicted astrology as the link between metaphysics and natural 
philosophy.56 The value of astrology as a window into the secrets of God’s creation and plan was 
eloquently defended later by the famous astrologer Girolamo Cardano (1501–1576) in his commentary 
on Ptolemy’s Tetrabiblos: 
Nothing comes closer to human happiness than knowing and understanding those things which nature 
has enclosed within her secrets. Nothing is more noble and excellent than understanding and pondering 
God's supreme works. Of all doctrines, astrology, which embraces both of these—the apotheosis of God's 
creation in the shape of the machinery of the heavens and the mysterious knowledge of future events—
has been unanimously accorded first place by the wise.57 
The ability to predict the future came from this understanding of ‘nature’s secrets’, the chain of cause 
and effect that linked the highest and most perfect part of God’s creation with terrestrial and human 
affairs. 
Perhaps the most striking and famous example of the providential qualities of astrology is presented by 
Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560), an admirer of Cardano, whose influence over the creation and 
administration of Lutheran universities resulted in a so-called ‘circle’ of mathematicians who advanced 
astronomy and astrology in a pious attempt to approach God through his celestial secondary causes.58 
According to Melanchthon, astrology is the part of physics ‘which teaches what effects the light of the 
stars has on simple and mixed bodies, and what kind of temperament, what changes and what 
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inclinations it induces’.59 This simple invocation of the role of celestial light in sublunary processes 
underlies his conviction that behind the perfectly ordered motions of the celestial realm lies God’s plan 
for the governance of the universe.60  
The teleological dimension of astrology will be investigated further in later chapters. For someone like 
Melanchthon, the commitment to an Aristotelian/Ptolemaic cosmology, with its set hierarchy of spheres 
and emphasis on the instrumental function of the planets and stars, discouraged the entertainment of 
unorthodox ideas, such as Copernicanism and pluralism, that could disrupt this relationship. This is 
explicit in the passage where he specifically criticises the theory of a plurality of worlds: 
God is a citizen of this world with us, custodian and server of this world, ruling the motion of the heavens, 
guiding the constellations, making this earth fruitful, and indeed watching over us; we do not contrive to 
have him in another world, and to watch over other men also…61 
The teleology of the heavens, according to Melanchthon, is founded solely on a principle of influence, 
which is incompatible with the idea of other worlds. He had, of course, more obvious theological 
objections to such innovations, based on the absurdity and blasphemy of the idea that Christ may have 
lived, died and been resurrected multiple times on multiple worlds. But then there were just as many 
theological objections to astrology.62 Overall, however, Melanchthon’s approach was in line with the 
prevailing opinion that the celestial bodies should be understood in terms of their effect on, and service 
to, a passive, central earth. In the Renaissance and early modern periods, this picture would be disrupted 
by the development of cosmological alternatives to Aristotle which triggered a reassessment of the 
astrological chain of causation, and from that followed a reconsideration of the chain of being, and the 
contemplation of ET life. It is to the history of the ‘plurality of words’ philosophy that we now return. 
 
Nicholas of Cusa and Platonic Influences 
From Plutarch, our discussion of pluralism leaps over a millennium to Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa (1401–
1464). Provided with the appropriate qualifications and exceptions, we may conclude that medieval 
Christian scholastic philosophy was dominated by Aristotle to an extent that largely precluded 
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Dooley (Leiden: Brill, 2014): 99–140. 
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pluralism, or, for that matter, any extension to astrological theory which proposed that the effects as 
well as the causes of celestial influence could exist in the heavens. The view of the cosmos that 
dominated Western thought in the Middle Ages and, indeed, up until the late seventeenth century, rested 
upon a singular enclosed world ontologically demarcated between sublunary and celestial.  
That is not to say that certain anti-Aristotelian ideas were not entertained, discussed, and even upheld. 
The most obvious in terms of its relevance to pluralism was the debate about whether God created more 
than one universe. It was one of the sticking points between Christianity and Aristotelian philosophy, 
and a subject of controversy between the Church and the universities at the time of Albertus and Thomas 
Aquinas. Christian theology dictated, on the one hand, that God created only one universe, while on the 
other hand it was made a matter of orthodoxy that he could have created more.63 This scholastic debate 
on the distinction between God’s potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata is the main focus of the 
histories of pluralism in the medieval period.64 There were, however, other interesting ideas being 
considered. Robert Grosseteste, for example, posed this question in the thirteenth century: 
But how is it known that there are not more planets, invisible to us but nevertheless useful and necessary 
for generation in the lower world? For the philosophers say that the Milky Way is made up of very small 
fixed stars, invisible to us. Therefore, how can it be known, except by divine revelation, whether there 
are not more stars of this sort invisible to us? For the stars which make up the Milky Way, although they 
cannot be distinguished by sight, are not without effect on generation and growth in the lower world.65 
This passage occurs amidst Grosseteste’s discussion of the mechanics of celestial motion, and his 
scepticism that a motion of the firmament is necessary for the motion of the planetary bodies. Thus, we 
have instances of divergence from Aristotelian science, in which the author stresses his ignorance (and 
that of others) in terms of both the number of celestial bodies and the means of their motion. We should 
notice, however, that the terms in which the argument is expressed are rooted firmly in a teleology of 
influence—all celestial bodies, however many there may be, have the function of causing change in the 
sublunary realm. 
Ignorance is of course a theme of central importance to Nicholas of Cusa, and to the cosmological 
suggestions presented in his famous work De docta ignorantia (‘On Learned Ignorance’, 1440).66 Just 
                                                          
63 See Pierre Duhem, Medieval Cosmology: Theories of Infinity, Place, Time, Void, and the Plurality of Worlds, 
trans. by Roger Ariew (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 441–454; Amos Funkenstein, Theology 
and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1986), pp. 140–150. 
64 According to Dick, the crucial development in this period was from ‘outright rejection of other worlds to the 
insistence that they were possible according to natural law’: Dick, Plurality of Worlds, p. 23. See also the rest of 
his chapter on the medieval tradition, in ibid., pp. 23–43, and also Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs, pp. 150–68. 
65 Robert Grosseteste, Hexaemeron (III, vi, 1–3, viii, 3), trans. by Richard C. Dales, ‘The De-Animation of the 
Heavens in the Middle Ages’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 41 (1980): 531–50 (541). 
66 Citations will be to the edition in Cusa, Opera omnia, I. Available English translations are Nicholas of Cusa, 
On Learned Ignorance: A Translation and an Appraisal of De Docta Ignorantia, trans. by Jasper Hopkins, 2nd ed. 
(Minneapolis: A.J. Benning Press, 1985); Nicholas of Cusa, Selected Spiritual Writings, ed. by H. Lawrence Bond 
(Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1997), pp. 85–206. The translations here have been altered from those of Hopkins. 
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like Grosseteste, Cusa’s stress on ignorance refers largely to the unjustified assumptions and 
conclusions which form the foundation of medieval cosmology. Many things claimed to be ‘known’ 
were based upon spurious observation or reasoning, or were a futile attempt to reduce the scope of 
unintelligible ideas. According to Cusa, the ordering of the heavens was one example of something that 
could not be known in a precise way.67 Although it cannot be proven that Cusa read Plutarch’s work on 
lunar theory, he was competent in Greek, and the similarities between some of the cosmological 
arguments of De docta ignorantia and those in De facie make it very tempting to suppose that he had 
studied the work, possibly during his stay in Constantinople in 1437–38.68 It was after all on the return 
voyage that Cusa claimed to have experienced the divine illumination which led him to write De docta 
ignorantia.69 
Cusa’s philosophy and cosmology, in particular his concept of infinity and the coincidence of opposites, 
have already been examined by several specialists in the field, so we can limit ourselves to a 
consideration of those passages that are relevant to the topics of celestial influence and inhabitation.70 
To begin with, we can look at a passage that describes a Platonic rationale for motion which resembles 
that of Plutarch: 
For while all things are moved individually, so that they may exist as they are in the best way possible, 
and so that none moves exactly as another, each thing also contracts and participates in, both mediately 
and immediately, the motion of each other thing—just as the elements and elemental bodies do in regard 
to the motion of the heavens, and all the members of the body in regard to the motion of the heart—so 
that the universe may be one. Through this motion things exist in the best way that they can, and they 
move for this reason: so that they may be conserved in themselves or in species by means of the natural 
union of different sexes. These sexes are contracted separately in individuals and united in nature by the 
enfolding of motion.71 
There are many elements of this passage that need to be unpacked. First of all, Cusa asserted that things 
are moved individually according to their own unique purpose. This immediately contradicted the 
Aristotelian theory of movement which assigned to each thing a motion according to place. This purpose 
that he alludes to is betterment, which we saw above in Plutarch: a tendency towards the ‘good’. Yet 
                                                          
67 Cusa, Opera omnia, I, p. 61: ‘Caeli etiam dispositio … praecise scibilis non est.’ 
68 It is known that he did acquire a copy of Plutarch’s Vitae and Moralia on this trip (British Library, Cod. Harl. 
5982), although this particular manuscript does not contain De facie.  
69 Cusa, Opera omnia, I, p. 163. 
70 Nicholas of Cusa – A Companion to His Life and His Times, ed. by Morimichi Watanabe, Gerald Christianson 
and Thomas M. Izbicki (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2013); Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite 
Universe, pp. 6–24; Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, pp. 112–15; Dick, Plurality of Worlds, pp. 40–42; 
Wolfgang Achtner, ‘Infinity in Science and Religion. The Creative Role of Thinking about Infinity’, Neue 
Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, 47 (2005): 392–411. 
71 Cusa, Opera omnia, I, p. 98: ‘Nam dum omnia moventur singulariter, ut sint hoc, quod sunt, meliori modo et 
nullum sicut aliud aequaliter, tamen motum cuiuslibet quodlibet suo modo contrahit et participat mediate aut 
immediate, sicut motum caeli elementa et elementata et motum cordis omnia membra, ut sit unum universum. Et 
per hunc motum sunt res meliori quidem modo, quo possunt. Et ad hoc moventur, ut in se aut in specie 
conserventur per naturalem sexuum diversorum connexionem, qui in natura complicante motum sunt uniti et 
divisive contracti in individuis.’ 
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Cusa qualified this by asserting further that everything is connected—that they contract and participate 
in the motion of everything else. This notion of ‘contraction’ is crucial to Cusa’s philosophy, although 
he never gave us a precise definition.72 To explain simply how Cusa used it in a cosmological and 
cosmogonic sense, we could say that the universe is perfect and unified in the mind of God, but in 
reality it is imperfect and contracted into individual species. 
This communication of motion between individuals is how the disparately contracted universe can still 
be considered as ‘one’, and the examples that Cusa gave were how the members of the body are 
connected to the motion of the heart, and how elemental bodies are connected to the motions of the 
heavens. So Cusa justified his theory of motion with both a microcosmic and a macrocosmic analogy, 
and in terms of the macrocosm this motion of contraction and participation was astrological. Here, even 
in Cusa’s unorthodox cosmology, we can plainly see the appeal of astrological thinking: it creates one 
out of many—a singular ordered and interconnected world out of the incomprehensibly vast and 
chaotic. Cusa, however, placed this astrological principle within a providential design that was more 
unique and immediate than the general and external system of Aristotle. That is, each thing is 
individually motivated in order to conserve itself and exist in the best possible way, rather than all 
motion proceeding down from the circumferential prime mover. 
The remaining statements by Cusa which pertain to this discussion all derived from his attempt to argue 
that the earth is not the lowliest, nor the most imperfect or ignoble part of the heavens. One of the 
prevailing opinions he had to counter was that the earth is dark. This, like many other false conceptions 
(e.g. the earth’s centrality and immobility), is only a matter of perspective. For the sun, thought Cusa, 
seems to possess regions like the earth, i.e. a central earthy part, a middle watery and airy region, and a 
fiery circumference. If one were far enough away from the earth to be able to perceive the circumference 
of its own sphere of fire, then the earth too would look like a bright star. That the moon is similarly dull 
can be explained by the fact that we are closer to it, and are looking directly at its watery region.73 Not 
only does this prevent us from seeing the bright sphere of the moon, but it also prevents us from 
receiving the heat from its fiery circumference. ‘The earth’, he wrote, ‘seems to be situated between the 
regions of the sun and the moon, and through the medium of these two bodies it partakes of the influence 
of other stars’.74 All these stars, by which Cusa seems to have meant all celestial bodies, are of a similar 
construction, but because we only see the region of each that shines, we cannot perceive the bodies 
themselves.75 
                                                          
72 See Hopkins introduction to Cusa, On Learned Ignorance, p. 17. 
73 Cusa, Opera omnia, I, p. 105. 
74 Ibid.: ‘Unde ista terra inter regionem solis et lunae videtur situata et per horum medium participat aliarum 
stellarum influentiam…’ 
75 This seems to be what Cusa means by ‘…quas [stellas] nos non videmus propter hoc, cum extra earum regiones 
simus; videmus enim tantum regiones earum, quae scintillant’ (ibid., pp. 105–6). The other alternative is that he 
means other ‘dark’ stars which do not shine. 
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The earth, therefore, being a star like the others, emits its own distinct light, heat and influence. These 
influences are then shared between the stars, creating a system in which each individual body strives 
towards the best possible existence, but does so ‘in communion’ with others: a cosmic ecosystem grown 
out of the survival instincts of individual stars.76 Cusa expanded on this matter, making it clear that we 
should not think the earth lowly because it receives influences. It also influences the other celestial 
bodies, e.g. the sun, but we obviously do not experience this counter-influence (refluentia). He then 
supposed a specific system of mutual influence between the earth, moon, and sun, with the earth being 
potentiality, the sun being actuality, and the moon being the middle link between the two. In this 
relationship, the one body cannot exist without the others, and in each body the influence is both three 
and one. Cusa obviously derived this system from his obsession with Trinitarian theology and its 
manifestation in the universe. Interestingly, it led him to suggest that these three bodies are in the same 
region, and that Mercury and Venus are above the sun, ‘as some ancients and even some moderns 
said’.77 This conflicts with another passage in De docta ignorantia, in which Cusa seemed to maintain 
the standard Ptolemaic ordering.78 It is this passage which has led most commentators to assume that 
while Cusa’s cosmology was in many ways revolutionary, his planetary order was conventional.79 
However, this alternative ordering with Mercury and Venus above the sun is part of a more explicit and 
metaphysically grounded argument by Cusa, which suggests that it should be given more weight in our 
consideration of his astronomical ideas. 
There is one more crucial way in which Cusa’s earth was no less noble than the other stars, and it is the 
main reason why Cusa has such a prominent role in the history of pluralism: the nature of its inhabitants. 
Cusa believed that all the places in the heavens and stars cannot be empty, but rather that ‘natures of 
diverse nobility’ proceed from God and inhabit every region.80 Yet, whatever varying grades of nobility 
they might engender, these natures cannot be more perfect than that intellectual nature which resides in 
the earth and its surrounds. But what can we know about these extraterrestrial beings? Not a lot, but 
Cusa did have some conjectures: 
We are able to know disproportionately less about the inhabitants of other regions. Those in the region 
of the sun are presumably more solar, meaning more bright, illustrious and intellectual, and even more 
spiritual than those in the moon, where they are more moon-like (lunatici), and those in the earth, which 
are more material and dense. In this case those intellectual solar natures would exist more in actuality 
and less in potentiality, while the terrestrial natures would be more in potentiality and less in actuality, 
with the lunar natures fluctuating in between the two. We suppose this from the fiery influence of the 
sun, the watery and airy influence of the moon, and the weighty and material influence of the earth. We 
                                                          
76 Cusa, Opera omnia, I, p. 106; Cusa, On Learned Ignorance, p. 118. 
77 Cusa, Opera omnia, I, p. 107; Cusa, On Learned Ignorance, p. 119.  
78 Cusa, Opera omnia, I, p. 102. 
79 See Hopkins’s introduction to Cusa, On Learned Ignorance, p. 27. 
80 Cusa, Opera omnia, I, p. 108. 
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similarly suppose that none of the other regions of the stars lack inhabitants, so that there may be as many 
world-like parts of the one universe as there are stars, of which there is no number.81 
In this passage, Cusa assumed that the nature of a celestial body’s inhabitants matched that body’s 
influence—not just in terms of fiery or watery, but also in line with the potentiality/actuality spectrum 
he had outlined previously. By extension, all the stars (which of course includes the planets) have 
inhabitants which assumedly conform to their nature; a nature which we perceive manifested in their 
influences. 
Cusa’s reliance on the role of celestial influence in generation is continually evident in De docta 
ignorantia.82 On the topic of earthly corruption, for example, he questioned not only whether corruption 
is a peculiarly terrestrial phenomenon, but also whether anything can be said to be altogether corruptible 
at all. Generation is, in his view, a process of the contraction of stellar influences into an individual, and 
so corruption is just the separation of those influences, which is not so much death as the end of a 
particular way of being.83 Nowhere did he make the connection between astrology and pluralism more 
apparent than in this question: 
Certain people have said that there are as many species of things in the earth as there are stars. If the 
earth thus contracts the influence of all the stars into individual species, why does it not happen similarly 
in the regions of other stars, which receive the influences of the others?84 
Cusa used the universal nature of his Platonised astrological influence to argue that similar processes 
of contraction and generation occur on the other celestial bodies. When he imagined extraterrestrials it 
was through an astrological lens. This lens informed not only his conjectures about their natures, but 
also his reasoning for why and how they exist at all. When ET life was discussed seriously for the first 
time in over a thousand years, it did not conflict with astrology; to a certain extent it was derived from 
it. 
 
                                                          
81 Ibid.: ‘suspicantes in regione solis magis esse solares, claros et illuminatos intellectuales habitatores, 
spiritualiores etiam quam in luna, ubi magis lunatici, et in terra magis materiales et grossi; ut illi intellectuales 
naturae solares sint multum in actu et parum in potentia, terrenae vero magis in potentia et parum in actu, lunares 
in medio fluctuantes. Hoc quidem opinamur ex influentia ignili solis et aquatica simul et aërea lunae et gravedine 
materiali terrae, consimiliter de aliis stellarum regionibus suspicantes nullam inhabitatoribus carere, quasi tot sint 
partes particulares mundiales unius universi, quot sunt stellae, quarum non est numerus…’ 
82 On Cusa’s astrology, see Ulli Roth, ‘Die Astronomisch-Astrologische “Weltgeschichte” des Nikolaus von Kues 
im Codex Cusanus 212. Einleitung’, Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft, 27 (2001): 
1–29; id., ‘Cusanus’ Weltgeschichte im Codex 212. Astronomisch-Astrologische Überlegungen’, Litterae 
Cusanae. Informationen der Cusanus-Gesellschaft, 1:1 (2001): 2–14. 
83 Cusa, Opera omnia, I, pp. 108–9. 
84  Ibid., p. 109: ‘Dixerunt quidam tot esse rerum species in terra, quot sunt stellae. Si igitur terra omnium stellarum 




Pluralism and Italian Anti-Aristotelianism: Giambattista Benedetti and 
Francesco Patrizi 
The cosmological innovations of Nicholas Copernicus (1473–1543) and Tycho Brahe (1546–1601) are 
central to the history of the ET life debate. Copernicus’ heliocentric theory made the earth one of the 
planets, opening up the possibility of analogies between terrestrial and planetary natures. The earth’s 
displacement from the centre of the universe also necessitated a rethink of theories about natural motion 
and gravity.85 Tycho’s geo-heliocentic alternative—with the planets orbiting the sun which in turn orbits 
the central earth—didn’t require such a drastic upheaval, but it did suggest that the celestial ether was 
liquid or permeable rather than being composed of solid crystalline orbs. His observations of the new 
star of 1572 and the comet of 1577 also seemed to prove that at least some level of alteration took place 
in the superlunary region.86 As well as obvious direct implications for the question of ET life, the 
possible motion(s) of the earth and corruptibility of the heavens also had an indirect impact through 
new developments in theories about celestial influence.  
The scope for modification within the celestial influence paradigm is demonstrated in different ways 
by two Italian contemporaries and correspondents: Giambattista Benedetti (1530–1590) and Francesco 
Patrizi (1529–1597). These authors also provide evidence for the way in which astrological questions 
could encourage pluralist ideas. Benedetti was a Venetian mathematician best known for his theories of 
impetus which later influenced Galileo. He served at various times as the Court Mathematician to Duke 
Farnese of Parma and later to the Dukes of Savoy in Turin. These posts included duties as an astrologer, 
and indeed Benedetti maintained a lifelong interest and faith in judicial astrology. He had predicted his 
own death for the year 1592, but on his death bed in 1590 he recalculated and concluded that the original 
nativity must have involved an error of four minutes. He was also involved in an astrological dispute 
with one Benedetto Altavilla of Vicenza, in which he defended the reliability of ephemerides and the 
validity of prognostication.87  
Benedetti argued for the superiority of the Copernican ephemerides for use in astrology, but rather than 
taking a ‘Wittenberg interpretation’ of Copernicus, he was also enthusiastic about the reality of the 
system itself.88 His cosmological views can be found scattered throughout his later work, Diversarum 
speculationum mathematicarum et physicarum liber (‘A Book of Various Meditations in Matters of 
                                                          
85 On Copernicus’ impact on pluralism, see Dick, Plurality of Worlds, pp. 66–105. 
86 See Adam Mosley, Bearing the Heavens: Tycho Brahe and the Astronomical Community of the Late Sixteenth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Ann Blair, ‘Tycho Brahe’s Critique of Copernicus and 
the Copernican System’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 51 (1990): 355–77. 
87 See ‘Defensio Ephemeridum’, in Giambattista Benedetti, Diversarum speculationum mathematicarum et 
physicarum liber (Turin: Heirs of Nicola Bevilaqua, 1585), pp. 228–48. See also Omodeo, Copernicus in the 
Cultural Debates of the Renaissance, pp. 145–49. 
88 See Westman, ‘The Melanchthon Circle’. Westman characterised this interpretation as involving the adoption 
of Copernican mathematical models and ephemerides, while ignoring the physical implications. 
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Mathematics and Physics’), published in Turin in 1585, where, among other anti-Aristotelian views, he 
rejected the system of solid spheres in favour of planets moving independently through the celestial air 
according to providentially determined paths.89 He also wrote an essay entitled ‘The opinion of those 
who believe there to be many worlds is less than sufficiently rejected by Aristotle’, in which he 
countered specifically the argument that the elements of another world would seek their natural place 
in this one.90 If these are indeed ‘worlds’ in the proper sense of the term, they will have their own centre 
and circumference. 
This led Benedetti to then invoke the opinion of Aristarchus, or at least his own unusual interpretation 
of it: 
For example, if the opinion of the most learned Aristarchus is true, it would stand to reason that what 
happens in the case of the moon may happen similarly to each of the other five planets. That is, as the 
moon is turned around the earth by means of its epicycles, as though [moving] through the circumference 
of a second epicycle, in which the earth takes the form of a natural centre (i.e., it is in the middle), deferent 
from the annual orbit around the sun; in the same way also Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus and Mercury 
may revolve around some other body, which is situated in the middle of their own major epicycle. This 
body may also have a certain motion around its own axis, be opaque, and be furnished with conditions 
similar to the earth; while in the epicycle, as we have called it, things may be similar to the way they are 
on the moon.91 
As we can see, Benedetti believed that in the ‘Samian’ or Copernican system the planets should be 
thought of as moons, orbiting around other earths which are ‘opaque’, meaning dark, and therefore 
invisible to us.92 This is an example of a Renaissance astrologer who took a keen interest in both physics, 
metaphysics, and cosmology. It seems that Benedetti was trying to give a physical account or reason 
for the main planetary epicycles that remain in the Copernican system. The moon, which orbits in 
epicycles of its own around a point (the earth) on a deferent circle (the earth’s orbit around the sun), 
seemed to offer the perfect model. 
Benedetti discussed this idea again in his Diversae speculationes in the form of a published letter to the 
Italian historian Filiberto Pingone (1525–1582), entitled ‘On the purpose of the celestial bodies and 
                                                          
89 Omodeo, Copernicus in the Cultural Debates of the Renaissance, pp. 30–31. 
90  Benedetti, Diversae speculationes, p. 195: ‘Minus sufficienter explosam fuisse ab Aristotele opinionem 
credentium plures mundos existere.’ 
91  Ibid., pp. 195–96: ‘ut exempli gratia, si doctissimi Aristarchi opinio est vera, rationi quoque consentaneum erit 
maxime, ut quod lunae contingit, cuilibet etiam ex aliis quinque planetis eveniat, idest, ut quemadmodum Luna 
suorum epicyclorum ope circum terram voluitur, quasi per circumferentiam alterius cuiusdam epicycli, in quo 
terra sit instar centri naturalis (idest sit in medio) delati ab orbe annuo circa Solem; Sic etiam Saturnus, Iupiter, 
Mars, Venus, atque Mercurius, circum aliquod corpus in medio sui epicicli maioris, situm habens, volvantur; quod 
quidem corpus, et aliquem quoque habeat motum circa suum axem, sit opacum, iis conditionibus, quae terrae sunt 
similes, praeditum existat, et in dicto epyciclo sint res similes istis lunaribus.’ 
92 On Benedetti’s interpretation of Copernicus, see also Omodeo, Copernicus in the Cultural Debates of the 
Renaissance, pp. 175–78. 
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their motion.’ This short letter sheds light on Benedetti’s model of celestial influence and its relation to 
his peculiar ‘Copernican’ pluralism. It begins: 
If you desire to know to what end, apart from superior light, the celestial bodies have been made, and if 
you wish to follow human reason, considering that these bodies are divine, or of such an 
incomprehensible number, with magnitudes so great and motions so fast, then you should not believe 
that they have been made only to rule such a vile body, as is the earth encompassed by water, with its 
animals and plants. Those who follow the opinion of Aristarchus of Samos and Nicholas Copernicus will 
believe this even less. According to them it cannot be the case that the rest of the universe has no other 
purpose than the rule, to use their words, of this centre of the epicycle of the moon. If this opinion is true 
(as they reasonably consider it to be), how unseemly would it be if the centres of the epicycles of the 
other planets were deprived of similar governance; indeed, it consents in no way with reason.93 
Elaborating on this teleological description of the celestial bodies, Benedetti goes on to repeat his 
cosmological theory: that the planets are moons orbiting around unseen ‘earths’.94 It is interesting to 
see a practitioner and defender of astrology state so strongly that the governance of the earth cannot be 
the only purpose for the creation of the planets and stars. The greatly increased size of the universe in 
the Copernican system required to account for the lack of stellar parallax encouraged sympathetic 
readers to consider philosophical alternatives to Aristotle, but, as we can see, Benedetti did not abandon 
the concept of celestial influence, rather he expanded it along with the cosmos. 
Doing so required him to counter the argument of Aristotle that the celestial regions do not experience 
generation and corruption, and have never been seen to change—a feat he accomplished in his letter by 
explaining that earthly change only occurs in small magnitudes, and from a distance its pattern of earth 
and sea would look as stable as any other celestial body.95 Much of the rest of the letter is an argument 
for Copernicanism, claiming that the axial rotation of the earth is preferable to the excessive speeds 
required by the diurnal rotation of the planets, and that an annual orbit of the earth easily substitutes for 
that of the sun. The participation of the earth’s parts in its natural impetus counteracts Ptolemaic 
objections, and this theory also, in Benedetti’s mind, removes the need for a finite universe. It is 
interesting that he saw the need to argue that both the diurnal and annual motion of the earth suffice to 
expose it to the light, heat, and influence of the sun and the other bodies.96 The celestial influence 
                                                          
93 Benedetti, ‘De fine corporum coelestium, et eorum motu’, in Benedetti, Diversae speculationes, pp. 255–56 
(255): ‘… si absque lumine superiori, in quem finem facta fuerint corpora coelestia scire desideras, et humanam 
rationem sequi volueris, putandum tibi non erit ea solum effecta esse, ut tam vile corpus, ut est terra aquis irrigata, 
animalia, et plantas regant, cum ea corpora sint divina, an numero incomprehensibilia, maximis magnitudinibus, 
et motibus velocissimis, praedita, id etiam minus putabunt hii, qui opinionem Aristachi Samii, et Nicolai Copernici 
sequuntur, quorum ratione fieri non potest, ut credant; eius, quod ex uni[verso reliquum] est, alium finem non 
habere, quam regimen huius centri epicycli Lunaris, ut illorum more loquar. Quam enim turpe esset si centra 
aliorum epicyclorum planetarum tali regimine privarentur, id quod nullo modo cum ratione consentit, [si tam] 
vera est ea opinio, quemadmodum rationabiliorem eam existimant.’ 
94 Ibid., p. 255. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid., pp. 255–56. 
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received by the earth would not change whether you assumed that it moved or not, yet we see this 
argument repeated again and again by early Copernicans. 
Furthermore, the provision of celestial influence was the key factor in Benedetti’s repetition of his ‘lunar 
planet’ theory. His theory of other earths in the centre of the planetary epicycles was the answer to 
Pingone’s question about the purpose of the celestial bodies, and of their motion. As he explained in 
another letter, this time to Antoine of Navarre (1518–1562), the rationale behind the motion of the 
celestial bodies is the need to diversify influences.97 His system reclassified the planets as moons, all of 
which act, as he explained to Pingone, ‘like mirrors conferring the light of the sun to their centre by 
reflection’.98 This repetition of the earth/moon partnership explained for Benedetti not only the epicyclic 
motion of the planets, but, by extension, the ends to which they were created: as agents of celestial 
influence in a multi-earth cosmos. As mentioned above, it should not be surprising that discussions by 
astrologers, or about astrology, ventured into the realms of celestial physics, metaphysics, and indeed 
pluralism. By the same token, it is not surprising that these discussions of pluralism were influenced by 
the astrological paradigm. 
We see similar trends in the innovative cosmology of another Venetian, Francesco Patrizi, who was a 
correspondent of Benedetti, and who engaged in a critical debate with the philosophy of Bernardino 
Telesio (1509–1588). Patrizi was a defender of Plato against Aristotle who held the chair of philosophy 
at the University of Ferrara, and then later the chair of Platonic philosophy in Rome. Some of his most 
influential theories concerned optics and light metaphysics.99 Being influenced in turn by the Platonic 
theories of Plotinus, Proclus and Ficino, Patrizi believed that light was the preeminent cosmic force, 
and drew a distinction between lux (light) and lumen (the brightness which emanates from it).100 Light 
was for him a formal, efficient, and material cause, the basis of both existence and behaviour for created 
things.101 His work, true to the pattern of Renaissance Platonism, demonstrates an interest in magic and 
                                                          
97 Ibid., p. 413: ‘Motus corporum coelestium fit ratione situs, et varietatis virtutis stellae in diversis locis, haec 
autem varietas absque diverso situ eiusdem stellae, nec diversus hic situs absque motu fieri posset, ita ut motus 
stellarum sit ratione diversitatis situum ipsarum, ergo motus, et diversitas situum, fit, ob diversam influentiam.’ 
Translation: ‘The motion of the celestial bodies takes place in order that the position and influence of a star vary 
in diverse parts [of the earth]. This variety, however, cannot be achieved without the diverse position of that star, 
nor can this diverse position be achieved without motion. Thus, as the motion of the stars occurs on account of 
the diversity of their positions, the motion and the diversity of positions occurs in order to create a diverse 
influence.’ 
98 Ibid., p. 255: ‘quasi specula, lumen Solis suo centro ex reflexione, deferentia’. 
99 See David C. Lindberg, ‘The Genesis of Kepler’s Theory of Light: Light Metaphysics from Plotinus to Kepler’, 
Osiris, 2 (1986): 4–42 (28–29). On issues related to atomism, see John Henry, ‘Void Space, Mathematical 
Realism, and Francesco Patrizi da Cherso’s Use of Atomistic Arguments’, in Late Medieval and Early Modern 
Corpuscular Matter Theory, ed. by Christoph Lüthy, John Murdoch and William Newman (Leiden: Brill, 2001): 
133–161. 
100 This was actually a common scholastic distinction. See Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs, pp. 392–93. 
101 Benjamin Brickman, An Introduction to Francesco Patrizi’s Nova de Universis Philosophia (New York: 
Columbia University, 1941), p. 28; Paul Oskar Kristeller, Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 119. 
42 
 
occult philosophy, and he published translations of Zoroastrian and Hermetic texts under the title Magia 
philosophica (Hamburg, 1593).102 
The work that interests us is his Nova de universis philosophia (‘A New Universal Philosophy’, 1591). 
The work is divided into four books, with the longest, and most relevant to this discussion, being the 
fourth, with the title ‘Pancosmia’. In this book, he argued favourably for the rotation of the earth (but 
not its annual motion) and discussed the possibility of an infinite universe and an inhabited moon. On 
the latter point, in agreement with the Pythagoreans, he thought it possible that there were mountains 
and valleys on the moon, as well as giant races of men and animals, and plants more beautiful than here 
on earth.103 Yet Patrizi’s description of an earth-like moon needs to be qualified. He suggested that 
perhaps the moon is compounded from the crass sediment of the rest of the ethereal region, as the earth 
is from that of the material world. The earth and the moon therefore make a unique pair: 
Let the moon, therefore, be the ethereal earth. And let our earth be the elemental moon. These two earths, 
or indeed these two moons, were not made by God in vain. Indeed, according to a mutual similarity, the 
one supports the other, and they are favourable to each other in turn. They receive influences one from 
the other, by which they live and are preserved in themselves and in their parts.104 
Rather than the moon being a ready example to extend to the other planets by analogy, the moon is a 
unique case: the partner of the earth, as described by the ancient philosophies. This uniqueness of the 
moon is an issue which we see coming up again and again, and it presents an obstacle to the historian 
who wishes to extrapolate from lunar theories to broader pluralist ideas. 
The problem was summed up by Lambert Daneau (c.1535–c.1590) in his popular Physica christiana 
(‘A Christian Natural Philosophy’, 1576), translated into English as The Wonderfull Workmanship of 
the World (1578). Some people, he tells us, believe that the ethereal region spans from the highest 
heaven to the moon, under which lies the elementary region. Others, however, believe that the moon 
should be considered part of the elementary and earthly region: ‘concerning which varietie of mens 
opinions, reade Plutarches book of the face whiche appeareth in the globe of the Moone’.105 In this 
case, Daneau adhered to the former opinion. For Benedetti, likewise, the moon had not been earth-like, 
and the marks on its surface were simply areas which were more diaphanous and less reflective.106 
While he postulated the existence of other earths, the moon retained its more traditional nature and role 
                                                          
102 See Cesare Vasoli, Francesco Patrizi da Cherso (Rome: Bulzoni, 1989); Maria Muccillo, ‘Marsilio Ficino e 
Francesco Patrizi da Cherso’, in Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone: Studi e documenti, ed. by Gian Carlo 
Garfagnini, 2 vols (Florence: Olschki, 1986), II: 615–79. 
103 Francesco Patrizi, Nova de universis philosophia (Ferrara: Benedetto Mammarello, 1591), fols 112v-113r.  
104 Ibid., fol. 113r: ‘Luna ergo, aetherea terra esto. Et terra nostra, elementalis esto luna. Neque duae hae terrae, 
sive duae hae lunae, a Conditore frustra sunt conditae. Similitudine enim mutua, altera alteram fovet, et sibi 
invicem favent, et influxus, quibus et ipsae, et utriusque partes, tum vivant, tum conserventur, altera ab altera 
suscipiunt.’ 
105 Lambert Daneau, The Wonderfull Woorkmanship of the World, trans. by Thomas Twyne (London: Andrew 
Maunsell, 1578), fol. 58v. 
106 Benedetti, Diversae speculationes, p. 299. 
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as a luminary. In Patrizi’s new philosophy, the moon shares in some of the earth’s deficiencies, but this 
is compensated by the beneficial effects they have on each other: 
And since feculent bodies are by their own nature the most torpid and ignoble, there was a need that, 
besides the benefits which they draw from the sun (which are specific to each), the moon and the earth 
should aid each other mutually. This they do by sending their own powers one to the other. That being 
the case, while it is generally known to us what the moon does in the earth, it is not known what the earth 
does in the moon.107 
In the final analysis, then, the existence of certain beings on the moon is affirmed, but it relied, as was 
the case with Plutarch and Cusa, on the lunar influence on the earth being reciprocated by an earthly-
influence on the moon.108 
Patrizi was not, however, as big a fan of judicial astrology as Benedetti. Following his chapter on the 
moon, he dedicated a chapter to answering the question ‘Are the stars causes?’, and stated that most 
things said about the stars in regard to effects and events were baseless.109 Yet he did allow that perhaps 
events may be signified by them, because all the parts of the world are interconnected.110 This position 
was based on Plotinus’ consideration of the same question in Ennead II.3, which had of course been 
translated by Ficino.111 Patrizi considered that the attacks on the false astrological arts by Ficino and 
Pico both relied on this work by Plotinus. And yet while he assented to this criticism of astrological 
practice, he did not deny that the stars do perform some actions. To understand Patrizi’s theories of 
celestial influence, it is necessary to look a bit closer at his novel natural philosophy.  
His cosmology retained a hierarchical division, with the empyrean at the top, followed by the ethereal 
regions, and finally the ‘hylaeal’ sublunary regions of air, water and earth. In this scheme, the universe 
is infinite only on the far side of the empyrean, which encloses the finite material world.112 This infinite 
universe is pure light, which descends through the immobile empyrean, becoming heat, and then fire, 
and forming the seeds of all things below. Below the empyrean heaven Patrizi united, to a certain 
degree, the terrestrial and celestial worlds. There are four essential ingredients to the entire universe: 
space, light, heat, and fluor. These finite inner regions of the ether and the material world are both 
                                                          
107 Patrizi, Nova de universis philosophia, fol. 113v: ‘Et quia foeculenta corpora, torpidissima, sui sunt natura, et 
ignobilissima, necesse habuerunt, ut praeter ea quae a sole, beneficia hauriunt, sese propriis, luna et terra mutuo 
iuvarent, altera alteri vires suas influendo. Qua in re, quid terra in lunam agat, sicut est nobis ignotum, sic est fere 
nobis cognitum, quae luna agat in terram.’ 
108 See Natacha Fabbri, ‘Looking at an Earth-Like Moon and Living on a Moon-Like Earth in Renaissance and 
Early Modern Thought’, in Early Modern Philosophers and the Renaissance Legacy, ed. by Cecilia Muratori and 
Gianni Paganini (Dordrecht: Springer, 2016): 135–51.  
109 Patrizi, Nova de universis philosophia, fols 114v-115r: ‘An stellae aliquid agant.’ 
110 Ibid., fols 115r-v. 
111 Plotinus, Ennead, II.3, ‘Utrum stellae aliquid agant’, in id., Opera philosophica omnia, trans. by Marsilio 
Ficino (Basel: Pietro Perna, 1580), pp. 137–59. 
112 Patrizi, Nova de universis philosophia, fols 80r-82r (’De mundo empyreo’). On Patrizi’s theory of space, see 
John Henry, ‘Francesco Patrizi da Cherso’s Concept of Space and Its Later Influence’, Annals of Science, 36 
(1979): 549–73; Edward Grant, Much Ado about Nothing: Theories of Space and Vacuum from the Middle Ages 
to the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 199–206. 
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mobile and indeed both mutable.113 In fact, they are both corporeal, being formed out of the one 
primeval liquid (fluor).114 The division of the world into separate regions is based solely on a scale of 
rarity and density, a scale which descends from the empyrean heaven down to the earth, with rareness 
being the closest to Godliness.115  
The stars and planets are individual bodies composed of condensed and incandescent fluor within the 
ethereal regions, just as the air, water and earth are even further condensed sediments in the hylaeum. 
The ethereal and terrestrial regions, therefore, are both complex and corruptible. Yet some sort of 
division between the ethereal and sublunary regions does remain, perhaps because the difference in 
density is such that it prevents material interaction. While earth, water, and air freely intermingle, the 
ethereal region sits on the sublunary world like oil on water. This makes the comparison between the 
earth and the moon easier to understand. The moon is to the heavens what the earth is to the regions of 
water and air, a body formed by sediment accumulating and compacting in the lowest region.  
At the same time, it demonstrates the limits of any possible pluralism within Patrizi’s cosmology. In his 
chapter on the planets, he argued that the sun should not be counted as one of these ‘wandering stars’, 
and that the moon should not be counted as a star at all.116 Its terrestrial components, or at least its 
ethereal analogues, seem particular to it as a result of its place in the cosmos, as opposed to the stars 
and planets which are purer, luminescent bodies. For Patrizi the Platonist, these bodies were of course 
alive: 
They are not, as the common crowd of astronomers and philosophers believe, inanimate bodies. Rather 
they are, as Zoroaster rightly called them, and Plato and Aristotle after him, animals. Therefore, by 
nature, which executes their actions, and by spirit, which is their conveyor, and by soul, which gives 
them the beginnings of motion, and by intellect, from which comes and depends the order of all things, 
they themselves live, and are carried, and act, and comply to the will of God, and moderate the harmony 
of the universe. As is useful for the world, they traverse courses, and execute their other actions, and the 
seeds and spirit of the varied generation of our things flow in.117 
This cosmology of ensouled celestial bodies within a hierarchical yet somewhat homogenous universe 
forms the setting for Patrizi’s chapter on the effects of the stars, which constitutes something of a 
dividing point in the ‘Pancosmia’, separating the chapters on the ethereal subjects and those on 
                                                          
113 See Cesare Vasoli, ‘Sophismata putida: La critica patriziana all dottrina peripatetica dell’eternità e immutabilità 
del cielo’, in Francesco Patrizi filosofo platonico nel crepuscolo del Rinascimento, ed. by Patrizia Castelli 
(Florence: Olschki, 2002): 167–80. 
114 Patrizi, Nova de universis philosophia, fol. 121v. 
115 Ibid., fol. 122r. See also Edward Rosen, ‘Francesco Patrizi and the Celestial Spheres’, Physis, 26 (1984): 305–
24. 
116 Patrizi, Nova de universis philosophia, fol. 105v. 
117 Ibid., fols 105v-106r: ‘Suntque non uti Astronomorum, et philosophorum plerumque vulgus existimavit, 
corpora inanima. Sed sunt, ut vere eos appellavit Zoroaster, et post eum Plato, et Aristoteles, animalia. Igitur, et 
natura quae actiones eorum peragit, et spiritu, qui eorum est vector, et animo, qui motus eis dat initia, et intellectu, 
a quo omnis rerum venit ac pendet ordo, ipsa vivunt, et feruntur, et agunt, et Conditoris nutibus obtemperant, et 
universi harmoniam contemperant, et ut mundo expedit, cursus obeunt, et actiones alias suas peragunt, et 
generationis tam variae rerum nostratium, semina, atque spiritus influunt.’ 
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terrestrial ones. It is immediately obvious that, for Patrizi, the key issue was generation. The 
introduction to the chapter is primarily concerned with Aristotle’s comments on the subject. He quoted 
Aristotle on man and the sun begetting man, and on the biological spirit analogous to the element of the 
stars, and criticised him on both counts for his opacity and lack of explanation.118 The Philosopher 
limited his explanation of generation to those things which have seeds, namely animals, and so leaves 
aside all those zoophytes, plants, and metallic stones which are generated without them. Just as we saw 
in the medieval period, it is spontaneous generation that again raised the question of celestial influence. 
This is why his assent to the criticism of astrologers did not translate to a blanket denial of astrology’s 
major premise. His agreement with Plotinus, Ficino and Pico only extends so far. As he wrote:  
The question is proposed by us whether the stars do anything. This is something more universal than can 
be reduced to man alone, as these three great men did. One could ask, for example, whether the stars 
administer the care of man alone, or whether they have some good or bad influence only on themselves. 
But the question must spread more widely: do the stars do anything at all? This action either remains 
amongst them, or is extended through the entire heaven, or diffuses itself either to all parts of the heaven, 
singular, near, far, and as far as possible. Either it extends into the superior empyrean world, or descends 
into the inferior material world, and pervades through the universal air, water and earth, occupying all 
parts of them. And indeed, whether they cause something in metals, in stones of all types, in plants and 
zoophytes, in all species of animals, not less than whether they act only in men, should be considered, if 
not by astrologers, who ply their trade for the catching of riches, then at least by philosophers, whose 
proper function is to search for truth and inquire into the causes of things.  
Let us, therefore, put the matter in the following terms: The stars, by the admission of all astrologers and 
philosophers, are bodies. Yet all bodies are substances, and all substances have their own powers. Powers 
come forth in actions proper to themselves. We have previously contemplated the substance of the stars. 
Now the powers and actions of them need to be discovered. The stars were created by God. God creates 
nothing in vain. Therefore, the stars being bodies so remarkable, so enormous, and of such a number, 
who could say he made them in vain? Nor, therefore, did he give them powers in vain, nor from these 
powers do actions vainly proceed.119 
Hence it is affirmed that the stars are causes. Yet, crucially, discussion of their effects expands beyond 
any influence they may have on human affairs to more universal considerations. The philosopher, who 
                                                          
118 Ibid., fol. 114v. 
119 Ibid., fol. 115v: ‘Quaestio est nobis proposita, utrum stellae aliquid agant. Haec quidem universalior est, quam 
ut ad homines solos, uti hi tres magni fecere viri, redigatur. An scilicet stellae, hominum tantum, vel curam gerant, 
vel ipsis solis boni, vel mali influant aliquid. Sed in amplius, est quaestio fundenda, utrum omnino agant aliquid 
stellae? Actio haec, vel inter eas versatur, vel per totum extenditur coelum, vel per partes eius omnes, et singulas 
vagatur, et proximas, et longinquas, et procul maxime positas. Vel etiam in superum mundum Empyreum 
porrigitur, vel in inferiorem hylaeum descendit, et per aerem pervadit universum, et aquam, et terram occupat 
universas, tum horum partes. Nec non etiam, an quid in metalla, in tot generum lapides, in plantas in Zoophyta, 
in tot animalium species, non minus quam, an in homines tantum agerent, considerare si non Astrologi, qui 
pecuniarum suam artem fecerunt aucupium, philosophi saltem debuerunt, quibus, veritatis vestigandae proprium 
est munus, et rerum causas inquirendi. Nos igitur ita dicamus. Astra confessione tum Astrologorum, tum 
philosophorum omnium, corpora sunt. Corpora aut omnia, sunt substantiae. Substantiae aut omnes vires habent 
suas. Vires in actiones sibi proprias exeunt. Siderum substantiam iam antea sumus contemplati. Vires modo 
eorum, et actiones sunt cognoscendæ. Astra a Deo sunt creata. Deus nihil frustra facit. Igitur, astra, corpora tam 
insignia, tam ingentia, tanto numero, quis dixerit eum fecisse frustra? Neque igitur vires eis indidit frustra, neque 
ex iis viribus, frustra exeunt actiones.’ Emphasis added. 
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can remain unbiased in his judgment, should enquire into their possible effects on all things animal, 
vegetable and mineral, as well as into the effects they have on one another. 
The method of their influence, however, remained to be decided. Aristotle’s assertion that this comes 
from motion and light could not be maintained, because Patrizi had robbed the ether of motion by 
granting a diurnal rotation to the earth. The celestial bodies do move themselves, but this motion does 
not reach the earth.120 The remaining option then was light. His own theory of their effects was Platonic, 
based on the idea that the forms, which are the seeds of all things, proceed from the world of archetypal 
ideas (which he identifies with the empyrean heaven).121 These seeds are joined to the light, which 
serves as a vehicle. Sticking to his quadrapartite theory, these seeds are received and contained in space, 
and diffused by the light into heat and fluor, by which all bodies and forms of bodies are affected.122 
Before entering the ethereal and hylaeal worlds, however, these seeds act first and foremost within the 
empyrean heaven itself, producing ‘empyrean animals, zoophytes, plants, rocks, metals, and other types 
of things proper to that realm’.123 From there they descend into the ethereal world and are disseminated 
through the entire space, preventing the existence of a vacuum by establishing a seminal plenum. And 
as they are spread through the whole heaven, they also exist in the stars. As these stars are one step 
down from the perfect ‘incorporeal’, then so too will the seeds undergo a similar degeneration. But is 
there one seed in each star, the same seed in every one, or all seeds in all of them? Patrizi’s preference 
was that individual seeds are in individual stars in such a way that all the seeds are spread amongst all 
the stars.124 Yet while a star has one seed in essence and species, its actions can be many as the effects 
are divided into individuals of the same species. 
It is confirmed therefore that the stars are not idle, and that they are in fact causes, and moreover the 
underlying method of causation has been described. But what do they cause? ‘Actions, which 
correspond to each of them, and which are unique to each’, thought Patrizi, ‘partly known to us, and 
partly unknown’.125 The known actions are light and heat. As for the less known, Patrizi returned to the 
question of generation. If it is true that the sun and man generate man, it must also be true that the sun 
generates individuals of all the other species. And if the sun does this, why shouldn’t the other planets, 
being made of the same substance, do the same? It is here that Patrizi’s discussion took an 
unconventional turn:  
Each of the stars has seeds. Either they project them within themselves, or mutually amongst themselves. 
Indeed, either they project them, or they don’t. This projection, we understand as fertilisation. If they do 
                                                          
120 Ibid., fol. 114v. 
121 Ibid., fols 115v-116r. 
122 Ibid., fol. 115v. 
123 Ibid., fol. 116r: ‘At quid producunt? Empyreos nimirum partus, Empyrea animalia, Zoophyta, plantas, lapides, 
metalla, reliquorum entium genera, Empyreo convenientia, Empyreo propria.’  
124 Ibid.: ‘…ita in stellis singulis semina erunt singula, ita ut in omnibus stellis, semina sint omnia’.  
125 Ibid.: ‘Actiones, quæ singulis illis competunt, quæque propria sunt cuique, notas  partim, partim nobis ignotas.’  
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not fertilise, both the seeds and the stars are superfluous, and have been made in vain by the Maker. But 
to say that is impious, and so they must fertilise. But do they do so within themselves, or outside of 
themselves? Indeed it is both. Within themselves in so far as they are fertilised and proliferate in a way 
that is suitable to them. Our senses, however, do not comprehend that, but reason does. Reason declares, 
for instance, that God did not make the stars in vain. They would be vain, however, if they did not have 
any effect. Every one of their seeds, therefore, fertilises first of all within themselves.  
And thus we should approve of those Pythagoreans, who affirmed every single star to be a world; worlds 
which contain their own airs, waters, and earths, and have animals living in them more pure and divine 
than ours. For that is much more probable than to suggest or assert that all those huge and beautiful 
bodies were crafted by the Maker in vain, or effectively in vain. Or if no philosophy admits this, it is at 
least necessary to admit something similar, for instance, that the stars themselves are celestial worlds 
living by their own spirit, soul and mind, or that they are worlds living entirely by the universal life, from 
the universal mind, soul and spirit.  
Outside of themselves, however, they should act at a distance as far off as they can cast their light, and 
with this light also the powers of the seeds, by which they aid and favour each other mutually. They 
should conspire amongst themselves in turn; they inspire good things both to themselves and to the 
whole; and they should imbue everything with the goodness given to them by the Maker. And they 
conspire so as to become one; so that all sound aloud and together that harmony of the Divine Artificer. 
This is not that harmony which Aristotle foolishly laughed at in the Pythagoreans, but that which the 
Pythagoreans assert in the heavens, and we, it must be said, assert in the whole universe.  
For if the stars were said to act wholly within themselves, one could not say that they have been made in 
vain; but they would be somewhat in vain if they did not effect something between each other, operate 
mutually, or assist one another. Or if such great lights poured out in such great number into the material 
world, yet barely reach it. Or if the stars were believed to be made solely for the benefit of the earth.126 
The key doctrine that informed Patrizi’s discussion of stellar activity was that God creates nothing in 
vain. As we can see in the last paragraph, the benefits that the stars may give to the earth are not enough 
to satisfy this condition. This necessitates that the seminal and fertilising powers of the stars must have 
an effect within the stars themselves, and indeed this would be enough to justify their creation. The 
preferred option, though, is that the powers of the stellar seeds are communicated along with the stellar 
                                                          
126 Ibid., fols 116r-v: ‘Stellae, semina quae habent singulae. Vel in se ipsas iaciunt, vel in socias mutuo, vel enim 
ea iaciunt, vel non iaciunt. Iacere hoc, foecundare intelligimus. Si non foecundant, ociosa, et semina sunt, ociosae 
et stellae, et frustra a Conditore conditae sunt. At id dicere est nefarium. Foecundant igitur. Id vero, vel in se ipsis, 
vel extra se? Et in se et extra se. In se quidem, ut modo quo illis convenit, foecundentur et prolificent. At sensus 
noster id non cognoscit. Cognoscit tamen ratio. Dictat enim, Deum stellas non frustra fecisse. Frustra autem essent, 
si operarentur nihil. Semina ergo quaeque sua in se foecundant primo. Atque ita Pythagoreis assentiendum illis, 
qui singulas stellas singulos esse mundos affirmarunt. Qui suos aeres, suas aquas, suas terras continerent, et 
animalia in eis habitarent puriora, nostrisque diviniora. Idque longe est probabilius, quam putare, aut asserere, tot, 
ac tanta, et tam pulchra corpora, vel frustra esse a Conditore fabrecta, aut quasi frustra. Aut si hoc nulla admittit 
philosophia, necesse est illud admittere, aut aliquid simile, ut scilicet, et ipsa sidera, mundi sint coelestes, spiritu, 
animo, menteque propriis viventes, et viventes mundi totius vita communi, ex communi tum mente, tum animo, 
tum spiritu. Extra vero se, agant procul, quam procul lumina sua iacere possunt et cum luminibus etiam seminum 
vires, quibus sese mutuo foveant, et sibi mutuo faveant, et inter se invicem conspirent, et sibi invicem, et toti, 
bona inspirent, et bonitate, sibi a Conditore data, omnia perspirent, et in unum ita conspirent, ut harmoniam illam 
divini artificis, omnia consonant, et personent. Non eam quam fatue in Pythagoreis irrisit Aristoteles, sed eam, 
quam et ipsi in coelestibus, et nos in universo, dictatu necessariae rationis esse, et asserimus, et contendimus. Nam 
si stellae in se tantum agere dicerentur, frustra quidem non esse factae dicerentur, sed quasi frustra, si dicerentur, 
non in se mutuo quicquam agere, et non ope mutua, sese iuvare. Aut si tanta in hylaeum mundum lumina tot 
numero funderent, quae ad eum vix pertingunt. Aut si solius tanta terrae gratia factae esse crederentur.’  
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light, such that each shares its virtue with the others. They ‘conspire’, ‘inspire’, and ‘perspire’ to create 
a universal, mutual harmony. 
This necessity that the stars exercise their generative powers internally is what led Patrizi to approve of 
pluralism, the theory advocated by those ‘Pythagoreans’ who considered every star a world. But in fact, 
we cannot say that he believed in ET life in the sense used in this discussion. While sympathising with 
the so-called Pythagorean philosophy, Patrizi hedged his bets and presented the Platonic/Stoic 
alternative—rather than having their own ‘terrestrial’ regions, these bodies are living, celestial worlds. 
Considering his other chapters on the stars and the planets, the Pythagorean theory would not fit with 
his concept of the planets and stars as bright, flaming condensations of the liquid ether. The two denser 
compactions of that primeval liquid, the earth and the moon, are separated from the rest by their 
possession of seas, mountains, and creatures. These two bodies are made a pair, one on each side of the 
terrestrial/ethereal divide, and that pair is then distinguished from the other celestial bodies. This makes 
an interesting contrast with Benedetti, who had differentiated between earth and moon, but had then 
repeated that pattern for the other planets. 
Yet regardless of how inconsistent the Pythagorean theory may seem with Patrizi’s cosmology, he 
still described the stars as worlds (mundi) in his alternative. They must have, at the very least, some 
independent purpose and self-contained existence. It is telling that Patrizi, the moon aside, brought up 
the question of a wider pluralism not in his chapter ‘On the planets’, or ‘Whether the stars are fires’, 
or indeed ‘Whether the world is finite’, but rather in his chapter on the effects of the stars. One could 
connect Patrizi’s tentative pluralism to the size of his universe; one could also connect it to his 
reduction of the entire universe, and not just the earth, to the same four principle constituents; or, one 
could connect it to his belief that God’s infinite goodness must be manifested in the world. These are 
undeniably factors, yet Patrizi himself tied it most directly to celestial influence. Influence underpins 
the symbiotic relationship between the earth and its celestial partner, the moon, and furthermore it 
determines what is happening in and amongst the stars. 
Strangely enough, after stressing so earnestly that the light of the stars barely reaches the earth, and that 
it is highly unreasonable to think that all these incredible bodies were generated by God ‘for the favour 
of only one, and one such inadequate and deformed body, as the earth’, Patrizi presented an alternative 
theory which rescued the astrological qualities of each and every star and planet.127 While the earth does 
not receive much stellar light, and so would not benefit directly from stellar ‘seeds’, it does, on the other 
hand, come into closer contact with the sun, which seems to us to be the sole generator of all things. Is 
it possible, he asked, that the stars project their light, heat and seminal virtues altogether into the sun 
                                                          
127 Ibid., fol. 116v: ‘Ad quam, lumina ipsarum, aut non, aut vix pertingunt. Ac certe ratio affirmare, aut credere 
non audet, tam ingentia corpora, terra multo maiora, tot numero, et pulchritudine tanta, fuisse a Conditore Deo, 
unius tantum, et tam exigui, et tam deformis corporis, qualis terra est, gratia procreata.’  
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and the moon, which then administer vicariously to the regions of generation, the air, water and earth?128 
This is reminiscent of Cusa’s theory that the earth receives the influences of the stars through the 
medium of the sun and moon.  
Patrizi truly seems to represent an intermediary stage. He refashioned the cosmic causal chain to operate 
both laterally and hierarchically. The stars receive seminal powers from the empyrean heaven, which 
they utilise within themselves, making each its own living world. At the same time, they act outside of 
themselves, ‘first in the other stars, then in the sun, then in the moon, and then in the material world, 
the same gifts which come from above being transferred below’.129 The mutual dimension to Patrizi’s 
theories of celestial influence was crucial to his vision of a living, harmonious and sympathetic world 
system, where there is no discord ‘which does not contribute to the ornament, perfection and 
conservation of the universe’.130 While acknowledging his debt to the Platonic, and indeed Hermetic, 
traditions, we can also, in light of his theories of the rotation of the earth and the matter and motion of 
the heavens, agree with Patrizi that he was philosophising in a new way. 
The salient point to our larger discussion is that the period which saw the dawn of pluralism was a 
period which saw generation as related to astrological forces. Consider this passage from Patrizi’s 
chapter on the substance of the earth:  
It [the earth, or sediment] is enormously affected by the heavens, that is, by the stars, the planets, the sun, 
and the moon. It is also affected by the air and the water. From the celestial bodies it receives especially 
three powers. Two are evident, i.e., light and heat. The third power, however, is less known, and it 
consists in certain occult influences from celestial and ethereal impressions. Since indeed the earth is 
inert in itself and in potency, and yet we can see in it certain kinds of works which do not seem to be able 
to arise from proximate seeds of things, it is necessary that these extraordinary qualities flow in and are 
poured in from a different source.131 
Spontaneous generation is an example of the link between the perceived complexity of celestial 
influence and the relative ignorance of the mechanics of terrestrial generation. For a Platonist with 
occult leanings like Patrizi, the light and heat which are communicated between celestial bodies are not 
simple forces, but transmitters of seminal virtues which, given a passive and mutable celestial 
substance, open the door for pluralist ideas. 
                                                          
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid.: ‘Agere quoque ea extra se, tum in astra alia, tum in Solem, tum in Lunam, tum in hyleum, eadem dona, 
quae sibi a superis venerunt, in infera transfundendo.’  
130 Ibid., fol. 117r: ‘…ut nulla in eo sit dissonantia, nulla discordia, quae ad universi, tum ornamentum, tum 
perfectionem, tum conservationem, non conferat’.  
131 Ibid., fol. 153r: ‘Patitur autem a coelo maxime, ab astris videlicet, a planetis, a sole, a luna; patitur et ab aere, 
et ab aqua. Ab illis quidem tria maxime, duo indubia, lumen et calorem: tertium autem minus notum, influxus 
nimirum quosdam occultos, coelestium aetherearumque impressionum. Cum enim ipsa per se iners sit, et 
inefficax, cernantur autem in ea opera quaedam, quae a rerum seminibus proximis, oriri non videantur posse, 
necesse est, aliunde in eam qualitates illas miras influi, et infundi.’  
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The Astrobiology of Giordano Bruno 
No history of pluralism or extraterrestrials can ignore the figure of Giordano Bruno (1548–1600). The 
wealth of secondary literature on his philosophy and ideas is such that little can be added here; rather 
we can only attempt to highlight certain aspects of his cosmological theories which demonstrate the 
embedded relationship between celestial influence and pluralism. His name more than any other is 
attached to the infinity of the universe. He drew inspiration from many of the sources discussed so far, 
but differed from all. Unlike Lucretius and the atomists, he theorised not a plurality of kosmoi but the 
infinite extent of this one. Unlike Cusa, whose theories aligned quite closely to his own, he didn’t advise 
learned ignorance, or distinguish between an infinite creator and an ‘unlimited’ creation, but preached 
his absolute faith in the infinity of the created world. Unlike Patrizi, his infinity was not limited to a 
heavenly realm or world of pure light, but was filled with an innumerable number of material things: 
For I do not insist on infinite space, nor is Nature endowed with infinite space for the exaltation of size 
or of corporeal extent, but rather for the exaltation of corporeal natures and species, because infinite 
perfection is far better presented in innumerable individuals than in those which are numbered and 
finite.132 
Thus, Bruno’s infinite universe has a certain right to be called original, being unlike those that had come 
before.133 His cosmology also argued, significantly, that the stars were other bodies like the sun, orbited 
by other planets like the earth. This sun/earths system was for him the base unit which he then repeated 
ad infinitum, creating a universe which sat uneasily, according to his critics, between the embodiment 
of plenitude and the superfluity of infinite repetition.  
His own imagined critic, the character of Burchio in his dialogue De l'infinito universo et mondi (‘On 
the Infinite Universe and Worlds’, 1584), brought up one such objection to this infinity: 
Burchio: ‘Where then is that beautiful order, that lovely scale of nature rising from the denser and grosser 
body which is our earth, to the less dense [sphere] which is water and on to the subtle [sphere] which is 
vapour, to the yet subtler which is pure air, on to the subtlest which is fire and finally to the divine which 
is the celestial body? From the obscure to the less obscure, to the brighter and finally to the brightest? 
From the dark to the most brilliant, from the alterable and corruptible to liberation from all change and 
corruption? From the heaviest to the heavy, thence to the light, on to the lightest and finally to that which 
is without weight or lightness? From that which moveth toward the centre to that which moveth from the 
centre and then to that which moveth around the centre?’ 
                                                          
132 Giordano Bruno, De l'infinito universo et mondi (Stampato in Venetia [i.e. London]: J. Charlewood, 1584), p. 
11: ‘…perché io non richiedo il spacio infinito, e la natura non ha spacio infinito, per la dignità della dimensione 
o della mole corporea, ma per la dignità delle nature e specie corporee; perché incomparabilmente meglio in 
innumerabili individui si presenta l'eccellenza infinita, che in quelli che sono numerabili e finiti.’ English 
translations are from Giordano Bruno, On the Infinite Universe and Worlds, trans. by Dorothea Waley Singer, in 
ead., Giordano Bruno: His Life and Thought (New York: Schuman, 1950): 225–380 (257).  
133 See Miguel A. Granada, ‘Bruno, Digges, Palingenio: Omogeneità ed eterogeneità nella concezione 
dell’universo infinito’, Rivista di storia della filosofia, 47 (1992): 47–74; Dario Tessicini, I dintorni dell’infinito: 
Giordano Bruno e l’astronomia del Cinquecento (Pisa; Rome: Serra, 2007). 
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Fracastoro: ‘You would like to know where is this order? In the realm of dreams, fantasies, chimeras, 
delusions.’134 
Bruno did indeed do away with that ordered structure of the spherical Aristotelian universe which had 
been maintained to some extent by other early Copernicans. This should and did have profound 
implications for astrology, a science to which Bruno alternately showed disdain and great interest.135 
Yet the Aristotelian system was only one pillar of astrology in the Renaissance and early modern 
periods, existing awkwardly alongside Platonic and Stoic concepts of sympathy and determinism. As 
previously mentioned, the reality of celestial influence was so paradigmatic that it could adapt to 
varying cosmological assumptions. Bruno’s involvement with astrology in practical terms leaned 
towards the Hermetic and overtly magical, but when it came to the workings of the universe at large he 
relied on Cusa’s theory of interplanetary exchange and a decidedly Stoic plenism.136  
For Bruno’s universe was not a collection of separate worlds, but was in itself truly one. As Thomas 
Aquinas had said, ‘[t]he world is called one by the unity of order, according to which certain things are 
ordered to others’.137 The basis for this order for Bruno was not a vertical scale or hierarchy, but rather 
the motion and influence which determined the relationship between individuals. This motion and 
influence rested in turn upon Bruno’s vision of the ether and the World Soul. As the speaker Fracastoro 
summarises in De l’infinito: 
Thus there is not merely one world, one earth, one sun, but as many worlds as we see bright lights around 
us, which are neither more nor less in one heaven, one space, one containing sphere than is this our world 
in one containing universe, one space or one heaven. So that the heaven, the infinitely extending air, 
though part of the infinite universe, is not therefore a world or part of worlds; but is the womb, the 
receptacle and field within which they all move and live, grow and render effective the several acts of 
their vicissitudes; produce, nourish and maintain their inhabitants and animals; and by certain 
dispositions and orders they minister to higher nature, changing the face of single being through countless 
subjects.138 
                                                          
134 Bruno, De l’infinito, pp. 85–6: ‘Burchio: Ove è dunque quel bell'ordine, quella bella scala della natura, per cui 
si ascende dal corpo piú denso e crasso, quale è la terra, al men crasso, quale è l'acqua, al suttile, quale è il vapore, 
al piú suttile, quale è l'aria puro, al suttilissimo, quale è il fuoco, al divino, quale è il corpo celeste? dall'oscuro al 
men oscuro, al chiaro, al piú chiaro, al chiarissimo? dal tenebroso al lucidissimo, dall'alterabile e corrottibile al 
libero d'ogni alterazione e corrozione? dal gravissimo al grave, da questo al lieve, dal lieve al levissimo, indi a 
quel che non è né grave né lieve? dal mobile al mezzo, al mobile dal mezzo, indi al mobile circa il mezzo? 
Fracastoro: Volete saper ove sia questo ordine? Ove son gli sogni, le fantasie, le chimere, le pazzie.’ Bruno, On 
the Infinite Universe and Worlds, pp. 313–14. 
135 See Leen Spruit, ‘Giordano Bruno and Astrology’, in Giordano Bruno: Philosopher of the Renaissance, ed. 
by Hilary Gatti (London: Ashgate, 2002): 229–49. 
136 Ibid., pp. 247–49. See Westman, The Copernican Question, p. 306. 
137 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I, q. 47, a. 3: ‘Mundus enim iste unus dicitur unitate ordinis, secundum 
quod quaedam ad alia ordinantur.’ 
138 Bruno, De l’infinito, pp. 98–9: ‘Di maniera che non è un sol mondo, una sola terra, un solo sole; ma tanti son 
mondi, quante veggiamo circa di noi lampade luminose, le quali non sono piú né meno in un cielo ed un loco ed 
un comprendente, che questo mondo, in cui siamo noi, è in un comprendente, luogo e cielo. Sí che il cielo, l'aria 
infinito, immenso, benché sia parte de l'universo infinito, non è però mondo, né parte di mondi; ma seno, ricetto 
e campo in cui quelli sono, si muoveno, viveno, vegetano e poneno in effetto gli atti de le loro vicissitudini, 
producono, pascono, ripascono e mantieneno gli loro abitatori ed animali, e con certe disposizioni ed ordini  
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The heaven is space, is air, is ether, but is not empty void. He argues that space itself is in fact a kind 
of matter, and that therefore it has both quality and action.139 It is both the infinite space where motion 
takes place, and also the source of all motive power, as it not only surrounds bodies but penetrates them 
and is incorporated into their being, giving each the ability to generate motion.140 More than this, the 
ether and the universe as an infinite space is in itself an animal, for ‘it is imbued with all soul and 
embraceth all life and it is the whole of life’.141 
Yet apart from this living nature, motive power, and generic quality, the ether can have no specific 
quality of its own, as one of its main tasks is as a neutral carrier and medium for the influences of the 
bodies within it.142 It is here that the Stoic plenum met Platonic sympathy and antipathy, boiled down 
to an opposition of hot and cold reminiscent of the philosophy of Archelaus (fifth century BC).143 This 
combination was the key to Bruno’s new order: 
We shall understand that the orbs and spheres of the universe are not disposed one beyond another, each 
smaller unit being contained within a greater—as, for example, the infoldings of an onion. But throughout 
the ethereal field, heat and cold, diffused from the bodies wherein they predominate, gradually mingle 
and temper one another to varied degrees, so as to become the proximate origin of the innumerable forms 
and species of being.144 
The two types of primary bodies in the universe, hot suns and cold, watery earths, exist in a symbiotic 
relationship, each being unable to exist without the other. ‘This shows’, he said in the philosophical 
poem De innumerabilibus, immenso et infigurabili (‘On Innumerable Things, Immensity and 
Unrepresentable Reality’, 1591), ‘that nature provides for the motion, generation and continued 
existence of things by the concourse of diverse and opposite entities’.145 The ether is the ‘womb’ of the 
universe, in which all the spheres move and effect the changes within themselves, producing and 
maintaining populations of inhabitants and animals. Each globe itself, and indeed the entire universe, 
should be considered an animal.146 This then took on an explanatory role in terms of celestial ordering 
                                                          
amministrano alla natura superiore, cangiando il volto di uno ente in innumerabili suggetti.’ Bruno, On the Infinite 
Universe and Worlds, pp. 322–23.  
139 Ibid., p. 272. 
140 Ibid., p. 273. 
141 Ibid., p. 300. 
142 Ibid., p. 372. 
143 On Archelaus, see Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, II, 4, ed. and trans. by R. D. Hicks, 2 
vols (Cambridge, MA; London: Cambridge University Press and Heinemann, 1925), I, pp. 144–49. 
144 Bruno, De l'infinito, p. 106: ‘Comprenderemo, che non son disposti gli orbi e sfere nell'universo, come vegnano 
a comprendersi l'un l'altro, sempre oltre ed oltre essendo contenuto il minore dal maggiore, per esempio, gli 
squogli in ciascuna cipolla; ma che per l'etereo campo il caldo ed il freddo, diffuso da' corpi principalmente tali, 
vegnano talmente a contemperarsi secondo diversi gradi insieme, che si fanno prossimo principio di tante forme 
e specie di ente.’ Bruno, On the Infinite Universe and Worlds, p. 328.  
145 Giordano Bruno, De innumerabilibus, immenso et infigurabili, in id., Opera Latine conscripta, ed. by 
Francesco Fiorentino et al., 8 vols (Naples; Florence: Morano and Le Monnier, 1879–1891), I, p. 213: ‘Unum 
primorum corporum genus absque alio consistere minime posse, illud indicat, quod diversorum oppositorumque 
concursu ad motum, ad generationem et rerum consistentiam natura provideat.’ Hereafter De immenso. 
146 Bruno, On the Infinite Universe and Worlds, p. 300. 
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and motion. They can both be explained through a biological imperative, such that each globe with its 
inhabitants is preserved by the mediation of celestial influence which ensures optimal living conditions.   
Just as the earth is heated and lit by the sun, allowing things to live here, so is the sun chilled and 
watered by its surrounding planets, allowing things to live there.147 This influence of the earth was 
explained not only in terms of a moistening effect, as we had seen in Plutarch and Cusa, but also in line 
with Bruno’s atomistic philosophy: 
Nevertheless, the universe being infinite, and the bodies thereof transmutable, all are therefore constantly 
dispersed and constantly reassembled; they send forth their substance, and receive within themselves 
wandering substance. Nor doth it appear to me absurd or inconvenient, but on the contrary most fitting 
and natural that finite transmutations may occur to a subject; wherefore particles of [elemental] earth 
may wander through the ethereal region and may traverse vast space now to this body, now to that, just 
as we see the same particles change their position, their disposition and their form, even when they are 
yet close to us.148 
The continual concourse of atoms which is the basis of all change, generation, and corruption, takes 
place not only on a local but also on an interplanetary and interstellar scale. The physical grounding of 
astrology could adapt, it seems, both to Bruno’s reimaging of space and cosmic order as well as to his 
atomistic theory of matter. It formed an essential part of his vision of a universe operating according to 
a quasi-mechanical vitality. 
When Bruno argued specifically for the inhabitation of all the celestial bodies—for which he is 
honoured as the founding father of modern pluralism—his words echoed those of Cusa. All these 
celestial bodies ‘are either themselves suns, or the sun doth diffuse to them no less than to us those most 
divine and fertilizing rays’.149 This influence alone is enough to guarantee the existence of inhabitants, 
as elsewhere he argued that generation by reproduction was not a universal truth. The ‘mere force and 
innate vigour of nature’ is enough to bring forth many and varied animals without any ‘original act of 
generation’.150 In the dedicatory letter to De immenso, again echoing Cusa, Bruno described the 
perfection of the universe in a series of three-part principles, one of which involved the efficacy of 
active power, the disposition of passive power, and the dignity of the effects.151 His physical universe 
                                                          
147 Ibid., p. 309. 
148 Bruno, De l’infinito, pp. 47–8: ‘Tutta volta, essendo l'universo infinito e gli corpi suoi tutti trasmutabili, tutti 
per conseguenza diffondeno sempre da sé e sempre in sé accoglieno, mandano del proprio fuora e accogliono 
dentro del peregrino. Non stimo che sia cosa assorda ed inconveniente, anzi convenientissima e naturale, che sieno 
transmutazion finite possibili ad accadere ad un soggetto; e però de particole de la terra vagar l'eterea regione e 
occorrere per l'inmenso spacio ora ad un corpo ora ad un altro, non meno che veggiamo le medesime particole 
cangiarsi di luogo, di disposizione e di forma, essendono ancora appresso di noi.’ Bruno, On the Infinite Universe 
and Worlds, pp. 284–85.  
149 Ibid., p. 323. 
150 Ibid., p. 376. 
151 Bruno, De immenso, in id., Opera Latine conscripta, I, p. 198. 
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encapsulated this with the generation of living things by the action of celestial influence on the passive 
material of the celestial bodies.  
Bruno’s theories on the motion of these bodies were of course animistic. The living planets, endowed 
with sensitive and intellective souls, carry out vagaries of motion which are to be understood not 
according to geometrical laws but rather in terms of purpose and desire.152 These earths move so as to 
perpetuate and renew not only their life, but that of their inhabitants, and this motion is oriented not 
only to the sun but also to the other planets which share vital principles among themselves.153 This 
purposive motion is not without a certain amount of providential design, however. There could be a 
danger that contrary bodies placed too close together would be harmful rather than beneficial, and as 
well similar bodies could block one another from receiving necessary dissimilar qualities. The truth of 
this is demonstrated by eclipses, ‘when our frailty suffereth considerable damage through the 
interposition between ourselves and the sun of that other earth that we name the moon’.154 It seems that 
Providence determined certain cosmic distances, and then provided the celestial bodies with the 
intellective ability to decide the most productive course. This was an animistic physics built upon 
principles of analogy; on the one hand, from motion as witnessed in living creatures to motion in 
general, and, on the other, from the earth as an individual to the earth as a generic type of celestial body. 
This analogy, however, ran into obvious difficulties because he had no real knowledge about any of 
these bodies except for the one which was the ‘prototype of the class’.155 In the Ash Wednesday Supper, 
and also in De immenso, we see how this led him into problems. Just like his contemporary Benedetti, 
Bruno misunderstood Copernican astronomy and distorted it according to his own understanding of the 
nature of celestial bodies and their relationships. He believed that the moon does not orbit around the 
earth as its central point, but rather that they are positioned on opposite sides of a single epicycle with 
a common centre, and in this arrangement they orbit around the sun together.156 Not only this, but he 
stated that this situation is replicated in the case of Mercury and Venus, meaning they orbit around each 
other and share a common orbit around the sun. All of this contravened the existing body of 
observational evidence.157 So we see in Bruno another case of the moon/earth pairing being extrapolated 
to cover the other celestial bodies, but in his cosmology the idea of the moon as simply an auxiliary 
support mechanism did not make sense. It must be a living and inhabited body in its own right, on equal 
footing to the earth, otherwise the principle of universal homogeneity would be stretched too far.  
                                                          
152 Ernan McMullin, ‘Bruno and Copernicus’, Isis, 78 (1987): 55–74 (61). 
153 Giordano Bruno, The Ash Wednesday Supper = La cena de le Ceneri, trans. by Edward Gosselin and Lawrence 
Lerner (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1977), pp. 91, 156, 185, 213; McMullin, ‘Bruno and Copernicus’, pp. 61–
62; Michel, The Cosmology of Giordano Bruno, p. 216. 
154 Bruno, On the Infinite Universe and Worlds, p. 335. 
155 Laurence A. Breiner, ‘Analogical Argument in Bruno’s De l’infinito’, MLN, 93 (1978): 22–35 (28). 
156 Bruno, The Ash Wednesday Supper, p. 192. 
157 Bruno, Opera, I, p. 397. See McMullin, ‘Bruno and Copernicus’, pp. 56–59. 
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This brief survey of Bruno’s cosmology is intended to demonstrate his participation in a broader 
movement away from a top-down theory of celestial causation to a belief in the mutual influence of 
celestial bodies, and the stimulus this move gave to pluralist philosophies. How then does this change 
our perception of Bruno in the history of the ET debate, and the history of science more generally? He 
has, it has been said, assumed a ‘rather awkward niche’ in the history of science.158 His scepticism of 
the ability to predict planetary motion, and his reliance on philosophical theory rather than observation 
meant that he was quite quickly superseded by Tycho Brahe, Kepler and Galileo in terms of astronomy 
and physics. The influence he had on English thinkers during his time there in England has been 
downplayed in a recent article by Feingold, who suggested that Bruno gained more from the exchange 
than vice versa.159 Many authors downplay his contributions to either Copernicanism or science in 
general.160 Lovejoy regretfully concluded that he was not ‘a very good philosopher’.161 He was a 
Hermetic magus, a ‘benign high priest’, with an outlook more ancient than modern.162 
Yet there is no reason to necessarily remove him from his exalted place in the history of pluralism, 
extraterrestrials, or astrobiology. He was its loudest voice at this time, evangelically spreading the word 
of an infinitely populated universe, proving himself an original and influential thinker. Though for a 
long time the notion that he was executed for specifically this belief was rejected, a new article by 
Martinez, based on a study of the available inquisitorial records, suggests that perhaps it was just that.163 
And perhaps he wasn’t the only one, as a report from February 12, 1600, a few days before Bruno’s 
execution, makes reference to another ‘curate’ burned at the stake for believing in ‘so many suns’.164 
Bruno’s place in the history of pluralism need not be diminished, then, but rather developed. Lovejoy’s 
thesis that pluralism was stimulated less by Copernicus and more by a resurgent Platonism has some 
merit, but needs to be expanded. It was not the principle of plenitude alone which opened the door, but 
also the growth of a more Platonic astrology. Bruno should be remembered not only for enlarging and 
populating the universe, but also for his theories on celestial influence and motion, and the ties that 
bound all these together. 
                                                          
158 Breiner, ‘Analogical Argument’, p. 35. 
159 Mordechai Feingold, ‘Giordano Bruno in England, Revisited’, Huntington Library Quarterly, 67 (2004): 329–
46. 
160 McMullin, ‘Bruno and Copernicus’, p. 74. 
161 Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, p. 54. 
162 Frances Amelia Yates, Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1964); Giuseppe Candela, ‘An Overview of the Cosmology, Religion and Philosophical Universe of Giordano 
Bruno’, Italica, 75 (1998): 348–64 (351). 
163 Alberto A. Martinez, ‘Giordano Bruno and the Heresy of Many Worlds’, Annals of Science, 73 (2016): 345–
74. 
164 Ibid., p. 365. Martinez suggests that the curate may have been Friar Celestino of Verona, born Giovanni 
Antonio Arrigoni. The document in question is: Report [12 February 1600, Rome], Archivo Orsini. I. 
Corrispondenza, b. 380, n. 385, Archivo Storico Capitolino, Roma. On the relationship between Bruno and Fra 
Celestino, see now Germano Maifreda, Giordano Bruno e Celestino da Verona: Un incontro fatale (Pisa: Edizioni 
della Normale, 2016). 
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The history of astrobiology provides perhaps an ideal vehicle for this re-evaluation. In his 1962 work 
La Cosmologie de Giordano Bruno, Paul-Henri Michel twice used the term astrobiologie: 
The description of the planetary system no longer depends on cosmic geometry but on astrobiology which 
makes the motion of celestial bodies a function of their nature; and if the irregularity of this motion 
reveals the imperfection of the tangible being, it is equally a sign of its freedom.165 
And again: 
In Bruno’s mind, the life of celestial bodies is not a legend, a symbol or a metaphor, but one of the 
theorems of his physics and the fundamental axiom of his astrobiology.166 
Michel was referring not so much to Bruno’s thoughts about life on the other globes, but rather to the 
life of the globes themselves, and to the biological astronomy that Bruno expounds. It could be argued 
that this is simply a now-defunct usage of the term. On the other hand, it could be an opportunity to 
enrich our understanding of the history of astrobiology. In the Renaissance, astrology and animism were 
the equivalent interdisciplinary fields melding astronomy and biology, and the ways that people 
understood life in its cosmic context. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has touched on a broad range of philosophical, scientific and theological topics over an 
even broader time frame. The treatment of these subjects has been necessarily cursory, but hopefully 
certain themes and trends have been sufficiently illustrated. Plutarch’s De facie preserved Platonic and 
Stoic approaches to the question of the earth’s relationship to the moon and the rest of the celestial 
realm. He discussed the relativity of cosmological perspective, the influence of the earth on other 
bodies, and the comparative teleological implications of influence and inhabitation in the case of the 
moon. It was influence which dominated the teleological discussion of the heavens in the Middle Ages, 
with an astrologised version of Aristotle’s biology being transmitted via Arabic philosophy, and the 
ordered celestial hierarchy standing as both sign and causal agent of God’s providence.  
Cusa, Benedetti, Patrizi and Bruno are examples of how Platonic philosophy and cosmology, absorbed 
in different forms through classical and medieval philosophy, fused with the medieval and Renaissance 
understanding of that universal astrological law of nature in such a way as to facilitate the rehabilitation 
of the belief in a plurality of worlds. The introduction of Copernicanism and the growing criticism of 
the Aristotelian/Ptolemaic view of the cosmos did not put an end to that law, as the next two chapters 
of this paper will demonstrate. The belief in ET life, which would eventually replace astrological 
                                                          
165 Michel, The Cosmology of Giordano Bruno, trans. by R. E. W. Maddison, p. 216. 
166 Ibid., p. 300. 
57 
 
thinking as a teleological explanation for the creation of the planets and stars, matured in the seventeenth 
century, in an enviroment in which astrology was still considered to play an important role in generation 




William Gilbert: Magnetism as Astrological Influence, and the 
Unification of the Terrestrial and Celestial Realms 
The body of the earth is one and uniform. However, it is not simple in its qualities (as the opinion of 
many conceives them) … both from its internal forces and from the lights of the stars striking its surface, 
a great variety of things flow forth… 
William Gilbert1 
 
But it is only on the surfaces of the globes that the multitude of living and animated beings is clearly 




As the preceding chapter has hopefully demonstrated, the shift of focus within Western astronomical 
cosmology from influence to inhabitation was not a clean break or sudden change, nor was it a simple 
replacement of an occult mentality with scientific speculation. Rather it was a process; one involving a 
combination of subtle yet profound adjustments in natural philosophy and theology. Having thus far 
attempted a brief sketch of this process up to the death of Bruno in 1600, this next chapter will present 
a case study of a philosopher whose major work was published in the same year. William Gilbert (1544–
1603), although well-known to the history of science, has little place in the histories of astrology or the 
ET life debate, yet he introduced and developed theories that are essential to both. He was familiar with 
the ideas of Cusa, Benedetti, Patrizi and Bruno, and his ideas were in turn highly influential in 
seventeenth-century physics and cosmology. The analysis of his work presented here is an attempt to 
both highlight and clarify certain aspects of his somewhat problematic yet highly interesting philosophy, 
as well as to take a more in depth look at how astrological and pluralist ideas could interact within a 
single worldview. 
                                                          
1 William Gilbert, De mundo nostro sublunari philosophia nova (Amsterdam: Lodewijk Elzevir, 1651), p. 108: 
‘...unum enim telluris est corpus et uniforme, non tamen qualitatibus, ut multorum eas opinio concipit, simplex… 
et insitis viribus, et luminibus astrorum concussum in eminentiis, multa rerum varietate efflorescat…’ 
2 William Gilbert, De magnete, magneticisque corporibus, et de magno magnete tellure; physiologia nova, 
plurimis et argumentis, et experimentis demonstrata (London: Peter Short, 1600), p. 210: ‘Sed in globorum 
extremitatibus tantum, animarum et animatorum frequentia manifestius cernitur, in quibus summus opifex, maiore 
et iucunda varietate sibi perplacet.’ 
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In Gilbert’s novel philosophy of nature (physiologia nova), we find the possibility of ET life appearing 
within a universe pervaded by a distinctly novel form of astrological influence. One of the main 
ambitions of his attack on Aristotle and the Peripatetics was to unify the terrestrial and celestial realms. 
This involved separating the earth from the planets physically, by the interposition of a vacuum, while 
bonding them qualitatively. These moves towards a more modern understanding of the heavens were 
not in themselves inhibitive towards astrology, as Gilbert will demonstrate. Instead, the opening of new 
lines of analogical reasoning led to a re-appraisal of astrological physics, in which planetary motion 
was related to celestial influence, and the earth along with the rest of the celestial bodies partook in a 
mutual exchange of forces. At the same time, the planets became more earth-like, acquiring the crucial 
attribute of habitability.  
The main obstacle facing any historian wishing to study the Elizabethan physician William Gilbert is 
that, apart from his two published works, De magnete (1600) and De mundo (1651), there is an almost 
complete dearth of auxiliary source material. Apart from one letter to William Barlow, which was 
printed as an appendix to Barlow’s Magneticall Advertisments (1616), no other written material by 
Gilbert survives.3 Historians, however, have managed to piece together a rough biography from 
institutional records and other sources. He was born in the town of Colchester, Essex, in or around 1544, 
and later studied at Cambridge. After a brief spell as senior bursar there in 1570, he left Cambridge to 
pursue a medical career in London. What followed was an apparently successful practice as a physician 
spanning just over thirty years, leading to his election as president of the College of Physicians in 1600. 
He acquired the residence of Wingfield House near St Paul’s Cathedral sometime in the mid-1590s, 
where he lived until moving to court upon his selection as a Royal Physician in 1601, obtaining an 
appointment for life as physician to Elizabeth I. He was re-appointed in the same post to James I, but 
died shortly afterwards, the year being 1603.4 
While Gilbert’s professional career was in medicine, his intellectual interests encapsulated a much 
broader swathe of natural philosophy. His main contribution to the field was his De magnete, 
magnetisque corporibus, et de magno magnete tellure; physiologia nova, plurimis et argumentis, et 
experimentis demonstrata (‘On the Magnet, Magnetic Bodies and the Earth, the Great Magnet: A New 
Philosophy of Nature Demonstrated through Many Arguments and Experiments’), published in London 
in 1600.5 It is divided into six books, all dealing with roughly one subject but frequently digressing into 
seemingly tangential material. The first book examines magnetic substances. The next four books deal 
with the various known motions of lodestones and especially of the compass needle: coition, direction, 
                                                          
3 William Barlow, Magneticall Advertisements, Or, Divers Pertinent Observations, and Approved Experiments 
Concerning the Nature and Properties of the Load-Stone (London: Timothy Barlow, 1616), pp. 87–88. 
4 Stephen Pumfrey, ‘Gilbert, William’, in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. by H. C. G. Matthew 
and Brian Harrison, 61 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), XXII, pp. 195-202. 
5 Hereafter De magnete. 
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variation and declination. In Book 6, Gilbert argues that the whole body of the earth is a magnet which 
revolves daily on its axis. This work, with its dismissal of Peripatetic philosophy and emphasis on an 
experimental method, led to Gilbert’s reputation as the father of magnetism and as part of the vanguard 
of modern science.6 
More recent historians have qualified these sentiments by exploring some of the less modern 
philosophical elements in Gilbert’s philosophy.7 Often referred to simply as De magnete, the full title 
of Gilbert’s ground-breaking publication is a reminder that, beyond the investigation of magnetic 
motions and their causes, there is a larger cosmological agenda at work. This agenda reveals itself more 
fully in his other work, De mundo nostro sublunari philosophia nova (‘A New Philosophy Regarding 
Our Sublunary World’), left unfinished at his death and known to have circulated in manuscript form 
before being edited by his nephew and later published in Amsterdam in 1651.8 De mundo seems to 
consist of the drafts of two distinct books: Physiologia nova contra Aristotelem (‘A New Natural 
Philosophy against Aristotle’) and Meteorologia nova contra Aristotelem (‘A New Meteorology against 
Aristotle’).9 The Meteorologia is thought to have been started in the 1580s, with the Physiologia being 
composed later in the 1590s, although both were probably being revised by Gilbert up until his death. 
To the historian who comes to know Gilbert first through De magnete, the De mundo seems somewhat 
of an anomaly, containing very little of the experimental method and mathematical sophistication of his 
more famous work. However, there are certain issues pertaining to the composition of De magnete 
which shed some light on this seeming imbalance. Stephen Pumfrey argues that De magnete was 
somewhat of a collaborative work, with some of the more technical and mathematical features being 
contributed by some of the colleagues whom Gilbert entertained at Wingfield House, such as Edward 
Wright (1561–1615).10 From Pumfrey’s perspective, it is De magnete that is somewhat of an anomaly, 
with De mundo being a more accurate representation of Gilbert’s own philosophical style. No 
conclusion can be definitive considering the unfinished nature of De mundo and the lack of source 
material that might shed light on the composition of De magnete. What seems apparent, though, is that, 
                                                          
6 See, for example, William Whewell, History of the Inductive Sciences from the Earliest to the Present Time, 3rd 
ed. (London: J. W. Parker, 1857), III, p. 37. More recently the comment by Kargon: ‘It is, by now, a cliché to hail 
Gilbert as one of the first experimental scientists, but there is much truth to this well-worn example.’ Robert Hugh 
Kargon, Atomism in England from Hariot to Newton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 9. 
7 See Gad Freudenthal, ‘Theory of Matter and Cosmology in William Gilbert’s De Magnete’, Isis, 74 (1983): 22–
37; John Henry, ‘Animism and Empiricism: Copernican Physics and the Origins of William Gilbert’s 
Experimental Method’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 62 (2001): 99–119; Stephen Pumfrey, Latitude and the 
Magnetic Earth (Cambridge: Icon, 2001). 
8 Hereafter De mundo. A manuscript version survives in the British Library, Royal MS 12 F XI.  
9 The manuscript version only gives a title for the Meteorologia, and so the title Physiologia may have been an 
addition by the publishers. 
10 The main evidence comes from Mark Ridley, an associate of Gilbert’s who worked on magnetic philosophy. 
He tells us that Edward Wright authored at least one chapter of De magnete, and one ‘Doctor Gissope’ also assisted 
Gilbert, whose own knowledge of Copernicus was limited. See Mark Ridley, Magneticall Animadversions 
(London: Printed by Nicholas Okes, 1617), p. 9.  
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considered together, Gilbert’s three works, De magnete, Physiologia nova and Meteorologia nova, 
represent a single project. That project was the establishment of a new cosmology and natural 
philosophy to supplant those of Aristotle.  
Gilbert’s main doctrinal targets in this mission against Peripatetic philosophy were the four terrestrial 
elements, the impossibility of a void, the immobility of the earth, and the distinction between the 
celestial and terrestrial realms. In Gilbert’s cosmology, ‘true earth’, with its nascent magnetic potency, 
is the only true element in the sublunary world. The earth, planets and stars (which Gilbert called 
collectively the primary globes of the world) each have their own unique nature but are in many senses 
all of a kind. All are surrounded by their effluvia, some (such as the sun and the brighter stars) produce 
light, and they all transmit their natures outwardly into an ‘orb of virtue’ (orbis virtutis). In between the 
globes is the vacuum, which for Gilbert was complete privation and offered no resistance. The globes 
move freely through this void, their motions directed by a soul with the aim of regulating celestial 
influences in order to conserve, perfect and ornament their bodies. Gilbert’s understanding of celestial 
motions, including those of the earth, was built upon two consequences ensuing from his decision to 
abandon the distinction between the earth and the heavens. These were a radical reinterpretation of 
astrological physics and the assumption that the surfaces of all the globes were adorned in a way similar 
to the earth. 
 
The Sublunary World: Elements, Magnetism, Electrical Attraction and the Soul 
of the Earth 
Considering that Gilbert’s theories about the celestial world were largely built upon analogies with 
terrestrial physics, a proper analysis of those theories (including his stance on celestial influence and 
inhabitation) must begin with an examination of his philosophy of the sublunary world. In the opening 
chapters of De mundo, Gilbert dismissed the idea that everything below the orb of the moon was 
composed of the four elements. These elements, he argued, have never been seen, and cannot be 
demonstrated to exist in the form that Aristotle imagined. The idea that each element is a combination 
of two of the four qualities (hot, cold, dry, moist) was also fanciful and counter-intuitive.11 Rather, 
Gilbert maintained that the only substance worthy of being called an ‘element’ in the traditional sense 
was ‘true earth’. This is the homogenous matter that makes up the majority of the solid mass of the 
globe of the earth. All the other substances seen towards the periphery of the globe are created by the 
degradation of this ‘true earth’. Both water and air are thus considered as exhalations or effluvia of the 
earth. Gilbert had explained this in De magnete:  
                                                          
11 See De mundo, pp. 10–12. 
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The earth emits various juices, which are not produced from water, or dry earth, nor from their mixtures, 
but rather born from the substance of the earth; these juices are not distinguished by contrary qualities or 
substances, nor is the earthly substance simple, as the Peripatetics dream. The juices come from vapours, 
risen up from great depths; indeed all waters are extractions or exudations, so to speak, of the earth.12 
The difference between earth, water and air, therefore, is one of ‘state’, in something approaching the 
modern sense of the term, rather than nature or quality in the Aristotelian sense. Earth can break down, 
attenuate or expand into other substances such as water and air, but, while this may be a process of 
degradation, the hypostatic principle of true earth remains within the substance.13 As for fire, this is 
described in De mundo as ‘nothing other than intense heat, which has entered into a suitable material; 
an activity inherent to the perishing humour. Therefore it is not an element, nor a principle of nature’.14  
There are several other factors crucial to Gilbert’s understanding of matter. He rejected the possibility 
of a vacuum within substances, and was strongly opposed to atomistic philosophy. This position he 
makes clear in De mundo: 
Body adheres to body, not due to the abhorrence of a vacuum. Bodies that appear to us solid are separated 
through bodies, for air and water flow through them. This happens so that the continuity of bodies may 
be preserved, and therefore they do not admit a vacuum in their innermost parts.15 
And again: 
We know that denser bodies change into more tenuous ones, as water extends into air with heat… Yet 
neither water nor air are composed by atoms or the aggregation of bodies, but are continuous bodies, 
and united in all their parts.16 
In Gilbert’s view, it is humour or moisture that is responsible for granting solidity to bodies.17 At a later 
part of De mundo, he listed what he considered to be qualities: heat, moisture and dryness. Cold, rather 
than being a quality, is simply the privation of heat. Yet even for the three remaining qualities, Gilbert 
was keen to curtail their active ability. On moisture and dryness, he stated: ‘They are not things 
themselves or primary operating qualities. Bodies are not changed by moisture or dryness, but by the 
application or detraction of moist or dry bodies.’18 So if these qualities are not responsible for the 
                                                          
12 De magnete, p. 20: ‘Terra emittit succos varios, non genitos ex aqua, aut terra sicca, nec ex earum mixturis, 
quam ex telluris substantia prognatos, hij non adversis qualitatibus, aut substantiis distinguuntur, neque tellus 
substantia est simplex, ut somniant Peripatetici. Existunt succi ex sublimatis ex profundioribus locis vaporibus. 
Aquae etiam omnes, telluris sunt extractiones et quasi exsudationes.’  
13 De mundo, p. 109.  
14 Ibid., p. 20: ‘nihil aliud quam intensus calor, qui materiam idoneam invasit, actus inhaerens perituro humori. 
Non igitur elementum, nec naturae principium’.  
15 Ibid., p. 53: ‘Corpori adhaeret corpus, non propter fugam vacui, separantur corpora per corpora, ut apud nos 
solida, aere aut aqua interfluente: quod sit ad continuitatis conservationem, atque ita vacuum in penetralibus non 
admittunt.’ 
16 Ibid., p. 65: ‘Sed nos cognoscimus crassiora corpora in tenuiora transire, ut aquam per calorem in aerem 
extendi… Neque enim aqua, aut aer, ex atomis aut corporum aggregatione constant, sed sunt corpora continuata, 
et omnibus suis partibus unita.’ 
17 Ibid., p. 104. 
18 Ibid., p. 216: ‘non sunt res ipsae aut primae qualitates operantes; nec immutantur corpora per humiditatem et 
siccitatem, sed per appositionem et detractionem corporum humidorum aut siccorum’. 
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alteration of bodies, what is? Gilbert listed three things: ‘Essences, activity, and the privation of activity 
change bodies; not qualities.’19 
The Aristotelian system of four elements and their composite qualities was therefore reduced to a monist 
philosophy, with the qualitative distinction between earth, water, air and fire replaced by a single 
spectrum of rarity and heat based on the homogenous substance of the globe of the earth. This 
homogenous substance is endowed in Gilbert’s philosophy with two main attributes. One is an intrinsic 
moisture, variously labelled succus (‘juice’ or ‘sap’), humor or fluor (‘fluid substance’). It is the 
attenuation of this humour which results in the effluvia of water and air, with heat produced at the same 
time. Indeed, this was Gilbert’s very definition of heat:  
We define all heat as the activity of a body from the attrition of humour, either intrinsic or external, for 
it is evident that no body grows warm without the attrition of humour, nor is humour attrited without heat 
being produced.20 
The other attribute was what he described in De magnete as the primordial and ‘prepotent’ form of the 
earth: magnetism.21 One of the main achievements attributed to Gilbert in the history of science is his 
assertion that the entire body of the earth is a dipole magnet. He believed that magnetism was a force 
intrinsic to true earth, the pure substance forming the majority of the globe. ‘This globe of ours’, he 
stated in De mundo, ‘which consists of earth and water along with the other effluvia, is imbued with 
magnetic virtues, principally from its solid and firmer primary part.’22 In Gilbert’s understanding, this 
virtue is manifest in those substances which are the nearest to that pure earth, such as the lodestone or 
iron. He consequently considered iron to be far more venerable than either gold or silver.23 
De magnete is structured to explain various known magnetic motions of lodestones and compass 
needles which had navigational, and to Gilbert also geological and cosmological, implications. These 
five motions are coition (here he rejected the more common term ‘attraction’), direction, variation, 
declination and revolution. Gilbert’s aim was to show that they all derived from a ‘congregant nature’. 
Magnetic motions, he argued, ‘are the incitation of homogeneous parts either towards one another or 
towards the primary conformation of the whole earth’.24 Earlier philosophers had argued that the 
                                                          
19 Ibid.: ‘Essentiae, et actus, et actus privatio, mutant corpora, non qualitates.’ The concept of actus is central to 
Gilbert’s philosophy, but it is difficult to find an English term that appropriately conforms to his varied usage. In 
Aristotelian philosophy actus is the Latin translation of ἐνέργεια (energeia), meaning ‘activity’ or ‘operation’. In 
Gilbert’s philosophy, it means something akin to ‘energy’ or ‘force’, but in order to avoid unwanted modern 
connotations I have translated it as ‘activity’.  
20 Ibid., p. 78: ‘Quare calor omnis a nobis definitur, ut sit actus corporis ab attritione humoris insiti vel alieni. 
Nullum enim incalescere corpus sine humoris attritione manifestum est, nec atteritur humor, qui illico non sit 
calidus.’ 
21 De magnete, p. 42. 
22 De mundo, p. 35: ‘Globus hic noster, qui ex terra et aqua simul cum effluviis aliis constat, praecipue ex solida 
et firmiori parte primaria, magneticis imbutus est viribus.’ 
23 De magnete, p. 24. 




compass needle was directed either to some point in the heavens, such as the north Pole star, or to some 
large magnetic mountain or continent in the far north of the globe. Gilbert instead insisted that it is the 
body of the earth itself that has a magnetic polarity responsible for the movement of a compass, and, 
significantly, that it projects out from itself a magnetic orb of influence.  
It is this magnetic virtue of the earth, as Gilbert explained in the last two books of De magnete, that 
enables the earth to rotate diurnally while maintaining a fixed verticity. True earth is not inert or passive 
as it was seen to be in the Peripatetic philosophy; rather it is an inherently active and mobile substance: 
We consider true earth to be a solid substance, homogenous to the earth, firmly bound together, and 
endowed (as in the other globes of the world) with a powerful primary form. It maintains its orientation 
with a fixed verticity, and revolves with a necessary motion caused by an inherent tendency to turn.25  
While magnetism is a property of the solid matter of true earth, it is in itself a completely immaterial 
force. Unlike Descartes, who later hypothesised the existence of screw-shaped magnetic particles, 
Gilbert maintained that magnetism was, in the early modern understanding of the term, an occult 
virtue.26  
Yet this magnetic force was for Gilbert more than just an occult virtue; it pointed to something more 
profound again. The motive ability of a magnetic substance suggested a form of animism, present not 
only in the lodestone or iron but in the entire substance of the earth itself. In De magnete he raised this 
idea in Book 2, Chapter 4, ‘On Magnetic Force and Form, What It Is, and on the Cause of Coition’. He 
discussed the manner in which iron, when heated, loses its magnetic qualities, yet when it cools it 
regains a polarity in line with either that of the earth or an adjacent lodestone. To Gilbert this was clearly 
not a corporeal action, but a disposal and conformity due to primary form. It was not violent, but 
harmonious and concordant, and here he saw an analogy with the celestial spheres whose motion and 
disposition are similarly regulated. ‘For the power to move oneself seems to indicate a soul,’ he 
reasoned, ‘and the supernal bodies, which are also celestial and, as it were, divine, are thought by some 
to be animate, because they move with an admirable order.’27 
Like the motion of the planets and stars, which will be discussed further below, Gilbert considered 
magnetic motion to be indicative of an animate nature. Since he also believed that the rotation of the 
earth was magnetic, Gilbert saw fit to declare that the earth was in fact a living creature. He compared 
                                                          
25 Ibid., p. 42: ‘Sed terram veram volumus esse substantiam solidam, telluri homogeneam, firmiter cohaerentem, 
primaria, et (ut in globis aliis mundi) valida forma praeditam; qua positione, certa verticitate constat, et insita 
volubilitate motu necessario volvitur.’  
26 On Descartes’ theory of magnetism, see his Principles of Philosophy (1644), IV, articles 133–83; see also 
Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes’ System of Natural Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
pp. 173–79. On the change in the meaning of the term ‘occult’, see Hutchison, ‘What Happened to Occult 
Qualities in the Scientific Revolution?’ 
27 De magnete, p. 68: ‘Vis enim movendi sese anima ostendere videtur, corporaque superna quae et caelestia 
tanquam divina, censentur a quibusdam animata, quod ordine admirabili moveantur.’ 
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its physical features and motion to the organs and locomotion of animals, and drew a link between its 
own life-force and that of the things which live upon it:   
The earth has its own form, it has internal spirits which flow in and out, and the mind moves the mass 
(mensque agitat molem) … The soul is the activity of an organic body. In the earth not only is the activity 
internal through the whole mass, but also the vital forces of those things which are begotten, grow and 
exist on the earth depend upon it. If you need organs, look at the poles, the equator and the meridian, and 
the agreement of its homogeneous parts. It is possible to see veins of ores in its outermost parts, 
extraordinary repositories of salts, metals and stones. Furthermore, you can see the processes of things 
and orders of fibres in the deepest sections, especially in the homogenous and magnetic parts.28 
Gilbert argued that the observable characteristics of the substance of the earth—its primary magnetic 
form, its motion, and its ‘breath’ (the cyclical flow of water and air from the interior)—demonstrate 
that the earth itself has a soul. This animate nature is not confined to the centre nor any other point, but 
present in all matter that has true earth as its informative principle. 
Another force that Gilbert investigated in De magnete was electrical attraction. The most common form 
of this phenomenon discussed at the time was the attraction of chaff to rubbed amber. For Gilbert, a key 
distinction between the two apparent attractions of lodestone and amber was that the amber did in fact 
act materially through the surrounding air. He pointed out that magnetism still acted through intervening 
substances, while electrical attraction could be blocked by a thin cloth. The amber, when rubbed, emits 
a very fine effluvium, which draws other objects to it within a certain radius:   
For electrical effluvia have the power of, and are analogous with, extenuated humour; but they will 
produce their effect, that is, both union and continuity, not by the external activity of humours, nor by 
the heat and attenuation of heated bodies, but by their moisture itself attenuated into its own peculiar 
effluvia.29 
While the distinction between magnetic and non-magnetic bodies rested on their material proximity to 
true earth, the determining factor for electrical substances was moisture. The crust of the earth is made 
of both humid and dry matter. Those things which have ‘originated predominantly from moisture’ 
produce electrical attraction when rubbed; those made mainly from dry earth do not.30  
                                                          
28 De mundo, pp. 125–26: ‘Habet etiam tellus suam formam, habet spiritus internos, qui effluunt redeuntque, 
mensque agitat molem... Anima est actus corporis organici. In tellure non solum actus est insitus per universam 
molem; sed etiam adnascentium, excrescentium, supervenientium entelechiae ab illo pendent. Organa si desideres, 
ecce tibi polos et aequinoctialem et meridionalem, convenientiam partium eius homogenicarum. Videre etiam 
licet in eminentioribus partibus venas glebarum, salium , metallorum , lapidum admirabiles thesauros , in 
profundissimis etiam et maxime homogenicis et magneticis fibrarum ordines et processus rerum.’ Mensque agitat 
molem is a quotation from Virgil, Aeneid, VI, 727. 
29 Ibid., p. 59: ‘Humoris enim extenuati vim et analogiam habent electrica effluvia, nec ab actu humorum externo, 
calore, et attenuatione calidorum corporum, sed per ipsum humidum attenuatum, in sua et peculiaria effluvia, 
effectum dabunt, et unitionem et continuitatem.’ 
30 Ibid., p. 52: ‘Omnia igitur quae a praedominanti humido orta sunt, et firmiter sunt concreta, et fluoris speciem, 
et naturam inclytam retinent, in corpore firmo et concreto: alliciunt corpora omnia, sive humida, sive sicca.’ 
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Gilbert also illustrated another important distinction between the two forces: ‘In all bodies in the world 
two causes or principles have been laid down, from which the bodies themselves are produced: matter 
and form. Electrical motions acquire their strength from matter, but magnetic motions from the primary 
form.’31 These two disparate forces both play their part in the preservation of the globe of the earth, 
which ‘is congregated and coheres throughout itself electrically’ while being ‘directed and turned 
magnetically’. At the same time, it is ‘cemented in its innermost parts so that it may cohere and be 
solid’.32 Just as he had done with magnetism, Gilbert took his small-scale experiments of electrical 
attraction and expanded them into broader cosmological explanations. Gravity, therefore, is explained 
by Gilbert in De magnete as an electrical attraction by the earth’s effluvia: ‘Air (the common effluvium 
of the earth) not only unites the disjointed parts, but also the earth calls bodies back to itself by means 
of the intervening air.’33 
This was Gilbert’s view of the earth, as described in De magnete and De mundo: a living entity, 
composed of one element, the ‘true earth’ forming the interior mass, its inherent moisture expanding 
into the effluvia of water and air, cohering internally through that same moisture, externally by the 
electrical attraction of the air, and being imbued with a magnetic potency which moves and directs it. 
But there were many more diverse phenomena to be explained, and it was the ambition of De mundo to 
explain as many of them as possible. A crucial aspect of his natural philosophy was one shared by the 
Peripatetics and Renaissance philosophy in general: celestial influence.  
 
The Supralunary World: Void and Celestial Influence 
In De mundo, Gilbert made clear that much of the activity on the surface of the earth is brought about 
through the action of the celestial bodies, primarily the sun and the moon. It is the light of the sun which 
warms the earth, attenuating the earthly humour into water and air: ‘The sun, due to various motions in 
nature, either by diurnal revolution or the annual course, illuminates all things in all regions. It brings 
forth heat by light, and elevates air throughout the whole orb of the earth.’34 In fact, in Gilbert’s new 
philosophy the various influences of the celestial realm are largely responsible for the deterioration of 
the substance of true earth and its transformation into the variety of matter we see on the periphery of 
                                                          
31 Ibid., pp. 52–53: ‘In omnibus mundi corporibus duae propositae sunt causae, sive principia, ex quibus ipsa 
corpora producta sunt, materia et forma; Electricae motiones a materia, magneticae vero a forma praecipua 
invalescunt.’ 
32 Ibid., p. 60: ‘Globus telluris per se electrice congregatur et cohaeret. Globus telluris magnetice dirigitur et 
convertitur; simul etiam et cohaeret, et solidus ut sit, in intimis ferruminatur.’ 
33 Ibid., p. 57: ‘Aer (commune effluvium telluris) et partes disiunctas unit, et tellus mediante aere ad se revocat 
corpora.’ 
34 De mundo, p. 29: ‘Sol propter varios in natura motus, undique aut diurna revolutione, aut annuo cursu omnia 
lustrat, caloremque lumine accendit, aereamque elevat materiam per omnem orbem terrarum.’ 
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the earth. But investigating Gilbert’s theories on celestial influence first requires a study of one of his 
major points of departure from Aristotelian cosmology: the possibility of a vacuum. 
While Gilbert explicitly rejected the existence of a vacuum within bodies, in De mundo he was adamant 
that above the air, which extends about five or six miles above the earth, there is the void. He first 
argued this on the basis that the space between the earth and the sphere of the moon cannot possibly be 
taken up by the elements: ‘Therefore, the world is not filled in that whole space by a sufficient mass of 
elements, nor do the heavens descend below the orb of the moon. There is therefore a vacuum.’35 He 
also argued that, if the heavens were filled with some sort of substance, like ether, then it would interfere 
with the passage of light from the far distant stars, no matter how fine or diaphanous it was: ‘No body 
is so transparent that there is no resistance in it. Moreover, all resistance is an impediment and causes 
light to refract.’36 Gilbert used these arguments and several similar to establish, contrary to accepted 
doctrine, that there is indeed a vacuum separating the celestial globes. In De magnete, this topic was 
only briefly mentioned when he talked of motion in ‘an ether which is free of resistance, or else in a 
vacuum.’37 In De mundo he also gave the reader a choice of term on occasion, but, when making his 
arguments, he was explicit in his terminology: ‘est igitur vacuum’. Furthermore, his definition of the 
vacuum was clear and simple. It involves the absolute privation of bodies and activity.38 
So nothing exists in the vacuum, yet the vacuum allows the light from the sun and the stars to reach the 
earth. The nature of light itself was another subject of interest to Gilbert. He made a distinction between 
lux and lumen similar to that made by Patrizi. The two terms are often translated as ‘light’ and 
‘brightness’ respectively, but perhaps an easier translation to work with in Gilbert’s case is to think of 
lux as fire or flame and lumen as light.39 This was one of his explanations in De mundo: 
Light (lumen) is essence. Flame (lux) is an activity rising from attenuating humour. Light is an activity 
proceeding from flame. Light is an immaterial essence, effused by flame, received by a body. Light 
crosses the ether, but does not stay or exist in it. It is restrained by dense and opaque bodies.40 
Light travels through the vacuum instantly, sine tempore, until it slows down or is stopped by contact 
with matter. Due to this instantaneous motion, it cannot be said to really exist in the vacuum, having no 
                                                          
35 Ibid., p. 45: ‘Non igitur in illo spatio toto plenus est mundus elementorum sufficienti mole, nec coelum infra 
orbem Lunae descendit. est igitur vacuum.’ 
36 Ibid., p. 52: ‘Nullum corpus ita diaphanum est, quin aliqua sit in illo renitentia, omnis autem renitentia 
impedimentum est et luminis refractio.’ 
37 De magnete, p. 221: ‘in aethere a renitentia libero, aut in vacuo…’. 
38 De mundo, p. 50. 
39 Ibid., p. 214: ‘Lux est eadem quae flamma.’ Compare this with Patrizi, Nova de universis philosophia, fol. 
101r: ‘Lux enim flamma est. Et flamma est lux.’ 
40 De mundo, p. 214: ‘Lumen est ens. Lux est actus assurgens ab humore attenuante. Lumen est actus procedens 
a lucido. Lumen est ens immateriale, effusum a luce, a corpore exceptum. Lumen transit aetherem, nec in eo 
manet, aut est, a denso et opaco sistitur.’ This theory of light places Gilbert in the Platonic tradition of Plotinus, 
Ficino and Patrizi, as opposed to the scholastic tradition which considered light as a quality of the medium. See 
Lindberg, ‘The Genesis of Kepler’s Theory of Light’. 
68 
 
presence or effect until retained by an object. Gilbert argued, for example, that ‘light, which spreads 
from the fire of the sun, is not warm in itself until it strikes a body; the sense of heat comes from the 
attenuation of the internal or near surrounding humour’.41 
The light from the sun and the other stars played a very important role in Gilbert’s theories of generation 
and corruption. He needed to explain how his essentially monist philosophy could account for 
difference and change. This is an issue he tackled directly in De mundo: 
The body of the earth is one and uniform. However, it is not simple in its qualities (as the opinion of 
many conceives them) … both from its internal forces and from the lights of the stars striking its surface, 
a great variety of things flow forth… Firstly, however, the substance of the earth is firm, united and 
stable, the whole of which is magnetic and filled throughout. It is not arid and sapless, like chalk, or filled 
with inert ashes, but it has its own sap and intrinsic humour, and in this way all things on its surrounds 
are born or similarly generated. The power of fluid matter is more apparent on the exterior than in the 
interior, because in the interior the active attenuated humour extends into spirit and emanations, whence 
it is turned into water, as if the waters were the sweat and effluvia of the mass of the earth. But it is by 
the lights of the stars, especially the sun, that the humour is continuously elaborated and driven through 
the whole circumference of the earth. And although the humour seems to us to be extinguished by the 
heat of the sun, it is in fact attenuated, and once again will return to its pristine form, and sink back in 
another region of the circumference.42 
The light from the sun and the stars is responsible for the attenuation of the humours of the earth and 
therefore a large amount of the activity and variety on the surface of the earth. Light, however, is not 
the only thing which can stretch across the vacuum, nor is it the only form of celestial influence. The 
key to understanding this other kind of influence is once again magnetism. In De magnete, Gilbert gave 
an explanation of the transmission of the magnetic force that was very similar to that of light:   
The magnetic virtue flows out in every direction around a magnetic body in an orb; spherically around a 
terrella, more confusedly and unevenly in other shapes of stones. Yet there exists in nature no orb, or 
permanent or essential virtue spread through the air, rather a magnet only excites magnetic substances 
that are at a convenient distance. And as light arrives in an instant (as the experts on optics teach), so 
even more so is the magnetic vigour present within the limits of its power, and because its activity is 
much more subtle than light, and does not consent with a non-magnetic substance, it has no intercourse 
                                                          
41 De mundo, p. 89: ‘Lumen, quod a Solis luce dimanat, per se calidum non est, donec corpus feriat, humorem 
insitum aut proxime circumfusum atterendo; unde caloris ille sensus.’  
42 Ibid., p. 108: ‘unum enim telluris est corpus et uniforme, non tamen qualitatibus, ut multorum eas opinio 
concipit, simplex… et insitis viribus, et luminibus astrorum concussum in eminentiis, multa rerum varietate 
efflorescat… Primaria autem telluris substantia, firma, unita, et stabilis est, quae tota magnetica, interiora implet, 
non arida et exsucca, ut calx, aut cinis coacervatur iners; sed succum habet suum et humidum insitum, 
quaemadmodum ea omnia, quae in ambitu eius aut crescunt, aut quovis modo generantur. Vis tamen materiae 
fluidae, in eminentioribus magis apparet quam intimis, quod in internis actus humor attenuatus in spiritum et 
eminentias tendit, ubi in aquam vertitur, quasi aquae terrenae molis sudores essent et effluvia. Sed astrorum 
lumine, vel maxime Solis, per ambitum terrarum humor elaboratur et urgetur continuo; qui etsi nobis evanescere 
aliquando propter Solis ardores videatur, attenuatur tantum, et iterum in pristinam naturam revertitur, et in aliquam 
circumferentiae regionem relabitur’.  
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with air, water, or any non-magnetic substance; nor does it drive a magnetic substance to any motion by 
inrushing forces, but being present in an instant, it invites friendly bodies.43  
In De mundo Gilbert categorised magnetism as the ‘effused form’ of the earth. Effused forms, similarly 
to light, traverse the void but do not stay or exist in it. But unlike light, which is stopped by a dense and 
opaque body (a denso et opaco sistitur), an effused form is not stopped by anything (a nullo resisti 
potest).44 Gilbert used this theory of effused forms to explain, for example, how the moon affects the 
tides: 
The astral virtue of the moon extends beyond the limits of its body. The seas are moved not by its own 
light or borrowed light, or by its motion, but by the activity of the astral virtue, while the earth is within 
the orb of its virtue.45 
The effused form, which extends outwards from the moon and is not stopped by dense or opaque 
objects, explains why the moon still has an effect on the earth throughout all its phases, or when it is 
below the horizon. Every celestial body, just like the lodestone or the magnetic earth, effuses its form 
outwards into an orb of influence or virtue. Gilbert differentiated the effect of these effused forms from 
that of light, whose main purpose is to attenuate humour and create heat: 
Warmth does not arrive from above except through light. In the earth, light attenuates the earth’s humours 
and excites heat; the various lights from the stars have therefore various effects. Other astral virtues are 
not produced by heat… It remains to be discovered what these other natures are, deduced from form, not 
material, nor arising from heat or light. There are primary forms in the stars, singular and specific; as in 
the earth there is the powerful and excellent magnetism. By this cause the moon, when it is new and 
without light, still affects the earth and draws humour… Likewise, by this cause the planets affect the 
earth in many diverse ways; Venus different from Saturn, Jupiter and Mars different from Mercury or 
Venus; which shine either by their own light or the light of the sun. For if they were to be without light, 
like the moon, the effect would still be made. Likewise, and in the same way, the fixed stars emit certain 
influences, which are like the seedbeds of many things, which cannot be blocked by any impediment, no 
different from the way that the primary magnetic virtue of the earth and its parts have their activity 
unobstructed. It will be helpful to know the activities of the stars, which are not less illustrious than this 
extraordinary power, attested to by stunning forces (magnetism), but are distinguished by their great and 
primary qualities. Therefore, always different natures descend from the stars: from Lyra different from 
Arcturus, from Hyades different from Canis Maior, from Praesepe different from Spica in Virgo, or from 
the Cor Leonis.46 
                                                          
43 De magnete, pp. 76–77: ‘Funditur virtus magnetica undequaque circa corpus magneticum in orbem; circa 
terrellam sphaerice; in aliis lapidum figuris, magis confuse et inaequaliter. Nec tamen in rerum natura subsistit 
orbis, aut virtus per aerem fusa permanens, aut essentialis; sed magnes tantum excitat magnetica convenienti 
intervallo distantia. Atque ut lumen in instanti advenit (ut docent optici); ita multo magis vigor magneticus intra 
virium terminos praesens est, et quia eius actus multo quam lumen est subtilior, et cum non magnetico non 
consentit, cum aere, aqua, aut quovis corpore non magnetico nullum habet commercium, nec magneticum 
commovet motu aliquo irrumpentibus viribus, sed praesens in instante amica corpora invitat.’ ‘Terrella’ is the 
name given to a spherical magnet. 
44 De mundo, p. 215. 
45 Ibid., p. 186: ‘Astrica virtus Lunaris ultra corporis limites extenditur. Non enim lumine aut proprio, aut mutuato, 
aut motu, maria commovet, sed actu astricae virtutis, dum terra intra orbem virtutis sit.’  
46 Ibid., pp. 80–81: ‘tepor vero nullus desuper dimanat, nisi per lumen; Lumen vero in tellure humorem telluris 
attenuat, calorem excitat; unde ab astris lumina varia varios habent effectus. Virtutes vero astrorum aliae non a 
calore fiunt… Sed relictis eorum sententiis sciendum est, quod illud alterius naturae est, a forma deductae, non 
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Gilbert’s theories concerning the efficacy of celestial influence resemble the ‘multiplication of species’ 
of Grosseteste and Roger Bacon. Yet they differed radically from traditional scholastic astrology by 
holding up effused forms (based on the example of the magnet) as a secondary form of influence 
separate from light. Unfortunately, Gilbert’s astrological physics was not developed in De mundo in a 
particularly systematic or coherent way. Many of the most crucial concepts are found at the very end of 
the Physiologia amongst somewhat miscellaneous collections of aphoristic notes. For example, Chapter 
27 entitled ‘De effluviis’ (‘On Effluvia’) begins: ‘In the effluvia of the sun and the moon, the rays of 
the fixed stars mix, and descend to the earth with the light of the sun, and the borrowed light of the 
moon.’47 On the surface at least, this idea is similar to those found in Cusa and Patrizi, where the sun 
and moon serve as intermediaries for the influence of further-flung bodies, but Gilbert provided no 
further explication. One page later on lux and lumen, Gilbert stated: ‘Light (lumen) penetrates every 
body, even the most opaque ones to a certain extent, by which intrusion it [i.e. the body] is deformed.’48 
Two pages further in a chapter on forms and qualities, he presented the aphorism that ‘[a]ctivity destroys 
the form of substance.’49 
As cryptic as some of these statements may seem, a detailed reading of the whole work reveals at least 
the supporting structure of Gilbert’s new understanding of celestial influence. The two kinds of 
conveyor of this influence are light and the effused forms, both of which cross the vacuum between the 
globes instantaneously, without presence or action, until interacting with a material body. Both are 
responsible, in their own way, for degrading and transforming the homogenous substance of the globe 
of the earth into the variety of substances seen on its surface. The activity of light seems to be restricted 
to the attenuation of humour (and subsequently the production of heat), although Gilbert did allow for 
some diversity amongst the celestial lumina regarding this outcome. Effused forms, being unique and 
fitting to each celestial body, permit a much broader range of possible influences. 
Gilbert’s new ‘physiology’ of the sublunar world, by dispensing with the doctrines of the four elements 
and qualities, eroded much of the explanatory foundations of traditional astrology. Indeed, he 
                                                          
materiatae, nec a lumine aut calore provenientis. Sunt enim in astris formae primariae, singulares et propriae; sicut 
in tellure, magnetica praepotens et egregia. Ob eamque causam Luna cum sine lumine fuerit in interluniis, tellurem 
concutit, et humorem ducit… Ob eamque etiam causam errones longe diversis modis tellurem et corpora afficiunt; 
Venus aliter quam Saturnus, Iupiter Marsque aliter quam Mercurius aut Venus; qui et propriis luminibus, et 
solaribus etiam fulgent. Quod si nulla haberent lumina, ut Luna, effectus tamen facerent. Eodem etiam modo 
stellae fixae influentias quasdam immittunt, tanquam rerum plurimarum seminaria, quae nullis obicibus refraenari 
possunt; non aliter atque primaria magnetica virtus telluris et eius partium, efficientiam habent a nullo impeditam. 
Ab hac tam egregia et demonstrata miris virtutibus potentia, astrorum actus non minus illustres, sed summis et 
primariis dotibus insignes agnoscere juvabit. Quare alia atque alia pendet ab astris natura; a Lyra alia quam ab 
Arcturo: ab Hyadibus diversa a cane majori: a Praesepi aliena a Virginis Spica, a corde Leonis; atque effluvia 
maxima.’ 
47 Ibid., pp. 213–14: ‘In effluviis Solis et Lunae, fixarum stellarum radii miscentur, et in terras descendunt cum 
lumine Solis, et Lunae mutuato lumine.’ 
48 Ibid., p. 214: ‘Lumen ingreditur omne corpus vel opacissimum aliquantulum, quo ingressu foedatur.’  
49 Ibid., p. 216: ‘Actus destruit formam substantiae.’ 
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occasionally criticised certain aspects of contemporary astrological practice in De mundo, but always 
remained laudatory of the science itself.50 Early in the text, for example, he wrote: ‘Astrologers, in a 
way that is not so much imprudent as insane, attribute the elementary qualities to their Trigons, and 
establish four of them for the four elements; and many of these trifles in Astrology, the queen of the 
sciences, are fictions from ignorant soothsayers.’51 Astrology retained an important place in Gilbert’s 
new cosmology, not only in the abstract sense of celestial influence, but also being pragmatically 
relevant to issues ranging from meteorology to personal characteristics and health, and to geography 
and politics.52  
The only evidence we have of Gilbert engaging personally and practically with astrology is a section of 
the Meteorologia claiming to be a sample from a notebook of observations he had made of the weather 
and planetary positions. This notebook is likely from his early days at Cambridge and so it is impossible 
to say whether his novel theories of celestial influence had begun to form at this stage. Pumfrey argues 
that the notebook represents Gilbert’s disillusionment with Aristotelian meteorology in the early stages 
of his Cambridge education, but there is not enough information to know for certain.53 Regardless of 
the exact import of the notebook, there is ample evidence in De mundo—in Physiologia as well as 
Meteorologia—that he still considered astrology relevant to meteorology. For example, he wrote: 
The winds are raised up by the earth itself, by the light of the sun, which impels most of all, by the light 
and specific forms of the stars and planets, and also by the moon, not so much through its borrowed light 
as by the effort and cooperation (synentelechia) of its unique virtue.54  
Other examples of his regard for astrology abound within Gilbert’s texts. One important passage in 
De magnete compared the effect of the magnetic earth upon iron to that of the heavens upon a new 
born:  
For the magnetic effluence of the earth rules everywhere within the orb of its virtue, and changes bodies; 
but those bodies which are by nature more similar and connected to it, it especially rules and controls; 
such as magnets and iron. Wherefore in many affairs and actions it is clearly not superstitious and vain 
to observe the positions and conditions of regions, the points of the horizon and places of the stars. For 
as when a baby is brought forth from its mother’s womb into the light, and acquires respiration and 
certain animal activities, then the planets and celestial bodies, according to their position in the universe, 
and according to that configuration which they have with regard to the horizon and the earth, instil 
                                                          
50 On astrology in England during this period, see Curry, Prophecy and Power; Richard Dunn, ‘The True Place 
of Astrology among the Mathematical Arts of Late Tudor England’, Annals of Science, 51 (1994): 151–63. 
51 De mundo, p. 6: ‘Astrologi enim non tam imprudenter, quam insane, Trigonis suis elementarias qualitates 
attribuunt, quatuorque instituunt pro quatuor elementis; atque eius farinae plurima in Astrologia, scientiarum 
regina, ab indoctis ariolis ficta sunt.’  
52 Interestingly, the best evidence we have for placing Gilbert’s date of birth is a nativity, identified among the 
Ashmolean manuscripts by S. P. Thompson. See the discussion in Duane Roller, The De Magnete of William 
Gilbert (Amsterdam: Hertzberger, 1959), p. 64. The nativity in question is Bodl. MS Ashmole 176, VI, 3. 
53 Pumfrey, Latitude and the Magnetic Earth, pp. 18–19. 
54 De mundo, p. 33: ‘Excitantur venti a tellure ipsa, a Solis lumine, quod maxime impellit, a planetarum et astrorum 




peculiar and individual qualities into the newborn; so that piece of iron, whilst it is being formed and 
lengthened out, is affected by the common cause (i.e. the earth); and again when it returns from ignition 
to its former temperature, it is imbued with a specific verticity as a result of its position.55 
Gilbert also employed astrology for explanations on a much larger scale. He used astrological reasoning 
to explain why the northern hemisphere is more suited to the activities of commerce, to the seats of 
republics, to the establishment of empires, and to the flourishing of the arts and disciplines.56 
On an equally broad scale and time frame was Gilbert’s astrological exposition of the phenomenon of 
precession. The precession of the equinoxes, the slow shift of the sun’s equinoctial position against the 
fixed stars over thousands of years, was explained in Ptolemaic astronomy as a movement of the 
celestial sphere. First Copernicus and then Gilbert explained it more correctly as a slow change in the 
orientation of the earth’s axis. In Gilbert’s philosophy, there is a very clear reason for the earth’s various 
motions, which was explained both in De magnete and De mundo. These motions, like that of the 
magnet, are for the earth’s own benefit, so that the influences from the sun, moon, planets and stars do 
not become harmful, but are tempered and varied and make the earth fruitful.57 Thus he wrote in De 
mundo: 
The fixed stars also have their own powers, which work upon the earth. While admittedly they are 
weaker, over a long time… they could impart a more serious and disruptive change. For this reason, 
nature has provided another slow motion… by an inflexion of the axis of the earth.58 
In De magnete Gilbert was more specific about the astrological implications of precession: 
Thus all the stars change their rays of light at the surface of the earth, through this wonderful magnetical 
inflection of the earth’s axis. This is the origin of the different seasons during the year, and this is why 
regions become more fruitful or more barren; hence the characters and manners of nations are changed; 
kingdoms and laws are altered, in accordance with the virtue of the fixed stars, and the strength thence 
received or lost from the singular and specific nature of each as they culminate; or on account of new 
configurations with the planets in other places of the Zodiac; on account also of risings and settings, and 
of new concurrences at the meridian.59 
                                                          
55 De magnete, p. 142: ‘Regnat enim ubique intra orbem virtutis suae, telluris magnetica effluentia, et immutat 
corpora: Quae vero sunt illi natura magis similia et coniuncta maxime, regit et componit; ut magnetem et ferrum. 
Quare in plurimis negotiis et actionibus non est plane superstitiosum, et vanum, positiones et habitudines terrarum, 
horizontis puncta, et astrorum loca observare. Nam ut cum ex utero materno natus in lucem editur, et respirationem 
et animales quasdam actiones adipiscitur, tunc planetae et corpora caelestia pro habitudine sua in mundo, et pro 
ea quam habent ad horizontem et terram configuratione, proprias et singulares nato immittunt qualitates: sic 
ferrum istud dum fingitur et extenditur, a communi causa (tellure scilicet) afficitur; dum etiam ab ignitione ad 
pristinam temperiem revertitur, verticitate singulari pro positionis ratione imbuitur.’ 
56 De mundo, p. 134. 
57 Ibid., p. 159. 
58 Ibid., p. 161: ‘stellae fixae vires etiam habent suas, quibus tellus laboratur; quae licet minores sunt et exiles, 
tamen diuturnitate temporis, propter longiorem moram in parallelis circulis, unicuique perpendiculari mutationem 
magis gravem et molestam mitterent. ob eamque causam natura provida motum habet alium tardum, quia vis illata 
subitanea non est, axis telluris inflexione’. 
59 De magnete, p. 235: ‘Sic omnes stellae immutant suos luminis radios in superficie telluris, admirabili hac 
magnetica axis telluris inflexione. Hinc temporum anni novae varietates, terraeque foecundiores magis[q]ue 
steriles evadunt; hinc gentium ingenia et mores immutantur, regna et leges alterantur, pro stellarum fixarum 
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An interesting parallel can be found in the Narratio prima of Georg Joachim Rheticus (1514-1574). In 
this first account of Copernicus’s astronomy published in 1540, three years prior to De revolutionibus, 
the author Rheticus also discussed the astrological relevance of precession. After he described 
Copernicus’s account of precession as the third motion of the earth, he offered an astrological 
prognostication, predicting the fall of the Mohammedan empire based on the shifting obliquity of the 
ecliptic.60 For both Rheticus and Gilbert the new theory of precession needed more than physical and 
astronomical explanations, it needed a functional and teleological justification as well. Celestial 
influence provided that. For Gilbert, magnetism showed ‘how’; astrology showed ‘why’. 
Gilbert’s interest in astrology has been paid very little attention in the few modern interpretations of his 
work. Pumfrey, in his biography of Gilbert, briefly mentioned that his ‘profound belief in astrology was 
not unusual, but his belief that astrological forces were master-minded (mistress-minded?) by a 
terrestrial magnetic soul certainly was’.61 Such a statement barely scratches the surface of all that was 
new and interesting about Gilbert’s theories of celestial influence. Because he represents an early stage 
in the development of modern ideas of force, most discussions of his ‘magnetic’ philosophy, while 
recognising its debt to Platonic animism, fail to appreciate how this theory of the earth’s astral virtue 
was part of a process of rethinking celestial influence. Gilbert’s dismissal of three of the four elements, 
and of the four qualities as active forces, undermined the traditional understanding of astrology. This 
was a subject which, as a sixteenth-century natural philosopher and physician, we can assume he had a 
personal and professional interest in. At the same time, he gave a new dimension to the occult qualities 
of the celestial bodies by differentiating light from effused form in terms of both operation and effect. 
The notion that astral forces, as mentioned by Pumfrey, were mediated by the magnetic soul was indeed 
unusual, although not entirely unprecedented, and will be further discussed below. What truly separates 
Gilbert’s astrology from the Aristotelian tradition, and aligns him more with Cusa and Bruno, is that 
the earth was no longer a passive recipient of astral forces, but a participant in the mutual exchange of 
influences between the primary globes of the universe.  
 
                                                          
virtute, et robore suscepto aut amisso, pro singulari et specifica natura fixarum culminantium; aut propter novas 
in aliis Zodiaci locis cum planetis configurationes; propter ortus etiam, et occasus, et concursus in meridiano 
novos.’ 
60 Georg Joachim Rheticus, ‘Narratio prima’, in Three Copernican Treatises: The Commentariolus of Copernicus, 
the Letter against Werner, the Narratio Prima of Rheticus, trans. with introd. and notes by Edward Rosen (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1939), p. 122. See also Westman, ‘The Melanchthon Circle’; Reijer Hooykaas, 
G. J. Rheticus’ Treatise on Holy Scripture and the Motion of the Earth: With Translation, Annotations, 
Commentary, and Additional Chapters on Ramus-Rheticus and the Development of the Problem before 1650 
(Amsterdam; New York: North Holland, 1984); Dennis Richard Danielson, The First Copernican: Georg Joachim 
Rheticus and the Rise of the Copernican Revolution (New York: Walker, 2006). 
61 Pumfrey, Latitude and the Magnetic Earth, p. 170. 
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The Void and the Motions of the Globes 
Part of Gilbert’s deconstruction of the edifice of Aristotelian natural philosophy was his criticism of the 
common understanding of natural motion. Natural motion, according to Aristotle, varied depending on 
the nature of the object in question. For the incorruptible celestial bodies, composed of ether, this meant 
a perfect circular motion. Within the sublunary world, the elements moved rectilinearly in an attempt 
to find their place according to their disparate natures; heavier earth and water towards the centre, lighter 
air and fire towards the periphery.62 Gilbert fundamentally disagreed with Aristotelian notions of both 
place and motion, and proposed a different explanation for the tendencies of sublunary substances: 
Gravity is therefore the inclination of bodies to their own principle, such as the inclination towards the 
earth of those things which are cast from it, while levity is an incitation of a body by its own principle, 
either because the humour [inside] is thinning or because the surrounding bodies rise up.63  
The principles of gravity and levity, however, only apply within the confines of a globe’s effluvia, a 
point he made clear with the example of comets.64 When it came to discussing the movement of the 
globes themselves through the vacuum, Gilbert was even more dismissive of the importance of ‘place’. 
The void was all important to Gilbert’s new philosophy of the heavens. It contains no body, no activity, 
zero resistance. It is complete privation.65 We have already seen its relevance to the question of celestial 
influence and the daily motion of the earth, which, with nothing to restrict it, revolves as one with its 
effluvia.66 The void also provides an open setting for the free motions of the other stars and planets: 
No sane person would say that the vacuum is the cause of motion, but in the separate vacuum bodies are 
moved; not by the vacuum, but by the bodies themselves, which emit their own activity. In the vacuum 
the prime bodies, the globes themselves, move, such as the planets and the earth, and even some of the 
fixed stars, if they have motion, which cannot be known due to their long distance from us.67  
The vacuum cannot be a cause of motion itself. Nor, as Gilbert spent much time arguing, is there any 
such thing as a prime mover or any other solid celestial sphere carrying stars or planets. There is just 
the void, which itself is not surrounded by anything, but should be thought of as just continuous space.68 
The planets and stars have a motive power, inherent throughout their homogenous substance, as does 
the earth: ‘The motive power (motor) of the earth is not in its centre more so than in its own or any 
                                                          
62 Aristotle, On the Heavens, 1.2. 
63 De mundo, pp. 47–48: ‘Est igitur gravitas corporum inclinatio ad suum principium, a tellure quae egressa sunt 
ad tellurem. Levitas vero incitatio a suo principio, vel humoris solventis ratione, vel circumfusi corporis 
attollentis.’ 
64 De mundo, p. 49. 
65 It is labelled as such in a diagram of the earth. See ibid., p. 51: ‘Vacuum separatum nullum Corpus, nullus actus, 
nulla renitentia, privatio.’ 
66 Ibid., p. 142. 
67 Ibid., p. 48: ‘Praeterea nemo sanus dixerit, vacuum esse causam motus, sed in vacuo separato moventur corpora, 
non a vacuo, sed ab ipsis corporibus, quae actus suos emittunt. In vacuo moventur prima corpora, globi ipsi, ut 
planetae, et terra, et fixae etiam aliquae stellae, si motum habuerint, qui propter longinquitatem a nobis discerni 
non possit.’ 
68 Ibid., p. 50. 
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other circumference (as a certain Nolanus thought), nor is the motive power in any other part.’ The truth 
of the matter, Gilbert continued, is that ‘all homogenous and primary parts, which are also magnetic, 
contribute to the motion’.69 
Gilbert had already attempted to argue in De magnete that the magnetic power of the earth was 
responsible for its daily rotation. There were several reasons, however, why it could not be entirely 
responsible. Gilbert based many of his arguments about the earth on the reasoning that a small spherical 
magnet, or terrella, would behave in a similar way to the earth. The medieval study of magnets by Peter 
Peregrinus, a thirteenth-century natural philosopher, had done the same, although he had assumed that 
the behaviour mimicked the spherical heavens, not the earth. In his Epistola de magnete (1269), 
Peregrinus had argued that a terrella, suspended by its poles, would rotate once in 24 hours. Such a 
result would have been valuable to Gilbert, but alas he could not recreate it:  
I omit what Peter Peregrinus constantly affirms, that a terrella suspended above its poles on a meridian 
moves circularly, making an entire revolution in 24 hours: which, however, has not happened to ourselves 
as yet to see; and we even doubt this motion on account of the weight of the stone itself, as well as 
because the whole Earth, as it is moved of itself, so also is it propelled by the other stars: and this does 
not happen in proportion (in the terrella) in every part.70 
The second part of Gilbert’s explanation is important for understanding his physics of planetary motion. 
Motion is achieved by the combination of the planet’s own motive power with the propulsion provided 
by the other globes. The terrella does not replicate the earth’s rotation because, being positioned on one 
part of the earth, it is not exposed to the same astral influences. In De mundo he expanded on the errors 
in Peregrinus’ theory: 
Moreover, the earth is moved by the conspiring of the motions of the other bodies, and by their effused 
motive forms, especially those of the sun and the moon, by which the earth is contained and defined as 
if by the terms of a proportion… In this way Peter Peregrinus is mistaken.71 
Apart from Peregrinus, there were other possible sources of inspiration for the application of magnetism 
to the question of the earth’s motion. A contemporary of Copernicus, Celio Calcagnini (1479–1541), 
wrote an essay in about 1518–1519 with the title Quod coelum stet, Terra autem moveatur (‘That the 
                                                          
69 Ibid., p. 165: ‘Motor telluris non est in centro suo potius, quam in sua, aut aliena circumferentia (ut quidam 
putavit Nolanus) nec in ulla alia parte; sed omnes partes homogenicae et primariae, quae et magneticae, ad motum 
faciunt.’ The quidam Nolanus is of course a reference to Giordano Bruno. 
70 De magnete, pp. 223–24: ‘Omitto quod Petrus Peregrinus constanter affirmat, terrellam super polos suos in 
meridiano suspensam, moveri circulariter integra volutatione 24 horis: Quod tamen nobis adhuc videre non 
contigit; de quo motu etiam dubitamus, propter lapidis ipsius pondus, tum quia tellus tota uti movetur a se, ita 
etiam ab aliis astris promovetur: quod proportionaliter in parte quavis (ut in terrella) non contingit.’ 
71 De mundo, p. 138: ‘Praeterea movetur terra conspiratione motuum aliorum corporum, et formis effusis 
commoventibus, praesertim Solis et Lunae, quibus proportionatur, et continetur quibusdam quasi terminis... Ita 
fallitur Petrus Peregrinus.’  
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Heaven Stands Still while the Earth Moves’).72 In this essay Calcagnini directly compared the motion 
of the magnet to the daily rotation of the earth, and then linked this motion to terrestrial processes of 
generation: 
Do we not all admire the magnet stone, constantly turning one part to the south, the other to the north? 
… From which is plainly understood how great the power of nature is, and how great its faculty that we 
call ‘sympathy’. So then why does nobody admire the earth itself, which surely without the aid of the 
sun would lie inert and infertile, and so eagerly strives for the embrace of the sun, in order to obtain from 
it the vital flamelets for the propagation of things.73 
Gilbert doesn’t make any reference to this essay, but in De magnete he did refer to another essay by 
Calcagnini, De re nautica, which was published alongside Quod coelum stet in the Opera aliquot 
(1544).74 This is not proof that Gilbert read it, as he may have had access to a different version of De re 
nautica, but there is a certain degree of probability. It was definitely not beyond Gilbert to avoid 
referencing other writers where it would detract from his own originality. 
While there were precursors to his connection of terrestrial motion to magnetism, Gilbert takes the 
theory in new directions. Calcagnini, for example, had thought the earth more apt for motion than the 
heavens because the former was the place of change and mortality while the latter was nobler and more 
suited to rest.75 Gilbert, on the other hand, continually stressed that the positions and motions of the 
globes have nothing to do with any predetermined notion of ‘place’, but are rather a product of forces 
between the planets themselves. So he wrote in De mundo:  
Place does not draw any bodies, rather the primary bodies distribute themselves through space by mutual 
activity... The maker of things… did not create one place around which things must remain or into which 
things must conglomerate, rather he gifted bodies with primary virtues, by which they mutually array 
themselves, and combine in an admirable order though the intervals of the universe.76 
                                                          
72 The essay was only published after the author’s death. Quod coelum stet, Terra autem moveatur, in Celio 
Calcagnini, Opera aliquot (Basel: Hieronymus Frobenius, 1544), pp. 388–94. See also Omodeo, Copernicus in 
the Cultural Debates of the Renaissance, pp. 209–13. 
73 Calcagnini, Opera aliquot, p. 390: ‘Magnesium vero lapidem nonne omnes admiramur, parte una in austrum, 
in arctum alia pertinaciter inclinantem? Ex quo plane intelligitur quanta sit naturae vis, et eius quam sympatheian 
vocamus facultas. Ut iam non sit cur aliquis admiretur, terram ipsam, quae sane absque solis praesidio iners foret 
atque infoecunda, tam cupide in solis complexus eniti, ut ex eo vitales igniculos ad rerum propagationem 
mutuetur.’ 
74 De magnete, p. 7. 
75 Calcagnini, Opera aliquot, p. 389; Omodeo, Copernicus in the Cultural Debates of the Renaissance, p. 211. 
76 De mundo, p. 115: ‘nec locus allicit corpora ulla, sed corpora ipsa primaria mutuis actibus disponunt sese per 
loca… Rerum igitur conditor… non singulis partibus primariis loca, circa quae, aut in quibus, conglobantur, et 
haerent, sed corpora ordinavit primariis virtutibus praedita, quibus mutuo disponunt sese, et per intervalla in 




[The stars] are not disposed due to place, or the power of place (for place is nothing), nor are they fixed 
to some more stable heaven, like nails to a vault, but they endure by the intrinsic forces between them… 
In the universe nothing wanders or is lost without a cogent and impelling cause.77 
This understanding of planetary motion allowed Gilbert to abandon the epicycles and eccentrics of 
Renaissance astronomy. He, like many before him, took them to be convenient inventions by 
astronomers to help predict the movements of the planets. They were therefore of no use to the 
philosopher who looked toward causes. Skilled men like Ptolemy, Regiomontanus and Copernicus 
‘have their own systems and inventions of spheres’ by which they save the appearances. But these are 
not real: ‘The variety and plurality of the heavens was first of all invented by mathematicians, not 
philosophers.’78 All perceived ‘inequalities’ in the motions of the celestial globes were for Gilbert the 
product of the varied and continually changing activities of the other globes. These motions, while not 
in perfect circles, are nonetheless certain and definite.79  
In Gilbert’s cosmology, as we have seen, the heavens did not revolve around the earth in 24 hours, 
rather the earth rotated on its own axis. The moon orbits the earth, but the planets, meaning Mercury, 
Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn, do not orbit the earth, but rather the sun. Gilbert never offered an 
explicit opinion of whether the earth had an annual orbit around the sun or vice versa. In De mundo he 
repeatedly deferred the question, and used somewhat ambiguous language.80 For the purposes of this 
discussion, the question of whether or not Gilbert was a Copernican is not as urgent as the ‘how’ and 
‘why’ of celestial motion more generally.81 The sun for Gilbert is certainly the most eminent among the 
planets in terms of its motive influence, but the nature of this power is not simply one of an active solar 
force working on passive planetary bodies. The motive virtues of the sun are in a sense used by the 
                                                          
77 Ibid., pp. 112–13: ‘Neque tamen ita repositae sunt propter loca aut loci vim, (locus enim nihil est) nec infixae 
caelo alicui firmiori, tanquam clavi in camerato, sed ab insitis permanent inter se viribus… In mundo enim nihil 
peregrinatur, aut vagum est, absque impellente et cogente causa.’  
78 Ibid., p. 148: ‘Ita viri peritissimi, Ptolemaeus, Regiomontanus, Copernicus, suas habent circulorum rationes et 
inventiones, quibus perpetua numerorum et apparentiarum consonantia correspondet. Non tamen circuli illi sunt 
corpora, sed spatia tantum imaginaria’, ‘Coelorum varietatem, et pluralitatem, primum omnium mathematici 
invenerunt, non philosophi.’  
79 Ibid., p. 187. 
80 See ibid., pp. 49, 141. 
81 On the subject of Gilbert’s potential Copernicanism, see Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite 
Universe, pp. 284–86, n. 47; Freudenthal, ‘Theory of Matter and Cosmology’, pp. 33–35; Stephen Pumfrey, 
‘William Gilbert’s Magnetic Philosophy 1580-1684: The Creation and Dissolution of a Discipline’ (unpublished 
PhD thesis, University of London, 1987), pp. 8–45; id., Latitude and the Magnetic Earth, pp. 169–70; Hilary 
Gatti, Giordano Bruno and Renaissance Science (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 98; Henry, 
‘Animism and Empiricism’, p. 106. There remains no ‘smoking gun’ for Gilbert’s commitment to an annual 
orbit of the earth. It is tempting (yet problematic) to make this conclusion for him based on his own physical 
principles. The allusions he makes in De mundo to astronomers past and present (including Copernicus and 
Tycho) are deceptive due to the fact that they are largely derived from similar passages in Patrizi. Compare De 
mundo, pp. 149–51, with Patrizi, Nova de universis philosophia, fol. 91v. 
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planets, which, by their own power, regulate their motion to their own advantage. This is the reasoning 
Gilbert saw behind both the rotation of the earth and the orbits of the planets: 
The earth is moved by a natural appetite for the preservation, perfection and ornamentation of its parts, 
towards more excellent things… The earth, by a certain great necessity and manifest virtue, intrinsic and 
conspicuous, is turned circularly to the sun; by which motion it enjoys the solar virtues and is firmed in 
its verticity, so that it does not revolve unstably to every region of the heavens. The sun is the most 
eminent actor in nature, as it drives the course of the planets, and here incites the revolution (conversio) 
of the earth. All these circular motions, both that of the earth and those of the planets, agree in one great 
cause, because the earth and the planets are all carried towards the east.82  
He argued the same theory in the cosmological climax of De magnete: 
For since the sun himself is the agent and inciter of the moving universe, other wandering globes 
positioned within his powers, when acted on and stirred, also regulate each its own proper courses by its 
own powers; and they are turned about in periods corresponding to the extent of their greater revolution, 
and the differences of their effused powers, and their intelligence for higher good.83 
The motions of the celestial globes, in terms of both orbit and rotation, are determined by their own 
intelligences. The sun provides the fuel, as it were, and the planets move in order to enjoy the virtues 
of the sun and the other globes in proper proportion. 
John Henry has rightly pointed out that magnetism didn’t work as an explanation of the earth’s rotation 
without animism. It is this feature of Gilbert’s cosmology which most readily invites comparisons with 
Cusa, Bruno and Patrizi. The pivotal argument of De magnete, which Gilbert sought to prove by 
experiments, is that the magnetism of the lodestone and hence of the earth is a product of an animate 
nature.84 In De mundo, Gilbert laid out his philosophy of the nature of celestial motion: 
In nature position is before movement. Therefore, God positioned the earth and the stars at certain 
distances, before they were put in motion. And this motion is from the impulse of the other bodies, and 
on account of the radiated virtues from these, as well as from the bodies themselves, when they seem to 
incline to betterment and perfection.85 
                                                          
82 De mundo, pp. 142–43: ‘Movetur naturali appetitu, ad suarum partium conservationem, perfectionem, et 
ornatum, versus praestantiora… Terra igitur magna quadam necessitate, et virtute manifesta, insita, et conspicua, 
convertitur ad Solem circulariter; quo motu solaribus virtutibus gaudet, firmaturque certa verticitate, ut non vage 
volvetur in omnem coeli regionem. Sol praecipuus in natura actor, ut erronum promovet cursus, sic hanc telluris 
conversionem incitat; qui omnes motus in orbem, tam telluris, quam erronum, in una aliqua magna causa 
consentiunt, quod omnes, tam tellus, quam errones, versus ortum feruntur.’  
83 De magnete, p. 231: ‘Nam cum sol ipse motivi mundi actor sit et incitator; globi alii errones intra vires eius 
positi, cum acti sunt et conciti, suis etiam viribus quisque cursus suos proprios moderatur, convertunturque suis 
temporibus pro vertiginis maioris amplitudine, et virium effusarum differentiis, et ad melius bonum intelligentia.’ 
84 Henry, ‘Animism and Empiricism’, pp. 117–19. 
85 De mundo, p. 210: ‘In rerum natura positio est ante motum. Ita Deus posuit tellurem, et astra, certis quibusdam 
distantiis, antequam moverentur. et hic motus sit impulsu aliorum corporum, virtutum ratione ab illius 
effluentium; vel a corporibus ipsis, cum ad melius, et ad perfectionem inclinare videntur.’ Reading ‘illis’ for 
‘illius’. Compare this with a passsage from De docta ignorantia: ‘[Hunc opificem] in uno mundo magnitudines 
stellarum, situm et motum praeponderans et stellarum distantias taliter ordinans, ut, nisi quaelibet regio ita esset 
sicut est, nec ipsa esse nec in tali situ et ordine esse nec ipsum universum esse posset; dans omnibus stellis 
differentem claritatem, influentiam, figuram et colorem atque calorem, qui claritatem concomitatur influentialiter, 
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All the globes have a soul, and in this sense Gilbert’s astronomy was animistic, but the souls behave in 
a theoretically predictable way. Their motions are not haphazard or whimsical, but determined by their 
exposure to the radiated virtues from the other globes. The divine astral intelligence of the earth, no 
different to that of the other globes, directs itself so as to best enjoy these virtues, and thus ensure the 
‘preservation, perfection and ornamentation of its parts’. 
 
Unification of the Realms and the Possibility of Life 
One of the most revolutionary features of Gilbert’s philosophy, which pervades much of De mundo as 
well as De magnete, was his attack on the traditional Aristotelian division between the sublunary and 
celestial realms. This attack is central to everything discussed thus far in terms of celestial influence 
and motion. Early on in De mundo he criticised philosophers who foolishly try to divide the world into 
the celestial and the elemental, and who claim the heavens to be made of incorruptible ether while the 
earth is sordid and mutable.86 Gilbert explained that ‘it is ridiculous to divide the sensible world in such 
a way that within it there can be no comparison or likeness’.87 It seemed clear to him that both space 
and nature are the same above the course of the moon and within it; there is no arbitrary divide. ‘Bodies 
form above the moon and pass away’, he claimed, ‘they have birth and death, constancy and motion.’88 
A significant portion of De mundo nostro sublunari was dedicated to a discussion of luna itself, which 
Gilbert called the partner of the earth (telluris socia).89 He began, as he did in many of his chapters, by 
reviewing previous opinion on the subject matter. Some, like Orpheus, Thales, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras 
and Democritus, considered it to be another earth, possibly inhabited with animals, or even with its own 
cities. Others considered it to be made of fire, or air. The Peripatetics, of course, considered it to be 
made of the fifth essence.90 Gilbert claimed that ‘by the rejection or acceptance of these opinions, at 
length, we will determine what the moon is’.91 Soon afterwards he made that determination clear. ‘We 
                                                          
et ita proportionaliter partium ad invicem proportionem constituens, ut in qualibet sit motus partium ad totum…’ 
(Cusa, Opera omnia, I, p. 112). 
86 De mundo, p. 8. 
87 Ibid., p. 9: ‘quod ut vanum est et falsum, ita mundum sensibilem sic distinxisse, ut nulla esset in eo comparatio 
aut proportio, ridiculum’.  
88 Ibid., p. 155: ‘Concrescunt enim supra Lunam corpora, et evanescunt, ortum habent et interitum, constantiam 
et motum.’  
89 Ibid., p. 170. 
90 Again, Gilbert paraphrased this summary of opinions from Patrizi. Compare ibid., pp. 170–71 with Patrizi, 
Nova de universis philosophia, fol. 112r-v. 




consider the moon to be another small earth’, he wrote, ‘or a body ordered in the way of the earth.’92 
According to Gilbert the similarities are numerous:  
The moon, different in nature from the sun, is a solid substance without light, diverse in its outermost 
parts, not condensed from an imaginary fifth essence, such that it is a thicker part of a nugatory sphere; 
rather it is a star, like the earth, having motion in its own space.93 
This motion, being the moon’s monthly orbit and rotation, serves the same purpose as the motion of the 
earth, that is, in order to enjoy the variety of beneficial influences from the sun and the stars.94 Gilbert 
had made a similar assertion in De magnete when comparing the reasons for the earth’s motion with 
that of the other ‘Wanderers’. The moon turns ‘to receive in succession the sun’s beams in which she, 
like the Earth, rejoices, and is refreshed’.95  
The moon and the earth were truly companions in Gilbert’s eyes. The earth acts for the moon as the 
moon does for the earth, supplying reflected light as compensation during the long lunar nights. The 
moon has continents and seas, the former showing as dark spots and the latter shining brightly.96 Gilbert 
even included in De mundo one of the first ever selenographs, a map of the moon’s surface drawn from 
the naked eye. He labelled the land masses and oceans, even granting the name Britannia to one of the 
smaller islands.97 He disagreed with the belief that the dark and light patches on the moon are only areas 
of lesser and greater transparency, singling out Benedetti as one who held this opinion.98 This theory 
had agreed with Benedetti’s belief that the moon and the planets acted as mirrors for their respective 
opaque earths, but didn’t fit with Gilbert’s attempt to establish the similarities between the primary 
globes. Nor did it suit his ideas about celestial influence. 
Gilbert spent much of De magnete attempting to prove that the entire earth had a magnetic potency, and 
that this was indicative of an animate nature. This characteristic—of a soul capable of effusing its 
form—he then granted to the moon and all the other globes in the universe. He was keen to distinguish 
this from the ‘formal cause of the Peripatetics’, or the ‘primary form of Aristotle’. Gilbert saw it as a 
‘primary, radical and astral form’, inherent to the primary spheres of the universe and all their 
                                                          
92 Ibid., p. 173: ‘Quod vero Lunam, tellurem alteram minorem, aut corpus aliud telluris modo ordinatum, 
existimamus, id postea confirmabimus.’  
93 Ibid.: ‘Luna, diversa natura a Sole, est solida absque lumine substantia, diversa in eminentiis, non provenit 
unquam ab inspissatione imaginatae quintae essentiae, adeo ut densior pars sit sphaerae nugatoriae; sed astrum 
est, sicut tellus, suis spatiis motum habens.’  
94 Ibid., pp. 156–157. 
95 De magnete, pp. 224–25: ‘Nam et Luna etiam menstruo cursu convertit sese, ut solis lumina successive recipiat, 
quibus non aliter atque tellus gaudet, et recreatur…’ 
96 De mundo, pp. 176–178. On Gilbert and the moon, see also Roos, Luminaries in the Natural World, pp. 88–93. 
97 The map is between pp. 172 and 173 of De mundo. See Stephen Pumfrey, ‘The Selenographia of William 
Gilbert: His Pre-Telescopic Map of the Moon and His Discovery of Lunar Libration’, Journal for the History of 
Astronomy, 42 (2011): 193–203. 
98 Benedetti, Diversae speculationes, p. 299. 
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homogeneous parts.99 In De magnete and De mundo the entire universe is animated, with the earth, the 
planets and every star possessing their own soul. These souls or astral forms are not all the same. Some, 
such as those of the sun and certain stars, are far more eminent and vigorous than others. Yet they all 
share some characteristics, such as the power to draw their parts back to themselves and extend their 
form outwards.100 Some, such as the earth and the moon, share more in common, as he explains in De 
mundo: 
Every one of the stars is imbued with its own primary and specific nature. For if in a field or meadow 
there are different types of plants, endowed with various virtues, so too are the great orbs informed by 
their own peculiar virtues; no lights are inactive, but light does not supply all vigour to the earth. The 
moon, which consents with the Earth in many ways, and endures similar affections from the sun, is 
indeed another Earth.101  
Thus, it is misleading to argue, as Freudenthal does, that Gilbert ‘postulated only two cosmologically 
significant forces, the magnetic and the quasi-electrical,’ and that ‘according to his theory, the earth and 
all other celestial bodies (including the sun) are physically entirely equivalent and indistinguishable’.102 
Gilbert in fact placed a lot of emphasis on variety: 
The simple and uniform Earth is not so externally, just as the moon, or the planets, or the stars themselves 
are composed of different substances and are vastly different bodies. Some are clear, bright and shining, 
like the sun, Venus, Jupiter, Canis Major, Lyra; others are less splendid, like Saturn, Mercury, Gorgon, 
Corvus; other are wholly without light, such as the Earth, the moon, Praesepe, Sagittarius, Capricorn, the 
head of Orion.103 
In Gilbert’s opinion, the stars and planets are a mixed bag of different globes, some shining with their 
own light, others reflecting light, all with their own effluvia, some more dense than others. Gilbert filled 
his universe with a diverse range of bodies, and a corresponding diversity of ‘forces’. Magnetism is the 
earth’s astral form, sharing similarities with, but not identical to, those of the other globes.  
Gilbert’s aim was to completely remove the philosophical and ontological barriers that differentiated 
the earth from the other planets. ‘Let this therefore be seen as a monstrosity in the Aristotelian universe’, 
he declared in De magnete, ‘in which everything is perfect, vigorous, animate; while the earth alone, an 
                                                          
99 De magnete, p. 65: ‘Forma illa singularis est, et peculiaris, non Peripateticorum causa formalis, et specifica in 
mixtis, et secunda forma, non generantium corporum propagatrix; sed primorum et praecipuorum globorum 
forma; et partium eorum homogenearum, non corruptarum, propria entitas et existentia, quam nos primariam, et 
radicalem, et astream appelare possumus formam; non formam primam Aristotelis, sed singularem illam, quae 
globum suum proprium tuetur et disponit.’ 
100 Ibid., p. 208. 
101 De mundo, p. 174: ‘Unumquodque astrum sua specifica natura et primaria imbuitur. Nam si in prato et herbaceo 
campo, variae sint herbae, virtutibus variis dotatae, consentaneum est magnos orbes, suis etiam peculiaribus 
virtutibus informatos; non lumina sunt otiosa, non omnem vigorem in tellurem infundunt. Lunam, quae in plurimis 
cum tellure consentit, quae similibus affectionibus a Sole patitur, tellurem etiam alteram esse.’  
102 Freudenthal, ‘Theory of Matter and Cosmology’, p. 32.  
103 De mundo, pp. 110–11: ‘Simplex terra et uniformis, licet non exacte, in externis; ut Luna, ut Planetae, ut Stellae 
etiam ipsae, ex varia substantia constant et longe diversa sunt corpora: unde alia clara, limpida, lucentia, ut Sol, 
Venus, Iupiter, Canis major, Lyra; alia minus splendida, ut Saturnus, Mercurius, Gorgon, Corvus; Alia prorsus 
absque luce, ut Terra, Luna, Praesepe, Sagittarius, Capricornus, caput Orionis.’  
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unhappy portion, is paltry, imperfect, dead, inanimate, and perishable’.104 However, the other side of 
the coin for Gilbert was his conviction that there was variety and change in the heavens just as there 
was on earth. The stars are seen as varying in size and brightness, the light of the most excellent ones 
distinguished by the degree of scintillation. Some have dense effluvia which reflect the light from the 
sun. The Milky Way he described as real material, spread and settled through the void of the world, but 
discrete from that void. Of the planets, he seemed unsure whether some shine with their own light or 
whether they all must borrow it from the sun.105 
This variety did not just exist between the different globes, but within the globes themselves. This was 
one of the most interesting repercussions of Gilbert’s attack on Aristotelian cosmology: generation and 
corruption were not limited to the earth itself, but occurred also on the surfaces of the other planets and 
stars: 
All of these, as the rest of the stars, are said to be simple in their interiors and intimate parts. Those who 
are in admiration of such a great simplicity and, as they call it, fifth essence, are greatly fooled. The earth 
is in its own nature simple, true, homogenous and uniform, yet its higher and exposed parts are shaken 
by solar lights as well as the lights of the other stars, and changed into the many species of things and 
corruptions. This is the origin of the varieties of animals, trees, plants, fossils; here is the origin and 
flowing of springs, seas and rivers.106 
The illusion that the heavens do not change, or that their surfaces are composed of simple elements like 
ether or fire, is a product simply of their distance from an observer on earth. ‘If an eye were carried 
above the moon’, he asked in De mundo, ‘would it observe changes in the plants of the earth, or the 
generation and corruption of other things?’107 He expanded on this point again in the first book of 
Meteorologia: 
In all previous times, as far back as can be remembered, if we accept the different traditions, it can be 
understood that no change has been seen to ensue in the highest part of the heavens or any part of it. It is 
now possible to prove, by various examples and reasons, the falsity of this. For the heavens are changed, 
and are ornamented with an admirable variety of things and vicissitude in their globes, in the same way 
as our earth appears to be. And yet no sense, no keenness of sight can see it. Just as if a human eye placed 
in the moon were to look down on the earth, it would not know that there are men, nor the delights of 
                                                          
104 De magnete, pp. 209: ‘Monstrum igitur istud in Aristotelico mundo videatur, in quo omnia perfecta, vivida, 
animata; unica vero terra, infoelix pars pusilla, imperfecta, mortua, inanimata et caduca.’ 
105 De mundo, pp. 206–210. On the Milky Way, see p. 52: ‘Lacteus circulus est realis materia, fusa constansque 
per inania mundi, discreta tamen ab inani.’ See also pp. 247–50. 
106 Ibid., p. 111: ‘Quae omnia, ut reliqua etiam astra suis interioribus et intimis partibus simplicia dici possunt. 
Qui vero tantam supernorum corporum simplicitatem, et quintam, quam vocant, essentiam admirantur, multum 
illi decipiuntur. Terra est in sua natura simplex, vera, homogenica et uniformis, etiamsi priores et extimae partes 
a solaribus, nec non aliorum astrorum luminibus, labefactae sunt, et in multas species rerum et corruptelas 
immutatae. Hinc animalium, arborum, herbarum, fossilium varietates: fontium; marium, et fluviorum primordia 
et confluentiae.’  
107 Ibid., p. 176: ‘Si enim supra Lunam oculus foret, an discerneret mutationem telluris in vegetabilibus, aliisque 
generationibus, et corruptionibus?’  
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forests or plains, nor mountains, nor clouds or rivers. Rather it would see a globe which resembles the 
moon, reflecting the rays of the sun, marked with a mottled face and certain blemishes.108 
We have already seen both Cusa and Benedetti advocate this kind of thought experiment, encouraging 
the reader to imagine what the earth might look like from a distance. Patrizi argued in an even more 
similar vein that the earth would appear much like the moon.109 Gilbert had already demonstrated that 
that particular globe possessed land masses, oceans, mountains, etc. These passages suggest that these 
are features shared by the rest of the globes, and that their similarity to the earth extends to the possibility 
of life on their surfaces. A better understanding of this facet of Gilbert’s cosmology can be achieved by 
examining his theories on the phenomenon of life itself, and generation more broadly.  
‘We consider life to be nothing other than the activity of the attenuated humour within the structures 
(cancellos) of the form.’110 He stated this in De mundo while discussing the nature of heat. Later on, 
while arguing that the earth (and the rest of the globes along with it) possesses a soul, he defined the 
soul, in Aristotelian terms, as ‘the activity of an organic body’.111 Gilbert, who we must remember was 
a physician, opposed established medical theories of natural attraction, especially the notion that heat 
is an attractive force.112 This opposition went hand in hand with, or was perhaps necessitated by, his 
reduction of the elemental scheme and his dismissal of the active role of ‘qualities’. He explained life 
and conception thus: 
We consider the invigorating force or soul to be a formal and organic activity, and the heat of plants and 
animals to be an activity of the attenuation of humours. Life, though, is a combined activity of heat and 
the soul; whether you prefer to call it soul, or the active substantial form, life results from either force. 
The substantial form cannot remain or have effect without heat, such that the form in seeds will lie 
dormant and not grow until heat is moved through the sap, at which point the appropriate humour is 
expanded by attenuation, and flows through itself, emitting roots or appropriate instruments of nutrition, 
and grows larger and rises.113 
                                                          
108 Ibid., pp. 241–42: ‘Omni enim praeterito tempore, quantum ex memoria, quam alii ab aliis traditam accepimus, 
intelligi potest, nulla aut in toto coelo summo, aut in ulla eius parte, consecuta videtur mutatio quod nunc minus 
verum esse variis exemplis et rationibus probari potuisset: tamen immutari coelum, et admirabili rerum varietate, 
et vicissitudine in suis globis (quemadmodum apud nos terra nostra) ornari, et tamen sensus noster nullus, nulla 
oculorum acies illam percipere potest. veluti si in Luna positus humanus oculus terras despectaret, non agnosceret 
quid facerent homines, non sylvarum, non camporum amoenitates, non montes, non nubes, non pluvias; globum 
tamen instar Lunae, Solis radios remittentem, varia facie et quibusdam quasi maculis insignitum, videret.’  
109 Patrizi, Nova de universis philosophia, fol. 112v: ‘Neque ullum dubium nobis est, si quis nostrum, in lunam 
ascenderet, terramque inde prospectaret, eadem illi in terra apparitura, quae nobis hinc in luna apparent.’ 
Translation: ‘Nor do we doubt that, if one of us were to ascend to the moon and from there view the earth, the 
same things would appear on earth to him as appear to us on the moon from here.’ 
110 De mundo, p. 81: ‘nosque vitam nihil aliud esse volumus, quam actum humoris attenuati intra formae 
cancellos’. 
111 Ibid., p. 176: ‘Anima est actus corporis organici.’ See Aristotle, On the Soul, 412a30. 
112 Gilbert, De mundo, p. 98. 
113 Ibid, p. 97: ‘positum enim est a nobis, vegetatricem vim sive animam, actum esse formalem organicum; 
caloremque stirpium, ut et animalium esse actum attenuationis humoris. vita vero est combinatus actus caloris et 
animae; sive animam volueris, sive substantialem formam operantem, per utrum vigorem vita existit. Nam et 
substantialis forma absque calore idoneo sopita diu manet, nec effectum producit, quemadmodum in seminibus 
cernere licet, quae non germinant, nec incrementum habent, donec calenti succo perfusa moventur. cum vero 
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But how did this concept of life agree with Gilbert’s theory that everything on earth derived from the 
one true earth element? For Gilbert, true earth not only contains an intrinsic moisture or sap, it also 
contains the seeds of all variety on earth. For example, in De magnete he talked about how the earth 
produces the different metals. He disagreed with the notions of the alchemists (chemistae) that it has 
anything to do with quantity or proportion, or any material cause whatsoever. Rather, when beds or 
regions agree appropriately with the material or moisture or vapour from the earth, the metals ‘assume 
forms from the universal nature, by which they are perfected; no different from the other minerals, 
plants, and animals whatever’.114 
The seed of everything, animal, vegetable, mineral, is present in the true earth itself, awaiting the proper 
circumstances to manifest. This he explained further in De magnete:  
For the hidden beginnings of metals and stones lie inside the earth, as those of herbs and plants do in its 
outer crust (peripheria). For the soil dug out of a deep well, where would seem to be no suspicion of 
harboured seed, when placed on a very high tower, produces green plants and unbidden grass by the 
incubation of the sun and sky (coelum); and those of the kind which grow spontaneously in that region, 
for each region produces its own herbs and plants, also its own metals.115 
This example of somewhat spontaneous generation was repeated in De mundo, along with further 
explanations of the role of the earth in generation: 
The earth is our common mother, it alone provides matter, and in it lie the seedbeds of things, which, 
when they are conceived in the fitting place by the activity of the humour, begin to have motion, change 
and condition from the activity of the humour within the structures of the form… Every single thing 
exists in the appropriate form of being. Those things which take root adhere to the earth and draw from 
it the sap necessary to its form... However, those things which live in the water move in the earth’s thinner 
sap, and are preserved by the appropriate warmth of the water. The rest of the animals live in the air, 
which is the most attenuated fluid. They are rejuvenated by this spirit-like fluid, they prolong their life 
by its heat, and they consume food so that, the humour having been consumed and put in motion, they 
grow.116 
                                                          
idoneus humor attenuando solvitur, fundunt sese, radicesque emittunt, tanquam nutritioni instrumenta idonea, 
germinant amplius et assurgunt’.   
114 De magnete, p. 20: ‘sed quando cum idonea materia alveis convenientibus, et regionibus, formas apprehendunt, 
ab universali natura, quibus perficiuntur; non aliter atque reliqua fossilia, vegetabilia, et animalia quaeque’. 
115 Ibid., p. 21: ‘Latent enim in tellure metallorum et lapidum abdita primordia, ut in peripheria, herbarum et 
stirpium. Terra enim ex profundo puteo eruta, ubi nulla suspicio concepti seminis esse videatur, si in altissima 
turri posita fuerit, herbam producit virentem, et iniussa gramina, Sole et coelo terrae incubantibus; atque illa 
quidem quae in illa regione sunt spontanea; suas enim unaquaeque; regio herbas producit, et stirpes, sua etiam 
metalla.’ 
116 De mundo, p. 46: ‘Tellus communis mater est, haec sola materiam suppeditat, in ea latent seminaria rerum; 
quae ut concepta fuerint loco idoneo, ab actu humoris, intra formae cancellos principium habent motus, 
augmentum, et statum. Elementa non aliunde petuntur: unaquaeque res in convenienti essentia; quae radices agunt, 
in tellure haerent, succumque inde hauriunt cuique formae necessarium. Succus ex tellure ducitur, quae undique 
et per universam molem succum habet insitum et genuinum. Quae vero in aquis degunt, in telluris solutiori succo 
vagantur, et aquarum convenienti tepore conservantur. In aere vero, qui fluor est attenuatus magis, caetera degunt 
animalia, fluore spirituali recreantur, eiusque etiam tepore vitam producunt, alimentaque etiam assumunt, ut acto 
et absumpto humore nova addantur incrementa.’  
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In Gilbert’s philosophy, the seeds lie dormant in the earth until germinated by moisture and heat. They 
grow by the addition of matter or humours—the appropriate nutrition being selected by the form—and 
this growth is directed again by the form into the appropriate shape.117 This process works similarly in 
animals as well as plants. In 1953, Jane Oppenheimer drew attention to an overlooked experiment in 
De magnete to do with plant grafting. In her opinion, the purpose of the experiment, seemingly out of 
place in a work on magnetism, was to demonstrate the importance of ‘form’ in the growth of both 
mineral and living substance.118 It is interesting to note that throughout all these processes—through the 
growth, development and change of living things—the hypostasis of the true earth remains embedded 
in the nature of everything.119  
Gilbert considered the life of all animals and plants to depend upon the living nature of the globes 
themselves, and thus celestial influence is intimately connected with his concept of an animate universe. 
In De magnete, when discussing the souls of the globes, he admitted that they would not have organs 
like other animals, ‘yet they live and imbue with life the small particles in the outer parts of the earth’. 
Furthermore, ‘since living bodies arise and receive life from the earth and the sun, and plants grow on 
the earth without any seeds thrown down… it is not likely that they can produce what is not in them; 
but they awaken life, and therefore they are living’.120 We need not look to Bruno as a source for this 
kind of animism. After all, we saw the very same argument put forward by Averroes. Like the motion 
of the globes, which is a composite of interior and exterior forces, life too is the combined product of 
the innate seeds and moisture of the earth with the life engendering virtues of the sun and other globes. 
Gilbert never discussed the nature of life on other planets or stars, nor did he explicitly refer to there 
being animals or rational creatures on them. He wasn’t, like Bruno, the champion of an infinitely 
populated universe. Nor did he speculate on the nature of extraterrestrial beings, as Nicholas of Cusa 
had done. Let us examine what he did commit to. In terms of being composed of a homogeneous 
substance and having a unique and extended astral form, the earth and the other stars and planets are of 
a kind. They also share the same reasoning behind their motions, i.e., the regulation of celestial influence 
to aid the conservation, perfection and ornamentation of their parts. The significance of this for the 
production of living things, at least in terms of the earth, is made clear in De magnete: 
But it is ridiculous for a philosophical person to suppose that all the fixed stars and the planets and the 
still higher heavens revolve to no other purpose, except the benefit of the Earth. It is the Earth, then, that 
                                                          
117 See ibid., pp. 217–218. 
118 Jane M. Oppenheimer, ‘William Gilbert: Plant Grafting and the Grand Analogy’, Journal of the History of 
Medicine and Allied Sciences, 8 (1953): 165–76. 
119 De mundo, p. 109: ‘Sed in terra firma et magnetica humor insitus exspirare potest; tota vero natura in aquam 
non solvitur, manet enim in rerum natura hypostasis telluris immutabilis.’ Translation: ‘The intrinsic humour in 
the firm and magnetic earth can be exhaled, but the whole nature is not changed into water. Instead, the immutable 
hypostasis of earth remains in the nature of things.’ 
120 De magnete, p. 209: ‘vivunt tamen, et vita imbuunt corpuscula in terrenis eminentiis... Cum vero a tellure et 
sole viventia corpora oriantur et animentur, crescantque in terra herbae absque ullis iactis seminibus … non 
verisimile est posse illa efficere quod in illis non sit, sed animas excitant, ideoque sunt animata’. 
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revolves, not the whole heaven, and this motion gives opportunity for the growth and decrease of things, 
and for the generation of living things, and awakens an internal heat for the bearing of life.121 
At the end of Book 5 of De magnete is one of the clearest indications in his work that he considered the 
other planets to be inhabited. All the globes are living and each possesses a soul of its own, as we have 
seen, which pervades its interior and homogeneous parts, but ‘it is only on the surfaces of the globes 
that the multitude of living and animated beings is clearly perceived, by which great and delightful 
variety the great maker is well pleased.’122 He wasn’t referring here just to the earth but rather to the 
‘globes’ plural. If we couple this with his arguments in De mundo that the heavenly bodies have their 
own effluvia, experience change, and enjoy admirable varieties and vicissitudes like the earth, it 
becomes clear that life on the surface of other globes was at the very least a possible, and more likely a 
realised, feature of Gilbert’s cosmology. According to Gilbert the earth is a planet, or rather the earth, 
planets and stars are animate globes, distinct but of a kind. This fundamental tenet combined with 
Gilbert’s understanding of planetary motions as self-regulatory in terms of light and celestial influence. 
These influences are not only life sustaining but life engendering, giving rise to the conclusion that the 
surfaces of the moon and the other planets are adorned with a variety of living things, as the earth is. 
 
Conclusion 
Unlike others that followed him, or indeed some that preceded him, Gilbert did not expand upon the 
subject of living beings on other planets. His chapters on the moon in De mundo, including his 
selenograph, are the only example of Gilbert investigating the nature of the surface of any other globe. 
The importance of his philosophy lies in the removal of any natural barriers to the existence of ET life. 
Crucially, in regard to our present investigation, this did not preclude a belief in astrology. In fact, 
astrology was central to his extension of life to the other globes. He represents further evidence that the 
development of pluralist ideas was often linked to changing ideas about the function, nature and extent 
of celestial influence. For Gilbert, celestial motion could be explained as individual globes 
endeavouring to regulate influences in order to preserve habitable conditions on their exteriors. The 
predominant influence is the light from the sun, but it also includes the more particular effects of the 
planets and stars. The celestial bodies move not for our benefit, but for their own, a theory which only 
makes sense if their surfaces are habitats like that of the earth. Gilbert thus united the terrestrial and 
                                                          
121 Ibid., p. 225: ‘Volvi vero astra omnia fixa, et errones, caelosque adhuc superiores, necquiquam nisi telluris 
commodo, homini philosopho ridiculum est putare. Volvitur igitur tellus non caelum totum; qui motus incrementis 
et decrementis rerum, et animantium generationi occasionem adfert, et intestinos calores ad foeturam excitat.’ 
122 Ibid., p. 210: ‘Sed in globorum extremitatibus tantum, animarum et animatorum frequentia manifestius cernitur, 
in quibus summus opifex, maiore et iucunda varietate sibi perplacet.’ 
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celestial realms, theorising an astrologically vibrant universe throughout which life thrives in its many 
forms. 
It is unclear how many people read De mundo, either in its manuscript form or after it was eventually 
published nearly fifty years after Gilbert’s death.123 His legacy was guaranteed by De magnete, and his 
attribution of magnetism as the method of the earth’s rotation, as well as his comparison of the earth to 
the other planets, opened up the door for the application of terrestrial or sublunar philosophy to the 
celestial realm.124 Gilbert’s new philosophy is deserving of a more prominent place in the history of the 
ET life debate, both because of the obvious influence of pluralist ideas on his cosmology, and because 
of the influence that his theories had on subsequent philosophers and astronomers. His description of 
magnetism as the astral virtue of the earth should also be of interest to historians of astrology, as it 
represents a bridge between older conceptions of astrological virtues and newer ideas about celestial 
physics. The link between astrology and pluralism makes him particularly relevant to the history of 
astrobiology. His ideas about matter theory, magnetism, biology and planetary motion all combined in 
a unique vision of life in a cosmic context, or perhaps of the cosmos in a vital context. In the next 
chapter, we turn to one person who was greatly influenced by Gilbert, and who earned notoriety for his 
ideas about both celestial physics and ET life: Johannes Kepler.
                                                          
123 Two known readers were Francis Bacon and Thomas Harriot. To this can be added Otto von Guericke, as will 
be discussed in Chapter 4.  
124 On the magnetic philosophy in the seventeenth century, see J. A. Bennett, ‘Cosmology and the Magnetical 
Philosophy 1640-1680’, Journal for the History of Astronomy, 12 (1981): 165–77; Pumfrey, ‘William Gilbert’s 
Magnetic Philosophy 1580-1684’; id., ‘Neo-Aristotelianism and the Magnetic Philosophy’, in New Perspectives 
on Renaissance Thought: Essays in the History of Science, Education and Philosophy: In Memory of Charles B. 
Schmitt, ed. by John Henry and Sarah Hutton (London: Duckworth, 1990): 177–89. See also Xiaona Wang, 
‘Francis Bacon and Magnetical Cosmology’, Isis, 107 (2016): 707–21. Although Wang’s assertion that Gilbert 
didn’t believe, or encourage others to believe, in action at a distance is debatable. On Gilbert’s influence on the 





Johannes Kepler: A New Astronomy, Astrological Harmonies and 
Living Creatures 
Thus the harmonies of music are sought within by the singer; the harmonies of the rays are looked for 
outside by sublunary Nature, are observed when met, are discriminated from those which are not 
harmonic (and thus take from it their essence), are selected, and are applied. In brief, the configurations 
sing the leading part; sublunary Nature dances to the laws of this song.  
Johannes Kepler1  
 
Thus this appearance, brought by the agency of light to the body of the Sun, can along with the light 
itself flow straight to living creatures, who share in this instinct, just as in the fourth book we have stated 




Johannes Kepler (1571–1630), the imperial mathematician who discovered the elliptical orbits of the 
planets, and whose name has recently been given to the thousands of exoplanets discovered by the 
Kepler orbital telescope, was also one of the last great minds to lend his talents to the scientific 
justification of astrology. His astrological theories, almost entirely based upon the influence of harmony 
on the soul, were as unprecedented as they were un-replicated. Often seen as an example of his Janus-
like nature, facing both the ancient and modern worlds, Kepler’s astrology was in fact a crucial part of 
the cosmology which gave birth to his now vaunted laws of planetary motion. At the same time, his 
contributions to the pluralist philosophy ‘make one of the most dramatic stories in the entire history of 
the extraterrestrial life debate’.3 Throughout his career Kepler vocally advocated the existence of living 
creatures on the other celestial globes, including the moon, the planets, and eventually even the sun 
itself. It seems that initially this advocacy was based upon perceived similarities between the earth and 
the other globes, in particular the earth-like geographical features of the moon. Yet this is only one part 
of the story. In fact, Kepler’s astrological beliefs provided an even more compelling reason to assume 
the existence of ET life. His astrological theories expanded the operation of celestial influence to centres 
                                                          
1 Johannes Kepler, The Harmony of the World, trans. by E. J. Aiton, A. M. Duncan and J. V. Field (Philadelphia, 
PA: American Philosophical Society, 1997), p. 325. 
2 Ibid., p. 424. 
3 Crowe, The Extraterrestrial Life Debate, p. 10. 
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other than the earth. In particular, his discovery of astrological harmonies centred on the sun 
necessitated the existence of souls engaged in the active reception of that influence. 
There is no space here to attempt to reconstruct a comprehensive account of Kepler’s cosmology. 
Thankfully, the ever-increasing field of Kepler scholarship has produced some thorough studies of 
various aspects of Kepler’s astronomy, astrology, physics and metaphysics.4 This chapter will focus 
mainly on instances of Kepler’s discussion of astrological and pluralistic themes, discussing other areas 
of his philosophy when relevant, to analyse exactly what fuelled his commitment to the existence of ET 
life and how it fitted into his highly theological cosmos. During the course of this chapter, comparisons 
will be drawn between Kepler and Gilbert, highlighting points of convergence and departure between 
the cosmologies of these two important figures in the early history of pluralism. In Kepler’s cosmos, 
like Gilbert’s, the celestial bodies serve as sources of influence while at the same time providing habitats 
for their own creatures. He therefore represents an intermediary stage in the development of astronomy 
which saw astrology supplanted by pluralism. Kepler’s extraterrestrials, like his laws of planetary 
motion, would eventually be separated from the philosophy in which they were conceived. 
 
Kepler’s Early Works: The Moon, Optics and Astrology 
Kepler’s first publication was his Mysterium cosmographicum (‘The Secret of the Universe’), in which 
he constructed a defence of the Copernican system based on astronomical, physical, geometrical and 
teleological grounds.5 He argued against the existence of solid spheres or orbs in the heavens, claiming 
rather that the region was full of what he called an ethereal or celestial ‘air’ (coelestis aura).6 He also 
argued against the Aristotelian notion of gravity and levity, in which elements were supposed to seek 
their natural place, in favour of the Copernican notion that everything of the same nature as a body 
sought its centre.7 For the first time as well, he proposed a motive soul or spirit in the sun which was 
                                                          
4 Some of the more relevant works for this discussion are Gérard Simon, ‘Kepler’s Astrology: The Direction of a 
Reform’, Vistas in Astronomy, 18 (1975): 439–48; J. V. Field, ‘A Lutheran Astrologer: Johannes Kepler’, Archive 
for the History of Exact Sciences, 31 (1984): 189–272; ead., Kepler’s Geometrical Cosmology (London: Athlone, 
1988); Bruce Stephenson, Kepler’s Physical Astronomy (New York: Springer, 1987); id., The Music of the 
Heavens: Kepler’s Harmonic Astronomy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Sheila J. Rabin, ‘Kepler’s 
Attitude Toward Pico and the Anti-Astrology Polemic’, Renaissance Quarterly, 50 (1997): 750–70; Charlotte 
Methuen, Kepler’s Tübingen: Stimulus to a Theological Mathematics (Aldershot; Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 
1998); Rhonda Martens, Kepler’s Philosophy and the New Astronomy (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2000); James R. Voelkel, The Composition of Kepler’s Astronomia Nova (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2001); Richard Lynn Kremer and Jarosław Włodarczyk (eds), Johannes Kepler: From Tübingen to Żagań, 
(Warsaw: Institut Historii Nauki PAN, 2009); Patrick J. Boner, Kepler’s Cosmological Synthesis: Astrology, 
Mechanism and the Soul (Leiden: Brill, 2013).  
5 Kepler, Mysterium cosmographicum (1596), in GW 1, pp. 1–80. English translations are from Johannes Kepler, 
The Secret of the Universe, trans. by A. M. Duncan (New York: Abaris, 1981).  
6 GW 1, p. 54. 
7 Ibid., p. 59. 
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responsible for driving the orbits of the planets.8 Yet quite aside from these seemingly modernising 
developments, the real crowning glory of this publication in Kepler’s eyes was his theory that the 
number and spacing of the planets in the Copernican system were determined by the five Platonic 
solids.9 With this theory, in which the regular solids (the tetrahedron, cube, octahedron, dodecahedron, 
and icosahedron) fit in between the insubstantial orbital spheres of the six planets, Kepler believed he 
had found the secret geometrical blueprint for God’s creation of the universe.  
This discovery, however, carried a significance beyond astronomy. These solids were not just 
quantitative, determining numbers and distances, but qualitative, relating to both the order and operation 
of the celestial world. In Kepler’s system, the earth, situated between the dodecahedron and the 
icosahedron, created a separation between the two classes of solids. This fit with his conviction that the 
earth was the ‘pinnacle and pattern of the whole universe’ and the most important of the planets: the 
dwelling place of Man, God’s favourite creature and the purpose of all creation.10 On a more practical 
note, Kepler also suggested in the Mysterium that the virtue or power of a planet, astrologically 
speaking, bore a relationship to the solid or solids which determine its orbit. ‘I shall have the physicists 
against me in these chapters’, he stated, ‘because I have deduced the natural properties of the planets 
from immaterial things and mathematical figures.’11 In fact, this practice of deducing qualitative 
properties from quantitative ratios would become a hallmark of Kepler’s natural philosophy, and in this 
work we see his first attempt to give a rational basis for the efficacy of astrological aspects.12 Astrology 
was an example of how geometry provided the blueprint not only for creation but also for the continuing 
operation of nature, and it remained a source of practical and philosophical fascination throughout his 
life.13 
One other such source of fascination was provided by pluralism. Kepler’s first treatment of pluralist 
themes appeared in the Mysterium during his discussion of the moon. In one particular passage, he 
suggested that the moon is dragged around by the earth—an early indication of the development of 
Kepler’s celestial physics which would develop still further once he read Gilbert’s De magnete.14 He 
then portrayed the moon as a source of influence; a steward serving its master, the earth, with light and 
moisture. He also asserted that an observer on the moon would be unsure of his direction or even if he 
is moving at all. This argument, designed to counter those against the motion of the earth, formed the 
core of the disputation that Kepler had written as a student, but been prevented from defending, at 
                                                          
8 Ibid., p. 70. 
9 Ibid., esp. p. 26. 
10 Ibid., p. 28. 
11 The Secret of the Universe, p. 123; GW 1, p. 37.  
12 Ibid., p. 43. 
13 On this point, see especially Field, Kepler’s Geometrical Cosmology. 
14 GW 1, pp. 55–56. 
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Tübingen in 1593. This work developed throughout his life before being posthumously published as his 
Somnium (1634). 
In one line of particular relevance to the issue of pluralism, Kepler considered it as proven that the moon 
contained geographical features which correspond to those of the earth, and went on to say that ‘on this 
account alone Copernicus is more convincing, as he endows these two bodies with a common position 
and motion’.15 Kepler was encouraged to engage with Copernicanism by Michael Maestlin (1550-
1631), professor of mathematics at Tübingen, who played an important role in Kepler’s early lunar 
theories as well.16 What is interesting is that both before and after this mention of the earth-like features 
of the lunar surface, Kepler linked it with the Copernican argument that they shared a common space 
and motion. By connecting the common nature of the earth and moon with their common situation in 
the Copernican scheme, he was in fact suggesting that the former was a consequence of the latter.  
At this early stage in his career, it appears that Kepler only extended earth-like qualities as far as the 
lunar globe, and that as part of a larger attempt to build evidence for the Copernican cause. Part of this 
attempt is continued in his first work on optics, the Astronomiae pars optica (‘The Optical Part of 
Astronomy’) published in 1604.17 Kepler considered optics as the third part of astronomy, along with 
the mechanical part (instruments), historical part (observations), and the fourth ‘physical part’.18 The 
first part of this work is laden with cosmogonic, metaphysical, and anatomical theories, some of which 
may be outlined here. Kepler believed that by giving the universe the shape of the sphere, God created 
in it an image of the Trinity, with the Father as the centre, the Son as the circumference, and the Holy 
Spirit as the intervening space.19 Material objects, such as the magnet, effused their virtues in a sphere. 
Light, as an effused virtue of the sun, proceeded in an infinite number of straight lines in an instant, or 
infinitely quickly, but was attenuated with breadth.20 The sun, accordingly, must be in the centre in 
order to project its light equally into a sphere.21 Furthermore, Kepler assumed that all light had heat. 
Within the human body, the heart contained a flame which transmitted heat to the body through the 
arteries, and so animal heat depended on light. The soul itself had an essence similar to light, and their 
fellowship was analogous to that of heat with light, ‘so far as light is the offspring of the soul.’22 
                                                          
15 The Secret of the Universe, p. 165; GW 1, p. 56. 
16 See e.g. Anthony Grafton, ‘Michael Maestlin’s Account of Copernican Planetary Theory’, Proceedings of the 
American Philosophical Society, 117 (1973): 523–50; Max Caspar, Kepler, trans. by Clarisse Doris Helmman 
with introd. by Owen Gingerich (New York: Dover, 1993), p. 46; Charlotte Methuen, ‘Maestlin’s Teaching of 
Copernicus: The Evidence of His University Textbook and Disputations’, Isis, 87 (1996): 230–47. 
17 Kepler, Astronomiae pars optica (1604), in GW 2.  
18 Ibid., p. 14. 
19 Ibid., p. 19. 
20 On Kepler’s metaphysics of light, and his debt to Plotinus, see Lindberg, ‘The Genesis of Kepler’s Theory of 
Light’.  
21 GW 2, p. 19. 
22 Ibid., p. 36: ‘…quatenus lux animae soboles’. 
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Pluralist ideas again materialise in the chapter on spots on the moon.23 ‘I assert the body of the moon to 
be of such a kind as this our earth,’ wrote Kepler, ‘one globe made from water and continents.’24 After 
presenting his reasons derived from optics to support this assertion, Kepler made his first mention of 
ET life: 
All these things provide evidence to what I have said: Plutarch is right in stating that the moon is like the 
earth, uneven and mountainous, and that, in proportion to its globe, its mountains are taller than the ones 
on earth. And likewise, allow me to play with Plutarch: since it comes to us by experience that men and 
animals take after the nature of their own land or region, therefore there will be living creatures 
(creaturae viventes) in the moon that are much greater in the size of their bodies and the hardness of their 
temperament than we are. The reason is clearly that, if there is anybody there, they endure days that are 
fifteen times longer than ours, with unimaginable heat, as the oppressive sun is overhead for a long time. 
Thus it was not rashly believed by common superstition to be the place appointed for the purification of 
souls.25 
Here Kepler speculated that if there were living creatures on the moon their physiology would be 
adapted to the evident nature of their dwelling place. Just as their mountains are bigger in comparison 
to the moon’s diameter, so their bodies would be larger than ours. They must also be tougher to endure 
the intense heat of the long lunar days. The concept of the celestial bodies as destinations for the soul 
after death is representative of that strand of Christian-Platonic eschatology, immortalised by Dante’s 
Paradiso, which will continue to echo through Kepler’s entanglement with pluralism, as indeed it has 
echoed through the ‘plurality of worlds’ philosophy up to the present day.26 Even as Kepler appears to 
us to break new ground by introducing pluralist themes into the serious study of astronomy, he did so 
by presenting it through the lens of his classical and religious heritage. 
There is no mention here of why precisely there should be creatures on the moon. The proposition is 
instead framed as a joke shared with Plutarch, whose De facie he had encountered since writing his 
student disputation.27 But this joke, as is the case for most of Kepler’s jocular outbursts, is in fact 
                                                          
23 Kepler highlights the importance of lunar theory to the Copernican cause. See GW 2, p. 224: ‘Tandem vero, ubi 
Plutarchus, ubi Moestlinus aequis in Philosophia auribus fuerint accepti: tum bene Aristarchus cum Copernico 
suo discipulo sperare incipiat.’ 
24 Ibid., p. 118: ‘…dicamque, Lunae tale esse corpus, quale haec nostra terra est, ex aqua et continentibus unum 
globum efficiens’. 
25 Ibid., p. 220: ‘Haec omnia mihi praebent argumentum eius quod dixi: recte Lunam a Plutarcho tale corpus dici, 
quale terra est, inaequale montuosumque, et maiores quidem montes in proportione ad suum globum, quam sunt 
terreni in sua proportione. Ac ut cum Plutarcho etiam iocemur: quia penes nos usu venit, ut homines et animalia 
sequantur ingenium terrae seu provinciae suae: Erunt igitur in Luna creaturae viventes, multo maiori corporum 
mole, temperamentorumque duritie, quam nostra: sane quia et diem quindecim nostros dies longam, et ineffabiles 
aestus, Sole verticibus tam diu incumbente, perferunt, siquidem aliqui ibi sunt. Ut non absurde locus ille gentium 
superstitione lustrationi animarum destinari creditus sit.’ 
26 In particular in religious movements such as Swedenborgianism and Mormonism. See David Dunér, 
‘Swedenborg and the Plurality of Worlds: Astrotheology in the Eighteenth Century’, Zygon, 51 (2016): 450–79; 
Robert Paul, ‘Joseph Smith and the Plurality of Worlds Idea’, Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought, 19 (1986): 
13–36. 
27 Kepler’s own Latin translation is in GW 11.2, pp. 380–483. See Appendix D in Johannes Kepler, Somnium: The 
Dream, or Posthumous Work on Lunar Astronomy, trans. by Edward Rosen (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1967), pp. 209–11. 
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serious.28 The argument which is implicit here is made explicit in Kepler’s second optical work, 
Dioptrice (‘Dioptrics’), published in 1611, in which he revisited the optical part of astronomy in the 
wake of the recent application of the telescope: 
For if one wishes to focus the power of reason on these new observations, who does not see how far the 
contemplation of nature will extend its boundaries, while we inquire for whose good (cui bono) the tracts 
of mountains and valleys and the large expanses of oceans in the moon are, and whether a certain creature, 
not less ignoble than man, can be proposed, which inhabits those tracts.29 
This cui bono argument lies at the heart of most debates on the topic of cosmological pluralism in the 
seventeenth century and beyond. We saw it already in Patrizi’s repetition of the dictum that God does 
nothing in vain. It is usually a consequence of the discovery of celestial objects or phenomena which 
conflict with the conception of the universe as centred around and geared towards the only inhabited 
place within it: the earth. Here we see the process of geocentrism and anthropocentrism giving way to 
a kind of anthropomorphism-cum-geomorphism, where a particular feature of the planetary or celestial 
realm is interpreted through analogy to its terrestrial equivalent and understood function. 
Kepler’s early engagement with pluralism, as mentioned, was limited to the moon. Obviously, of all the 
celestial globes it displays its imperfections, and subsequently its similarity to the earth, most clearly. 
But there is another possible reason. Before the publication of Galileo’s telescopic observations, Kepler 
believed that the other planets were in fact different in nature to the earth and the moon in one important 
aspect: light. In his De fundamentis astrologiae certioribus (‘On the More Certain Foundations of 
Astrology’, 1601), a work on the principles of astrology attached to his prognostication for the following 
year, he took a somewhat agnostic stance on the issue of whether the planets only reflected the light of 
the sun or whether they had their own intrinsic light as well.30 In his Astronomiae pars optica he took a 
more positive position and presented several arguments, derived from his astrological work, for why 
the planets shine with a ‘double light’.31 Firstly, Venus does not seem to demonstrate phases like the 
moon. Secondly, not all light must come from the sun, as some things in the sublunary world have their 
own intrinsic light. Thirdly, he argued that from a certain combination of geometrical differences, and 
the function of celestial light, it is necessary that the planets have both their own light and that from the 
                                                          
28 See Nick Jardine, ‘God’s “Ideal Reader”: Kepler and His Serious Jokes’, in Johannes Kepler: From Tübingen 
to Żagań: 41–52 (45). 
29 Kepler, Dioptrice (1611), in GW 4, pp. 327–414 (342): ‘Quod si cui iam super novis hisce observationibus 
lubeat etiam Rationis vim excutere: quis non videt, quam longe contemplatio Naturae sua pomoeria prolatura sit; 
dum quaerimus, cui bono in Luna sint montium valliumque tractus, marium amplissima spacia; et an non 
ignobilior aliqua Creatura, quam homo, statui possit, quae tractus illos inhabitet.’  
30 Kepler, De fundamentis astrologiae certioribus (1601), in GW 4, pp. 7–35. On planetary light, see especially 
Theses 25–32, pp. 17–20. See also the notes to these sections in the English translation in Field, A Lutheran 
Astrologer, p. 236 (n. 16) and p. 243 (ns 29, 30). The more traditional Aristotelian stance was that the planets are 
wholly illuminated by the sun. Grant traces the alternate hypothesis to Avicenna and Macrobius, with further 
arguments developed by Nicole Oresme and Albert of Saxony. Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs, pp. 393–413, esp. 
400–402. 
31 GW 2, pp. 228–29. 
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sun.32 Lastly, he gave his reasons for the effects of the planets being a result of their nature, with colour 
being indicative of nature.33 
In his De fundamentis, Kepler had argued for three main astrological ‘causes’. The first was physical. 
The sun heats through direct light; the moon humidifies through borrowed light. The planets do both, 
as well as transmitting some of their own nature as indicated by their colour.34 The second cause was 
geometrical, dealing mainly with aspects. The soul of the earth (more on this below), or the soul of a 
man, discerns when two or more planets are arranged at harmonic angles, and is at that moment roused 
into action. For the soul of the earth this means an increase in the production of vapours and therefore 
adverse weather.35 This theory of the aspects, developed philosophically through the study of geometry 
and the earth’s soul, and experimentally through the observation of the weather, formed the core of 
Kepler’s astrological project. A third cause, expressed at this point only as a suggestion, is what Kepler 
called a ‘harmonic cause’. If the soul can recognise harmonic angles, why not also harmonic ratios 
between the orbital velocities of the planets?36 In his more mature astrology, Kepler would largely 
abandon the physical cause, at least with regards to the planets and the humidifying power of reflected 
light, and focus on developing the second and third causes. At this early stage, however, it seems that, 
along with a lack of observational evidence, the need to preserve astrological efficacy was part of the 
reason why Kepler maintained a diversity in nature between the earth and the moon on the one hand, 
and the planets on the other. 
 
Kepler’s Nova and its Pluralist Significance 
Not long after the completion of his Astronomiae pars optica, however, Kepler professed his belief in 
the wider diffusion of ET life through the universe. The occasion which prompted this response was the 
controversy over the new star of 1604. This supernova, now known as ‘Kepler’s Nova’, aroused 
fascination and trepidation all across Europe.37 Large numbers of works of varying lengths and degrees 
of sophistication were published on the possible causes and astrological significance of the new star. 
Many called for Kepler, then the Imperial Mathematician, to publish his own views. He quickly 
published a short tract in German, but then delayed publication of a full treatment in Latin until two 
                                                          
32 He didn’t proceed to the conclusion that the earth, one of the planets, has its own light, as Cusa had done.  
33 The argument that the varying colours of the planets suggested a degree of self-luminosity was made by Albert 
of Saxony. See Grant, Planets, Stars, and Orbs, p. 402. 
34 GW 4, Theses 5, p. 12; 15, p. 14; 19, p. 15; 21, p. 16. 
35 Ibid., Thesis 43, pp. 23–24.  
36 Ibid., Thesis 48, pp. 25–26.  
37 See Miguel A. Granada, ‘Kepler v. Roeslin on the Interpretation of Kepler’s Nova: (1) 1604–1606’, Journal for 
the History of Astronomy, 36 (2005): 299–319; Patrick J. Boner, ‘Kepler v. the Epicureans: Causality, Coincidence 
and the Origins of the New Star of 1604’, Journal for the History of Astronomy, 38 (2007): 207–21. 
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years later.38 In De stella nova (‘On the New Star’), published in 1606, Kepler was compelled to discuss 
a wide range of astronomical issues relevant to the appearance of the new star.39 Long sections were 
dedicated to attacks on Aristotelian cosmology, the infinite universe of Bruno, and large swathes of 
astrological theory and practice.  
When discussing what caused the nova and how it was created, Kepler tried at all times to refrain from 
a divine or astrological explanation. Instead, he maintained that the nova was created by a natural 
process with a terrestrial equivalent. The earth, he believed, has a natural faculty which produces new 
things out of excess material. These things include weather phenomena, gems and minerals, plants, and 
small animals. The problem of spontaneous generation, as we have seen, was an old one in philosophy, 
and much discussed in Renaissance medical humanism.40 Kepler here aligned himself with some of the 
tenets of the Platonism of Marsilio Ficino, who believed the soul of the earth, a sub-class of the world-
soul, to be responsible for the production of plants and small animals from waste materials.41 Kepler 
argued that if the earth, one of the globes, possesses this faculty, then the other globes should possess it 
too. Yet the new star was produced not in a globe but in the ether itself, so it is necessary that there 
should be some similar faculty spread throughout the whole of the universe that cleans the ether by 
conglomerating and igniting excess material.42  
Kepler revealed his immediate source for this concept in a letter to David Fabricius, part of a detailed 
correspondence between the two men on the subject of the new star: 
I do not differ greatly from the philosophy of Cornelius Gemma, who supposes there to be one and the 
same spirit in the whole universe changing bodies (somatomorphōn) everyday, which acts according to 
the principle of the better and recognises what can be made most suitably anywhere from redundant 
material. Therefore, it changes the sweat of a woman or dog into head lice and fleas, dew into locusts 
and caterpillars, rope into eels, mud into frogs, water into fish, earth into plants, corpses into worms, 
dung into beetles and infinite new and unusual things, the exhalations of the air into shooting stars, and 
those of the ethereal region into comets and finally into stars. You can see that everywhere there is 
something moist that contains a seminal principle and produces the diversity of the species, so that not 
from the leaves of just any tree is a particular caterpillar born, but specific caterpillars from specific 
leaves. Yet that spirit of the whole world seems to exist for this purpose: that all things are regulated with 
respect to each other, and suitable bodily organs are added to a new creature. If nothing lived, it alone 
would enliven all matter, just as the earth, if nothing moved, would attract everything to itself, some 
things closer than others.43  
                                                          
38 Kepler, De stella nova in pede serpentarii (1606), in GW 1, pp. 149–356. 
39 See Miguel A. Granada, ‘Johannes Kepler and David Fabricius: Their Discussion on the Nova of 1604’, in 
Change and Continuity in Early Modern Cosmology, ed. by Patrick J. Boner (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011): 66–92; 
Patrick J. Boner, ‘Kepler’s Copernican Campaign and the New Star of 1604’, in Change and Continuity in Early 
Modern Cosmology: 93–114.  
40 See for example Hirai, Medical Humanism and Natural Philosophy. 
41 Ibid., pp. 124–25. See also James G. Snyder, ‘Marsilio Ficino’s Critique of the Lucretian Alternative’, Journal 
of the History of Ideas, 72 (2011): 165–81. 
42 GW 1, p. 269. 
43 Kepler to Fabricius (11 Oct 1605), in GW 15, no. 358, p. 258: ‘Ego vero non longe absum a Cornelii Gemmae 
Philosophia, qui existimat inesse unum et eundem spiritum in toto universo σωματομορφοῦντα quotidie, qui enim 
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Here we can compare the theories of generation of Kepler and Gilbert.44 Both gave credit for 
spontaneous generation ultimately to the soul of the earth, and more immediately to a seminal principle 
in fluid matter. Celestial influence played a role for both philosophers. In Gilbert, the light acts upon 
and expands the humours, allowing the seeds to grow within the form seemingly placed upon them 
according to their situation on the earth. For Kepler, astral influence spurs on the soul of the earth in its 
somewhat more autonomous generative methods. At the end of the passage just quoted, Kepler 
compared the vivifying action of this universal spirit to the attraction or gravity of the earth. This 
demonstrates how interconnected all these ideas were both for Kepler and his contemporaries. The letter 
to Fabricius contained material from the drafts of both De stella nova and Astronomia nova (1609). 
Observe again the heavy emphasis Kepler put on purpose in regard to natural processes. ‘This certainly 
is that faculty’, he asserted in De stella nova, ‘which everyday finds certain superfluous matter and 
converts it into the kind of small animal that is useful to nature, either in assisting or relieving.’45 
Soon after the publication of De stella nova, Kepler’s friend Johann Georg Brengger, who practised 
medicine in Kaufbeuren and Augsburg, took issue with his theory on the cause of the new star. He 
praised Kepler’s industry in arguing from sublunary things to celestial phenomena, but disagreed with 
the form that such argumentation took in this case. He wrote:  
Here let me explain, please, what prevents me from subscribing to this opinion. You know, my Kepler, 
that the nature of our earth is far different from that of the stars, since the bodies of the latter are simple, 
similar and most pure, as Aristotle attests. On the other hand, our earth is not simple but dissimilar and 
impure, and various bodies of diverse substance and temperament are mixed with it. Since, however, in 
order to produce an action two principles are necessarily required, that is, an active and a passive principle 
(for everything that acts does so not on itself but on something else), there is therefore a place given here 
on our earth where various humours and juices occur, and the heat of the earth is able to exercise its 
action on them by attenuating and resolving them into vapours and exhalations. But what will you give 
in the stars? Some kind of soluble substance? Will you perhaps say that the stars are imbued or pregnant 
with some humour or juice, which is then resolved into vapours? But then they are not pure and simple 
bodies.  
Then to whose profit (cui bono) do this humour (or another analogous material), and the exhalations into 
which it is resolved, serve? Perhaps so that the natural faculty of the rest of the ether may have a way to 
                                                          
agat διὰ τὸ κάλλιον καὶ βέλτιον, et noverit, quid ex qualibet redundanti materia fieri commodissime possit; 
propterea sudorem faeminae et canis convertit in pulices capitis, in pediculos, rorem in bruchos, erucas, linum in 
anguillas, uliginem in ranas, aquam in pisces, terram in plantas, cadaver in vermes, stercus in scarabaeos, et infinita 
nova ac insolentia, aeris halitus in διατάττοντας, aethereae regionis in cometas tandem et stellas. Videas ubivis 
existere uliginosum quippiam, quod rationem continet seminariam, efficitque specierum varietatem, ut non ex 
cuiusvis arboris foliis quaevis eruca nascatur, sed ex singulis fere singulae. Ille vero totius mundi spiritus hoc 
praestare videtur, ut omnia invicem ordinentur, accedant novae creaturae instrumenta corporis convenientia. Si 
nihil viveret, ipse totam materiam vivificaret, ut Terra, si nihil moveretur, ipsa omnia ad se attraheret, alia propius 
aliis.’ On Cornelius Gemma (1535–1578), see Hiro Hirai (ed.), Cornelius Gemma: Cosmology, Medicine, and 
Natural Philosophy in Renaissance Louvain (Pisa: Fabrizio Serra, 2008). 
44 Such a comparison is made in Patrick J. Boner, ‘Life in the Liquid Fields: Kepler, Tycho and Gilbert on the 
Nature of the Heavens and Earth’, History of Science, 46 (2008): 275–297. However, while Boner’s analysis of 
Kepler is good, some passages from Gilbert are misinterpreted. 
45 GW 1, p. 269: ‘Haec nempe est illa, quae quoties invenit superfluam aliquam materiam; convertit eam in 
animalculum tale, quod rerum naturae serviat, seu juvandae seu exonerandae’. 
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purge itself of its own excretions? In our globe, the function of these exhalations is different, for their 
own specific purpose is to be turned into rain, snow, dew and winds, by which the earth is made moist 
and fruitful, and the air is cleansed. All these things then serve generation, so that plants and fruits 
germinate for the nutriment and sustenance of all living things. No one denies this use to be superfluous 
to the globes of the stars, unless one with Giordano Bruno were to construct as many worlds as there are 
globes of the world.  
And to put it briefly, the production of excrements usually accompanies either generation or nutrition, or 
an action serving these, namely digestion. Thus where nature establishes no generation, or nutrition, there 
it produces no excrement. And therefore unless it is demonstrated either that stars generate, or are 
nourished, or are inhabited by animals which are in need of nutrition, it is laboured in vain concerning 
the birth or purification of excrements rising from that place.46 
Brengger seems to have been reticent to abandon the Aristotelian distinction between the impurity of 
the sublunary realm and the purity of the celestial one.47 The attribution of some passive fluid material 
capable of being acted upon and resolved into vapours contradicted this axiom of natural philosophy, 
and so Kepler’s theories of the generation of the new star were invalid. On top of this, Brengger 
suggested that Kepler’s arguments lead to the untenable conclusion that there are living creatures in the 
stars, and indeed an infinite number of worlds. His use of pluralism and ET life as a reductio ad 
absurdum argument is a reminder of just how left-field these ideas were at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century. Brengger invoked the cui bono question to argue not for pluralism, but against the 
extension of natural terrestrial processes into the celestial realm. The existence of living creatures on 
other worlds is absurd, and so the action of generation or exhalation in the heavens must be ruled out 
on the basis of its superfluity.48  
                                                          
46 Brengger to Kepler (1 Sep 1607), in GW 16, no. 441, pp. 38–40: ‘Hic quaeso patiaris ut exponam quid me 
impediat quo minus huic sententiae subscribam. Nosti mi Keplere longe aliam esse nostrae terrae quam stellarum 
rationem, siquidem harum corpora sunt simplicia, similaria, et teste Philosopho purissima: nostra autem terra non 
simplex sed dissimilaris et impura, cui varia diversarum substantiarum et temperamentorum corpora sunt 
permixta. Cum autem ad actionem perficiendam necessario requirantur duo, Agens et Patiens: (quicquid enim agit 
non in se agit sed in aliud) hinc actioni et passioni locus quidem datur in nostra Tellure ubi varii occurrunt humores 
et succi, in quos calor terrae actionem exerere potest eos attenuando et in vapores ac halitus resolvendo. Quid vero 
in stellis dabis? Quam substantiam resolubilem? An et illas humore aliquo aut succo perfusas seu praegnantes 
dices, qui in vapores resolvatur? At sic non sunt pura et simplicia corpora. Deinde cui bono inserviunt tum humor 
ille, vel analoga materia alia, tum exhalationes in quas resolvitur? An ut reliqui aetheris facultas naturalis habeat 
quo subinde repurget inquinamenta? In nostro globo alia eorum est utilitas: nam exhalationes suum habent finem, 
ut nimirum vertantur in pluvias, nivem, rorem, ventos, quibus humectetur et foecundetur terra, ac mundetur aer. 
Ista omnia deinde inserviunt generationi, ut germinent herbae et fruges, in nutrimentum et sustentationem omnium 
animalium. Quem usum stellarum globis supervacaneum esse, nemo negat, nisi qui cum Jordano Bruno Nolano 
tot mundos statuit, quot sunt globi mundani. Et ut summatim dicam, excrementorum proventus comitari solet vel 
generationem vel nutritionem, vel actionem illis famulantem, puta coctionem. Itaque ubi natura nullam instituit 
generationem, aut nutritionem, ibi nulla producit excrementa: et proinde nisi demonstretur vel stellas generare, 
vel nutriri, vel inhabitari ab animalibus quae nutritione egent, frustra laboratur de excrementorum inde 
consurgentium exortu, aut repurgatione.’ For Aristotle’s theory of the incorruptibility of the heavens, see On the 
Heavens, I, 3. 
47 A more promising connection between the two realms, in Brengger’s opinion, could be found in Gilbert’s 
magnetic philosophy, which he thought ‘pointed the way to the inner sanctuaries of celestial philosophy’ (ad 
penitiora Philosophiae coelestium adyta viam monstrare mihi videntur): GW 16, p. 40. 
48 Another figure who took a similar line of argument with Kepler was Helisaeus Roeslin (1545–1616), who 
believed the pluralist consequences of Copernicanism to be sufficient grounds to reject it. He also criticised the 
homogeneity of the celestial and terrestrial realms on the grounds that it would break down the astrological causal 
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In his reply, however, Kepler was rather happy to accept the conclusion which to Brengger seemed so 
ludicrous. He wrote: 
You consider the globes of the stars to be the most pure and simple. They seem to me to be similar to our 
earth. You, being a philosopher, quote the Philosopher [i.e., Aristotle]: if he were asked, he would point 
to experience. But experience is wanting, because no one has been there, therefore it does not deny or 
affirm. But I myself argue with probability from similarity, and by induction, as you do, from the moon, 
which has many phenomena similar to the terrestrial ones. I therefore grant to the stars both humour and 
also regions which are rained upon by the exhalation of that humour, and living creatures, for which this 
cycle turns into something useful. Not only unfortunate Bruno, burned on the coals in Rome (Prunus 
prunis tostus Romae), but also my Brahe was of this opinion, that there are inhabitants of the stars (stellis 
incolae).  I follow this opinion so much more willingly because with Aristarchus I affirm the earth to 
move as the planets do.49 
Here we see Kepler using analogy and induction to take what he has established about the moon and 
extend it to the stellar region more broadly. There is an interesting distinction which presents itself here 
between the cosmologies of Kepler and Gilbert on the issue of the vacuum. Gilbert maintained a strict 
distinction between, on the one hand, the globes and their effluvia and, on the other, the void deprived 
of all substance and activity. Kepler, at least at this stage in his life, saw the heavens as composed of a 
certain ethereal air, which was largely continuous with the air of the earth, the latter albeit mixed with 
vapours. The interplanetary and interstellar regions are thereby characterised not by privation but by 
both substance and activity, allowing for the production of celestial novelties via the action of a 
pervasive generative faculty analogous to that of the earth. Kepler of course did not feel that by placing 
inhabitants in the stellar region he was committing himself to an infinite universe, but rather a finite 
world with more than one centre of life. In this sense he was happy to place himself alongside Bruno 
on the issue of ET life. 
Of course, Brengger could have known all this from De stella nova itself, in which Kepler did indeed 
assert the existence of life amongst the stars. Kepler did not, however, make the assertion in connection 
to the natural cause of the new star or the alterability of the heavens. The topic of ET life instead came 
up when he at last tackled the issue of the astrological significance of the nova. The position of the new 
star, so close to the conjunction of Jupiter, Saturn and Mars, seemed to suggest the hand of providence 
above the natural method of its creation. There would of course be some astrological effect, because 
nothing was deemed to happen in the heavens which was not occultly perceived by the faculty of the 
                                                          
chain. See Miguel A. Granada, ‘After the Nova of 1604: Roeslin and Kepler’s Discussion on the Significance of 
the Celestial Novelties (1607–1613)’, Journal for the History of Astronomy, 42 (2011): 353–90. 
49 Kepler to Brengger (30 Nov 1607), in GW 16, no. 463, pp. 84–92: ‘Stellarum globos putas purissimos 
simplicissimosque, mihi videntur esse similes nostrae Telluris. Tu philosophum allegas philosophus: si rogaretur 
experientiam diceret. At tacet experientia, cum nemo ibi fuerit, igitur nec negat, nec affirmat. Ipse vero argumentor 
probabiliter a similitudine, et ut tu inductione a Luna, quae multa habet similia terrestribus. Itaque et humorem 
stellis tribuo et regiones, quae ab exhalatione humoris compluantur et creaturas viventes, quibus id utilitati cedit. 
Nec enim solus infelix ille Prunus prunis tostus Romae, sed etiam Braheus meus in hanc concessit sententiam, 




earth and those of its inhabitants. But in determining its particular significance, Kepler first had to 
establish to whom it was significant: 
Therefore, having assumed that this star was set alight by the decision either of God himself or a rational 
creature, if I am asked to what end I think this was made and whether the phenomena signified by it are 
to be referred to what we as human beings have before our eyes, first I think that not only the individual 
nations, but the whole earth is too small, so that all our thoughts that arise about the genuine meaning of 
the star dwelling in the highest part of the ether are squandered in the attempt to embrace it. And the 
reason is that the size of the world is great, and Tycho Brahe did not reject as absurd that opinion of 
certain ancient philosophers who stated that the other spheres, which are so immense, also had their own 
inhabitants, certainly not human beings, but other creatures. And if these exist, they would assuredly suit 
the beauty of the world, and they not only feel deeply such a great effect of the stars, but they are also 
embraced by the providence of the supreme custodian. Nor will it be absurd if that sign, sent from that 
highest observatory of the fixed stars as much for them as for us men dwelling on earth, is perhaps more 
appropriate for their understanding than for ours. I ask therefore not for which race, but for which globe 
altogether this star can more aptly be believed to have been lit.50 
Of course, Kepler was in no position to investigate what exactly the effect of the new star on these other 
creatures would be, so he turned his attention to its terrestrial impact. Yet this is evidence that he 
considered celestial influence to be operative at locations other than the earth, in both a physical and a 
more occult sense, for the benefit of the non-human inhabitants therein. This, significantly, was the first 
time Kepler mentioned the possibility of ET life existing somewhere other than the moon, and it is 
mentioned in reference to astrology. There is a good reason for this. While one could see, for example, 
the mottled surface of the moon, observational evidence linking the other planets qualitatively to the 
earth was hard to come by. This is demonstrated by Kepler’s belief that the planets shone with an 
intrinsic light. The other possible line of argument would be if one could prove the existence of certain 
other celestial phenomena which could not be sufficiently explained on the basis of terrestrial utility. In 
this way, astrology came to the forefront of cui-bono arguments in favour of ET life. 
 
                                                          
50 GW 1, p. 339: ‘Igitur posito quod certo consilio seu Dei ipsius seu creaturae rationalis incensa fuerit haec stella, 
si ex me quaeretur, quem ad finem hoc factum putem; et utrum eius significata ad ea pertrahenda sint, quae sub 
manibus habemus homines? Primum ego non gentes tantum singulas, sed totum adeo Telluris globum nimis 
exilem puto, ut in eius complexum omnes cogitationes nostrae quae oriuntur super genuina significatione, sideris 
in altissimo aethere versantis, effundantur. Magna namque Mundi amplitudo est; nec absurda Tychoni Braheo 
visa est illa veterum quorundam Philosophorum opinio, statuentium caeteris quoque globis, qui vastissimi sunt, 
suos esse incolas, non equidem homines, at creaturas alias; quae si sunt, ad mundi ornatum utique pertinebunt, 
neque tantum siderum effectus persentiscent; sed etiam providentia supremi custodis comprehendentur; nec 
absurdum erit, aeque ipsis ac nobis in tellure versantibus hominibus, ex illa altissima specula fixarum Sphaerae 
signa mitti, magis forsan ipsorum appropriata captui, quam nostro. Quaero ergo non cui genti sed omnino cui 
globo potius credendum sit accensum esse sidus hoc’ (emphasis added). 
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The New Astronomy: Influence of, and Departures from, Gilbert 
Kepler’s famous Astronomia nova (‘New Astronomy’) was not published until 1609, but a draft was 
complete in 1605, at the time when the excitement about the new star was in full swing.51 While it does 
not contain any discussion of ET life, it does provide an opportunity to demonstrate just how greatly 
his celestial physics was influenced by Gilbert’s De magnete. Later in his Epitome Astronomiae 
Copernicanae (‘Epitome of Copernican Astronomy’) (1618-1621), Kepler would declare that he built 
his whole astronomy upon Copernicus’ hypotheses, Tycho’s observations, ‘and lastly upon the 
Englishman, William Gilbert’s philosophy of magnetism’.52 The cosmologies of the two men share 
much in common, but when Gilbert the physician and experimentalist comes up against Kepler the 
geometer and metaphysician, certain crucial differences arise. Kepler acquired a copy of De magnete 
in 1602, and shortly after this his friend Hans Georg Herwart von Hohenburg (1553–1622) wrote to ask 
his opinion on the work, particularly seeing as how Gilbert, in Herwart’s view, seemingly denied the 
annual motion of the earth.53 Kepler soon realised the profound implications that the magnetic 
philosophy could have for his endeavours in astronomy and celestial physics in particular. In the 
Astronomia nova, as we shall see, he truly ushered in a new astronomy, similar to Gilbert’s in its meld 
of the mechanistic and animistic, but far more advanced and ultimately influential. 
In the dedicatory letter to the work, Kepler explained what could be considered a maxim of his entire 
philosophy: 
Indeed, when I was but indifferently well versed in this theatre of Nature, I formed the opinion, with 
practice (usus) as my teacher, that, just as one human being does not greatly differ from another, neither 
does one star differ much from another, nor one opponent from another, and hence, no account is to be 
received easily that says something unusual about a single individual of the same kind.54  
A similar mode of thought runs through Gilbert, who, while allowing for differences between individual 
bodies, argued for the basic similarity of all the primary globes of the universe, including the earth with 
its magnetic astral virtue. But whereas Gilbert did not acknowledge a position in regard to the annual 
                                                          
51 Kepler, Astronomia nova (1609), in GW 3. Translations from Johannes Kepler, New Astronomy, trans. by 
William H. Donahue (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
52 Kepler, Epitome astronomiae Copernicanae (1618–1621), in GW 7, p. 254. Translated by Charles Glenn Wallis 
as Epitome of Copernican Astronomy: IV and V, in Great Books of the Western World, Volume 16: Ptolemy, 
Copernicus, Kepler (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952), p. 850. Bialas sees the three main influences for 
Kepler’s natural philosophy, especially in terms of metaphysics, as Cusa, Scaliger and Gilbert. See Volker Bialas, 
‘Kepler’s Philosophy of Nature’, in Johannes Kepler: From Tübingen to Żagań: 29–40 (29–30). 
53 On Herwart von Hohenburg, see Patrick J. Boner, ‘Statesman and Scholar: Herwart von Hohenburg as Patron 
and Author in the Republic of Letters’, History of Science, 52 (2014): 29–51. 
54 Kepler, New Astronomy, p. 33; GW 3, p. 9: ‘Quippe cum essem in hoc Naturae theatro mediocriter versatus: 
illud me, usu Magistro, didicisse persuadebar, non multum distare, ut hominem ab homine, sic neque stellam a 
stella, hostem ab hoste: quare non facile recipiendum sermonem, qui de gentis eiusdem individuo uno temere 
aliquid insolitum sparsisset.’ 
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motion of the earth, Kepler spent the first part of the Astronomia nova explaining why, on the basis of 
physical reasoning, the Tychonic system should in fact lead to the Copernican one.55  
A major objection to the displacement of the earth from the centre of the universe concerned the concept 
of gravity. Kepler, like Gilbert, believed that the common theory was in error. His own theory described 
gravity as ‘a mutual corporeal disposition among kindred bodies to unite or join together’.56 This is in 
line with the theory of gravity we see in Plutarch and Copernicus, with the key term being ‘kindred’ 
(cognatus). The earth and the moon are two such kindred bodies, embracing one another within their 
spheres of influence, resulting in phenomena such as the tides. But Kepler did not see gravity as having 
any application to the issue of orbits. He maintained, therefore, that the moon and the earth would come 
together if they were not held apart by an animate force or something similar.57 He further maintained 
that all corporeal substances have a tendency to rest; that is, they possess an inherent inertia, which in 
his understanding meant a resistance to motion relative to a body’s size and density.  
This understanding affected Kepler’s theory of planetary orbits. He identified the cause of planetary 
motion as an immaterial species proceeding from the sun, which weakens according to a law of diffusion 
as it travels sine tempore out to the sphere of the fixed stars.58 The weakening grasp of the sun’s power, 
coupled with the respective bulk and inertia of the celestial bodies themselves, accounts for the slower 
orbital speeds of the outer planets. The major discovery of the Astronomia nova was that these orbits 
were not circular, but elliptical. He saw in magnetism the potential to provide a physical explanation 
for the elliptical movements of the planets, which entailed varying speeds and distances from the sun. 
He considered the magnetic faculty as another example of the sort of mutual corporeal disposition which 
resulted in gravity. He was satisfied, as were many others at the time, with Gilbert’s proofs that the 
earth was a magnet, and was equally happy that Gilbert had proven the same for the other planets 
(although Gilbert had in fact said that they have their own powers, analogous to magnetism in the earth). 
Kepler suggested that there was a motive power responsible for making a planet’s body reciprocate 
along a straight line extended towards the sun, and that this was in fact a magnetic corporeal faculty 
belonging to the planetary bodies themselves.59 
This scheme prompted Kepler to declare that ‘every detail of the celestial motions is caused and 
regulated by faculties of a purely corporeal nature, that is, magnetic’.60 The exception remained, 
however, that the rotation of the sun required a vital faculty, or the action of a soul. Just as in Gilbert, 
                                                          
55 On the importance of the physical reality of heliocentrism for Kepler, see Owen Gingerich, ‘From Copernicus 
to Kepler: Heliocentrism as Model and as Reality’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 117 
(1973): 513–22. 
56 Kepler, New Astronomy, p. 55; GW 3, p. 25. 
57 GW 3, p. 25. 
58 Ibid., p. 34. 
59 Ibid., pp. 34–35, 348–364. 
60 Kepler, New Astronomy, p. 68; GW 3, p. 35.  
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magnetism could explain a fixed axis of rotation, but the actual movement of rotation required an 
impetus, either external or internal. Nevertheless, Kepler was rightly pleased with his new astronomy. 
He could now declare arguments based on the common notion of planetary intelligences or angels to be 
irrelevant to considerations of the natural operation of planetary movement. The argument was now 
‘about powers not endowed with a will to choose how to vary their action’, he stated, ‘and about minds 
which are not in the least separate, since they are yoked and bound to the celestial bodies which they 
are to bear’.61  
Kepler’s description of the motive power of the sun made its operation analogous to that of light in a 
way almost identical to that described by Gilbert. These two immaterial species of the sun travel 
instantaneously, not existing in the intermediate space, manifesting only when encountering some 
suitable material. When this motive virtue, which Kepler described as the ‘the first act of every motion 
in the universe’ (actus primus omnis motus mundani), comes into contact with a mobile body, such as 
a planet, it ‘activates’ (in actum elicit) the planet’s own proper power, just as we saw in Gilbert. It also 
mixes with the body’s own inertial disposition, ultimately resulting in the observed motion of the planet. 
Kepler compared this to the way in which colour mixes its own species with light to create a ‘third 
entity’. Here again is an attempt to explain diverse phenomena as results of analogous processes. Kepler 
and Gilbert both believed in a highly animistic universe, but one which endured with a quasi-
mechanistic operation, and which was ultimately reducible to a few fundamental laws. The application 
of terrestrial physics to the question of celestial motion is what aligns them in the common narrative of 
the history of science. One important difference is that while Gilbert was sceptical of the ability of 
astronomy to map or predict the resulting motions, Kepler wanted or in fact required his physical 
hypotheses to produce definite distances and equations.62 
 
Alien Worlds through the Telescope 
The Italian philosopher Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) is credited as a harbinger of the Scientific 
Revolution for, among other things, his application of mathematics to physics, and of physics to 
astronomy. He had a major impact on Kepler’s astronomy, not through his laws of motion—which 
included a more accurate theory of inertia—but through his telescopic observations. The enhanced view 
of the universe provided by the telescope was one of the biggest spurs to scientific, philosophical and 
cultural interest in ET life. At the same time, it presented new challenges to the theoretical foundations 
                                                          
61 Kepler, New Astronomy, p. 170; GW 3, p. 98: ‘Disputamus enim de rebus naturalibus dignitatis longe inferioris, 
de virtutibus nullo arbitrio ad variandam actionem suam usis, de mentibus minime sane separatis cum sint 
conjunctae et alligatae corporibus coelestibus vehendis.’  
62 GW 3, p. 364. 
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of astrology.63 The results of Galileo’s observations were published in his Sidereus nuncius (‘Sidereal 
Messenger’, 1610). If these results were to be believed, it would necessitate radical revisions of the size, 
substance and contents of the celestial region. When Kepler read it he immediately accepted the veracity 
of Galileo’s observations, and was thus forced to rethink several key features of his astronomy.64 He 
discussed these issues in his hasty reply to Galileo, which was soon after published as the Dissertatio 
cum nuncio sidereo (‘Conversation with the Sidereal Messenger’, 1610).65 For example, he admitted 
that he was wrong about the land/sea division on the moon. He had previously thought that the dark 
areas were land, with the brighter areas being reflective oceans. Galileo’s arguments proved to him that 
in fact the opposite was the case.66 Another adjustment came from the fact that there seemed to be no 
indistinctness in the image as a result of the passage of the light through the ether. ‘Hence we must 
virtually concede, it seems,’ concluded Kepler, ‘that that whole immense space is a vacuum.’67  
The key word here, pēne, translated by Rosen as ‘virtually’, could also be read as ‘nearly’ or ‘almost’, 
and it’s important to realise that Kepler was not in fact ready to believe that the space between the 
planets was a void.68 It would have ruled out the plenist philosophy which underpinned his theories, as 
discussed above, on the production of celestial novelties. It would also have conflicted with his theory 
of the universe as an image of the Trinity, with the sun as the Father, the sphere of the fixed stars as the 
Son, and the space in between as the Holy Spirit. This was a theory with a deep and long-lasting 
significance for Kepler, and its influence can be perceived in his constant poetic praise of the sun, as 
well as his engagement with cosmological issues such as the vacuum and the infinity of the universe.  
The size of the universe was indeed another issue to be brought into question by telescopic observations. 
Kepler was led to the topic in his Dissertatio first of all through Galileo’s conclusions about the circular 
appearance of the planets in contrast to the sparkling points of the stars. The issue was finally settled 
for Kepler; the stars generated their own light, but the planets were wholly illuminated from without. 
He even conceded to a point of Brunian philosophy: that the stars were suns and the planets were moons 
or earths. Depriving the planets of an intrinsic light did not in fact have major consequences for Kepler’s 
astrology. The planets’ role in celestial influence was almost wholly contained in the ‘geometrical 
cause’, and we have seen how the individual natures were preserved through the interaction of light 
                                                          
63 On Galileo’s involvement with astrology, see H. Darrel Rutkin, ‘Galileo Astrologer: Astrology and 
Mathematical Practice in the Late-Sixteenth and Early-Seventeenth Centuries’, Galilaeana, 2 (2005): 107–43. 
64 Galileo Galilei, Sidereus nuncius (Venice: Thomas Baglionus, 1610). 
65 Kepler, Dissertatio cum nuncio sidereo (1610), in GW 4, pp. 283–311. Translations from Kepler's Conversation 
with Galileo's Sidereal Messenger, trans. with an introd. and notes by Edward Rosen (New York: Johnson Reprint 
Corporation, 1965). 
66 GW 4, p. 298. 
67 Conversation, p. 19; GW 4, p. 294: ‘… ut pene concedendum videatur, totum illud immensum spacium vacuum 
esse’. 
68 He was not alone in this. Gilbert was almost unique in arguing for an interplanetary void at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, while Kepler’s commitment to a celestial air or resistance-less ether would remain 
commonplace well into the eighteenth. On Newton’s transition from a material to an immaterial ether, see Grant, 
Much Ado about Nothing, p. 247. 
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with the planetary essence, represented by colour. What this discovery most likely did do was bolster 
Kepler’s confidence in extending, by induction, terrestrial analogies beyond the moon to the other 
planets. 
Yet Kepler was not prepared to consider an infinite universe. He believed that the appearance of an 
incredible crowding of stars through the telescope demonstrated that, in fact, those bodies were close 
together, and that ‘where we mortals dwell, in the company of the sun and the planets’, provided a 
unique perspective and was indeed the very heart of the universe.69 Nor would Kepler concede that 
there may be planets or moons orbiting the fixed stars. This last option had been what Kepler had feared, 
and his friend Johannes Matthäeus Wackher von Wackenfels (1550–1619) had hoped, upon hearing the 
news that Galileo had discovered four new planets. Kepler dismissed Bruno’s reasoning that the fiery 
worlds of the suns required the company of the watery earths, so that both could be sustained and in 
turn sustain life.70 As the four new planets were in fact moons orbiting Jupiter, rather than planets 
orbiting one of the fixed stars, Kepler felt at ease once more in his belief in a finite universe. ‘Hence 
this will remain an open question’, Kepler concluded, ‘until this phenomenon too is detected by 
someone equipped for marvellously refined observations. At any rate, this is what your success 
threatens us with, in the judgment of certain persons.’71 Rosen pointed out that this passage was not part 
of the original letter reply to Galileo, but was added to the published version, possibly in an attempt to 
appease someone such as the Brunian Wackher.72 
It was for this friend Wackher that Kepler professed to have recently written a lunar geography.73 This, 
we assume, was added to his university disputation to form the Somnium. In it he had worked on the 
assumption, now firm in his mind, that there were indeed living beings on the moon. In the Dissertatio 
we see how this assumption asserts a bias over Kepler’s interpretation of observational evidence. On 
the subject of the appearance of large, circular cavities, Kepler asked whether it was the work of nature 
or a trained hand.74 The appearance of geometrical shapes in nature seemed to him always to suggest 
the work of a mind. He also saw it as highly probable that there was a lunar atmosphere. The evidence 
for this was thin. He asserted that at full moon the spots on the moon are hidden somewhat and the sun’s 
rays more brightly reflected by dense air. He also states that Maestlin had seen rain on the moon. But 
what seems to have really convinced him is the assumption that the lunar inhabitants would not be able 
to endure the intense heat of the sun in the middle of the day.75 The ‘joke’ about living creatures on the 
                                                          
69 Conversation, p. 34; GW 4, pp. 302–3. 
70 See Miguel A. Granada, ‘Kepler and Bruno on the Infinity of the Universe and of Solar Systems’, in Johannes 
Kepler: From Tübingen to Żagań: 131–58. 
71 Conversation, p. 39; GW 4, p. 305: ‘Hoc igitur in incerto manebit, quoad aliquis subtilitate observandi mira 
instructus, et hoc detexerit: quod quidem hic successus tuus, iudicio quorundam nobis minatur.’  
72 See Conversation, p. 137, n. 340. 
73 GW 4, pp. 297–98. 
74 Ibid., p. 299. 
75 Ibid., p. 299. 
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moon had now become an accepted premise for the argument that lunar conditions must be conducive 
to life.76  
The interpretation of celestial phenomena through the lens of a pluralist worldview continued when 
Kepler came to discuss Galileo’s discovery of four moons orbiting Jupiter. This discovery could have 
caused more problems for Kepler’s cosmology. First of all, the orbits of the moons could disrupt his 
system which spaced out the planets according to the Platonic solids. Luckily the orbits could easily be 
accommodated within the ‘sphere’ of Jupiter’s own orbit, and Kepler hoped they might even help 
resolve a discrepancy between the actual distance separating the orbits of Mars and Jupiter, and that 
predicted by his theory.77 The other problem was in the realm of astrology. Didn’t these new planets 
discredit the predictions of astrologers, who were never aware of them or their potential influence? 
Thankfully Kepler knew that the planets do not influence us directly, but only through the perception 
of aspects by sublunary souls. The moons were not visible without the assistance of the telescope, and 
more pertinently their orbits close to Jupiter’s globe did not create an intelligible difference to the 
formation of aspects with the other celestial bodies.78 
For whose sake, the question then became, were there these four small bodies revolving around Jupiter 
at different distances with different periods? The answer was that there must be creatures on Jupiter to 
observe this ‘wonderfully varied display’.79 Directly after determining that the new moons had no role 
to play in terrestrial astrology, Kepler concluded that they must therefore have been ordained for the 
Jovian beings. The Sidereus nuncius led Kepler to add a new category of celestial object, circulatores 
(satellites), to his cosmos: 
The conclusion is quite clear. Our moon exists for us on the earth, not for the other globes. Those four 
little moons exist for Jupiter, not for us. Each planet in turn, together with its occupants, is served by its 
own satellites. From this line of reasoning we deduce with the highest degree of probability that Jupiter 
is inhabited.80 
Just like that, the conjecture that Jupiter was inhabited became an assertion that each planet had its own 
inhabitants. Not only that; he also concluded that each must have moons ministering to it, even though 
none of these had as yet been observed. There is an interesting parallel here to Benedetti’s theories, 
                                                          
76 See the analysis by Dick, in Plurality of Worlds, p. 178: ‘In proportion to the extent that Kepler saw an Earthlike 
moon as a prediction of the Copernican theory, that theory may have affected his interpretation of the evidence 
for a lunar atmosphere. Such arguments of interpretation, enmeshed in metaphysical predispositions, rendered it 
virtually certain that observation would provide no speedy solution to the problem of a world in the moon, much 
less in the planets.’ 
77 GW 4, p. 310. On Kepler’s continuing commitment to this theory, see Field, Kepler’s Geometrical Cosmology, 
pp. 73–95. 
78 Ibid., p. 306. 
79 Conversation, p. 40; GW 4, p. 306. 
80 Conversation, p. 42; GW 4, p. 307: ‘Plane igitur sic est, quod nobis est in Tellure nostra Luna, hoc non est globis 
caeteris; et quod Iovi sunt illae quatuor lunulae, id non sunt nobis: et vicissim singulis planetarum globis, 




except that whereas he had seen the planets as moons and posited the existence of other earths to 
accompany them, Kepler sees the planets as earths and grants each of them moons. The belief in ET 
life was influencing the interpretation of celestial phenomena and also informing predictions about the 
reality of the cosmos beyond the limits of observations.  
As with the nova of 1604, talk of ET life went hand in hand with considerations of celestial influence. 
Just as the influence of the new star would be more significantly felt by an audience somewhere other 
than on the earth, the exclusion of the new moons from terrestrial astrology led to the conclusion that 
they were intended to influence the non-human inhabitants of Jupiter. The benign influence provided 
by orbiting lunar servants became an indication of life. Then, by a process of induction, it became a 
necessary condition thereof. This of course presents a seeming inconsistency in Kepler’s pluralism. If 
moons or satellites were intended for the benefit of the inhabitants of their respective planet, where do 
Kepler’s lunar inhabitants fit in? This is indicative of the different methodologies which Kepler applies 
to the earth’s moon on the one hand, and the larger solar system on the other. But perhaps there is no 
inconsistency. The same globes could be both sources of influence and dwelling places for ET life. 
Though Kepler never mentioned the possibility of life on the Jovian moons as well as the globe of 
Jupiter itself, there is no reason to think he would have denied the possibility. Kepler’s cosmology thus 
shares a certain commonality with Bruno’s vision of binary planetary opposites. The difference is one 
of complexity and indicates that Kepler preferred a finite cosmos defined by diversity rather than the 
repetitious uniformity implied by an infinite universe.  
The existence of life on the other planets raised for Kepler the religious and philosophical question of 
its implications for the importance of mankind in the universe. This is a question which has dominated 
pluralist philosophy ever since, and its relevance is still felt today.81 How can we be sure, Kepler asked, 
that we are the most noble of all creatures? How can we be sure that we occupy the central role in God’s 
providence? We have seen already in the Mysterium cosmographicum that part of Kepler’s answer was 
that the earth, occupying a middle position between the planets and the two classes of solids, represented 
the most prestigious location in the cosmos. It had a temperate climate, and afforded a view of all the 
planets. At the same time, Kepler felt that the four moons given to the Jovians served as compensation 
for their distance from the sun and their inability to see the inner planets. Kepler even went further, 
suggesting that the moons were established upon a blueprint of geometric solids just as the primary 
planets were: 
Let the Jovian creatures, therefore, have something with which to console themselves. Let them even 
have, if it seems right, their own four planets arranged in conformity with a group of three rhombic solids. 
Of these, one is the cube (a quasi-rhombic); the second is cuboctahedral; the third is icosidodecahedral; 
                                                          
81 This is naturally a very broad topic. Some good introductions are Dick, ‘Other Worlds’; Andreas Losch, 
‘Astrotheology: On Exoplanets, Christian Concerns, and Human Hopes’, Zygon, 51 (2016): 405–13; Lucas John 
Mix, ‘Life-Value Narratives and the Impact of Astrobiology on Christian Ethics’, Zygon, 51 (2016): 520–35. 
107 
 
with 6, 12, and 30 quadrilateral faces, respectively. Let the Jovians, I repeat, have their own planets. We 
humans who inhabit the earth can with good reason (in my view) feel proud of the pre-eminent lodging 
place of our bodies, and we should be grateful to God the creator.82 
Kepler never developed this theory beyond its brief mention in the Dissertatio. However, it was one of 
the axioms of his philosophy that the attributes of geometrical shapes have consequences in the natural 
world, both astrological and otherwise. We can therefore imagine that he saw these solids as dictating 
more than just the Jovian lunar distances.  
In the Dissertatio, Kepler urged Galileo to establish the astronomy of Jupiter for the benefit of 
mankind’s future space explorers, while he himself established that of the moon. From the above 
passage, we see that Kepler could not resist the temptation to lend his own talents to Jovian astronomy. 
He continued to do so in his Dioptrice (1611), his second work on optics which now included an 
investigation into the science of the telescope and its observations. In the space of a few paragraphs he 
described the appearance of the heavens from Jupiter, just as he had done for the moon:  
And certainly in these places, this sun of ours, common focus both of this earthly world and that Jovian 
world, which we estimate to be of the size of thirty minutes, fills up barely six or seven minutes, and 
having measured the zodiac in the space of twelve of our years is found to be in the same fixed stars 
again. Therefore, those creatures living in that globe of Jupiter, while they contemplate those brief 
courses of the four moons through the fixed stars, while they look at them and at the sun rising and setting 
every day, would swear by the Jupiter Stone (indeed I have recently returned from these regions) that 
their own globe of Jupiter rests immobile in one place (while in truth the bodies that rest are the fixed 
stars and the sun) no less than their four moons revolve with a multiple variety of motions around their 
home.83 
The issue of perspective again becomes a way for Kepler to counter arguments against the motion of 
the earth. He paints the reader a picture of the sky as seen from Jupiter, with the sun being pitiably 
small, but with four moons continually tracing their courses against the backdrop of the fixed stars. This 
practice of considering the apparent motions of the celestial bodies from a point in the universe other 
                                                          
82 Conversation, p. 46; GW 4, p. 309: ‘Habeant igitur creaturae Ioviae quo se oblectent; sint illis etiam, si placet, 
quatuor sui planetae dispositi ad normam classis trium rhombicorum corporum; quorum unum (quasi rhombicum) 
cubus ipse est, secundum Cuboctaedricum, tertium Icosidodecaedricum, sex, duodecim, triginta planorum 
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would later try and prove this rhombic solid theory. See Field, Kepler’s Geometrical Cosmology, pp. 79–80, 218–
19. 
83 GW 4, pp. 343–44: ‘Atque illis quidem locis Sol hic noster, communis et huius terrestris, et illius Iovialis mundi 
focus, quem nos tricenum plurimum minutorum esse censemus, vix sena aut septena minuta implet; interimque 
duodecim nostratium annorum spacio Zodiacum emensus apud easdem rursum fixas deprehenditur. Itaque quae 
in illo Iovis globo degunt creaturae, dum illa quatuor Lunarum brevissima per fixas curricula contemplantur, dum 
quotidie orientes occidentesque et ipsas et Solem aspiciunt, Iovem lapidem jurarent (nuper enim ex illis regionibus 
reversus adsum) suum illum Iovis globum quiescere uno loco immobilem, Fixas vero et Solem quae corpora 
revera quiescunt, non minus quam illas suas quatuor Lunas multiplici motuum varietate circa suum illud 
domicilium converti.’ I can make no sense of Kepler’s statement that he had recently returned from Rome. 
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than the earth would take on a new significance in Kepler’s cosmological masterpiece, the Harmonice 
mundi. 
 
Harmony and Astrology 
Johannes Kepler’s Harmonices mundi libri V (1619) was the culmination of a research project which 
had occupied him for two decades.84 We have seen how in his De fundamentis he had suggested a third 
astrological cause based on the ratio between the orbital speeds of the planets. The main achievement 
of the Harmonice mundi was Kepler’s discovery that the extreme velocities of the planets fit very 
closely to a musical scale, but not from the perspective of the earth where he had first looked. The scale 
only fit when the orbits were calculated from the vantage point of the sun. This discovery forms the 
climax of the work in Book 5, but the work as a whole is a much larger investigation into the origins, 
causes and attributes of harmony, and the application of the science of harmonics to human, natural, 
and celestial philosophy. It will be worthwhile to briefly track Kepler’s development of a harmonic 
philosophy, especially through the second half of the Libri V, as the scale of his attempt to redefine 
astrology within a non-geocentric framework has not been properly grasped.85 This will also provide a 
better understanding of just how relevant the question of astrology is to ET life in Kepler’s harmonic 
heliocentric cosmos. 
The first two books of the Harmonice deal with the construction of the regular polygons and polyhedra, 
and the congruence thereof. Kepler thus made it clear that the science of harmony belonged firmly 
within the science of geometry, rather than arithmetic or numerology. From that starting point he could 
assess the geometrical qualities of certain figures, their ratios and congruences, and thereupon build a 
foundation for a new philosophy of harmonic influence. In the introduction to Book 2 he explained this 
as an axiom of his entire philosophy: 
…the effect these figures have in the realm of Geometry, and in that part of Architechtonics which deals 
with Archetypes, is as an image of and a prelude to their effects beyond Geometry, beyond things 
conceived in the mind, namely their effects in things natural and celestial.86  
                                                          
84 Kepler, Harmonices mundi libri V (1619), in GW 6. Translations are from Kepler, The Harmony of the World, 
with minor adaptations.  
85 There is something of a disconnect between Kepler’s supposedly limited astrological theory, as it is understood 
by Field, Boner and others, and his more traditional and complex astrological practice, as examined by, among 
others, Greenbaum. The analysis in this section will hopefully contribute to bridging that divide. See Field, 
Kepler’s Geometrical Cosmology, pp. 127–41; Dorian Gieseler Greenbaum, ‘Kepler’s Personal Astrology: Two 
Letters to Michael Maestlin’, in From Māshāʼ Allah to Kepler: Theory and Practice in Medieval and Renaissance 
Astrology, ed. by Charles Burnett and Dorian Gieseler Greenbaum (Ceredigion, Wales: Sophia Centre Press, 
2015): 177–200. 
86 Harmony of the World, p. 97; GW 6, p. 67: ‘…cum hic figurarum effectus intra Geometriam, intraque 
Architectonices partem illam, quae circa Archetypos versatur, sit quaedam velut imago et praeludium Effectuum 
extra Geometriam, extraque mentis conceptus, in ipsis rebus naturalibus et coelestibus…’  
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One example of this in practice is when Kepler divided congruence into three distinct classes, along 
with a fourth class containing no congruence. These classes, he declared, will help in Book 4 when it 
comes to choosing which aspects are efficacious and in what way.87  
Book 3 of the Harmonice deals with musical harmony, and is split into two parts: causes and effects. In 
the first part Kepler explained how the cause of harmonies lies in the ratio of the arcs of a circle cut by 
the inscription of the regular polygons.88 This was in opposition to the Pythagoreans who, ignoring the 
evidence of their ears, ascribed the root of harmony to be simple numerical ratios. The much larger part 
of Book 3 deals with the actual effects of audible harmonies. In fact, the structure of the work makes 
more sense if we take into account the preamble and explanation of order at the beginning of Book 4. 
There Kepler explained that there could have been six books: three on harmonic theory (shapes, 
congruence, musical harmony), and three on its manifestations and applications in the natural world 
(music, aspects, planetary motion). For some reason Kepler decided to merge the middle two books into 
one.  
Accordingly, part way through the third book Kepler explained the philosophical basis of harmonic 
efficacy. ‘Indeed all spirits, souls, and minds are images of God the Creator’, he argued, ‘if they have 
been put in command each of their own bodies, to govern, move, increase, preserve, and also 
particularly to propagate them.’89 These minds therefore contain the same archetypal geometric patterns 
that existed coeternally with God and provided the blueprint for all Creation. These patterns are then 
observed in the functions and operations of those souls. For the same reason, these souls ‘rejoice’ when 
they perceive these archetypal patterns, either by bare contemplation, through the interposition of the 
senses, or by some concealed instinct.90 The harmonic scale of planetary motions and the effect of the 
aspects on the soul of the earth are two examples of this, while the general effect of harmony on the 
human soul is another. All three boil down to one principle: ‘Everything is lively while the harmonies 
persist, and drowsy when they are disrupted.’91 
One of the most interesting sections of Book 3 is Chapter 15, which contains a theoretical attempt to 
link certain tones, intervals and harmonies with different emotional states.92 When considering this 
subject, Kepler argued that it must be separated from the ‘general’ effect of harmony stated above.93 
                                                          
87 GW 6, p. 89. 
88 Ibid., Chs 1–2, pp. 101–120.  
89 Harmony of the World, p. 146; GW 6, p. 105: ‘Dei vero Creatoris imagines sunt, quotquot Spiritus, Animae, 
Mentes, suis singulae corporibus sunt praefectae, ut illa gubernarent, moverent, augerent, conservarent, adeoque 
et propagarent.’ 
90 Harmony of the World, p. 146; GW 6, p. 105. 
91 Harmony of the World, p. 147; GW 6, p. 105: ‘vivunt omnia, durantibus Harmoniis, torpescunt iisdem 
disturbatis’. 
92 Harmonice mundi, Ch. 15 (‘Qui modi vel toni, quibus serviant affectibus’), GW 6, pp. 173–79; Harmony of the 
World, pp. 238–46. 
93 Harmony of the World, p. 238; GW 6, p. 173. 
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This was clearly an attempt to create a fuller scheme of harmonic influence, one which extends beyond 
the action of general stimulus and couples specific harmonies with specific effects. It is in fact another 
instance of Kepler creating analogies between geometric and natural qualities. One example he gave is 
how God dictated the laws of generation according to the harmonic divisions involved in the 
construction of the pentagon. There were two types of generation to be considered. For plants, which 
contain their own seeds as individuals, the laws of generation follow ‘the ratio of inexpressible terms 
which is genuine and perfect in itself’. Sexual reproduction, on the other hand, is represented by ‘the 
combined ratios of pairs of numbers (of which the falling short of one by unity is compensated by the 
excess of the other)’. ‘What is surprising then’, asked Kepler, ‘if the progeny of the pentagon, the hard 
third of 4:5 and the soft 5:6, moves minds, which are the images of God, to emotions which are 
comparable with the business of generation?’94 Kepler here explained (or imagined) the aphrodisiac 
effects of these musical intervals based on the geometrical properties from which they are derived. 
The subject of Book 4 is the aspects. This is usually considered the astrological section of the 
Harmonice, which has had the unfortunate consequence of distracting the focus of historians of 
astrology from the highly relevant information provided at the end of Book 3 (and indeed Book 5, as 
will be discussed below). The linking of specific harmonies to specific moods forms part of the 
theoretical groundwork for the practical business of aspect astrology. Before discussing this astrology 
directly, Kepler began Book 4 by delving further into the essence, perception, and effect of harmonies 
themselves. Regarding the reception of harmonies by the soul, he asked himself by what means they 
enter. The answer is partly actively, partly passively. The harmonies are embodied in emanations, or 
species—sound from the motion of the string, light and colour from the rays of the stars. These 
emanations are active in the way they move (movere) our senses. Yet these same emanations are also 
passive in the way they are felt (sentiuntur), remembered (memorantur), and compared 
(comparantur).95 Now the harmonies themselves would have no power, and indeed not exist, if there 
was not a soul to perceive them and compare them to the pure archetypes which exist within itself.96 
The soul has the knowledge of the harmonies through instinct alone, and it is a basic or low faculty 
                                                          
94 Harmony of the World, p. 241; GW 6, pp. 175–76: ‘Haec cum sit natura huius sectionis, quae ad quinquanguli 
demonstrationem concurrit; cumque Creator Deus ad illam conformaverit leges generationis; ad genuinam quidem 
et seipsa sola perfectam proportionem ineffabilium terminorum, rationes plantarum seminarias, quae semen suum 
in semetipsis habere jussae sunt singulae: adjunctas vero binas Numerorum proportiones (quarum unius deficiens 
unitas alterius excedente compensetur) conjunctionem maris et foeminae: quid mirum igitur, si etiam soboles 
quinquanguli Tertia dura seu 4.5. et mollis 5.6. moveat animos, Dei imagines, ad affectus, generationis negocio 
comparandos?’  
95 Harmony of the World, p. 291; GW 6, p. 213. 
96 The pre-existence of the geometrical archetype within the soul of the individual was one of the ways by which 
Kepler could save the aspects from the criticism of Pico, who saw no reason why an aspect of 60° should be 




which recognizes these proportions in sensible things, belonging not only to men but also to animals, 
the soul of the earth, and possibly even plants.97 
The consideration of emanations and instinct is key to understanding the potential complexity of 
Kepler’s astrological system. The inferior faculties of the soul do not experience harmonies instinctually 
in their purity, but ‘along with the wrappings of the emanation (species) which is subject to them’.98 
One can therefore differentiate between the effects of the same harmonic proportion coming from 
different sources. The effect is then a result of soul acting upon itself, not by intention but by natural 
instinct—an instinct which is not only excited by harmony, but which also responds to the various 
natures of the different proportions: 
And in fact it [the soul] has from its very origin the ideas both of the harmonies incorporated into sound 
and of the feelings of the mind which respond to them linked together and, so to speak, conflated into 
one, so that the idea of harmony is implanted in it only insofar as it delights in it, and is something 
pleasurable, and insofar as it is bound up with the idea of the associated motion.99 
Considered together, these passages represent the foundation stones of Kepler’s vision for a complete 
system of harmonic astrology, one in which the base level of the soul’s excitement by harmony is 
augmented by the qualities both of the particular harmony involved and the emanations in which it is 
embodied.  
The main, or at least the largest, participator in terrestrial astrology is of course the soul of the earth 
itself. Kepler believed, like Gilbert, that this sublunary soul or nature is diffused throughout the whole 
body of the earth. Unlike Gilbert, however, Kepler believed that it would be primarily present, or rooted, 
in one particular part of the earth’s globe, just as the soul of the human body is located in the heart. 
From there it projects itself through emanations, just as Gilbert’s had by effusions, into the oceans and 
the air.100 From that central location it also compares the incidence of celestial rays against its instinctual 
knowledge of the geometrical archetypes of creation and isolates those that are harmonic. By another 
natural faculty, at those harmonious times, it more energetically operates its ‘workshops’, located 
particularly under mountainous regions, resulting in a greater than usual production of vapours and 
clouds.101 Hence we have the basis for an astrological prediction of the weather based on the earth’s 
                                                          
97 Harmony of the World, pp. 307–8; GW 6, p. 226. 
98 Harmony of the World, p. 310; GW 6, p. 227: ‘Quippe ipsae etiam Ideae Harmoniarum, quas hae inferiores 
Animae facultates secum habent intus, non plane purae ipsis sunt instinctae, sed cum involucris speciei subjectae, 
eius scilicet quae cuiusque facultatis sit objectum.’ 
99 Harmony of the World, p. 310; GW 6, p. 228: ‘habetque iam ab ipso ortu connexas et in unum quasi conflatas 
Ideas, et Harmoniarum in sonos incorporatarum, et affectionum animi respondentium: ut non aliter ipsi sit 
implantata Idea Harmoniae, quam quatenus laetificat, estque delectabilium aliquid, et quatenus est Ideae motus 
conformis implexa’. 
100 GW 6, p. 237. 
101 Harmony of the World, p. 323; GW 6, p. 237. 
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reaction to celestial aspects. As Kepler poetically put it: ‘In brief, the configurations sing the leading 
part; sublunary Nature dances to the laws of this song.’102 
Kepler described this faculty of the earth, which moves itself according to its archetypes of proportion, 
sympathy, and associated functions, as an ‘activity’. ‘Others have named it dunamis,’ he wrote, ‘but I 
for preference energeia. For the latter is the essence of souls; the former a kind of “flowing” of the 
flame’.103 These two Greek terms, fundamental to Aristotelian metaphysics, translate into Latin as 
potentia (power) and actus (activity) respectively. Kepler used ‘activity’ here in a different sense to that 
of Gilbert, but it is perhaps significant that both authors prioritised this term particularly to emphasise 
the animistic nature of celestial influence. It is this frame of animism which allowed Kepler to take his 
conclusions about meteorological astrology and apply them to the human soul. The principle is indeed 
the same. Planetary aspects provide an impetus for people ‘to carry through the business which they 
have in hand’.104 This impetus, which Kepler compared to a goad or a spur, a stirring oration or a 
symphony of instruments, works more acutely on masses of people than on a particular individual, 
which is why an aspect involving Mars may lead groups to go to war. However, more interesting to 
Kepler than this general effect, relevant to the astrological category of ‘revolutions’, was the issue of 
horoscopes or nativities. 
According to Kepler, an infant, being sustained entirely by its mother during its development in the 
womb, has its own soul ‘lit’ at the moment of birth. At this point the vital faculty takes on an impression 
of the celestial zodiac, including the position of the planets and of course any aspects between them, 
and retains this impression for the rest of his or her life. Throughout the course of this life, the soul 
continually compares the situation of the heavens against its own nativity and is spurred or agitated 
when similar configurations occur.105 Now we have already seen how different harmonic proportions 
have different effects, like how those associated with the pentagon move minds to generation. Kepler 
then gave an example of how the emanations which make up the aspect also determine the effect: 
Interpose here, again from birth, the difference which planets make in qualities. For if the soul is a kind 
of light, it will also distinguish the red colour of Mars from the whiteness of Jupiter and the leaden colour 
of Saturn. Thus it must be admitted that great assistance comes from Mars not only, as before, towards 
industriousness, but also towards sharpness of talents, which is based on fiery vigour.106 
                                                          
102 Harmony of the World, p. 325; GW 6, p. 239: ‘Breviter, configurationes praecinunt, Natura sublunaris saltat 
ad leges huius cantilenae.’  
103 Harmony of the World, p. 367; GW 6, p. 271: ‘quam alii δύναµιν, ego ἐνέργειαν lubentius nominaverim. Est 
enim animarum essentia haec, est veluti ῥύσις quaedam huius flammae ista’.  
104 Harmony of the World, p. 373; GW 6, p. 277: ‘Hinc igitur habent hoc Animae humanae, quod sub tempus 
aspectuum coelestium praecipuos capiunt impetus, ad negocia, quae sub manibus habent, peragenda.’  
105 Harmony of the World, pp. 374–75; GW 6, pp. 278–79. 
106 Harmony of the World, pp. 376–77; GW 6, p. 279: ‘Hic intersere, rursum ex Genesi, Planetarum discrimina 
in qualitatibus. Nam si Anima lux quaedam est; discernet etiam Martis ruborem a Jovis candore, Saturnique 
livore: itaque fatiendum est, magnum auxilium ex Marte, non tantum, ut prius, ad industriam; sed etiam ad 
acrimoniam ingenii, quae consistit in vi ignea.’ 
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So the soul of the infant is not moulded by the influence of the planets so much as it moulds itself 
according to the aspects present at birth, the qualities of those aspects, and the identifiable essence of 
the bodies which create them. 
The depth of Kepler’s personal interest in horoscopes has had a light cast upon it by recent 
scholarship.107 While he professed not to believe in the reality of the zodiacal signs, house divisions, or 
the ability, for example, of a horoscope to predict death, his system of harmonic astrology could still 
provide a natal chart to be judged on the traditional basis of planetary qualities and aspects. He also 
believed, interestingly, in a form of hereditary astrology. Kepler thought that a mother would be more 
inclined to give birth on days when the configuration of the heavens most closely resembled what it had 
been at the time of her own birth, therefore creating an affinity of the nativities of parents with their 
children.108 In Book 4 of the Harmonice he also delved into medical astrology, giving a theory of critical 
days, which were an example of the astrological category of election, based on the angle between the 
true moon and its position in the patient’s nativity.109  
The old adage that Kepler dabbled in astrology only as a professional obligation or source of income 
has been satisfactorily disproven by more recent scholarship. However, one still reads that Kepler 
disregarded most of astrology, keeping only the aspects.110 The first part of this argument is of course 
true if one considers how richly complex and varied astrological culture and practice was at the time. 
Yet looking at Kepler’s astrological and cosmological works we see how important astrology was to 
his understanding of how and why nature, both sublunary and celestial, operated as it did. And while 
he may have vocally impugned contemporary astrological practice, at the same time he built a new 
foundation for terrestrial astrology which could encompass three of the four traditional categories of 
astrological prediction: revolutions, nativities, and elections. The fourth category, interrogations, which 
was still quite prevalent in medical astrology, seems to have had no place in Kepler’s system. Overall, 
however, the limitation of terrestrial astrology to the aspects did not in fact place much of a limit to the 
potential application of Kepler’s astrology to a wide range of phenomena. Furthermore, when Book 5 
of Harmonices mundi is taken into account, one cannot even assert that he limited astrology to the 
aspects at all, or at least not without significant qualification. 
 
                                                          
107 See, for example, Greenbaum, ‘Kepler’s Personal Astrology’; David Juste, ‘Musical Theory and Astrological 
Foundations in Kepler: The Making of the New Aspects’, in Music and Esotericism, ed. by Laurence Wuidar 
(Leiden: Brill, 2010): 177–96.  
108 Harmony of the World, p. 383; GW 6, p. 284.  
109 Harmony of the World, p. 384; GW 6, p. 286.  
110 See e.g. Rabin, ‘Kepler’s Attitude Toward Pico and the Anti-Astrology Polemic’, p. 754; Boner, Kepler’s 
Cosmological Synthesis, pp. 33–37.  
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Astrological Harmonies and Solar Beings 
Kepler’s theory linking planetary orbits to the Platonic solids gave him the reason why there were no 
more or less than six planets, and also why they were set distances apart. His aspect astrology, based 
on perspective and therefore transferrable to any centre, could not provide any teleological information 
regarding the make-up of the cosmos. Planetary motion was the problem which monopolised much of 
Kepler’s astronomical efforts, and he still needed to know why God had created them to move as they 
do. In Book 5 of the Harmonice he gave us his answer. From the perspective of the sun, the proportions 
between the apparent minimum and maximum orbital speeds of the planets combine to create a musical 
scale.111 Indeed, his calculations for these orbital velocities were so close to the prescribed ratios of the 
scale that Kepler was convinced that musical harmony was the rationale behind the non-uniform 
motions of the planets. In the course of their elliptical orbits, the planets would vary their ‘pitch’, a lot 
in the case of the highly elliptical Mercurial orbit, as little as one diesis for the nearly circular orbit of 
Venus. Occasionally, these planetary tones would combine in harmonies—a true ‘music of the spheres’ 
that was inaudible yet powerful nonetheless. This was his crowning achievement, and the reason why 
the Harmonice mundi was the work he was proudest of.112 
The section of Book 5 most relevant to this discussion is the Epilogue, where Kepler, having concluded 
his calculations and proofs, asked the question: cui bono? Here he took the time to philosophise, 
conjecture and speculate about the deeper reasons behind this planetary chorus that he had discovered. 
As the harmony is created not by the true speeds of the planets through the ether, but rather by their 
apparent motions against the zodiac from the point of view of the sun, Kepler argued that ‘the harmony 
does not ornament the ends’. Rather, there must be some audience, some mind which can compare these 
motions with each other and appreciate the moments when they combine in harmonic proportion, just 
as terrestrial souls do with the aspects. Kepler thus concluded that ‘since no object is arranged vainly, 
and without something which is moved by it, those angles seem in fact to presuppose some agency, like 
our sight, or certainly the sensation of it’.113 Just as the planets are honoured and served by their orbiting 
moons, which not only supplement the light from the sun but also create harmonies by their aspects, so 
is the sun served by the planets, which repay the life-giving gifts of light and heat by combining their 
motions into ‘the most desirable harmony’.114 
                                                          
111 See D. P. Walker, ‘Kepler’s Celestial Music’, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 30 (1967): 
228–50 [reprinted in id., Studies in Musical Science in the Late Renaissance (London; Leiden: The Warburg 
Institute and Brill, 1978): 34–62]. 
112 See, for example, Caspar’s reflection on Kepler’s harmonic philosophy: ‘Certainly for Kepler this book was 
his mind’s favorite child. Those were the thoughts to which he clung during the trials of his life and which 
distributed light to him in the darkness which surrounded him. They formed the place of refuge, where he felt 
secure, which he recognized as his true home.’ Caspar, Kepler, p. 288. See also J. V. Field, ‘Kepler’s Harmony 
of the World’, in Johannes Kepler: From Tübingen to Żagań: 11–28 (13). 
113 Harmony of the World, p. 492; GW 6, p. 363. 
114 Harmony of the World, p. 492; GW 6, pp. 363–64. 
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But what is the nature of this mind, or these minds, in the sun, situated as it is in the very heart of the 
world? He seemed to hesitate between certain possibilities, ranging (if we can create such distinctions 
in Kepler) from the naturalistic to the philosophical and theological. At first he decribed the sun as the 
governmental edifice of the kingdom of nature, populated by ‘chancellors, princes or prefects’.115 
Further on, he wondered whether ‘some intelligent creatures, of different nature from the human, 
happen to inhabit a globe which is in that way animated, or will inhabit it’.116 The discussion then 
broadened to incorporate the nature of souls and minds elsewhere in the cosmos. He invoked Proclus’ 
hymn and suggested that if one were to drink too deeply from the cup of Pythagoras, he might begin to 
dream that there were other reasoning faculties dispersed among the globes which orbit the sun. The 
faculty granted to the middle globe (the earth) is the most outstanding and absolute, while ‘on the Sun 
dwells simple Understanding, the “intellectual fire” or “mind”’. 117 Finally, Kepler compared the variety 
observed on the surface of the sun, such as the recently observed sun-spots, to the meteorological 
activity of the earth, suggesting that it may serve a similar purpose in fostering life. ‘What use is this 
furnishing, if the globe is empty?’, he asked: ‘Do not the very senses themselves cry out that fiery bodies 
inhabit it, which have the capacity for simple minds?’118 
Invoking again the opinion of Tycho Brahe as a precedent, Kepler argued that life should in fact be 
spread amongst all the globes of the world.119 The ubiquity of life on earth, with species fitted to survive 
in various environments—be it aquatic, aerial, snowy or arid—suggested that God would adorn the 
other globes with living creatures suited to their conditions. Each globe in fact is ‘commended’ by 
different properties: the period and eccentricity of their orbits, their proximity to the sun, the brightness 
of their bodies, and most interestingly perhaps of all, ‘the properties of the figures on which every region 
is supported’.120 Just as an impetus to sexual reproduction is provided by the harmonic progenies of the 
pentagon, so is the entire globe of the earth characterised by this form of generation. In Kepler’s scheme 
of solids, the dodecahedron, which encompasses the sphere of the earth, is masculine, while the 
icosahedron, which supports the earth from the inside, is feminine. The act of sexual procreation is thus 
expressed ‘in the divine proportion of that marriage and its inexpressibility’.121 One could therefore 
(although Kepler doesn’t) speculate on the nature of the inhabitants of each globe based on the figure 
                                                          
115 Harmony of the World, p. 492; GW 6, p. 364.  
116 Harmony of the World, p. 495; GW 6, p. 366.  
117 Harmony of the World, p. 496; GW 6, p. 367. The editors of the English version of the Harmony remark that 
Kepler would have come across Proclus’ hymn to the sun printed as an addition to the Orphic hymns. Harmony 
of the World, p. 493, n. 176. On Proclus’ hymns, see Proclus' Hymns: Essays, Translations, Commentary, ed. by 
R. M. van den Berg (Leiden: Brill, 2001), esp. pp. 145–150 for the hymn to the sun. 
118 Harmony of the World, p. 497; GW 6, p. 368. 
119 There is no textual evidence that Tycho in fact believed in life in/on the other globes, although that doesn’t 
rule out the possibility that it may have been discussed privately between the two astronomers. Dick argues that 
Kepler misconstrued a reductio ad absurdum argument made elsewhere by Tycho, i.e. the immense size of a 
heliocentric universe would seem to necessitate celestial inhabitants to make it useful. Celestial inhabitation is 
absurd, ergo heliocentrism is incorrect. See Dick, Plurality of Worlds, pp. 73–74. 
120 Harmony of the World, p. 497; GW 6, p. 367. 
121 Harmony of the World, p. 497; GW 6, p. 367.  
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or figures which determine the sphere of its orbit. Perhaps sexual reproduction is unique to the earth, 
and on the other planets things are generated asexually or spontaneously?  
Book 5 of the Harmonice mundi, more so than the Dissertatio, proves that astrology provided an 
impetus for Kepler’s considerations of ET life. In his cosmology, the celestial bodies are both habitats 
for living creatures and sources of influence in themselves, as their emanations are received and 
compared at the other globes. Prior to making the discoveries in Book 5, the sun is only ever discussed 
in terms of its life-giving, not life-harbouring, properties. The musical scale being played out by the 
planets, wherein lay the entire logic behind the determination of their motions, necessitated the 
existence of at least some perceptive soul in the sun, and quite possibly some form of solar beings. It 
should be remembered that harmonic ratios formed by the extreme motions of the planets was in fact 
the hypothetical third cause of astrological influence described by Kepler in his De fundamentis in 1601. 
Yes, Kepler restricted his terrestrial astrology to considerations of the aspects, but the earth was no 
longer the sole recipient of celestial influence. In Kepler’s cosmology extraterrestrial life went hand-in-
hand with extraterrestrial astrology.  
Astrology answered the cui bono question for a large number of astronomical phenomena. In the 
Astronomia nova, for example, he criticised the hypothesis of latitudinal libration advanced by the 
contemporary astronomer Magini, citing that it calculated no conjunctions of Mars and the sun which 
did not take place ‘through the body’. If this were true, Kepler argued, it ‘would render vain nature’s 
latitudinal temperings, which prevent the excessive arousal of the sublunary powers’.122 A decade later, 
in part of his Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, astrology provided a possible reason behind the tricky 
business of the motion of the apsides. This was a phenomenon that entailed the slow migration through 
the zodiac of a planet’s furthest departure from the sun, or aphelion, in its elliptical orbit. Not being able 
to provide a physical cause for this process, or even to accurately calculate it, Kepler resorted to a more 
metaphysical speculation: 
But in the meantime I would not rigidly deny that this effect can be a part of the design, so that it is not 
a consequence of necessity, or a mere consequence: because we are still ignorant of the magnitude of it. 
Then there will be room to speak about the final cause: to the final cause belongs the mutual tempering 
of the forces of libration, of the deflection of the threads, and of the revolution, in some fixed proportion: 
in order that, because the librations were prepared in order to set up the harmonies of the movements, 
any given harmony should not be born always in some one configuration of two planets, but in the 
succession of the ages would pass through absolutely all the configurations, and in order that thus all the 
harmonies of movements—which Book V of the Harmonies is about—should be mingled with all the 
harmonic configurations—which is the matter of Book IV of the Harmonies.123 
                                                          
122 New Astronomy, p. 232; GW 3, pp. 140–41: ‘Quod si verum sit, frustra natura temperamentum latitudinum 
confinxerit, ne corporalibus conjunctionibus crebro contingentibus nimiae essent exagitationes sublunarium 
virtutum.’ 
123 Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, p. 945; GW 7, p. 342: ‘At non interim rigide negaverim, hunc effectum 
potius in consilii parte fuisse, ut non sit, vel non sit mera necessitatis appendix: quia huius quantitatem adhuc 
ignoramus. Tunc locus erit dicendae causae finalis: huc tendere contemperationem inter se virium, librationis, 
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So Kepler’s explanation of the motion of the apsides was that, from this same grand seat of the sun, the 
harmonic influence of the motions and the harmonic influence of the aspects should be constantly 
shuffled together.  
Going further, we may still ask ourselves what good is served by this complex astrological system. 
Taking the example of astrology and the weather, one could ask why the meteorological operation of 
the earth, powered internally, should be sensitive to astrological aspects. This particular question is one 
that Kepler answered in Book 4 of Harmonice: 
However, although this operation of the Earth’s soul is perpetual, yet there was a need of some amounts 
in excess to be evaporated, not continuously for the whole of some period of time, but confined to definite 
days, so that from the abundance of vapours emitted to the outside the seasonal rains might be supplied, 
though with some sunny weather interspersed, in order to revive and water the surface of the Earth, so 
that fruits and food for living creatures might spring up from them.124 
This is part of a fascinating issue in post-Aristotelian astrology, and indeed just a larger part of Kepler’s 
own teleological project. Faced with the task of re-founding astrology within a non-geocentric 
framework, he not only had to answer ‘how’ celestial influence functioned, but ‘why’. Here his answer 
was that the meteorological excitement accompanying the varied occurrence of astrological aspects 
shakes up what might otherwise be a monotonous weather cycle. The resulting daily variation of the 
excess and deficit of atmospheric vapours and rains is beneficial to the growth of vegetation on which 
animals depend. In conclusion, one could say that, for Kepler, celestial inhabitation stepped in as an 
explanation for phenomena when influence on the earth no longer seemed tenable. Another way of 
thinking about this, however, is to say that the posited inhabitation of the other celestial bodies allowed 
Kepler to explain more things according to a principle of influence—it’s just that that influence was no 
longer solely directed towards the earth. 
 
The Somnium and Kepler’s Legacy to Pluralism 
Kepler’s Somnium, published posthumously in 1634, was an accumulative work, the basis of which was 
his lunar disputation from his student days at the University of Tübingen. The narrative framework was 
added later, and a version of this circulated in manuscript form, to which Kepler continued to add notes 
                                                          
fibrarum inclinationis, circumlationis, certa in unoquolibet proportione: ut quia librationes quidem comparatae 
sunt ad constituendas Harmonias motuum, Harmoniarum quaelibet enasceretur non semper in una aliqua binorum 
planetarum configuratione, sed successu saeculorum omnes omnino configurationes pervagaretur: atque sic 
Harmoniae motuum omnes (quae sunt lib. V. Harmonicorum) cum Harmoniis configurationum omnibus (libri IV. 
Harm: materia) permiscerentur.’ 
124 Harmony of the World, p. 368; GW 6, p. 272: ‘Hoc vero Animae Terrae opus, etsi perpetuum est: opus tamen 
fuit excessibus aliquibus in evaporando; non continuis toto aliquo tempore: sed ad certos dies redactis; ut ex copia 
vaporum foras emissa pluviae tempestivae, Solibus tamen intercurrentibus, suppeditarentur, superficiei Terrae 
refocillandae humectandaeque causa; unde fruges et pabula Animantibus succrescere possent.’  
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between 1620 and 1630. This was then supplemented with a geographical appendix, most likely the 
‘lunar geography’ which, as noted above, he had written for his friend Wackher.125 The purpose of the 
work as a whole was to present a lunar astronomy in a way which would remove any objections to the 
motion of the earth. The narrative itself is much shorter than the accompanying notes, and most of this 
is dedicated to a description of astronomical phenomena from a lunar perspective. What concerns us 
here is that smaller proportion of the work which is dedicated to considerations about the lunar 
inhabitants themselves, because it is probably the most detailed early example of the application of 
terrestrial biological concepts to the question of life on another celestial body. Kepler divided his lunar 
inhabitants into two main categories. The earth was known to the lunarians as volva, and those creatures 
which lived on the side of the moon always facing the earth he called ‘Subvolvans’; those on the dark 
side of the moon he called ‘Privolvans’. Both possessed what could be considered ‘civilisation’. 
Kepler believed that the circular cavities observable on the surface of the moon could not be produced 
by any natural motion of the elements, but must be the work of an intelligent mind. In the Harmonice 
he had quoted a passage from Proclus’s Commentary on Euclid to the effect that nature does not produce 
perfectly straight lines, flat surfaces, right angles, or geometric shapes.126 In the geographical appendix 
he built on this argument, considering as axiomatic the proposition that order is always the product of 
mind. ‘If you direct your mind to the towns on the moon’, he entreated the reader, ‘I shall prove to you 
that I see them.’127 The suggestion is that the circular cavities on the moon have been created by the 
Selenites to provide shelter both from the elements and also from incursions by hostile forces. For once 
you institute a comparison between lunar and terrestrial populations, Kepler thought, you can make 
judgments about similar things. The circular settlements must be inhabited by different groups, while 
the rough surrounding regions must be host to ‘wild and savage bands of thieves’.128  
This may seem like a somewhat naïve assessment of lunar craters, shaped by teleological and 
metaphysical biases, but even today the search for ET life and ET intelligence follow similar 
methodological principles. Astronomers look for phenomena that are out-of-the-ordinary, such as high 
concentrations of atmospheric oxygen or repetitive bursts of electromagnetic radiation, which may 
indicate a divergence from the normal or non-biological course of nature.129 On the surface of the moon 
Kepler saw a natural elemental world, similar to the earth with many of its features, which had been 
                                                          
125 Kepler, Somnium, seu opus posthumum de astronomia lunari (1634), in GW 11.2. Translations from Kepler, 
Somnium: The Dream, or Posthumous Work on Lunar Astronomy, trans. by Edward Rosen, hereafter cited as 
Dream. On the composition of the work, see the introduction to Rosen’s translation, pp. xvii-xxiii.  
126 Harmony of the World, p. 229; GW 6, p. 219. See also Proclus, In primum Euclidis Elementorum librum 
commentarii, ed. Gottfried Friedlein (Leipzig: Teubner, 1873), p. 14. 
127 Dream, p. 151; GW 11.2, p. 368: ‘[Ad] Oppida Lunaria si mentem afferas, tibi me videre comprobabo.’ 
128 Dream, p. 169; GW 11.2, p. 376.  
129 Some methodological handbooks are Sara Seager, Exoplanet Atmospheres: Physical Processes (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2010); H. Paul Shuch (ed.), Searching for Extraterrestrial Intelligence: SETI Past, 
Present, and Future (Chichester: Springer, 2011). 
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shaped into order by the art and artifice of reasoning creatures. Even in this basic distinction between 
natural chaos and intelligent planning, he perceived the manifestation of universal providence. ‘Indeed, 
the surface of the spheres seems to have been left to blind chance for this very purpose,’ he proposed, 
‘that in arranging it and embellishing parts of it there may be room for the exercise of reason.’130 
We have already seen how in earlier works Kepler imagined the lunar inhabitants to suit their 
environment, and at the same time imagined the lunar environment to suit its inhabitants. He took both 
approaches in the Somnium, asserting again his belief in the necessity of a lunar atmosphere and 
exhalations.131 He also maintained that the moon must be perforated with caves, especially on the 
Privolvan side, where the conditions were more extreme without the tempering influence of the earth, 
and the inhabitants in more dire need of shelter.132 Indeed, the environment on the Privolvan side of the 
moon required a liberal use of Kepler’s imagination to guarantee inhabitation:  
Since I had deprived the Privolvans of water, and I was compelled to leave them immense alternations 
of heat and cold coming directly on each other’s heels, it occurred to me that those regions could not be 
inhabited, at least not out in the open. Hence it was convenient that water flowed in at fixed times of the 
day. When it receded, I had the living creatures accompany it. To enable them to do so quickly, I gave 
some of them long legs and others the ability to swim and endure the water, with the proviso that they 
would not degenerate (degenerare) into fishes. None of this will be unbelievable to anybody who has 
read about Cola, the Sicilian man-fish. Moreover I thought that nothing on earth is so fierce that God did 
not instil resistance to it in a particular species of animals: in lions, to hunger and the African heat; in 
camels, to thirst and the vast deserts of Palmyrene Syria; in bears, to the cold of the far north, etc.133 
The use of the term degenerare is interesting here. Fish were a category of life lower than that of other 
animals, being a product of spontaneous generation and therefore more comparable to insects. By 
referencing the legend of Cola, the Sicilian man who could survive underwater for hours at a time like 
a fish, Kepler made it clear that he wished his lunar inhabitants to be of a certain class or nobility of 
creature.134  
                                                          
130 Dream, p. 161; GW 11.2, p. 373: ‘Equidem ob id ipsum superficies globorum videtur permissa coeco casui, 
ut in ea ordinanda et ornanda per partes, locus esset exercitio rationis.’  
131 Dream, p. 89; GW 11.2, p. 348.  
132 Dream, pp. 128–29; GW 11.2, p. 362. 
133 Dream, pp. 130–31; GW 11.2, p. 363: ‘Cum aquas Privolvis ademissem, aestus et frigoris vicissitudines 
immanes proximis omnino temporum articulis relinquere cogerer: subiit animum, eos tractus habitari non posse, 
saltem sub dio. Ex opportuno igitur aquae influebant certis diei tempestatibus: eas iterum recedentes jussi viventia 
comitari; et ut tam propere possent, longos pedes dedi; aliis nandi facultatem, et aquarum patientiam: ut tantum 
non in pisces degenerarent. Nec quicquam huius illi erit incredibile, qui de Cola Siculo, Homine-pisce, legerit. 
Etiam illud reputabam; nihil in terris tam esse nobis violentum, cuius tolerantiam non indiderit Deus certo generi 
animalium; famis et aestus Africani, Leonibus; situs et immensorum desertorum Syriae Palmyrenes, Camelis; 
frigoris Hyperborei, Ursis, etc.’ 
134 Kepler may have read about Cola in Julius Caesar Scaliger, Exotericae exercitationes liber quintus decimus 
de subtilitate ad Hieronymum Cardanum (Paris: Michel de Vascosan, 1557), Exercise 262. See Rosen, Dream, 
p. 131, n. 353.  
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Yet these lower forms of life exist in the moon as well. ‘Things born in the ground’, he imagined, 
‘generally begin and end their lives on the same day, with new generations springing up daily.’135 The 
lunar day, of course, is the length of fifteen earth-days, as is the night. The lunar flora could not possibly 
survive such a long time deprived of light and heat, and so the body of the moon, possibly carrying the 
seeds, brings forth a new generation following the eventual return of the sun. Furthermore, there are 
examples of bizarre generative processes: 
To certain of them the breath they exhaust and the life they lose on account of the heat of the day return 
at night; the pattern is the opposite of that governing flies among us. Scattered everywhere on the ground 
are objects having the shape of pine cones. Their shells are roasted during the day. In the evening when, 
so to say, they disclose their secrets, they beget living creatures.136 
The note to this section expands, citing terrestrial examples: 
From the resin which exudes from ship timbers as a result of the sun’s heat and sticks together in a ball, 
ducks are born. The last part of their whole body to develop is the bill. When this is released, they slip 
into the water below. So says Scaliger in his Exercises. The Scottish tree which produces the same 
offspring is well known because many people have made it famous. In the year 1615, when the summer 
was very dry, at Linz I saw a juniper twig that had been brought in from the abandoned fields of the 
Traun. The twig had given birth to an insect of unfamiliar shape and of the colour of a horned beetle. The 
insect had emerged up to its middle and moved slowly. The back parts clinging to the tree were juniper 
resin.137 
Lunar creatures born from cone-shaped objects are examples of that natural process which brings forth 
living creatures from seemingly inanimate matter. Kepler gave earthly examples like ducks born from 
pitch or from trees, and stick insects (we may assume) from sticks. These are all manifestations of that 
universal faculty which is responsible also, as in De stella nova, for the production of comets, new stars, 
and the like. Lunar life, as depicted in the Somnium, demonstrates not only God’s ingenuity when it 
comes to the coupling of life with its environment, but also the ability of nature to produce life itself in 
certain conditions. The moon is another example of Kepler’s vision of a beautifully varied cosmos, but 
one which is united by certain universal laws and operations, and therefore to a degree understandable 
by recourse to terrestrial analogies.  
The Somnium contains no discussion of astrology and therefore it is not surprising that, as the most 
famous example of his pluralist philosophy, historians have failed to make the connection between 
                                                          
135 Dream, p. 28; GW 11.2, p. 330: ‘Terra nascentia … plerumque eodem die et creantur et enecantur, novis 
quotidie succrescentibus.’ 
136 Dream, p. 28; GW 11.2, p. 330: ‘Quibusdam per diei aestum spiritus exhaustus, vitaque extincta, per noctem 
redeunt, contraria ratione quam apud nos Muscis. Passim per solum dispersae moles figura nucum pinearum, per 
diem adustis corticibus, vesperi quasi reclusis latebris, animantia edunt.’ 
137 Dream, pp. 133–34; GW 11.2, p. 364: ‘Ex resina, exsudante ex trabibus navium per Solis fervorem, et globatim 
adhaerescente, Anates nasci, quibus ultimum totius corporis, rostrum maturescat, quo soluto, se dent undis 
subjectis, refert Scaliger in Exercitationibus. Nota est multorum celebratione, arbor Scotiae, quae eundem foetum 
proferat. Anno 1615 aestate siccissima, vidi Lincii allatum ex Drani campis desertis, ramulum juniperi, cui adnata 
erat figura insecti insolita, colore scarabaei cornuti, mediotenus extans, et sese movens lento motu, posteriora 
arbori adhaerentia, erant resina juniperina.’ 
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astrology and ET life in Kepler. It is another example of the danger of focusing on the most novel or 
interesting components of Kepler’s philosophy without appreciating those components in the larger 
context of his work.138 The Somnium is narrow in intention and therefore in scope, and for Kepler the 
question of life on the moon had always been tied together with concepts derived from his interpretation 
of Copernicanism, such as the relativity of motion and the unity of terrestrial and celestial nature. The 
expansion of life beyond the moon is linked closely in Kepler with the discovery of celestial influence 
in operation at non-terrestrial locations, especially the new star in the firmament and the harmonic 
motions of the planets around the sun. The particular and idiosyncratic nature of Kepler’s astrology 
should not distract from his involvement in the larger trend outlined thus far. It is the same line of 
thinking visible in Plutarch, Cusa, Benedetti, Patrizi and Bruno: the role that the celestial bodies play 
in generative processes here on earth may be replicated between those bodies themselves, for similar 
purposes and with similar results. For Kepler, whose work was so influential on the development of the 
‘plurality of worlds’ philosophy, the notion of life, both on earth and elsewhere, was deeply attached to 
the notion of influence from the celestial realm. 
It is tempting to see Kepler as a nexus between the histories of astrology and pluralism. He was the last 
great reformer of astrology who could still be considered part of the scientific elite, and interest in his 
astrological theory and practice continues to grow.139 He is also one of the main characters in the history 
of pluralism in the seventeenth century. The Somnium is largely responsible for this, both because of 
the astronomical expertise it brought to the subject of lunar life, but also because the narrative setting 
places it as an early example or precursor of the literary genre of science fiction. Tales of voyages to 
the moon and the planets, many of them influenced by Kepler, would proliferate in the decades and 
centuries after Kepler, and they played a large part in disseminating and popularising theories of other 
worlds and ET life.140 There has been very little mention, however, of the relationship between astrology 
and pluralism in Kepler.141 Many would see it as another example of his Janus-like nature, looking both 
                                                          
138 See Caspar’s similar criticism of the historical treatment of Kepler’s laws of planetary motion: ‘In truth, if a 
work presents science with such a valuable contribution as the third planet law (not to mention the mathematical 
and musical fruits), then a critic must seek the lack in himself if he does not achieve an understanding of the 
manner of contemplating nature out of which the work has arisen.’ See Caspar, Kepler, p. 289. 
139 The scientific elite, that is, as it is construed by our modern history of science. There were later reformers of 
astrology, such as Jean-Baptiste Morin (1583–1656), who were considered elite in their own time. 
140 Over 10% of Dick’s Plurality of Worlds, which stretches from Democritus to Kant, is taken up by discussion 
of Kepler. The heavy-weighting given him in this standard text, as well as his prominent position in the history of 
astronomy more generally, means that Kepler is one of the first names mentioned in any short description of the 
history of pluralism, e.g. in Catling, Astrobiology, pp. 3–4. 
141 Dick did say this much: ‘Finally, Kepler the astrologer, who had cast many horoscopes for Rudolph II, noted 
that the astrological point of view also favored the existence of Jovians, because the small arcs that the orbits of 
the new moons subtended could be of significance only to the Jovians.’ See Dick, Plurality of Worlds, p. 77. 
Kepler didn’t explicitly link these moons to a Jovian astrology (see Boner, Kepler’s Cosmological Synthesis, p. 
152), but it is not necessarily a misguided connection on Dick’s part. 
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forward and back.142 In reality, these were both ideas of contemporary interest with long histories, and 
they fit together quite harmoniously in Kepler’s mind.  
Appreciating this is crucial for the construction of an accurate and rich history of astrobiology—a 
history to which Kepler is already closely tied. This connection has been strengthened by the fact that 
his name was given to an orbital telescope which has been used to identify thousands of planets orbiting 
other stars (commonly called exoplanets). The irony in naming this telescope after a man who was 
vocally opposed to the idea that the stars could have their own planets has largely been lost, and besides 
is a trifling point.143 What is more important for the history of astrobiology is to appreciate the 
pervasiveness of astrological ideas within Kepler’s thought, and in particular how they contributed to 
the development of pluralist theories. Astrology was a significant factor in how the life on any particular 
celestial body was intimately related to that body’s cosmic environment. In the following chapter, we 
will look at examples further into the seventeenth century of cosmologies which combined elements of 
astrology and pluralism, before turning our attention to an instance of these ideas under debate within 
the context of early mechanism.
                                                          
142 See, for example, the analysis of the Somnium in Fernand Hallyn, The Poetic Structure of the World: 
Copernicus and Kepler (New York; Cambridge, MA: Zone Books, 1990), pp. 279–80. 
143 He may well have been delighted, however, by the discovery that some moons and planets, in this system and 
others, have an orbital resonance, where their orbital periods are related by ratios of small integers. One can 
imagine the ambivalence he might have felt towards such articles as Matthew J. Holman et al., ‘Kepler-9: A 





Influence and/or Inhabitation: The Celestial Bodies between 
Kepler and Newton 
 
Ramus did overthrow Aristotle’s Philosophy; Copernicus, Ptolomey’s Astrologie; Paracelsus, Galen’s 
Physick; So that every one hath followers and disciples, and all appearing plausible. We have much ado 
whom to believe, and thereby are constrained to confesse, that what we know, is much lesse then what 
we know not. 
Pierre Borel 1  
 
Introduction 
The preceding chapters have attempted to show how a belief in ET life grew within and was in fact 
spurred on by the dominant astrological paradigm. The philosophies of Gilbert and Kepler, and those 
who preceded them, hinted at a universe with multiple inhabited globes, all participating in a mutual 
exchange of virtues and influences. We will come across similar cosmological themes in the following 
chapter, but our attention will also shift onto how these ideas could be placed in opposition. This will 
then serve as groundwork for the second main argument of this dissertation: that the theory of celestial 
inhabitation came to be placed purposefully in opposition to theories of celestial influence, a process 
which led to the establishment of pluralism as the central paradigm of astronomical cosmology. The 
main issue is of course one of teleology, and the next two chapters will sketch out the process by which 
these two ideas went from being teleologically complementary to teleologically opposed. This 
development was heavily tied to the obsession with atheism amongst philosophers in this period, natural 
or otherwise. Whereas in earlier periods astrology was often used as a defence against the perceived 
atheism of atomism, in the seventeenth century we see the situation almost reversed, with forms of 
pluralism and atomic vitalism being used to combat the threat of an astrological cosmology portrayed 
as deterministic and atheistic.  
Apart from Giordano Bruno, about whose philosophy we said relatively little, none of the figures 
studied so far have been atomists. It was, however, the resurgence of atomistic or corpuscularian ideas 
which formed the basis for the mechanical philosophies of the mid-seventeenth century, and it was these 
mechanical philosophies, Cartesianism in particular, which nurtured and propagated pluralism. Implicit 
in early atomism and mechanism, treating physical phenomena as the motion and collision of effectively 
                                                          
1 Pierre Borel, A New Treatise, Proving a Multiplicity of Worlds, trans. by D. Sashott (London: John Streater, 
1658), p. 6. 
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indivisible particles, was the rejection of the terrestrial/celestial division. Most mechanical philosophers 
were Copernicans, and so believed the earth to be one of the celestial globes, which, as we have already 
seen, could have important impacts on notions concerning the activity and/or passivity of those bodies. 
At the same time, there was a desire within mechanical philosophy to do away with occult qualities, 
and astrology saw itself largely excluded or marginalised. It is not the aim here to delve into the myriad 
of factors contributing to the decline of astrology as a scientific discipline, although certain aspects, 
such as the appropriation and rhetorical rebranding of astrological concepts by the new philosophies, 
will form part of the discussion.2 The intention is rather to suggest that pluralism has an important and 
hitherto under-appreciated role in this narrative, and to that end this chapter will compare and contrast 
the views of individual philosophers concerning the compatibility or incompatibility of astrology and 
pluralism within a more mechanical cosmos. 
To begin, however, it is worth touching briefly on a few developments in the first four decades of the 
seventeenth century that were passed over while our attention was on Gilbert and Kepler. One of the 
earliest post-Brunian attempts to describe an atomistic, pluralistic cosmos was made by the English 
philosopher Nicholas Hill (1570–c.1610) in his Philosophia Epicurea (1601).3 Hill was a member of 
the Northumberland Circle, and his work was influenced not only by Bruno but also by Gilbert, as well 
as Democritus, Hermes Trismegistus and Aristotle.4 The two championed novelties of his work are 
atoms and the infinity of the world, but magnetism, and effused substantial forms and species more 
generally, take on a large role in the functioning of this new cosmos.5 In Hill’s infinite universe the 
reality of superiority and inferiority is abolished, and they are therefore considered as respective things. 
He proposed magnetic attraction as an analogue for the return of projected earthly bodies.6 Magnetic 
laws also explained why the primary globes ‘fall’ (decumbere) towards one place more than other, while 
                                                          
2 Hutchison, ‘What Happened to Occult Qualities in the Scientific Revolution?’; Ron Millen, ‘The Manifestation 
of Occult Qualities in the Scientific Revolution’, in Religion, Science, and Worldview: Essays in Honor of Richard 
S. Westfall, ed. by Margaret J. Osler and Paul Lawrence Farber (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985): 185–216; Henry, ‘The Fragmentation of Renaissance Occultism and the Decline of Magic’. On the 
mechanisation of celestial influence, see also Roos, Luminaries in the Natural World, Ch. 5, pp. 165–220. 
3 References are to the second edition. Nicholas Hill, Philosophia Epicurea, Democritiana, Theophrastica 
proposita simpliciter, non edocta (Geneva: François Le Fèvre, 1619). 
4 On Hill’s cosmology, see Jean Jacquot, ‘Harriot, Hill, Warner and the New Philosophy’, in Thomas Harriot: 
Renaissance Scientist, ed. by John William Shirley (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974): 107–28. See also Grant 
McColley, ‘Nicholas Hill and the Philosophia Epicurea’, Annals of Science, 4 (1939): 390–405; Kargon, Atomism 
in England from Hariot to Newton, pp. 5–17, 43–53; Daniel Massa, ‘Giordano Bruno’s Ideas in Seventeenth-
Century England’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 38 (1977): 227–42; H. R. Trevor-Roper, ‘Nicholas Hill the 
English Atomist’, in Catholics, Anglicans and Puritans: Seventeenth-Century Essays, ed. by H. R. Trevor-Roper 
(London: Fontana Press, 1989): 1–39; Stephen Clucas, ‘“The Infinite Variety of Formes and Magnitudes”: 16th- 
and 17th-Century English Corpuscular Philosophy and Aristotelian Theories of Matter and Form’, Early Science 
and Medicine, 2 (1997): 251–271 (266–268); Dick, Plurality of Worlds, pp. 48–50. 
5 Stephen Clucas, Thomas Harriot and the Field of Knowledge in the English Renaissance (Oxford: Oriel College, 
1995), p. 38. 
6 Hill, Philosophia Epicurea, N. 205, pp. 55–6. 
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the stable distances between them prevents any possible coming together.7 The similarity between the 
globes extends beyond magnetism to include their material and indeed inhabitants: 
The superior globes (as many call them) are of the same material as the globe in which we live, and in 
which all things are analogous to ours, the globes being super-fertile, and distinct species being 
subordinated to and ruling one another. Perhaps there are giant men in the sun of a size exceeding ours 
160 times, compared with which we are dwarfs and slave-boys, while the lunar men are perhaps pygmies 
even smaller again.8 
Hill anticipated the concern that this infinite world, in which the observable universe is an insignificant 
part, may be detrimental to man’s perceived standing. In his view, the reason for this concern is that we 
are more likely to be envious of the humanity of another than to appreciate our own blessings. ‘The 
special prerogative of our nature’, he reassured us, ‘in no way suffers from the propagation of numerous 
men.’9 
He even suggested that God separated the orbs from each other in order to guard against human envy, 
but this separation (disterminare) does not prevent some form of interaction between the globes.10 There 
are many astrological arguments in the Philosophia Epicurea, although in terms of judicial astrology 
he limited its foundations to the aspects and the ‘manifest analogy of superior to inferior things’.11 
Elsewhere he described the powers of things (vires rerum) as ‘the influxes and effusions of the 
combined specific forms of the planets, aspects and ascendants’.12 We can see the stress on forms, 
powers, species and active virtues as compensation for the underdeveloped explanatory power of the 
nascent atomism, and as an early sign of the problems the mechanical philosophy would have with the 
declared passivity of matter.13 Hill saw elements in atomic terms, but argued that they receive their 
strength ‘from the firmament’, and although the seeds of offspring gestate in the womb, they do not do 
                                                          
7 Ibid., N. 438, p. 160. 
8 Ibid., N. 278, pp. 79–80: ‘Globi superiores (oportet loqui cum vulgo) eiusdem sunt materiae cum globa quam 
incolimus, in quibus etiam ea sunt omnia quae apud nos secundum analogiam, globis superfoetantibus, speciebus 
distinctis sibiinvicem subordinatis et imperantibus tum illis, tum sibiinvicem hominibus gyganteis, mole 
exuperantibus nostrates centies sexagesies forsan qui in sole sunt, ad quos comparati homunciones nos sumus, et 
servoli, lunaribus hominibus pygmeis multo forsan humilioribus.’ 
9 Ibid., N. 482, pp. 186–7: ‘…addo naturae nostrae specialem praerogativam nullatenus sublatam numerosa 
hominum propagatione…’ 
10 Ibid.: ‘…qui (Deus) ut invidiam forsitan praecaveret orbes ita a seinvicem disterminavit’.  
11 Ibid., N. 392, p. 131: ‘Illa sola astrologica iudicia aestimanda quae in globorum aspectibus primariorum 
fundatur, et superiorum ad inferiora manifesta analogia.’ 
12 Ibid., N. 252, p. 67. 
13 On the influence of al-Kindi, Grosseteste and Bacon on the vis radiativa theory favoured by members of the 
Northumberland Circle, see Stephen Clucas, ‘Corpusclar Matter Theory in the Northumberland Circle’, in Late 
Medieval and Early Modern Corpuscular Matter Theories, ed. by Christoph Lüthy, John E. Murdoch and William 
R. Newman (Leiden: Brill, 2001): 181–207 (182–201). 
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so ‘without celestial influences’.14 Not only the growth of the individual creature but also the wellbeing 
of the earth itself as a habitat depends on celestial interaction:  
Orbs do not exhaust themselves, or empty themselves, but by mutual virtues revive themselves, and, 
once they join forces together, they grow strong by turns from the reciprocal communication of their 
peculiar properties (idiomatum communicatione), and refresh each other’s weakened powers.15 
This vision of harmonious discourse between the primary globes is of course very similar to that of 
Bruno and especially Gilbert. In Hill’s cosmology the celestial/terrestrial divide is abolished, the 
elements are thought of in terms of atoms, the celestial medium is replaced by a vacuum, and yet the 
paradigm of celestial influence holds fast.  
The key analogy was magnetism, and it was grounded again in emanation theory. More than just that, 
Hill saw the consideration of such active virtues as a way to understand more about the nature of the 
universe as a whole: 
The natural and usual action of the form of anything is a certain emanation. Operation is an indicator of 
virtue; virtue an indicator of substance. We have no more certain way of grasping the way in which 
innumerable worlds agree in their substances, or of discovering the medium, than the perceived similarity 
of action.16 
Assuming the similarity of material and physical law in the heavens and the earth, while retaining a 
belief in the influence of the celestial over the terrestrial, Hill saw a way to argue from effect to cause 
so as to discover the nature of the substance of the other globes themselves. This is an argument we 
have seen before, for example, when Plutarch argued that the moon must be wet because of its 
humidifying influence. The argument that the ontological superiority of the celestial bodies is 
demonstrated by their influence was flipped around by Hill, who, with magnetism as his prime example, 
argued that a similarity of effects entailed an agreement of substance. 
There were other signs that the similarity of celestial to terrestrial material would not immediately 
undermine the theoretical foundations of astrology. The Italian philosopher Giulio Cesare Vanini 
(1585–1619), whose naturalistic and highly astrological interpretation of God’s providence saw him 
accused of atheism, dismissed the Aristotelian notion that the two realms were made of different types 
of matter.17 Vanini came to be greatly influenced by the philosophy of Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525) 
following his move from Naples to Padua. He was a materialist who strongly advocated a form of astral 
                                                          
14 Hill, Philosophia Epicurea, N. 241, p. 64. 
15 Ibid., N. 249, p. 67: ‘Orbes non se exhauriunt, aut exinaniunt, sed mutuis viribus se refocillant, et confoederati 
alterna idiomatum communicatione seinvicem corroborant, et redintegrant fractas vires alter alterius.’ 
16 Ibid., N. 248, pp. 66–7: ‘Naturalis, et Usitata cuiusque actio formae quaedam est emanatio, operatione virtutis, 
virtute substantiae indice, nec certius habemus ad mundorum innumerabilium consensum substantialem 
tenendum, aut inveniendum medium, quum actionum analogiam conspicuam.’ Reading ‘quum’ as ‘quam’. 
17 Nicholas S. Davidson, ‘“Le plus beau et le plus meschant esprit que ie aye cogneu”: Science and Religion in 
the Writings of Giulio Cesare Vanini, 1585–1619’, in Heterodoxy in Early Modern Science and Religion, ed. by 
John Hedley Brooke and Ian Maclean (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005): 59–80 (72). 
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determinism, believing that the heavenly bodies were the tools with which God exercised his providence 
in terrestrial affairs.18 This was in itself not a particularly heterodox opinion—Melanchthon, as we have 
seen, argued very similarly—but Vanini’s contemporaries were appalled by the way he granted all 
agency to physical and natural causes, leaving nothing to the spiritual or supernatural. He accordingly 
denied that the celestial bodies possessed intelligences by which they moved. Rather, he argued that 
they were possessed of an appropriate form which produces circular movement, and he used the analogy 
of a clock to illustrate the possibility of a certain and enduring law of motion.19 Better known for its 
adoption by the mechanical philosophy, it is worth remembering that the world-as-clock metaphor was 
used much earlier (and perhaps more accurately) by Johannes de Sacrobosco to describe the machina 
mundi, in which motion and action were transferred inwards to the earth from the law-defined motion 
of the heavens.20 
This world picture was upturned by Copernicus, but, as we have seen, the paradigm of celestial 
influence could be salvaged from its original framework. Tommaso Campanella (1568–1639) was one 
philosopher whose enthusiasm for the astronomical discoveries of Galileo failed to conflict with his 
enthusiasm for astrology. Indeed, when he wrote to Galileo giving his thoughts on the Sidereus nuncius, 
he was particularly intrigued by the possibility of ET life and suggested that ‘it should especially be 
investigated … to what extent the inhabitants of each star have knowledge of astronomy and 
astrology’.21 On top of this, we have seen from Rheticus onwards that new astronomical concepts could 
be argued astrologically.22 Such was the case with one of the first outspoken advocates of heliocentrism 
in the Netherlands, Philippe van Lansberge (1561–1632). His Bedenckinghen op den daghelijckschen 
ende jaerlijckschen loop vanden aerdt-cloot (‘Considerations about the Daily and Yearly Movements 
of the Earth’, 1629), translated into Latin the following year, contains many arguments from influence 
for the reality of the Copernican system.23 Like Kepler, Lansberge used Trinitarian theology as a 
cosmological model, dividing the world into three heavens: the first planetary heaven, the second 
                                                          
18 See Ian Maclean, ‘Heterodoxy in Natural Philosophy and Medicine: Pietro Pomponazzi, Guglielmo Gratarolo, 
Girolamo Cardano’, in Heterodoxy in Early Modern Science and Religion: 1–30. 
19 Lucilio Vanini, De admirandis naturae reginae deaeque mortalium arcanis libri quatuor (Paris: Adrien Perier, 
1616), p. 21. 
20 John of Sacrobosco, On the Sphere, quoted in Edward Grant, A Source Book in Medieval Science (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 465. 
21 Letter from Tommaso Campanella to Galileo (January 13th, 1611), in Galileo Galilei, Opere, ed. by Antonio 
Favaro, 20 vols (Florence:  Barbera, 1890–1909), II, p. 22: ‘Illud et maxime investigandum erat … qualem habent 
astrologiam et astronomiam singulorum incolae astrorum.’ On Campanella’s advocacy of pluralism, see Germana 
Ernst, ‘“Maculae Galilei me perplexum habent”: Campanella, Sunspots and the Temptations of Pythagoreanism’, 
in Authority, Innovation and Early Modern Epistemology, ed. by Martin McLaughlin, Ingrid D. Rowland and 
Elisabetta Tarantino (Cambridge: Legenda, 2015): 170–185; Dick, Plurality of Worlds, pp. 90–93. 
22 Indeed, it is worth remembering that Thomas Digges (c.1546–1595) presented the Copernican hypothesis to 
an English audience as an addendum to a new edition of his father’s astrological almanac. See Francis R. 
Johnson and Sanford V. Larkey, ‘Thomas Digges, the Copernican System, and the Idea of the Infinity of the 
Universe in 1576’, The Huntington Library Bulletin, 5 (1934): 69–117. 
23 Refences are to Philippe van Lansberge, Commentationes in motum terrae diurnum, et annuum, trans. by 
Martinus Hortensius (Middleburg: Zacharias Roman, 1630). 
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heaven of the fixed stars, and the third invisible heaven beyond that. Although distinct, he argued that 
the energies of these three heavens all worked together for the same goal.24 In his attempt to explain the 
advantages of the heliocentric arrangement, he appealed to both influence and inhabitation to make his 
case. 
In terms of the positions of the sun and the earth, justifying the switch is quite easy, because the two 
most important bodies were simply swapping positions. Lansberge began with the sun: 
Firstly, however, I will deal with the sun, which God established in the centre of the First Heaven; and 
he did not do so without good cause. It is not 166 times bigger than the earth, as Ptolemy thought, but 
433 or more times bigger, as I will show clearly in our Uranometria. And what better place could there 
be to establish this torch of such great size and inexhaustible light than in the centre, from whence it may 
illuminate the whole of the First Heaven on every side? Certainly, God established the sun in this place 
like a king on a throne, from whence he can behold and rule his subjects on all sides. There is nothing 
hid from the sight and heat thereof (Psal. 19:7), so that whatever lives under its rule is made a participant 
in its life-giving faculty, this according to the sentence of the Prince of Philosophers, where he asserts 
that the sun and man generate man. Indeed, unless the life-giving power of the sun contributed to the 
generation of man and the other animals, it would be useless to attempt any such generation.25 
The argument is not difficult to make, and had applied equally as well when the sun was considered to 
be in the middle position among the planets. The implied consequence, however, is that the life-giving 
faculty (vivifica facultas), indispensable to the process of generation on earth, is dispersed to every body 
in the first heaven. Lansberge then focused on the privileged position of the earth. ‘It [the earth] was 
set, therefore, in the middle of the planets’, he wrote, ‘the most dignified place in the whole of the First 
Heaven, to which both the superior and inferior planets freely transmit their influence, as if to a common 
storehouse.’26 Lansberge later expanded on this point, using the analogy of a balance to demonstrate 
that the middle, rather than the centre, is the most natural position for the earth to receive the beneficial 
influences of the planets: 
But it should be noted first of all, that the balance of God, by which he weighs the powers of the planets 
every day, was attached to the earth, not to the sun or the other planets. For the sphere of the earth is the 
middle point between the inferior and superior spheres, so that these are suspended like scales on either 
side. For which reason we teach that the proportion of the powers and operations of the planets, which 
God distributes every day like weights, is aimed at the convenience of the globe of the earth, and 
especially of man, the inhabitants of it. For indeed we have not yet detected any mutual alteration in the 
                                                          
24 Ibid., pp. 32–33. 
25 Ibid., p. 38: ‘Primo autem de Sole agam, quem Deus constituit in centro Primi Caeli; neque id sine gravi causa. 
Est enim Ille, non 166 vicibus, ut voluit Ptolemaeus; sed 433 et amplius, Terra major; ut in Uranometria nostra 
evidenter ostendam. Sed hanc tante magnitudinis, tamque inexhausti luminis, Facem; quis aptiori loco collocarit, 
quam in Centro; unde totum Primum caelum circumquaque illuminaret? certe ut Regem in Solio, Deus Solem isto 
loco collocavit: unde subjecta omnia, undique respiciat, & regat: a cuius intuitu & Calore, nihil queat abscondi, 
Psal. 19.7. ut quicquid sub ejus versatur imperio, Vivifica Facultatis fiat particeps, ex sententia Principis 
Philosophorum, qua Solem & Hominem, Hominem generare, asserit. Nisi enim Vivifica Solis Vis, ad 
generationem Hominis, aliorumque animalium concurreret; irritum esset, quicquid ad generationem molirentur.’ 
26 Ibid., p. 41: ‘Posuit ergo eam in medio Planetarum; loco totius Primi Caeli dignissimo: ad quem tam superiores, 
quam inferiores Planetæ, Influentias suas, quasi ad commune penu[s], liberaliter transmittunt.’ 
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planets from each other; while this [alteration], however that may be, always descends to the earth, as 
will be apparent from the following.27 
 
Lansberge then gave five examples of the tangible effects of conjunctions between superior and inferior 
planets, mainly in terms of temperature and weather. He was maintaining an orthodox opinion on the 
influential role of the planets in the new cosmology, even going as far as to describe how the balance is 
maintained, with each superior planet having its opposite, in terms of qualities and influences, among 
the inferior ones.28 Yet he didn’t completely shut the door on the possibility that alteration might occur 
among the planets themselves, and indeed he had allowed it to the moon a few pages earlier when he 
had put forward three arguments for why the moon was similar to the earth. Firstly, ‘as the moon is like 
another sun to the earth,’ he argued, ‘so is it like another earth to the sun’.29 This is shown by its solidity 
and its monthly rotation, which exposes every part of it to the light of the sun. Secondly, its dark and 
light patches seem to show that it is constructed in a similar fashion to the earth. Thirdly, it seems to act 
upon the earth ‘as if it were an earth itself’, as evidenced by the tides.30 The conclusion is that the moon 
is like another earth (altera Terra), and that these two celestial bodies ‘operate mutually between 
themselves’.31 
One more thing Lansberge had to explain in the heliocentric system was the greatly expanded distance 
between Saturn and the fixed stars, which, since Galileo, had themselves been shown to be much larger 
and more numerous. Here again, influence and inhabitation combined, although the Calvinist Minister 
was far from maintaining other worlds with human-like creatures. First, in a quite convoluted manner, 
he dealt with the light of the stars: 
The Second [Heaven] is illuminated by the fixed stars, which, no less than the sun, received particular 
and distinct light from God. But [that light] is as much stronger than that of the First Heaven as it [the 
Second Heaven] is bigger, for God made the light of each heaven proportional to its size. Hence we assert 
the light of the fixed stars to be circumscribed by its own limits; nor to be extended much further than to 
the sphere of Saturn. Indeed, around here [Saturn] the lights of the dual heavens come together, so that, 
united between themselves, by their conjoined powers, as much from below as from above, they extend 
their operation in the service of either heaven; but especially of man, who, as if Lord of the Universe, 
God set in the First Heaven.32 
                                                          
27 Ibid., p. 49: ‘Sed imprimis notandum, Deum O. M. Libram, qua Vires Planetarum quotidie expendit; appendisse 
Terrae; non Soli, aut alij Planetae. Nam Sphaera Terrae, media est inter Sphaeras inferiores, et superiores: ita ut 
inferiores Planetae, una superiores altera Lance, quasi suspendantur. Quo docemur, Temperamentum Virium et 
Operationum Planetarum, quas Deus indies tanquam ad pondus distribuit; tendere in commodum Globi Terrae, 
atque imprimis Hominis, eum incolentis. Nullam etenim in Planetis a se mutuo alterationem, hactenus 
deprehendimus: cum ea, quocunque tandem modo fiat, semper in Terram cadat; ut ex sequentibus erit 
manifestum.’ 
28 Ibid., pp. 48–49. 
29 Ibid., p. 46: ‘Porro sicut Luna, Terrae velut alter Sol; ita Soli est, velut altera Terra.’ 
30 Ibid.: ‘Luna non aliter operatur in Terram, quam si ipsa Terra esset.’ 
31 Ibid., p. 47: ‘Patet ergo, Lunam quasi alteram Terram esse; et has in se mutuo operari.’ 
32 Ibid., p. 33: ‘Secundum porro; illustratur a Fixis: quae non minus quam Sol, proprium ac distinctum a Deo 
Lumen accepere: sed tanto fortius, quanto majus hoc Coelum Primo, Deus enim O. M. Lumen cujusque Caeli, 
proportionale fecit eius Amplitudini: unde etiam Lumen Fixarum, suis terminis circumscribi asserimus; nec 
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But on top of this attempt to rescue some use of the Second Heaven for humanity, Lansberge argued 
that it is not devoid of God’s creatures: 
Although the space between the orb of Saturn and the fixed stars is huge, it is not a vacuum, as Tycho 
Brahe and his followers think. Rather, it is filled with God’s creatures, as much as the First Heaven. For 
besides new stars arising there, it is everywhere occupied by a multitude of invisible creatures; such that 
neither Tycho Brahe nor anyone else has any occasion for suspecting it to be empty or vacuum.33 
The Tychonic system, by keeping the earth stationary, had no need to assume such a vast space between 
Saturn and the fixed stars to account for the lack of observable stellar parallax. The enormity of this 
space was one of Tycho’s most consistent criticisms of a heliocentric system, and it is significant that 
part of Lansberge’s answer relied upon the idea of living-space. Of course, this is not pluralism in the 
form that has interested us thus far. These are angelic, incorporeal creatures, not mortal animals or 
humans, and they are living in the ether rather than calling another planet their home. 
These examples demonstrate that, beyond Gilbert and Kepler, thinkers in the first half of the seventeenth 
century—even some with pluralist leanings—not only saw the benefit of astrological reasoning for 
justifying new cosmological theories, but were also perfectly capable of accommodating astrological 
ideas to those new systems. The 1630s, however, saw the publication of several important and 
influential works on pluralist themes that had little or nothing to do with astrology. One was The 
Discovery of a World in the Moone (1638) by John Wilkins (1614–1672), which relied mainly upon the 
Copernican view of the earth as a planet as well as the more particular arguments about the earth-like 
nature of the moon found in Plutarch, Kepler and Galileo.34 Celestial influence plays very little part in 
its argumentation, although he did remark on the ‘compendium’ of providence that could make the same 
body a world for habitation and moon for the use of others.35 Another work was the fictional tale of a 
journey to the moon written by Francis Godwin (1562–1633), published posthumously in the same year 
as Wilkins’ book.36 This work, along with Kepler’s Somnium and the later L'Autre Monde: Ou les États 
et Empires de la Lune (‘The Other World, or A Comical History of the States and Empires of the Moon’, 
                                                          
ulterius extendi, quam ad Sphaeram Saturni. Circa hanc enim concurrunt binorum Caelorum Lumina; ut inter se 
unita, conjunctis viribus, tam sursum quam deorsum, operationem suam extendant: in usum utriusque Caeli; sed 
imprimis Hominis, quem Deus tanquam Dominum Universi, in Primo Coelo collocavit.’ 
33 Ibid., p. 53: ‘Licet ingens sit spatium, intra Orbem Saturni, et Fixarum; non tamen est vacuum, ut Tycho Brahe 
cum asseclis, sensit; sed Creaturis Dei repletum, aeque ac Primum Caelum. Nam praeter Novas Stellas inibi 
enascentes; tanta multitudine Creaturarum invisibilium undique obsidetur; ut nec Tycho Brahe, nec quisquam 
alius, ansam habeat suspicandi, inane esse aut vacuum.’ 
34 See Dick, Plurality of Worlds, pp. 97–104. 
35 John Wilkins, The Discovery of a World in the Moone (London: Michael Sparke and Edward Forrest, 1638), p. 
43. 
36 Francis Godwin, The Man in the Moone (London: John Norton, 1638). There are interesting cosmological 
features of Godwin’s work that show the influence of Gilbert. See William Poole, ‘The Origins of Francis 
Godwin’s The Man in the Moone (1638)’, Philological Quarterly, 84 (2005): 189–210; Roos, Luminaries in the 
Natural World, pp. 133–34; Sarah Hutton, ‘The Man in the Moone and the New Astonomy: Godwin, Gilbert, 
Kepler’, Etudes Epistémè, 7 (2005): 3–13. 
131 
 
1658) of Cyrano de Bergerac (1619–1655), is considered an example of early modern science fiction.37 
Combined with Wilkins’ scientific treatise, all these works popularised the idea of an inhabited lunar 
world. Instead of the moon being a special case (as we saw in Patrizi, for example), these works 
demonstrate how the moon, which had always been an exemplar of celestial influence, was now being 
held up as an exemplar instead of broader celestial inhabitation. They will not, however, form a 
significant part of this discussion, partly because they have been the most commonly studied of all the 
various aspects of the history of pluralism, and also because they have no obvious or direct relationship 
to celestial influence or astrology.38 
This chapter will instead continue to follow the interaction between pluralism and celestial influence 
further into the period from the 1640s to the 1680s, investigating examples of natural philosophers who 
built both ideas into their new cosmologies. This chapter and the next will, in addition, present instances 
where the merits of these ideas are debated and indeed pitted against each other. Towards the end of the 
century, the advocates and popularisers of the new science will largely restrict talk of influences to those 
of the sun(s) and moon(s), and pluralism will take on the majority of the teleological burden. The 
marginalisation of astrology, however, was not an immediate or necessary consequence of the decline 
of Aristotelianism and the rise of the mechanical philosophies. As the following discussion will 
demonstrate, there was not one ‘astrology’ or one ‘pluralism’ to be accepted or rejected; they were both 
cosmological putty in the hands of the community of seventeenth-century world-builders. 
 
The Symbiosis of Influence and Inhabitation in the New Cosmologies 
In this section, we will examine a selection of the new cosmologies which arose in the mid-seventeenth 
century with an eye on two factors in particular—the continuing persistence of astrological thinking 
within pluralist frameworks, and the way in which pluralism encroached on previously astrological 
domains. By the 1640s, Copernicanism had been widely disseminated and, more importantly, developed 
into a feasible world-system by the celestial physics of Kepler’s Epitome of Copernican Astronomy and 
Galileo’s Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems (1632).  This period also saw the 
                                                          
37 For an introduction to this topic, see the chapter on ‘Seventeenth-Century Science Fiction’, in Adam Roberts, 
The History of Science Fiction (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 36–63. 
38 See Nicolson, Voyages to the Moon; A. G. H. Bachrach, ‘Luna Mendax: Some Reflections on Moon-Voyages 
in Early Seventeenth-Century England’, in Between Dream and Nature: Essays on Utopia and Dystopia, ed. by 
Dominic Baker-Smith and C. C. Barfoot (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1987): 70–90; Sylvie Romanowski, ‘Cyrano de 
Bergerac’s Epistemological Bodies: “Pregnant with a Thousand Definitions”’, Science Fiction Studies, 25 (1998): 
414–32; Mary B. Campbell, Wonder and Science: Imagining Worlds in Early Modern Europe (Ithaca; London: 
Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 135–76; Roos, Luminaries in the Natural World; Hutton, ‘The Man in the 
Moone and the New Astonomy: Godwin, Gilbert, Kepler’; David Cressy, ‘Early Modern Space Travel and the 
English Man in the Moon’, The American Historical Review, 111 (2006): 961–82. These lunar works do, however, 
demonstrate the attempt to build up the moon, which remained an exemplar of celestial influence, as an exemplar 
instead of celestial inhabitation. 
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development of the mechanical philosophies, epitomised by the Christian-Epicurean atomism of Pierre 
Gassendi (1592–1655) and the physics of René Descartes (1596–1650). The works of these figures 
stimulated much of the interest in ET life in the middle and later decades of the seventeenth century, 
but none of the thinkers we will examine adhered strictly to their principles.  
The philosophy of the Cambridge Platonist Henry More (1614–1687) is central to the history of the 
plurality of worlds tradition. His poetic work Democritus Platonissans (1646), a syncretic mix of 
Cartestianism, Platonism and Christian theology, has been awarded a prominent role in the development 
of pluralism and sufficiently well analysed in this respect that we need only mention a few of its relevant 
facets before moving on.39 Henry More argued for that now familiar Copernican consequence that 
whatever is done on earth is done similarly in the other globes.40 He also argued that the stars in the sky 
have little relevance to us in terms of influence.41 Rather, the light any star shines to us in the evening 
is secondary to its main duty, which is to supply vital heat to its surrounding planets and to raise ‘long 
hidden shapes and life’ by its seminal virtue.42 If this were not the case, these stars would seem to be 
superfluous. This life-giving light provided to the inert planets by their suns seems to be complemented 
by two other factors: an inherent activity which God granted to every atom, and an ‘ethereal dew’ which 
he scattered all throughout the universe at creation.43  
The poem also contains verses expressing cosmological prophecies in pluralistic terms. It talks of 
countless other planetary worlds with plants, beasts and men, each beginning with an Adam and ending 
in conflagration. It suggests that new stars are in fact some of these planets which have met their fiery 
end, and that comets are perhaps dead planets cast off into the ether.44 Nevertheless, the infinite cycle 
of life continues when these orbs of purged ashes drink in the heavenly dew and ‘roscid Manna’, 
resulting in the production of new, prelapsarian life.45 Henry More is an example of how pluralism 
began to take over the teleological function of astrology, attributing meaning to celestial phenomena 
with drastically new consequences. More’s own aversion to astrology will be examined in the next 
chapter. His substitute in regard to the process of generation was a spermatic ‘spirit of nature’ or ‘world 
soul’—a universal and general contributor of form and vitality far different and purposefully opposed 
to the clockwork style of planetary influence of the likes of Vanini. This nominal agent of the immaterial 
                                                          
39 Henry More, Democritus Platonissans: Or, an Essay upon the Infinity of Worlds out of Platonick Principles 
(Cambridge: printed by Roger Daniel, 1646). See Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, pp. 125, 167; Koyré, From 
the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, pp. 125–55; Dick, Plurality of Worlds, pp. 50–53, 117–18. On Henry 
More’s philosophy and his role in seventeenth-century science, see Sarah Hutton (ed.), Henry More (1614-1687): 
Tercentenary Studies (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990), and the recent issue of the British Journal for the History of 
Philosophy, 25.5 (2017), devoted to Cambridge Platonism and edited by Sarah Hutton. 
40 More, Democritus Platonissans, p. 4.  
41 Ibid., p. 6. 
42 Ibid., p. 7. 
43 Ibid., pp. 4, 13. 
44 Ibid., pp. 21–22. 
45 Ibid., p. 26. 
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God constituted a Stoic/Platonic plenum, in which each world sits like ‘a knot in Psyches garment 
tide’.46   
A decade later, the French physician and chemist Pierre Borel (1620–1671) wrote his Discours nouveau 
prouvant la pluralité des mondes (‘A New Discourse Proving the Plurality of Worlds’, 1657), a popular 
work, translated into English the year after its release, which some have described as a middle-point 
between the old and new cosmologies.47 Borel repeated, as was now usual, the argument that if the earth 
is a ‘star’ then the other stars may well be inhabited earths, and he criticised those who thought that the 
infinite number of celestial bodies had been created for the sake of this earth.48 The plurality of worlds 
may have been a theme widely discussed in France at this time, as it was one of the topics included in 
the conferences of the Bureau d’adresse, a weekly public debate on miscellaneous topics of interest 
established in 1633 by Théophraste Renaudot (1586–1653).49 One of the objections raised in this 
particular meeting was taken on directly by Borel:  
In the second volume of the Conferences du Bureau d'adresse someone also opposes that if the stars 
were inhabited they would need other stars to influence them, and other heavens, so on to infinity; to 
which I respond that I am not powerfully persuaded that the stars are useful to us, except the sun and the 
moon. It may be that these stars communicate and serve one another mutually, and therefore there is no 
need for an infinity of heavens.50  
The objection is indicative of how many still perceived the entire system of heavenly bodies to be 
necessary for the functioning of a habitable earth. Borel, on the other hand, saw the generative virtues 
of the stars as another reason to believe that they are inhabited. If we see causes in the heavens then we 
should expect to find effects, because we should grant that the stars can act within themselves as well 
as on distant objects.51  
To better explain the operation of such stellar influences, Borel gave the example, unsurprisingly, of 
the lodestone. A magnet projects its virtue outwards to a certain distance, and the earth, being itself a 
large magnet, does the same up to the moon. The other stars likewise extend their virtues and spheres 
                                                          
46 Ibid., p. 4. 
47 Marie-Rose Carré, ‘A Man between Two Worlds: Pierre Borel and His Discours nouveau prouvant la pluralité 
des mondes of 1657’, Isis, 65 (1974): 322–35; Dick, Plurality of Worlds, pp. 118–20. 
48 Pierre Borel, Discours nouveau prouvant la pluralité des mondes (Geneva: s.n., 1657), p. 12.  
49 The topic to be debated was in fact the spots on the sun and moon, but the inhabitation of these bodies becomes 
a central point of discussion. Recueil general des questions traittées és conferences du Bureau d’adresse és années 
1633. 34. 35. jusques à present, sur toutes sortes de matieres, par les plus beaux esprits de ce temps. Tome Second, 
(Paris: s.n., 1655), pp. 697–712. The proceedings were later translated into English: A General Collection of 
Discourses of the Virtuosi of France, ed. and trans. by G. Havers (London: Thomas Dring and John Starkey, 
1664), pp. 536–41. 
50 Borel, Discours nouveau, pp. 48–49: ‘Quelqu'un oppose aussi dans le second tome des conferences du Bureau 
d’adresse que s’il y avoit d’astres habitez, il faudroit d’autres astres pour y influer, et d’autres cieux a l’infiny, a 
quoy ie responds que ie ne me persuade pas puissamment que les Estoiles nous soyent utiles, excepte le Soleil & 
la Lune, il peut estre que ces astres se communiquent & servent les uns aux autres mutuellement, & par avoir il 
n’est pas besoin d’une infinite de cieux.’ The English translator unfortunately mistranslates this passage as saying 
that the stars cannot influence each other mutually. See Borel, A New Treatise, pp. 131–32. 
51 Borel, Discours nouveau, p. 59; Borel, A New Treatise, pp. 161–62. 
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of attraction up to a certain circumference.52 These influences, mutually exchanged, helped Borel prove 
that an otherwise seemingly unconnected assortment of celestial bodies does in fact unite in amour 
mutuelle to create the harmony of the world. The ethereal air is the ocean which both separates and 
joins these celestial islands, as it ‘equally receives the influences and operations of every Globe, and 
communicates with great speed to every one those of all the others’.53 It would not be reasonable, 
however, to assume that any one of these islands lies uninhabited. We must at least admit, he thought, 
that they have some plants growing there. But if there are plants, they must be for the use of animals, 
and animals we know to have been made for the use of man. The whole world, he agreed, was made for 
the use of man, but rather than having the celestial bodies made solely to influence the earth, he 
expanded the dominion of mankind to include the infinite number of habitable bodies in the universe.54 
Borel’s work was as much humanistic as it was philosophical. As well as citing modern authors such 
as Francis Bacon, Gilbert, Galileo and Descartes, he discussed Cicero’s Dream of Scipio and ended the 
work with a long extract from the Zodiacus vitae (1536) of Marcellus Palingenius (c.1500–c.1551).55 
He cast a wide net for support for his thesis of a plurality of worlds, and the range of implications he 
discussed was equally broad, including the soteriological status of the humans on other planets and the 
location of heaven and hell (the former he placed in the sun and the latter in some as yet unidentified 
star). In Borel’s vision, the human population of the earth is no longer at the centre of the universe, but 
it remains part of the most important species; one island nation among many in the universal air, all 
connected by a harmony of mutually exchanged influences. The cosmological visions of both More and 
Borel use the benefits of the sun and moon as a standard model that is repeated in other solar and 
planetary systems. While More did invoke influence across larger distances, the underlying concepts of 
harmony and sympathy were robbed of specificity and manipulability, taking on instead more general, 
aesthetic meanings. Borel did not discuss explicitly astrological influences, but it should be noted that 
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he was deeply interested and involved in the theory and practice of chymistry, which had intrinsic links 
to astrology and the practical applications of sympathetic powers.56    
A particularly interesting symbiosis of astrological and pluralist ideas can be found in Otto von Guericke 
(1602–1686), whose cosmology, as described in his Experimenta nova (ut vocantur) Magdeburgica 
(‘The New (so-called) Magdeburg Experiments’, 1672), is in many ways reminiscent of Gilbert.57 
Indeed, at one point he paraphrased entire passages straight out of Gilbert’s De mundo, which by then 
had appeared in print. He was nevertheless also quite eclectic in his use of literary sources, citing Jesuit 
authorities such as Giovanni Battista Riccioli (1598–1671) and Athanasius Kircher (1602–1680), and 
the anti-Copernican Anton Maria Schyrleus of Rheita (1604–1660) to support the fact that the planets 
are elemental and corruptible bodies like the earth.58 He also quoted Descartes’ Principia philosophiae 
(‘Principles of Philosophy’, 1644) to the like effect, that terrestrial and celestial matter are identical. In 
a passage lifted straight out of Lansberge, he described the sun as a king on a throne, providing the 
planets with motion, light and a vital force without which all attempts at generation would be futile.59 
What aligns him with Gilbert, however, is his use of small-scale experiments upon which to build 
cosmological theories. He is most famous in the history of science for his success in creating a vacuum 
pump, and he was one of the first since Gilbert to advocate the existence of an interplanetary void. He 
explained the opinion of the Peripatetics on nature’s abhorrence of a vacuum, and how a completely 
full heaven allows virtues to flow from the upmost bodies through the intermediary ones into the 
lower.60 We have already seen how the newer cosmologies still relied on an ethereal plenum to convey 
influences. Von Guericke’s own theory was quite different. He did not call the general container of the 
earth-like bodies ether, nor exactly vacuum, but ‘space’ (spatio); a space which is full when such a body 
with its emanations is present, and empty when one is not.61 One such emanation is air, which he 
described, in Gilbertian style, not as an element but as an effluvium of the solid and liquid parts of the 
earth.62 This effluvium is a corporeal virtue which flows out in to the surrounding space up to a 
prescribed limit, at which point pure space begins. No corporeal body should be thought to exist beyond 
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that point. Von Guericke, like Gilbert, believed that such matter, fluid or otherwise, would hinder rather 
than help the motion and influences of the celestial globes.63  
The air is one corporeal virtue of the earth, but there are other such ‘mundane’ virtues common to all 
earth-like bodies, such as the planets and their moons, and also the sun. These virtues are either 
corporeal or incorporeal, and they extend themselves out into a sphere of virtue or activity which rarefies 
and weakens with distance. Corporeal virtues in general are effluvia from solid bodies which cannot 
pass through other solid bodies, while incorporeal virtues can.64 He talked of these latter as effluvia as 
well, but had earlier made it clear that they are completely without body. An incorporeal virtue does 
not fill up space and only ‘exists’ as long as a body which is susceptible to its influence is present within 
its sphere of activity.65 He identified six incorporeal virtues of the earth (impulsive, conserving, 
directing, turning, sounding and heating), two of the sun (light and colour) and one of the moon 
(chilling). There are undoubtedly, he thought, more virtues directed towards the earth from the planets, 
which astronomers call ‘influences’.66 
Again, these larger cosmological theories were based on experimental observations, and with regards 
to spheres of virtue his main guides were magnetism and electricity. For example, he discovered that a 
rubbed sulphur globe attracted some light objects, but arbitrarily repelled others, which seemed to him 
to explain ‘how the influences of the planets vary according to the differences in their forms and their 
proximity to one another’.67 This endorsement of varied and individual celestial planetary influence was 
even extended to include astrological aspects: 
Moreover, just as we are aware that many virtues emanate and flow from this body of the earth, diffusing 
themselves far and wide in surrounding space, so also must we assume that the rest of the mundane 
bodies or planets individually release different virtues consonant with their own natures and qualities, 
and that these touch and affect one another according to the nearness or farness of their positions, and 
their different situations (as when they look toward one another in opposition, conjunction, quadrature, 
sextile, etc.). Astronomers are wont to call these virtues, influences, which are either good or evil 
depending upon the different times and the different effects of these mundane bodies upon one another, 
and in any one body the Astronomers allege many effects.68  
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Although he accepted the theory of aspects in principle, however, and knew that the influences of the 
sun and the moon are so indispensable that the functioning of life on earth depends on them, he believed 
that the planetary influences are not so individual as to allow certainty in predictions, and he quoted 
such authorities as Marin Mersenne (1588–1648) and Riccioli on the inaccuracy of judicial astrology.69 
Also counting against the astrologers was the presence of hitherto unknown sources of influence, such 
as sunspots, which von Guericke believed to be small planets orbiting very close to the sun.70 
While there is this largely beneficial interplay of virtues and influences between the globes—the sun 
even feeds, in Stoic style, off the air from the planets—there is also quite a lot each globe can do for 
itself.71 Von Guericke believed (with similar Stoic bent) that the earth has a soul and that each celestial 
body similarly has a life and soul of its own.72 This is where he copied straight out of Gilbert’s De 
mundo, even using the same quotes from Virgil (‘the mind moves the mass’) and Aristotle (‘the soul is 
the activity of an organic body’), and stating that the actus, diffused through the entire body of the earth, 
is ultimately responsible for all birth and growth.73 Again, he echoed Gilbert that the earth’s soul is 
responsible for its motion, turning itself so that all things living on its surface can receive the light from 
the sun—the difference being that von Guericke explicitly mentioned the earth’s annual motion.74 His 
familiarity with both Gilbert’s De magnete and De mundo could help explain his experimental interest 
not only in magnetism and electrical attraction but also in the vacuum, a subject much more fully 
developed in Gilbert’s posthumous work. Von Guericke did add something seemingly novel to Gilbert’s 
theory of a living earth. If it is alive, it should grow, and this growth should lead to incrementally slower 
motion, which could explain the precession of the equinoxes.75 
The importance of this planetary soul for the generation of living creatures came into sharp relief when 
von Guericke discussed the moon. He was one who argued against it being inhabited, or at least, that 
any life on it must be a much lower order. He gave several reasons for his position. One was that it is 
too small in proportion to its distance from the sun to retain enough heat. He believed there was a direct 
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correlation between distance from the sun and planetary size, so much so that he criticised those who 
estimated Mars to be smaller than the earth.76 This lack of friction with the solar rays also meant that 
the moon doesn’t have an internal fire.77 Another reason was that the chilling influence of the moon on 
the earth suggested that that entire body is frigid. One further reason was that the moon doesn’t have 
any animate spirit of its own, which von Guericke thought was demonstrated by its lack of rotational 
movement. Without such an animate virtue, it has no hope of generating or sustaining animated 
creatures on its surface.78  
The moon, however, was an exceptional case, with von Guericke populating all the other planets and 
even the interior of the earth with living creatures.79 One of the reasons he gave for believing the planets 
to house animals was that they possess similar motions to the earth, which makes sense once you 
consider his association of a motive planetary soul with the ability to produce mobile creatures. The 
other reasons he gave are familiar by now: (a) it is hard to believe that such huge bodies are devoid of 
life; (b) they don’t seem to have been created simply to provide light to the earth; (c) the omnipotence 
of God is not limited to this one tiny corner of the universe.80 Unlike Borel, von Guericke was quick to 
argue that these creatures would not be men. The reason he gave is based on diversity. He stated that 
‘no animal which is on this sphere of earth also exists on the other planets, since there is a diversity in 
all things causing everything which is there to differ basically from the bodies we know’.81 The belief 
that God delights in variety was quite orthodox philosophically, and it also allowed von Guericke to 
sidestep theological questions. There may be rational animals on other planets, he admitted, but their 
natures, intellects and societies will be different and God will act with them in different ways.82 In the 
case of theories about the nature of ET life in this period, it is tempting to think of a ‘variety’ camp and 
a ‘similarity’ camp, but the treatments of this subject are usually not detailed enough to allow such a 
clean distinction. For example, in von Guericke’s case it is uncertain whether this biological variety is 
on a substantial, functional or simply accidental level. 
We have seen thus far in von Guericke a cosmology very similar to that of Gilbert, but there are some 
important differences. Von Guericke openly adhered to the Copernican system, and he discussed atoms 
(briefly) and the probability that the stars are other suns. Still, we have an assortment of ensouled globes, 
separated by empty space, moving themselves so as to preserve habitable conditions on their superficies 
and surrounding themselves with emanations and spheres of influence. These last are key to 
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understanding how von Guericke maintained a cohesive whole out of a collection of disparate globes 
in empty space: 
And even if so vast a space is assigned to each one of these bodies by the Copernicans, still this is not to 
be regarded as a useless vacuum. Indeed it must so please the divine Immensity to place its creatures 
widely apart for its own greater glory that each may be of an atom’s proportion relative to the vast Space 
surrounding it. And just as it is the nature of all living things in this world always to be seeking greater 
space, and just as all things which are of the same type have a neighbor and seek to extend themselves 
up to the point that it itself extends..., in the same way also, one can surmise that each of these heavenly 
bodies extends itself far and wide by means of its exhalations up to the limits of its own kind and expands 
its virtues between itself and its neighbours. Thus, in accordance with the condition, nature, mass, quality, 
etc. of each, these bodies function, come together, influence, and look upon one another, for good or ill.83 
Empty space, yes; but useless vacuum, no. It is occupied immaterially by the spheres of virtue of the 
planets, within which they act at a distance on other susceptible bodies. In von Guericke’s cosmology 
there are pieces of astronomy, astrology, laboratory physics and biology all playing their part to explain 
the size, shape, mechanisms and functions of the universe. 
Von Guericke’s main opponent in his arguments for the existence of empty space was Descartes.84 
While Descartes himself said little about the possibility of ET life and was scornful of astrology, 
subsequent philosophers more strictly Cartesian than More or Borel explored both subjects in respect 
to a universe filled with particles and vortices.85 Antoine Le Grand (1629–1699) wrote in his Institutio 
philosophiae, secundum principia Renati Descartes (‘The Teaching of Philosophy According to the 
Principles of René Descartes’, 1672) that heavenly matter undergoes generation, which is a simple 
‘congruous adaptation’ of material parts, and that there may be many earth-like bodies inhabited by 
diverse animals.86 He also maintained that these far distant parts of the world are united by a mutual 
relation and a uniting virtue, and this virtue is ‘the Subtil or Aethereal Matter, which permeating all 
Bodies is the cause of this Union and Harmony’.87 This ethereal matter, spread everywhere like a 
pneuma, allows for a form of celestial influence which reads like Cartesian-flavoured Stoicism: ‘For 
the Stars entertain such a Communication among themselves, as to convey food to one another through 
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their Vortexes, bestowing upon others what goes out by their Ecliptick, and receiving from others what 
comes in by their Poles.’88 
Le Grande, like other prominent Cartesian philosophers, was critical of the practice of astrology, and 
this limited action of particle transference is conventionally Cartesian. Jacques Rohault (1620–1675) 
included a chapter in his popular Traité de Physique (‘Treatise on Physics’, 1671) advocating the 
abandonment of astrological pursuits.89 He described the moon and planets as material and earth-like, 
but took an agnostic position on whether they were inhabited. At least one Cartesian philosopher, 
however, the young Claude Gadroys (c.1642–1678), attempted to justify larger swathes of astrological 
theory and practice according to Cartesian mechanical principles.90 In his Discours sur les influences 
des astres (‘Discourse on the Influences of the Stars’, 1671), he argued that heat and light alone cannot 
explain the diversity of effects seen within the vortex of the earth, and so some time should be given to 
the examination of other possible forms of influence.91 In his physical explanation of the process of 
influence, he described how the sun strikes the planetary bodies and in doing so elevates small particles. 
These particles are then pushed out with the rest of the vortex, taking with them the property of their 
origin.92 Seeing as a void is impossible in nature, each body must receive as much material as they emit, 
such that all celestial as well as sublunary bodies are constantly sustaining themselves one to another. 
‘It is a bond by which God has united all these bodies,’ he declared, ‘without which they would be 
disturbed in a thousand different ways, and never retain any assured rule.’93 
Most interesting for our purposes is that within this work on celestial influences is a chapter on the 
nature of the planets which presents a balanced discussion on the possibility that these bodies are 
inhabited. Gadroys believed that the best way to understand the nature of the planets is to consider this 
earth of ours and the bodies which compose it.94 Observations and terrestrial analogies prove that they 
are round, solid, opaque and rough bodies, with certain protrusions and possibly even water.95 All these 
factors led him to ruminate on the subject of inhabitability.96 He thought it reasonable to suspect that 
the combination of moisture and sunlight would lead to the production of plant life on the planets, but 
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hesitated to conclude that they would be inhabited by animals and men as well. Displaying a healthy 
Cartesian distaste for teleological thinking, Gadroys offered rebukes to philosophers on both sides of 
the argument who use the dictum that God does nothing in vain. We should not assume that we are the 
sole purpose of creation, but nor should we assume that God cannot take glory from the non-living parts 
of his creation. ‘That is why we must suspend our judgment’, he concluded, ‘and believe that it is as 
probable that there are men in the Planets, as it is that there are none.’97 This agnostic declaration, 
similar to that of Rohault, is then followed by this summation: ‘Though we have remarked that all 
Planets are alike in being solid, hard, opaque, fertile, and habitable, it may nevertheless be said that they 
are all different from one another.’98 In order to preserve a functioning astrological system, Gadroys—
similarly to Gilbert—balanced the essential similarity of the planetary bodies with an assertion of the 
individual differences between them.  
As mentioned in an earlier chapter, it should not surprise us that a work on astrology discusses the 
possible habitability of the planets, concerned as astrology is with the nature and physical composition 
of the celestial bodies. Another example of this is the English translation of Manilius’ Astronomica 
made by the poet Sir Edward Sherburne (1616–1702). In this quite impressive edition, copious notes 
and appendices accompany the text of the astrological poem itself, giving explanation and context as 
well as informing the reader of more modern opinions on the astronomical subjects. The references it 
gives to modern authorities are quite thorough, from Galileo, Kepler, Gassendi, von Guericke, to the 
Jesuits and the Cartesians, usually with specific chapter references. Sherburne informed the reader of 
the modern opinion that each star is the centre of a planetary system, and that our sun is a body mixed 
of liquid fire and ‘asbestinous’ solid parts from which flows a ‘panspermatick virtue’.99 
The section of the appendix dealing with the moon concludes that it is a terraqueous globe like the earth, 
which has been placed at such a convenient proximity that it may seemingly intercept and temper the 
light and influence of the celestial bodies, especially the sun, before reflecting them off its uneven 
surface towards the earth ‘with less incommodity’.100 Sherburne warned the reader not to assume that 
the stones, lakes and other such things on the moon are made of the same material as ours; in fact they 
are quite different and incomprehensible to us. Yet its usefulness to us and the alien nature of its material 
does not prevent it from being inhabited. Indeed, Sherburne believed that the recent telescopic 
observations of ‘mountains, vallies, woods, lakes, seas and rivers’ simply confirmed a fact known to 
the ancients, from Xenophanes to Macrobius.101 What kind of creatures these Lunarians may be is 
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unknown, but their existence is almost certain, seeing that nature has provided the moon with everything 
it needs to sustain life. It should not be thought, argued Sherburne, ‘that these Advantages and Benefits 
should be conferred by Nature for no Use or End; or that the Moon should only be made to reflect the 
Sun's Light to us’.102  
This mixture of astrological and pluralist ideas might seem like a clash of the old and the new, but for 
Sherburne both ideas were equally ancient and modern. He relied on the authority of Kircher to explain 
the nature of Mars, with its solid substances akin to sulphur and arsenic ‘evapourating malignant and 
destructive qualities’.103 The work he cited is Kircher’s monumental Itinerarium exstaticum (1656), 
which was published more than two decades after Kepler’s Somnium. There were Jesuits and figures 
like Gadroys who were applying new astronomical discoveries to astrology just as there were writers 
like More and Borel directing astronomy towards pluralism. For a humanist like Sherburne each project 
had an ancient tradition, and there was no reason to consider them mutually exclusive.  
There were some who gave more of the credit for pluralism to modern astronomers. Robert Wittie 
(1613–1684) in his Ouranoskopia (1681) talked of the inhabited moon and planets as things unthought 
of by the ancients.104 He considered that great and unprecedented steps had been made in the last 
century, and that with so many ‘Excellent Heads’ at the Royal Society more could be expected in 
time.105 He believed it arrogant to think that the planets and stars have been made for our use, and was 
doubtful that judicial astrology could be compatible with Christianity, and yet still celestial influence 
was a major part of his cosmological vision.106 Indeed, influence was part of his argument for inhabited 
planets: 
We plainly discern them to be dark Bodies like this Globe of the Earth, and to have a continual Succession 
of Day and Night, and Moons that surround them, that give Light by Night to them; and we may probably 
guess that there are other Influences that must according to the Course of Nature flow from them, and 
operate upon their several Planets, as the Moon upon this Globe of Earth and Sea; but what signifie all 
these, if there be no Inhabitants, or rational Beings in them?107 
If God, as he argued, uses the same methods of providence everywhere in the universe, then there should 
be no doubt that those other satellites are performing the same life-promoting functions for their planets 
as our moon does for us.  
Wittie talked of the ‘Machine of the World’, a metaphor appropriated by the mechanical philosophers 
but originally applied to the world of top-down astrological causation. The significance of the metaphor 
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to Wittie related not so much to the regularity or transfer of motion, but to the dependence of each part 
on all the others, centred on influence:  
And now let every wise Man and good Christian sit down a while, and consider what has been said in 
the foregoing Discourse concerning this great Machine of the World, so made and ordered by the Wisdom 
and Power of God, consisting of so many, and so great stupendous parts, at such immeasurable Distance 
from one another; yet with such subserviency towards one another, as that they cannot subsist, nor 
continue to perform the Ends of their Creation without the Help and Influence of each upon other.108 
This vision, which we have seen now in many forms, was a direct product of the confluence of the 
astrological paradigm with a belief in a plurality of earth-like worlds. The increased size of the universe 
in the new astronomy strengthened already present suspicions that God had not created all the 
innumerable celestial bodies solely for the benefit of the earth, and this was met with other theories and 
observations which suggested that many if not all of these bodies were habitable. Yet this was not 
enough to dispel the ancient and strongly held belief in a universe defined by influential relationships. 
The symbiosis of astrological and pluralist themes arose out of its use as a rationale for celestial motion 
and the reluctance to abandon the harmonious interconnected unity of the Aristotelian cosmos, as well 
as out of the shared intellectual and to some extent professional context of the two ideas. Our discussion 
will now begin to turn to how these two paradigms became delineated, philosophically opposed and 
contextually separated. To that end, the rest of this chapter will examine the debate over astrological 
and pluralist possibilities between differing schools of early mechanism. 
 
Influence and Inhabitation in Early Mechanism: Digby, White and Hobbes 
On the surface, the mechanical philosophy seems to be favourably inclined to pluralism, with its general 
commitment to heliocentrism, its claim to describe all phenomena, including life, in terms of matter and 
motion, and its abandonment of the ontological divide between terrestrial and celestial substance. If the 
ingredients and processes which lead to the development of living creatures are not unique to the earth, 
then the generation of life on other celestial bodies should follow as a logical consequence. By the same 
token, its aversion to ‘occult’ processes (in this sense meaning processes not involving, or involving 
more than, matter and motion) and its denial of any special dignity to the heavens would seem to make 
it incompatible with astrology. These are, of course, gross simplifications. Under the loose 
categorisation of mechanism lay any number of distinct cosmologies, as we have seen already, and 
commitment to celestial influence and/or inhabitation did not only concern physics, but also biology, 
theology, morality, epistemology and more. This complexity is demonstrated in the natural philosophies 
of Sir Kenelm Digby (1603–1665), Thomas White (1593–1676) and Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). All 
three figures were in some way connected to the intellectual circle of Marin Mersenne in Paris, which 
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also included the likes of Descartes and Gassendi. The philosophical agreements and disagreements of 
these English exiles demonstrate the intricacy of the interactions between atomism, religion, astronomy 
and the life sciences. 
The three main works to be considered are Digby’s Two Treatises (1644), White’s De mundo dialogi 
tres (1642) and Hobbes’ refutation of White’s De mundo, composed in 1643.109 Although Digby’s work 
was published after the composition of the other two works, White’s references to it indicate that a draft 
manuscript existed prior to 1642. Indeed, the two works deliberately complement each other, with 
Digby providing the physical and metaphysical foundations for White’s broader cosmological 
speculations. The two men were reforming Catholics and reforming Aristotelians, and their works are 
primarily concerned with reconciling aspects of the new astronomy and atomism with core tenets of 
Catholicism and Aristotelian philosophy. Before dealing with White’s cosmology and Hobbes’ nearly 
point-by-point rebuttal, we will begin with the opus maius of Digby, a figure who, while popular and 
well-renowned in his time, remains relatively un-feted in the history of science. 
 
Kenelm Digby 
The first and much longer treatise in Digby’s major philosophical work treats the nature of bodies, while 
the second treats the immortal soul.110 The attested aim of the work is to demonstrate the inherent limits 
in any physical philosophy so as to prove the necessity of a belief in an immaterial, immortal soul. His 
philosophy, as others have noted, was a development of the minima naturalia tradition, rather than 
Epicurean atomism; he denied the existence of indivisibles or the void, and defined atoms as ‘the least 
sort of natural body’.111 The physical treatise begins with the axiom, taken from Descartes, that body is 
the same as extension. Digby believed that the only differentiating factor in matter was a scale of rarity 
and density. From this foundation, he believed he could show that ‘all Physicall things and naturall 
changes do proceed out of the constitution of rare and dense bodies’.112 Following a straight Aristotelian 
definition, he explained that a body is rare when its quantity is more while its substance is less, and is 
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111 Digby, Two Treatises, pp. 14, 25–27, 48. See Antonio Clericuzio, Elements, Principles, and Corpuscles: A 
Study of Atomism and Chemistry in the Seventeenth Century (Dordrecht; London: Kluwer Academic, 2000), p. 
82; Henry, ‘Sir Kenelm Digby, Recusant Philosopher’, p. 70, n. 35.  
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dense when the substance is more, the quantity less.113 Heat is explained as a property of rarity; cold of 
density. The action of gravity then produces the qualities of moist and dry. A body is dry if its rarity or 
density is in greater proportion than the gravity which works upon it; moist if less.114 Having thus 
explained the foundation of the four prime qualities, Digby could easily combine them to explain the 
origin of the four Aristotelian elements, although it was patently un-Aristotelian to use gravity prior, 
rather than subsequent, to the distinction of the elements.115 Even less Aristotelian was his assertion that 
‘out of all we said of these foure Elements, it is manifest there cannot be a fifth’.116 
Out of the four elements, one in particular, fire, plays a particularly important role in physical change. 
This is because Digby considered light to be nothing but fire, spreading far and wide, unmixed with 
other ‘grosse bodies’.117 The interaction of fire with the other elements determines the temper, 
consistence and generation of all mixed bodies, and thus the fire of the light from the sun is ‘a universal 
action in the generation and corruption of bodies’.118 The light of the sun is even made responsible for 
gravity, which, as noted, is no longer a natural inclination of the heavier elements. Digby suggested that 
the light from the sun strikes the earth and rebounds, breaking off and carrying with it small dense 
particles. As these particles are lifted, other less dense particles rush in to take their place, moving in a 
direction which bisects the angle of reflection, and hence always perpendicular to the surface. Once the 
sun goes down, the denser particles which had been lifted up, ‘finding themselves in a smart descending 
stream’, move back down, displacing the rarer bodies below them.119 Thus all places within reach of 
the sun’s action will experience this perpetual motion of the air which results in gravity.120  
Digby employed similar mechanical explanations in the generation of plants.121 He asked the reader to 
imagine a buried conglomeration of mixed bodies with an excess of fire but very little moisture. The 
arrival of water to this mixture permits the free action of the fire, which causes the body to swell and 
grow. Endeavouring not to resort to the action of pre-existing form, he takes us through a step-by-step 
process of development, based on the nature of the mixed bodies and the actions of internal fire and 
external sunshine, resulting in a fully-grown plant with roots, branches and fruit. Juice, proceeding from 
the roots and being passed, strained and concocted throughout the whole plant, condenses in the centre 
of the fruit ‘like a tincture extracted out of the whole plant’. There it dries and becomes a seed, which 
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falls into the earth and awaits the arrival of moisture to start the operation all over again.122 Digby then 
described the natural process by which a plant may develop systems and organs granting it sense and 
movement, thus becoming a sensitive animal.123 While a seed or egg might ensure the continuity of 
species, Digby rejected the notion that it is necessary for the generation of plants and animals. As the 
start of his description of plant generation would suggest, he believed that spontaneous generation from 
the natural action of heat and moisture on suitable mixed bodies was both possible and not 
uncommon.124 Indeed, plant and animal life resulting only, like all other physical things and actions, 
from the mixture of rare and dense bodies, he argued that it is not only possible spontaneously, but also, 
daringly, that it is ‘easie to be effected’.125  
Digby thus described processes from gravity to generation in terms of the action of fire (including 
sunlight) on and within substances mixed from rare and dense bodies. Heat and cold were both active 
qualities in his estimation, but there were other, more specific actions and properties to explain, 
including magnetism. Rather than going into magnetism specifically, it will suffice to quote some more 
general arguments of Digby’s that pertain to many similarly ‘occult’ activities: 
… there is not a body in the world, but hath about itself an orbe of emanations of the same nature which 
that body is of. Within the compasse of which orbe, when any other body cometh that receiveth an 
immutation by the little atomes whereof that orbe is composed, the advenient body seemeth to be affected 
and as it were replenished with the qualities of the body from whence they issue.126 
The major difference between this description and that of, say, Gilbert, is Digby’s invocation of atoms 
and his denial of immaterial emanations. Regardless of this denial of effused forms, Digby could still 
rescue a physical explanation for sympathy that accounted for action at a distance: 
But withall we must note that it is not our intention to say, but that it may in some circumstances happen 
that some particular action or effect may be wrought in a remote part or body, which shal not be the same 
in the intermediate body that lieth between the agent and the patient, & that conveyeth the agents working 
atomes to the others body. … The reason of which is manifest to be the divers dispositions of the different 
subjects in regard of the Agent: and therefore it is no wonder that divers effects should be produced 
according to those divers dispositions.127 
Such a broad supposition worked to explain the effect of the lodestone on iron, but it also explained the 
action of the substance for which Digby was most famous: the weapon salve. His discourse on this 
powder of sympathy, which was thought to be able to treat wounds by being applied to the offending 
weapon or bloodied bandage, went through many editions and translations.128 Much of it was a summary 
of the relevant parts of his Treatise on Bodies with the addition of anecdotes intended to prove the 
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veracity of his theories, as well as long digressions on the effects of sympathy in human beings 
themselves.129 
The salve is simply powder of vitriol that is dissolved in water and has the bandage soaked in it. Sunlight 
strikes the bloodied bandage, carrying off small atoms of blood with the vitriol joined to it, diffusing 
the atoms into an orb. The wound meanwhile is exhaling fiery spirits, and consequently drawing in the 
surrounding air. The bloody atoms from the bandage then find themselves attracted back into the wound, 
where they find their ‘proper source, and originall root’, at the same time delivering their attached 
medication.130 The entire process, then, amounts to a targeted delivery system for a common medication. 
Digby went on to discuss the nature and effects of vitriol, which he described as one of nature’s most 
excellent bodies. ‘The Chymists do assure us’, he wrote, ‘that it is no other then a corporification of the 
universal spirit which animates and perfects all that hath existence in this sublunary World’.131 Digby 
had a long interest in alchemy and astrology, and this universal spirit was central to both pursuits.132 
However, this was no Platonic ‘Soul of the World’—it still remained within the realm of physics and 
mechanical explanation. 
Digby refrained from much discussion of the universal spirit in his discourse on the weapon salve but 
gave a slightly longer definition in his Discourse Concerning the Vegetation of Plants (1661). Here he 
was discussing a nitrous salt which he considered to be responsible for the generative powers of 
rainwater and dew: 
Now in this Salt are enclosed the Seminary vertues of all things. For, what is it, but a pure extract drawn 
by the Suns-beames from all the bodies that he darteth his Rayes upon, and sublimed up to such a height 
of place as leaveth all feculence behind it, and is there in that exalted Region of the Limbeck baked and 
incorporated with those very beames themselves which refined this extract out of its drossie Oar? 
Therefore I wonder not to see any sort of hearbe grow upon the highest Towers, where it is certain no 
man ever came to sow that Plant. And the Loadstone or Magnes of a like substance (though nothing near 
so pure) that is in the Earth, the creeping toad there, sucketh and pulleth down this flying Dragon to it; 
and both of them do become one body. And thus you see plainly and familiarly explicated the great 
Aphorisme of the Smaragdine Table; That what is above, is like what is below. The Sun is the Father, 
the Moon is the Mother; the Earth is the Matrix wherein this product is hatched; and the Aire conveyed 
it thither. This Universall Spirit then being Homogeneall to all things, and being in effect the Spirit of 
Life, not onely to Plants, but to Animals also: were it not worth the labour to render it as usefull to mens 
bodyes, as to the reparations of Plants?133 
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The sun is performing the same task as the juices in a plant, or the alchemist in his lab, extracting the 
essence from everything within reach of its beams, and then distilling these traces into a fine yet material 
spirit. This spirit is then re-solidified for use as either a universal stimulant or a panacea, depending on 
the situation.134  
So much of Digby’s philosophy rests upon the action of fire in the form of the sunlight. It is the universal 
cause of generation and corruption, it is the cause of gravity, and by rebounding off objects big and 
small it creates orbs of atomic emanation. Its action is universal. It tears off cold and moist particles 
from the moon and carries them by reflection to the earth, just as it carries vitriol to the wound. In the 
Two Treatises is a short passage which suggests that such universal action is accompanied in Digby’s 
mind by some idea of extraterrestrial life. Section 21 of Chapter 14 in the ‘Treatise on Bodies’ is 
marginally headed by the statement that ‘in the planets and starrs there is a like variety of mixed bodies 
caused by light as here upon earth’.135 The main text reads: 
…wheresoever there is any variety of active and passive bodies; there mixed bodies likewise must reside 
of the same kinds, and be indued with qualities of the like natures, as those we have treated of; though 
peradventure such as are in other places of the world remote from us, may be in a degree far different 
from ours.136 
Given there can’t be more than four elements, and presuming the universal action of light upon those 
elements, we can postulate the same kinds of generations and corruptions in the other planets, including 
the continuing spontaneous generation of living creatures. Digby, however, did not expand on this 
point.137 He kept to the limits of his work which was concerned entirely with familiar terrestrial objects 
and phenomena. While keeping his feet on solid ground, he entreated the reader to refer to the work of 
others who had sailed the ocean of higher cosmological speculation and brought back solid reports: 
‘Which surely our learned countreyman, and my best and most honoured friend… hath both profoundly, 
and acutely, and in every regard judiciously performed in his Dialogues of the world.’138 
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Thomas White was Digby’s friend, mentor, fellow Catholic and confederate in the attempt to create a 
new synthesis of Aristotelianism, Christianity and mechanical philosophy.139 He also wrote dozens of 
theological works under his alias Thomas Blackloe, which gave rise to the Blackloist movement in 
English Catholicism.140 Here, however, we will focus on his major work of natural philosophy: his De 
mundo dialogi tres. The cosmology therein is an innovative attempt to reconcile Copernicus and Galileo 
with Aristotle and Christianity, all within a largely mechanical framework. White rejected, for example, 
a universe of infinite extent, yet believed it to be big enough that the entire annual orbit of the earth 
could be considered a centre point.141 The cause White gave for the motion of the earth was particularly 
creative. He argued that the wind drives the ocean tides, and this movement of the ocean pushes the 
earth like weighted bags on a perpetual motion wheel. The first problem was that the prevailing winds 
move in the opposite direction to the rotation of the earth, but White solved this by arguing that the 
surface water, which is driven by the wind, pushes deeper water back the other way. It is this deeper 
water which is in contact with the earth, and drives it from west to east.142 This was, of course, an 
inversion of Galileo’s hypothesis, which had argued that the tides were caused by the rotation of the 
earth. 
These are some of the higher speculations which Digby left out of his Two Treatises, but they are 
soundly built on his principles. White took up the issue of cosmology where Digby had left it, discussing 
the similarity of substance and action in the heavens. There are three interlocutors in the dialogues: 
Ereunius gives the author’s opinion, Andabata is the antagonist and Asphalius is the notionally neutral 
third party. Andabata is sceptical of Ereunius’ claim that things which are born and die in the moon and 
the other stars are similar to those here on earth. He suggests that Ereunius limit his argument to the 
claim that the heavens are not free from corruptibility. After all, all our knowledge depends on sensory 
experience, and as we can not have any particular experiences of the situation on the moon, we cannot 
extend the argument further.143 Ereunius replies: 
Not so fast. You know what they say about the hasty dog. If you had but read a certain little golden book 
(which I have avidly considered) on the Immortality of the Soul, you would know otherwise. So that you 
may understand regardless, I will put forth the whole argument of this book, which can be ascended like 
a ladder up to the summit of heaven, and to the knowledge of those things which happen there, of 
whatever kind. This most ingenious man, seeing that the greatest power is positioned in that place which 
he has shown to be the spiritual soul of man, it follows that it [the soul] is immortal. Seeing also that 
something immaterial cannot be known of itself, except by way of separating body from spirit, he judged 
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he should aim at that very place, to explain what can be attained by body, and what place is left to 
spirits.144  
This ‘little golden book’ is the Two Treatises of Digby. While it is referred to here by the name of the 
second treatise, the argument is based exclusively on the physics of the first. Ereunius continues: 
What, therefore, did he come up with? That body is the same as extension is a fact appreciated by children 
and the elderly alike. From this beginning, he delineates quantity through rarity and density, in a way 
dividing by primary differences. But where there is rare and dense, being placed relative to a part of the 
universe, from necessity gravity and levity are born. Where these are present the four primary qualities, 
hot and cold, wet and dry, cannot be absent. And from these foundations we have the necessary reason 
of the Elements, each of which can be made by putting two of these Aristotelian qualities in order. But 
the elements cannot be observed in any great mass, or in their own estates. The particles, however, being 
minima, are continually mixed together. Hence having affixed the common reasons of mixtures, he 
explains the causes and origin of various motions, extending himself up to plants and animals. In every 
place he shows things which are produced, except man, to be of such a kind, that they follow from a 
necessary joining together from the organs of nature and the complexions of rare and dense, like threads 
being sent out and interweaved from a spider’s cave. After which he also illuminates the activities of the 
soul, and teaches that they are of a different power, and cannot be brought about by these instruments. 
You have, Andabata, a summary of that desirable book.145 
White is building up the case for pluralism by demonstrating, from Digby, how the variety of living 
and non-living things arises mechanically from the mixture of elements, these latter being 
differentiated by the rarity or density of the prima materia. There is nothing in the physical world, 
then, except the elements and mixed bodies.146 In order to demonstrate that ‘there is no other type of 
being in the universe, except those which we have numbered’, White further investigates these mixed 
bodies following an Aristotelian method of species definition. First of all, it needs to be asked whether 
a particular body has only one grade of rarity or density, or whether it has many, like ‘limbs’. If the 
latter, it is mixed; if the former, it is an element. A mixed substance, then, either grows or the quantity 
doesn't change. The latter is purely a mixed substance, while the former is divisible again, because 
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either it grows only from the outside, or it has internal organs by which it achieves growth. The latter 
occupies the grades of plants, which can be divided again. If it only receives nutrition, then the plant 
is pure; but if it directs itself to nourishment and displays an active principle in its motion, it is called 
an animal. If the whole of the animal moves, resulting in a change of place, it is a perfect animal; if 
only a certain part, it should be numbered in the class of zoophytes.147 White concludes:  
And since you see single divisions are confined by necessity of immediate contradiction, whatever way 
this conjecture is resolved in the heavens, this certainly is left undoubted: no other types can be concealed 
under the nature of body. Therefore you see this established: this universe, that we say to be one by 
contiguity of size, is distributed adequately and commodiously into these of its parts.148 
Having thus established that the observed variety of terrestrial species is in fact universal, following out 
of logical necessity from physical principles, the question turns to whether the moon specifically could 
sustain life.149 Asphalius repeats Galileo’s objections that the days and nights are too long, and that 
there is no rain. Ereunius believes that the philosophical certainty granted to him by Digby’s book is 
sufficient reason to ignore Galileo’s timid objections. If we see the solid earth of the moon surrounded 
by vapours, he argues, how can we deny the existence of the intermediate body, water? He refers to 
‘German observations’ of clouds on the moon, which could well be the same claim of Michael Maestlin 
referred to by Kepler. The existence of such effluvia is later justified by White on the assumption that 
‘that which proves useful in the earth, is to be expected the same in those celestial globes, if, as we said, 
they are equal to the earth’.150 In terms of the long days and incredible heat, White simply referred to 
people living at different latitudes of the earth. People in the far north endure day or night for months 
at a time, while those near the equator escape the heat by living at high altitudes.151 These and more 
explanations justify White’s belief ‘that indeed man and animals like ours can dwell in the moon, more 
happily than things are here’.152 
So far with White we have focused on the natural philosophical basis for his pluralism, but we have not 
yet mentioned the other focus of our discussion: astrology. There is in fact an entire section of the 
dialogue devoted to the subject, but while White was happy to admit the generative effect of the sun 
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and the moistening effect of the moon, he was highly critical of the practice of judicial astrology.153 
Indeed, Mersenne, with whose circle White was associated, was motivated in his support of mechanism 
largely by his aversion to the astrological naturalism of Pomponazzi, Cardano and Vanini, as was 
mentioned above and will be discussed later with regards to Henry More.154 White, in his attempt to 
modernise Aristotelianism, would have been aware of exactly that kind of Aristotelianism, which he 
deemed to be wrong, promoted by the Italian naturalists, and so, being at the same time minded to rid 
philosophy of occult causes, he attempted to undermine the astrological rationale. Accepting the fact 
that he had established earlier in the dialogues, that the stars are either fires or they reflect a fiery nature 
received from elsewhere, he argued that any effects from celestial bodies other than the sun and the 
moon would be so small that they were not sensible or measurable.155 He believed that the entire origin 
and basis for astrology was the idolatrous belief that the celestial bodies possessed souls filled with 
reason and intelligence. At this point in the dialogue, the speaker Andabata, while accepting the 
rationality of all Ereunius’ objections to astrology, has some concerns: 
I see that what you have said stands on great reason. But it worries me that we read that these stars were 
created for the use of man, whereas if they have no effect in human things, at least not that we can tell, 
then I would believe this contrary to reason.156 
It is Asphalius who replies first, giving traditional arguments for their use. They serve as signs of the 
seasons, months and years, and moreover as an indicator of divine magnificence, raising up souls to the 
contemplation of nature. They encourage a cosmic perspective, revealing the foolishness of all 
Alexanders and Caesars who violently divide up this speck of dust and reckon themselves the greatest 
of men.157 Ereunius adds to this that human utility does not exclude other ends of which we are ignorant. 
He counsels a safer opinion: ‘This orb on which we tread we accept to be given mostly if not uniquely 
in our servitude; the others unknown, we leave aside, at least until a new dawn breaks from 
elsewhere’.158 
A glimpse at that dawn is forthcoming, as at the end of the work Asphalius presents a proposition of 
truly cosmic proportions: 
The pastors also call me a prophet, so it may be allowed for me to prophesise, and if I am not able to do 
so concerning things far removed in time, I may at least on things distant and hidden. It seems to me that 
because the world is demonstrated not to be perpetual, and to be an instrument for the determination of 
a certain end, and this end to be something permanent and eternal—and furthermore that among bodies 
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nothing like this exists, nor can it be framed from our elements or from quantity—it is made necessary 
that this whole universe was created for no other reason than on account of spirits confined in bodies, 
which (because we only know of one species) we call humans. All of those [celestial] bodies, therefore, 
which appear bright to us, if they shine of themselves, like the sun, are the least noble, and more like 
instruments for those [celestial bodies] which are illuminated. These latter meanwhile are the seats of the 
various species of human, and indeed both the quantity and measure of the universe are to be accepted 
thereupon: that however many possible diverse species of human there are, there are that many diverse 
dwelling-places constructed for them by Almighty God. And in line with the principles of the propagation 
of individuals, each was given a suitable structure for their house, and also proportionate periods of 
time…159 
In this passage, the philosophical principles of Digby and White reach their cosmological climax. This 
bold pluralism is not isolated to this one ‘prophecy’ at the end of De mundo. It was repeated again in 
White’s Institutiones Peripateticae (1646), a work which was translated into English. This later 
publication contained repetitions and paraphrases of much of the De mundo, including some more bold 
phrasings of the pluralist theories. There White argued that the sun must have analogous effects on the 
analogous matter of the other planets.160 He described the world as a ‘vast wombe’ in which the opaque 
bodies are ‘cells’ for the housing and nurturing of spirits.161 In his later Contemplation of Heaven (1654) 
he again talked of ‘Corporeall Rationall Creatures in Globes besides the Earth’.162 These references cast 
doubt on the assertion by a modern biographer of White who, despite being familiar with some of these 
passages, argues that the likelihood of a plurality of worlds was diminished for theological and 
philosophical reasons, and that White maintained an anthropocentric stance.163  
White’s cosmology was certainly in one sense anthropocentric, but in the above passage from De mundo 
Asphalius makes it clear that we only call immortal souls confined in bodies ‘humans’ because we know 
only one species. White expanded on this point in his edition of the dialogues of William Rushworth 
(d. 1637), to which he added a preface and fourth dialogue of his own writing. In this fourth dialogue 
between an uncle and nephew, the nephew raises the possibility of life on other orbs in objection to the 
uncle’s assertion that all other creatures have been made for man. ‘I would not have you think I call 
Mankinde precisely the seed of Adam or Noe,’ replies the uncle, ‘but all such creatures (if there be any 
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where others) who are due to Eternity, and yet have their births couch'd under the shels of mortality. 
For to all such will agree the notion of Animal rationale, which definition our Philosophers have 
determin'd to man.’164 It is apparent therefore that when White agreed that everything was created for 
the use of man, he was not thinking purely of terrestrial humans. Humanity does not specify shape, size, 
appearance or custom. Rather, in White’s Aristotelian process of definition by contradiction, a human 
is simply a member of that branch of the Porphyrian Tree labelled ‘rational animal’—in this case an 
immortal rational soul confined in an animal body. Digby’s strict exclusion of the soul from physical 
considerations meant that while a universal process of abiogenesis could create ET life on the level of 
plants, animals and zoophytes, the creation of humans required a more direct involvement of the deity. 
In White’s estimation, not only does the influence of the sun produce similar generations in the other 
planets as in the earth, but God likewise acts similarly in them, using multiple locations for the 
soteriological journey of humanity. 
While White and Digby thus retained the importance of celestial influence for the processes of 
generation, White specifically precluded this from forming any basis for a wider astrological theory. 
The effects of the celestial bodies are general, not specific, and other than the sun and the moon they 
are negligible. All theories of their influence are philosophical bastardisations of idolatrous planet-
worship. As we saw in Chapter 1 with Benedetti’s letter to Pingone, the need to explain the use of the 
heavens was widely appreciated. White attacked the theory and practice of astrology, but knew that in 
doing so he would have to confront the rejoinder that God does nothing in vain, so he presented an 
alternate teleology of the heavens, painting the celestial bodies as other worlds filled with rational 
beings. The justification of this claim through Digbean philosophical principles, however, was met with 
incredulity by Hobbes. 
 
Thomas Hobbes 
Thomas Hobbes was part of the same circle in Paris as Digby, White, Mersenne, Gassendi and 
Descartes. The members of this philosophical community regularly responded to each other’s work 
both privately and publicly. Shortly after the publication of White’s De mundo, Hobbes composed a 
detailed refutation of most of its contents. The manuscript was only published in 1973 following its 
discovery in the Bibliothèque Nationale by Jean Jacquot.165 The critique contains many ideas found in 
Hobbes’ later De corpore (1655), and it has been observed that he was largely using White as a foil to 
sharpen his own philosophical principles.166 This work is thus not only helpful for understanding the 
early development of Hobbes’ mechanical philosophy, but also for demonstrating the many different 
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possibilities under the umbrella of mechanism in general, because Hobbes seemed determined to 
disagree and proffer alternatives to nearly everything White said. His objections were at times physical, 
metaphysical or sceptical, and even occasionally theological. While his criticisms were often legitimate, 
his alternatives, while interesting, were hardly more convincing, as we will see. 
Hobbes’ very different philosophical approach is obvious in the way he tackled White’s assertion that 
bodies analogous to those on earth exist in the heavens. He first of all contended that such an issue could 
not be investigated by natural reason. The extent of things which we know to exist does not in any way 
prevent the existence of any number of other monstrous creations, nor is there any way of telling 
whether the things we know do or do not exist in places unseen to us. Hobbes then drew the reader’s 
attention to the seeming confusion of our beliefs about celestial inhabitability—we believe not only that 
there might be similar bodies as ours in the heavens, but also that our own bodies will one day end up 
there. Yet he did grasp the essential point of White’s argument: whether the variety of things is 
necessarily finite.167 Approaching this question, Hobbes discussed Aristotle’s prima materia, which he 
took to be effectively equivalent to the homogenous atoms of modern philosophers. This prima materia, 
in his opinion, is nothing but body itself, because matter cannot be the material of itself.168 However, 
he believed that this material could move and change in innumerable ways, producing innumerable 
types of sensory images—which he took as the basis of all epistemology and hence philosophy—such 
that it is impossible to know how many varieties of bodies there might be, or whether those in the 
heavens are like our own. It may be that they are, but then again it may be that there is nothing in the 
heavens even remotely comparable on a basic physical level.169 
Hobbes then gave a summary of White’s own reasoning, based on Digbean principles and Aristotelian 
classification. Of this he was quite dismissive: ‘Indeed, it is astonishing if, by arranging names in this 
way, we can deduce an argument for limiting the things we do not know and to which we have therefore 
not yet given names.’170 His last criticism on this point was that White didn’t state the conclusion to 
which he was led, but instead left the conclusion to be inferred from the following discussion of the 
moon.171 On this subject, Hobbes agreed that telescopic observations suggest that the moon has a similar 
nature to the earth, and that this makes it possible that there may be living creatures there. However, he 
maintained that no experiment supported White’s conjecture that human beings or other terrestrial 
animals will be found there.172 Having undermined White’s philosophical limitation of bodily variety, 
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and with no sensory experience to tell one way or another, the terrestrial nature of the moon was no 
basis for any conclusions about its inhabitation. 
In later chapters Hobbes grew frustrated with White’s teleological reasoning. When White, arguing for 
the existence of a central fire in the earth which contributes to generation, inferred that the earth would 
be useless unless man were born on it, Hobbes retorted: ‘To whom, then, [one asks,] was it useful for 
man to exist, so that it was for his pleasure that in the centre of the earth fire was located?’173 For his 
own part, Hobbes attributed the earth’s fertility exclusively to the sun. When White, as we noted above, 
claimed that the other planets should have exhalations because of their parity with the earth, Hobbes 
contended that such equality had in no way been agreed.174 In a general rebuke to such life-centric 
teleology, he decried the belief that God could create nothing which did not benefit living things, and 
that human wisdom and self-esteem is any useful measure for the wisdom of God.175  
Hobbes’ own philosophical principles were put to the test when he tackled the motions of the earth and 
the moon. His explanations were mechanical yet undeniably (although Hobbes did deny it) animistic; 
more reminiscent of Gilbert than Kepler. When attempting to explain the eccentricity of the earth’s 
orbit, he began with the dictum that any given thing always moves towards the spot where its internal, 
essential motion is best conserved. It therefore maintains a distance from the sun and the other celestial 
bodies which is ‘best fitting its own nature’.176 He believed that if the sun and the earth were the only 
two bodies, the earth would orbit in a perfect circle. Since it does not do so, this must be the effect of 
influences from other stars. The northern stars being more numerous than the southern, for example, 
could be why the earth is further from the sun when the latter body is in Cancer than when it is in 
Capricorn.177 A similar urge to even out influences underpins the earth’s daily rotation. The shaded part 
of the earth strives to push forward in order to benefit from the sun’s rays, while the illuminated side, 
well-sated, moves away. Hobbes explicitly likened this motion to that of living creatures when they are 
moved towards people or things whose behaviour aids their own inner and innate motion. ‘I do not, 
however, think that the earth is animate’, he qualified, ‘yet all consistent bodies, or those possessing 
coherent parts, have this in common: they maintain habitual motion inasfar as other motions, gravity 
especially, do not hinder [them].’178 
Later in this work he suggested a different reason for the earth’s eccentricity: the earth, being a 
heterogeneous body, has some parts which need the sunlight more than others, and this leads to an 
inequality of motion.179 Again, this argument was supported by Hobbes with examples from animal 
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behaviour. He anticipated the objection that such examples would only be relevant if the earth itself 
were an animal, a proposition he was unable to accept. Instead, he suggested a theory that was perhaps 
even bolder, arguing that non-living terrestrial bodies, such as logs or stones, would all rotate 
themselves with respect to the sun if they weren’t prevented by gravity or some other force.180 So in 
fact Hobbes’ theory of celestial motion is not animistic; the suggestion is rather that animate motion, 
and the desire which drives it, is not necessarily animate, or at least not exclusively so, being in fact 
inherent to all bodies. We are simply used to expressing such notions in human terms, such as appetite, 
pleasure, and pain, but the basis of these phenomena is universal and relates to the strengthening or 
obstructing of a body’s specific, inner, natural motion.181  
Hobbes also applied himself to the tricky question of the motion of the moon. The upshot is that it is 
affected by many different bodies, such as the planets and stars, but most of all by the sun and the earth, 
and, being as well a heterogeneous body, its different parts are affected in different ways. The sun 
causes the earth and moon to orbit together once a year, while also illuminating the moon’s surface. 
The earth drives the moon’s monthly orbit by its daily rotation, but also affects it by an influence which 
Hobbes compared to magnetism, and again by vapours which may rise from the earth as far as the 
moon.182 Hobbes at one point took on this issue of influence more directly and generally. He believed 
that a first basic division could be made between types of influence. The influence of bodies which are 
homogenous throughout, like the sun, is light. Heterogeneous bodies, however, possess as many 
different inner motions as there are such bodies, and these motions lead to influences distinct from light. 
Not only will the influence of the moon differ from that of the earth, but different parts of the earth, like 
metals, stones, plants, magnets, all have different influences.183 
The question of how exactly those influences are transmitted was dealt with later in the work when 
Hobbes defended the physical foundations of astrology against White’s attack. From the outset, it is 
clear that this will not be a traditional defence of astrology. The first question he felt the need to ask 
was whether future events ‘so depend on the present influence of the stars that they cannot fail to be 
brought to pass’.184 He used stars as a catch-all term to mean all the celestial bodies, including the earth, 
and the transparent air or ether between them. He next laid out the mechanical approach to the problem: 
all actions which are usually attributed to sympathy, antipathy, occult qualities or influences are in fact 
just motion.185 Motion is transmitted from body to body over a theoretically infinite distance, and so 
when a star influences the earth nothing actually departs from the star itself; the side of the star facing 
the earth simply presses outwards onto the air or ether, and the motion is propagated as far as the earth. 
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This motion can be of varying kinds, and so it could potentially illuminate, heat, cool, dry or moisten. 
What is commonly called influence is defined by Hobbes as ‘that motion in parts of the stars (the senses 
cannot detect it) by which a motion is propagated to a distance by a continuous thrust of the medium’.186 
Such an interpretation of influence was much more amenable to the doctrine of aspects, which Hobbes 
duly defended on the basis that contrary motions retard each other, while conjoined motions strengthen 
one another. The other aspects will vary along this continuum. Whether the earth is the centre of the 
planetary orbits or not makes no difference to either the virtues and aspects of the celestial bodies, and 
we need not worry about the recent discovery of the satellites of Jupiter and Saturn: ‘Undoubtedly, even 
before they became visible to man, those secondary planets influenced Jupiter and Jupiter them.’187 
Indeed, influences are not just coming from the stars to the earth, but are also being exchanged between 
stars, while the earth itself exerts an influence on distant bodies. Everything is continually acting on 
everything else, and it is the combination of all these influences at any one time which produces a 
particular effect. This is the determinism for which Hobbes is so well-known: ‘Therefore any effect 
within any body must be wholly ascribed to the virtue of the stars. Hence the sum total of all the causes 
within the stars is the sum total of all the causes within the universe.’188  
Hobbes argued that White himself conceded this point on necessity and astral causality, and indeed 
White did seem to do so, not only in the section on Stoicism in the De mundo, but also in his later 
Contemplation.189 Yet White’s idea of fate involved God foreseeing the free decisions of every future 
person and planning accordingly. Hobbes, on the other hand, echoing the naturalism of Pomponazzi 
and Vanini, refused to exempt human decisions from the chain of secondary natural causes. He dealt 
with this directly when countering White’s argument that astrology relies on a belief in animate celestial 
bodies: 
God performs all natural actions, the voluntary no less than the involuntary, by means of second causes, 
namely the bodies constituting the universe. Therefore all actions should equally pre-exist in second 
causes, and hence all the appetites of animals, i.e. the wishes of men, should also possess their own causes 
composed of the gathering together of everything requisite to volition. That is, appetites should 
necessarily originate in secondary causes, be these animate or not-animate. So, to [produce] voluntary 
actions or those ordered by a kind of purpose leading towards a defined end, it is unnecessary for every 
agent to be animate, much less [for it] to possess intelligence. Many species of animals originate from 
putrefying matter, yet their actions are marked out and ordered by design towards a specific end; but 
neither the sun (that generates them) nor the decaying material is on that account to be considered as 
possessing intellect.190 
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Hobbes refused to accept that the processes which lead to human action are ontologically distinct from 
those of animals, which, as everyone knows, can arise from unintelligent matter. Where White argued 
that free will is what makes mankind worthy to be the cause for which God created the universe, Hobbes 
replied that such merit is shared with the animals. He understood that people are worried about admitting 
an external cause for the will, because it could then be invoked to cover all sins. People who thought 
otherwise, like Hobbes himself, upheld the view of an external cause not only because ‘for the celestial 
and eternal chain of causation to be broken is an affront to the Divine Majesty; but also that [for this to 
happen] is against natural reason’.191 
In the end Hobbes declared that the arguments used by White against astrology were invalid, but then, 
after confirming the inescapability of celestial causation, he declared that the infinitude and 
imperceptibility of stellar motions made comprehension, and hence prediction, impossible.192 He did 
suggest that weather prediction might be possible if sufficient records and commentaries were kept, but 
these ‘neither exist nor will exist’.193 So why did Hobbes go to the effort of dismantling White’s 
arguments against judicial astrology, only to dismiss it himself in the end? One answer is of course the 
contrarian nature of the work. Another is that it gave Hobbes a chance to present his arguments for 
mechanical determinism and the material nature of volition. Yet throughout his discussion of celestial 
motions and influence there is an emphasis on causes, influences and effects being shared and universal, 
in a way which had been played down when he criticised White’s arguments for ET life. The surety of 
his theorising didn’t quite square with his earlier scepticism. 
One clue to working this out lies in Hobbes’ ideas about epistemology and the value of philosophy. 
Consider this passage from his De corpore: 
The End or Scope of Philosophy, is, that we may make use to our benefit of effects formerly seen; or that 
by application of Bodies to one another, we may produce the like effects of those we conceive in our 
minde, as far forth as matter, strength and industry will permit, for the commodity of humane life. For 
[t]he inward glory and triumph of mind that a man may have, for the mastering of some difficult and 
doutfull matter, or for the discovery of some hidden truth, is not worth so much paines as the study of 
Philosophy requires; nor need any man care much to teach another what he knowes himselfe, if he think 
that will be the onely benefit of his labour. The end of Knowledge is Power; and the use of Theoremes 
(which among Geometricians serve for the finding out of Properties) is for the construction of Problemes; 
and lastly, the scope of all speculation is the performing of some action, or thing to be done.194   
In the same work, astrology is excluded from philosophy not because it is false, but because it is not 
well grounded.195 Hobbes believed that the reality of celestial influence could be proved by 
demonstrable philosophical and geometrical principles. While we can be sure that nothing happens that 
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is not caused ‘by the several motions of all the several things that are in the World’, that brings us no 
closer to predicting future events.196 Similarly, while we may concede the possibility, for example, of 
some sort of living creatures on the moon, without direct sensory experience we have no rational means 
of making conjectures. Nor, in Hobbes’ opinion, would such knowledge be of any use. Perhaps that is 
why he employed a definite mocking tone when he considered Asphalius’ final statement in De mundo 
that there are as many races of men in the universe as there are externally illuminated celestial bodies. 
‘Such questions, however, are too slight to be argued against’, he wrote, ‘and whether they are true we 
shall not be in a position to say before the human race (which has happened to secure its dwelling on 
earth) has found some way of conversing with the rest of the species of living beings: the inhabitants of 
the moon and of the other planets.’197 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter began with a survey of influence and inhabitation being employed together, and then 
presented a snapshot of one corner of early mechanism to understand how each of these ideas might 
come under debate. This transition involved a step back in time, and in the writings of Digby, White 
and Hobbes we came across certain ideas and themes related to astrology and pluralism which are 
familiar from the work of other astronomers and natural philosophers both before and after them. Digby 
was another, like Patrizi and Gilbert, who equated light with fire, but his description of its role in 
generation, both spontaneous and otherwise, took on a new atomist bent. He also stated more 
definitively that the action of light on the other planets should produce similar results. This belief in the 
analogy between terrestrial and planetary material and the universal action of light was gaining wider 
credence. The astronomer Ismaël Boulliau (1605–1694) considered this to be the main purpose of 
sunlight in opposition to Kepler’s theory that it was responsible for the motion of the planets:  
…the rays and active virtue of the sun act in the planets through heat and light not so as to move, but so 
as to produce alterations, and, if such is their nature, generations and corruptions to some extent, such as 
it produces in the earth.198 
As for an actual atomist account of such generations, there were as many theories as there were 
philosophers. The question of teleology is, of course, as entrenched in biology as it is in astronomy, if 
not more so.199 Digby, as we have seen, described seeds as the product of a natural process of distillation, 
while allowing for spontaneous generation without the presence of a seed. Another early English 
                                                          
196 Ibid., p. 393. 
197 Hobbes, Thomas White’s De mundo Examined, p. 497. 
198 Ismaël Boulliau, Astronomia Philolaica (Paris: Simeon Piget, 1645), p. 22: ‘Tertiam vero nihil aliud probare 
dico, nisi Solis radios, et virtutem activam, per calorem, et lucem in planetas agere, non ut moveat, sed alterationes, 
et si talis sit eorum natura, generationes, et corruptiones quadamtenus operetur, quales ipse in terra producit.’ 




proponent of atomism, Walter Charleton (1619–1707), preferred the Epicurean theories of Gassendi, 
which described small molecules of atoms, variously composed and configured, as the seminaries of 
various productions.200 These two ideas would be continually debated in the following century, 
especially in regard to the pre-existing germ theory.201 
Digby also gave a role in generation to the ‘universal spirit’, a more general distillation of life-giving 
virtues produced by the reflection of the sun’s rays against all bodies within its reach. In this sense, his 
philosophy is an example of the symbiosis of astrological and pluralist thinking explored in the first 
half of this chapter. Charleton agreed at least with the principle that light could take on the attributes of 
any opaque or diaphanous material it encountered, thus giving it new and particular influences over the 
process of generation.202 Yet Charleton was of a similar opinion to White that astrology usurped divine 
providence and human free will.203 Hobbes, as we have seen, thought quite differently. In terms of 
astronomical cosmology, it was Digby and White who were more in line with the development of 
modern thought. Regarding pluralism, Hobbes’ warning of the limits of observation and possible 
conjecture were largely ignored by future philosophers who embraced the idea of a multiply inhabited 
universe, the basic homogeneity of which was guaranteed by the limits of physical possibility. His 
defence of a naturalist astrological determinism, meanwhile, saw him surpass the likes of Vanini, 
Cardano and Pomponazzi as the philosophical betê noire and atheist par excellence of the seventeenth 
century. 
The question of whether astrology confirms or denies God’s providence is almost as old as astrology 
itself, and we will visit it again soon. What became more prevalent in the mid- to late-seventeenth 
century, as our earlier survey demonstrated, was an idea on which both White and Hobbes agreed: that 
perhaps not everything in the universe was created for the use of the inhabitants of the earth. While 
Hobbes would go so far as to suggest that God could create objects without regard to any living thing, 
most, like White, felt the urge to preserve utility, and pluralism was the obvious substitute. In Gassendi’s 
own attack on astrology, he countered the charge of futility by suggesting that the celestial bodies ‘serve 
among themselves to that further end, which the infinite wisdom intended at their Creation’.204 
Gassendi, like Descartes and Galileo, was critical of overly-anthropocentric cosmological thinking of 
                                                          
200 Walter Charleton, Physiologia Epicuro-Gassendo-Charltoniana, Or, A Fabrick of Science Natural, upon the 
Hypothesis of Atoms Founded by Epicurus (London: Thomas Heath, 1654), p. 105. On Gassendi’s theory of 
homogenesis, or pre-disposed matter, see Saul Fisher, ‘Gassendi’s Atomist Account of Generation and Heredity 
in Plants and Animals’, Perspectives on Science, 11 (2003): 484–512. For a more general view, see Ku-
ming (Kevin) Chang, ‘Alchemy as Studies of Life and Matter: Reconsidering the Place of Vitalism in Early 
Modern Chymistry’, Isis, 102 (2011): 322–29. 
201 See John Farley, The Spontaneous Generation Controversy from Descartes to Oparin (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1977); Justin E. H. Smith (ed.), The Problem of Animal Generation in Early Modern 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
202 See his discussion of the qualities of sunlight reflected from the moon; Charleton, Physiologia, p. 352. 
203 Ibid., p. 349. 
204 Pierre Gassendi, The Vanity of Judiciary Astrology. Or Divination by the Stars... Translated into English by a 
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the kind implicit in astrology, but was reluctant to endorse theories about ET life. Others were not so 
restrained. In the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries we see the symbiosis of astrology and 
pluralism deteriorate, as astrology continues to come under attack—and, perhaps more significantly, is 




Influence and Inhabitation Opposed 
 
On the other Hand, how is it possible to conceive that, that immense Number of glorious and Sun-like 
Bodies of the fixt Stars, those vast and huge Bodies of some of the Planets (in respect of our Earth) with 
their noble Attendance, were made for no other use but to twinkle to us in Winter Evenings, and by their 
Aspects to forebode what little Changes of Weather, or other pitiful Accidents were to be expected below, 




While Hobbes’ criticism of pluralism centred on its lack of utility and philosophical exactitude, there 
were others in the seventeenth century whose opposition to the rising popularity of ET life was more 
direct and explicit. The English clergyman Alexander Ross (1591–1654) was one who wrote several 
works against the new astronomy. His Commentum de terrae motu circulari (‘The Fiction of the 
Circular Motion of the Earth’, 1634) was directed largely against Lansberge’s similarly titled work, 
while his The New Planet No Planet (1646) was a response to Wilkins’ lunar work. In response to the 
pluralist claims of Wilkins’ book, Ross reaffirmed an anthropocentric astrological worldview. One of 
his first attacks on the extravagant conceits of the new philosophy involved the claim that we must find 
‘some office’ for the earth if it is to be considered a planet.2 The ridiculousness of such a proposition 
he considered self-evident. The earth, for Ross, was purely a receiver and not an emitter of celestial 
influence. 
This was perfectly in line with Ross’ anti-Copernican agenda. The earth was placed in the middle of 
the world not only because it is the most honourable place and thus befitting man as lord of the universe, 
but also because the centre is the best place for it to receive ‘equall comfort and influence’ from all 
parts of the heavens.3 Just like a seed grows in the centre of the fruit where ‘all the powers of the plant 
meet together’, so do all the powers of the universe unite together in the earth ‘as in a small epitome’.4 
Ross constantly reasserted the dogma that everything in the universe, including the sun, planets and 
even the new stars discerned by the telescope, was intended solely for man’s use. On these grounds, he 
rejected new astronomical opinions about the motion of the earth and the size of the space between 
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Saturn and the fixed stars.5 Such idle and vain speculations distract from the good uses of astronomy in 
medicine, agriculture, time-keeping, the prediction of eclipses, and ‘such things as have their immediate 
dependence from the opposition and conjunction of starres’.6 
We have already mentioned the Jesuit Athanasius Kircher, and we will do so again before long. His 
Itinerarium exstaticum, depicting a journey through the heavens guided by an angel called Cosmiel, 
was a widely read cosmological work. It showed the planets as elemental bodies complete with 
geological formations, and even had the stars as suns with their own orbiting planets, but not one of 
these celestial bodies had any human, animal or vegetable life; such a privilege was reserved for the 
earth.7 Instead, Kircher portrayed the surfaces of the planets as embodiments of their astrological 
qualities, and hence that description served as a physical explanation for said qualities. While such 
reservation about ET life seems conservative in the context of this discussion, Kircher was in fact quite 
progressive, or perhaps we should say eccentric, for a Jesuit writing in Rome. Although the intellectual 
restriction of the Counter-Reformation is often overstated, it is true that works promoting pluralist ideas 
were censored, prohibited and retroactively condemned.8 
In France one of the loudest voices against Copernicanism and pluralism was that of Jean-Baptise Morin 
(1583–1656). Morin was professor of mathematics at the Collège Royal in Paris from 1630 until his 
death, and from there he directed attacks against Galileo and Descartes and worked on the twenty-six 
books of his Astrologia Gallica, the 850 pages of which were only published posthumously in 1661. 
While the practical aspects of astrology outlined in this work were largely orthodox, there were several 
concessions to recent philosophical developments which were un-Aristotelian and non-traditional. He 
stated, for example, that the planets are mixed bodies. The question then remained whether they are 
mixtures of ethereal or elemental material. Recent observations suggested that the first option is out, 
but the alternative was not acceptable either: 
For the planets are the universal causes of all mixtures that are elemental and of man himself, by the 
common consensus of philosophers, hence the saying of Aristotle: ‘Man is begotten by man and the sun’. 
Therefore they are not of the same type as those mixed bodies, because for something to be its own cause 
is absurd.9 
                                                          
5 Ibid., p. 67. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Later editions of this work had altered titles. See the 1660 edition, Athanasius Kircher, Iter exstaticum coeleste 
(Wurzburg: Johann Andrea Endter, 1660), pp. 45, 341. See also John E. Fletcher, ‘Astronomy in the Life and 
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views were condemned, such as Palingenius’ Zodiacus vitae and Patrizi’s Nova philosophia.  
9 Jean-Baptiste Morin, Astrologia gallica (The Hague: Adriaan Vlacq, 1661), p. 170: ‘Nam Planetae causae sunt 
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The truth must therefore be that the planets are mixtures of both celestial and elemental material, and 
in each of them a different one of the elements predominates, according to and accounting for their 
diverse natures.10  
In his chapter on the particular mixture of the moon he first recounted the opinions of Anaximenes, 
Parmenides, Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Plato, Democritus, Xenophanes, Pythagoreans, and then Plutarch. 
The last, he knew, was used by Copernicans to argue for both the motion of the earth and the inhabitation 
of the moon.11 The proponent of lunar inhabitation singled out by Morin was Kepler, and the astrologer 
dedicated several dense pages to a long extract from Kepler’s Somnium followed by an equally long 
refutation.12 The final conclusion was definitive: 
It is therefore also alien from reason and truth for the other globes of the world to be habitats for rational 
creatures, much less irrational creatures. Indeed, all the celestial bodies were created for this end only 
(besides recounting the glory of God): by their light, heat, cold, influence and motion to serve man, for 
the grace of whom alone the whole corporeal world was made before man himself; and after all man 
himself is the end of this world. Thus we see how many ingrates deny themselves God’s great favour.13 
This brief survey suggests that while a belief in pluralism did not mean abandoning astrological 
thinking, the outright denial of pluralism did necessarily involve a reaffirmation of astrological 
teleology. The impossibility of a superfluous creative act of God, the reticence of most cosmologists to 
leave questions unanswered, and the strong belief in the centrality of living organisms to God’s creative 
purpose meant that astronomy and biology would meet in either astrology, ET life, or both. 
 
The More/Butler Debate 
The paradigms of influence and inhabitation were placed in direct opposition within a dispute over 
astrology between Henry More and the Anglican minister John Butler (1626–1698).14 We have already 
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11 Ibid., p. 173. 
12 Ibid., pp. 174–78. 
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14 Those dates are based on the assumption that this John Butler, B.D., author of Christologia (London, 1671) and 
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identification. See George Baker, History and Antiquities of the County of Northampton, 2 vols (London, 1822–
1841: John Bowyer Nichols & Son and John Rodwell), I, pp. 409–10; Joseph Foster, Alumni Oxonienses: The 
Members of the University of Oxford, 1500-1714 (Oxford and London: Parker and Co., 1891), p. 222; John Burke, 
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1835–1838), III, p. 253; John Butler, The True State of the Case of John Butler, B.D., a Minister of the True 
Church of England, in Answer to the Libel of Martha, His Sometimes Wife (London: John Butler, 1697).    
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discussed the pluralist cosmology of More’s Democritus Platonissans. Since the publication of that 
work he had distanced himself from Descartes and argued for a strict dualism which identified matter 
as inert, and gave the credit for all activity in the universe to an immaterial ‘spirit of nature’. This 
position was outlined in The Immortality of the Soul (1659). His criticism of astrology, meanwhile, was 
contained in four chapters of An Explanation of the Grand Mystery of Godliness (1660). There he 
singled out Pomponazzi, Cardano and Vanini for demonstrating the atheistic and blasphemous potential 
of this dangerous art. The worst crimes of these astrologers were casting a horoscope for Christ and 
explaining the raise and fall of religions by the changing configurations of the heavens. The idea that 
our salvation may be subject to celestial influence or indeed any natural law was abhorrent to More.15  
Butler, by his own account, first encountered these chapters in 1671, while his Christologia, in which 
he himself used astrology to calculate Christ’s date of birth, was in the press. That work already 
contained a defence of astrology in a postscript directed against John Selden (1584–1654), who had 
also published a work on Christ’s birthdate ten years previous.16 Butler was urged to pull his work from 
the press due to its blasphemous implications and More’s anti-astrological chapters were presented to 
him as evidence.17 Instead of retracting his work, Butler doubled down and wrote another vindication 
of astrology in response to More’s attacks which was published in 1680. More himself considered the 
matter serious enough to then reprint the four chapters of his Grand Mystery the following year as 
Tetractys Anti-Astrologica (1681) with notes summarising and responding to Butler’s defence.  
It is worth mentioning here that the period in England from the 1640s to the 1660s has been described 
as the ‘halcyon days’ of astrology.18 During the political upheavals of the Civil War astrological 
predictions abounded and the ensuing break-down of royal censorship saw a huge growth in astrological 
publications. Professional astrologers, the most notorious being William Lilly (1602–1681), gained 
wealth and renown, and thus attracted the attention and scorn of many religious and intellectual 
figures.19 This new class of largely self-taught practitioners were branded as soothsayers and charlatans, 
and the connection to politics in particular was seen as a dangerous threat. It is in this context that we 
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19 See Ann Geneva, Astrology and the Seventeenth Century Mind: William Lilly and the Language of the Stars 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995). 
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should view the attacks of White and More, and indeed the defence of Butler, which are only a few 
examples of a wide-ranging and often bitter debate over the moral, religious and philosophical 
legitimacy of astrology against the background of its burgeoning popularity and social impact. We have 
noted already Hobbes’ attack on the predictive arts in his political philosophy, even though his 
deterministic physics supported at least the principle of celestial causation. For More, on the other hand, 
what worried him most was the atheistic and irreligious implications of astrology on both a practical 
and theoretical level.  
The combatting of atheism in physics and metaphysics was one of, if not the main concern of More’s 
philosophical career.20 In the Tetractys he outlined two main varieties of atheism: Epicurean and 
Aristotelian.21 The former was what led to his distancing himself in his later career from the mechanical 
philosophy because of the tendency of some, especially Hobbes, to deny the existence of any 
incorporeal substance.22 The latter brand of atheism, while allowing spiritual substance, was guilty of 
not allowing God any direct influence on the world, assigning everything, including miracles and 
prophecies, to the secondary causation of the celestial spheres. Even if one such as Vanini posited a 
single immaterial ‘soul of the heavens’, it was still limited to act via the regular and predictable 
influences of the stars and planets.23 More himself believed that these pagan superstitions in the guise 
of Aristotelian science had been completely undermined by the discovery of the annual motion of the 
earth around the sun. The power which the Aristotelians granted to the celestial bodies must now be 
given to the immanent and omnipresent God.24 Such distaste for astrological thinking was shared by 
other Cambridge Platonists like Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688), who attacked not only the Stoic 
conception of astrological fate, but also such otherwise anti-astrological figures as Plotinus and 
Simplicius who thought the celestial bodies might still act as signs of future events.25 
Butler started to answer some of these objections in the first book of his Hagiastrologia, before getting 
to More’s chapters specifically in Book 2. When we look at all the wonder and variety in the generation 
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of living things it goes without saying that they are the work of God, but the real question, Butler 
contended, is whether he operates with or without natural means. To hold the latter opinion is equivalent 
to saying that every act of generation is a new creation, which is absurd because there was only one 
Creation. Ever since then ‘all things have come to pass by Nature, and therefore must there be some 
kind of Natural means for the production of all things’, which ‘means’ must be a combination of earthly 
and celestial, seeing as the four elements alone cannot explain the wonder of natural operations.26 Butler 
described the now familiar metaphor of the astrological cosmos as a clock; wheels interlocking and 
circumscribing each other all the way up to the master-wheel or First Mover.27 As to whether or not 
there is a general Soul of the World mediating the action of the celestial bodies on the earth, Butler 
didn’t seem to mind: Utrum horum mavis accipe (‘Accept whichever you prefer’).28 He soon did pick 
a side, however, positing a universal vegetative soul in the heavens underpinning the celestial bodies 
with God’s virtue. ‘And thus immediately God ruleth in the Heavens’, he concluded, ‘and ruleth all the 
World mediately by the Heavens.’29 
So much for the basic metaphysical differences between the Cambridge Platonists and the astrologers. 
In the second chapter of his attack on astrology, Henry More took it upon himself to detail the main 
arguments used by the astrologers to justify their art, using as his primary sources David Origanus 
(1558–1628/29) and the Englishman Sir Christopher Heydon (1561–1623), in order then to refute them 
one by one. Firstly, More explained, the astrologers argue teleologically that all the stars and planets 
were made for more than just ornament. Secondly, they argue that the simple bodies of the elements 
cannot account for the perceived variety of natural phenomena. They also argue that if the sun is capable 
of such feats as spontaneously generating living creatures from dead matter unassisted, then surely the 
other celestial bodies have their own similarly powerful influences.30 In his defence, Butler declared 
himself quite satisfied with this chapter of More’s. The would-be critic of astrology had done such a 
good job of explaining the arguments in favour of astrology that he had, so Butler thought, undermined 
the ambition of his work.31  
It was in More’s next chapter, where he took issue with each of these astrological pretences, that the 
cosmological and physical disagreements became apparent. He argued that we can safely assume that 
the fixed stars have no influence except for light and heat and not worry that they are thus useless: 
Because the later and wiser Philosophers have made them as so many Suns: which Hypothesis our 
Astrologers must confute before they can make good the force of their first Argument. And for the 
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30 More, Tetractys, pp. 39–41. 
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Planets, they have also suggested that they may have some such like use as our Earth has, i. e. to be the 
Mother of living Creatures.32 
In his crusade against astrological atheism, the assumption of ET life was one of More’s strongest 
weapons. It answered the teleological challenge of the astrologers, retaining an office and influence for 
each body but localising and limiting them to heat, light, and the hosting of living creatures. We saw 
Thomas White take a similar approach, and it was repeated after More by Cudworth, whose attack on 
astrology was met in the same work by praise of the recent improvements in astronomy and philosophy 
that have made every star a sun and supposed the existence of a plurality of habitable globes.33  
Butler’s method of reply to this particular assault was to deny both the assumption and the consequence. 
The hypothesis that the stars are suns was ‘a meer conceit’, and if they were suns ‘the more rather is to 
be expected from them’, the sun being as powerful as it is.34 He was not convinced by More’s vague 
allusions to higher beings making use of these suns, nor was he impressed by the possibility of living 
creatures on the other planets. He stuck fast to the belief that God made the planets in order to influence 
us here on earth, ‘whatever Chimera’s may dwell within them’.35 Henry More, of course, stuck to his 
own guns, and justifiably accused Butler of being ignorant of modern developments in astronomy, 
although his own talk of angels and ethereal genii composed of celestial matter inhabiting the vortices 
of the sun and fixed stars harked to the Cabbala rather than the telescope.36 As for the planets, if a 
secondary planet like the moon may be habitable, as the oceans and continents on its surface suggest, 
then there was even more reason to believe that the primary planets are all mothers of living creatures 
and so not made only for us. More concluded his rebuttal by declaring that the celestial bodies have 
‘manifold uses, partly in regard of others, and partly in regard of our selves, without Astrological 
Influence, and that therefore the force of this first general pretense of the Astrologians is defeated’.37  
The next proposition More took aim at was the claim that celestial influences are needed to explain the 
variety of terrestrial phenomena. He argued that even if you allow for some subtle differences between 
the material effects of the celestial bodies, these influences would still reach every point on the earth 
equally, and such material influences are not sufficient to explain terrestrial generation regardless. More 
instead credited his Stoic λόγος σπερματικός (spermatick principle)—identified with the Platonic 
world-soul—as being responsible for the moulding of matter ‘into such shapes and virtues as its 
disposition makes toward’.38 Butler criticised what he saw as the arbitrary and opaque complexion of 
such a theory. Nature, he reminded us, does not act randomly but with order, and ‘not according to any 
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list or choice of her own’, but by God’s providential method.39 She does not operate with only one 
instrument, but utilises the millions of tools available to her in the heavenly workshop. As to More’s 
claim that the influence of each body reaches the entire surface of the earth equally, Butler pointed out 
More’s own endorsement of the weapon salve, which, as we have seen, could act on a specific point 
from a great distance.40 On his part, More denied the veracity of this comparison. A logical and physical 
sympathy exists between a wound and the knife that made it. This sympathy cannot exist between the 
stars and embryonic matter, which is ‘a pure Crystalline homogeneous liquor, as Dr. Harvey describes 
it, unvariegated of it self’.41 
More also took issue with the reasoning by which astrologers argue from the palpable influence of the 
moon to the supposed influences of her fellow planets. Butler, of course, defended this analogical 
reasoning in his vindication, without adding much substance.42 More’s reply highlighted the division 
that the new astronomy had made between ‘planet’ and ‘satellite’, and so any analogy made from the 
moon could only apply to the moons around other primary planets, which, he accepted, should have 
similar effects on their planets to that of the earth’s moon on it.43 Nor does the moon’s effect on the 
tides justify a belief in occult influences:  
...the Laws of the Aestus marinus are executed sympathetically and synenergetically by the spirit of the 
World, and by the body of the Moon Mechanically as by his Instrument, and not by any strange Influence 
from her. And so the spirit of the World in Magnetical Phaenomenons acts Synenergetically and 
sympathetically from it self, but mechanically by those instruments of his operation, the Magnetick 
Particles which Cartesius calls the particulae striatae.44 
We saw hints of a similar theory in Gilbert, minus the particles, in which action at a distance is operated 
mechanically according to an essential sympathy underpinned by animate principles. Had More been 
so inclined, such a theory could easily be expanded to include planetary and stellar influences. 
Nevertheless, his loathing of astrological excess meant that he could not, while his long-standing 
partiality to pluralism meant he need not, do so. The stars supply heat and light to their own planets, 
and no significant amount thereof reaches the earth. The planets themselves are ‘but heaps of dead 
matter much like that of the Earth’, and while Butler tried to flip this around by saying that such earthy 
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planets would be more apt to influence our earthly human bodies, More would have none of it, allowing 
no action of the planets outside their own atmospheres.45 
This dispute between More and Butler is an example of how, by the latter stages of the seventeenth 
century, influence and inhabitation were increasingly in direct competition as teleological explanations 
in cosmology. Writing in 1680, Butler may seem to represent the ‘old guard’, but we should be mindful 
of letting our preoccupation with the anticipators of modernity blind us to the diversity of opinions at 
the time. Pierre Borel’s admission that ‘[w]e have much ado whom to believe’ well captures the state 
of seventeenth-century natural philosophy; pluralism still faced strong opposition on philosophical and 
theological grounds, and although astrology was being phased out of university curricula, it was still 
wedded to medicine and many other aspects of private and social life. More’s reliance on a spirit of 
nature to explain everything from the generation of living creatures to the sympathetic foundations of 
magnetic and tidal influences shows the continuing difficulties that such phenomena presented to the 
new science. Newton’s theory of gravity would take care of one problem, but generation and magnetism 
had to wait for the likes of Louis Pasteur (1822–1895) and Hans Christian Ørsted (1777–1851) to put 
them on a sound experimental footing.  
The More/Butler argument was almost entirely at cross-purposes; a melange of insults and false-
humility grounded upon analogies, suppositions and theological axioms. From a historical standpoint, 
it seems obvious to say that Henry More was the modern and Butler the traditionalist. We could even 
view the ‘incommensurability’ of their respective positions as evidence of a Kuhnian paradigm shift in 
progress. However, the only thing that really separated this dispute from similar ones conducted 
centuries before is that More was able to rebut the teleological argument for astrology with pluralism, 
whereas earlier critics had relied on timekeeping, navigation and the displayed glory of God as ways to 
rescue the utility of the celestial bodies without astrological influence. Butler’s easy dismissal of More’s 
pluralist theories as mere conceits shows how far telescopic observations and analogical thinking were 
from meeting the burden of proof. Astrology and pluralism were both conjectural theories with ancient 
pedigrees. As the revolution in astronomy approached fulfilment, it was only one of these theories—
that concerning ET life—which was made commensurate with the increasingly orthodox world-system. 
 
Pluralism Takes Hold: Flamsteed, Fontenelle and Huygens 
Neither Copernicanism, mechanism or pluralism were directly responsible for the marginalisation of 
astrology by the end of the seventeenth century. We have seen already the constructive role played by 
celestial influence in arguments for heliocentrism and ET life. On the other hand, the cases of White 
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and More suggest that these could be seen as enabling factors in astrology’s decline. For those who 
were opposed to judicial astrology for age-old reasons—that it had corrosive effects on politics, religion 
and the notion of free will—heliocentric cosmologies and mechanical philosophies could be interpreted 
so as to undermine the physical foundations of the art. Astrology, however, had strong teleological and 
providential functions. Some may have been happy to declare the unfathomability of God’s purposes 
and leave it at that, but for others a plurality of inhabited worlds was an attractive alternative, and so a 
teleology of inhabitation could be asserted against one of influence.  
Another good example of this can be found in the unpublished polemic against astrology written in 
1673 by the future Astronomer Royal John Flamsteed (1646–1719) that was brought to light a few 
decades ago by Michael Hunter.46 Flamsteed had been an avid student of astrology in his younger days, 
but later turned against it, perhaps, Hunter suggests, due to his rejection or exclusion from the profitable 
almanac-publishing community.47 It is important to note that again in this case, the motivations for an 
assault on astrology were not solely philosophical or empirical, and yet these were the tools which 
served for this purpose. The polemic tract, titled ‘Hecker’, was written as a preface to his ephemeris for 
the year 1674, and contains many of the usual ancient complaints against astrology as well as more 
recent ones concerning its incompatibility with a mechanical conception of nature. Inevitably, 
Flamsteed confronted the teleological refuge of the astrologer, who asks what use the stars will have if 
you don’t allow them to act upon sublunary bodies. Flamsteed responded by alluding to the theory of 
‘Borellus’ that the celestial bodies serve as habitats of other creatures.48 He put the following challenge 
to the astrologer:  
Nay let him say, if the Caelestiall bodies are not far more excellently usefull, whilest they may, and 
probably doe receave and susteine creatures to give theire maker perpetual praises; then hee would 
willingly suppose them, whilest he argues that they operate, hee knows not how, upon our globe; and 
influence, not onely the great, but triviall affaires, thefts, rapines, & debaucheries of it.49 
Flamsteed contrasted the probability, as he saw it, of ET life to the ignorant suppositions and trivialities 
of astrology. He tried to make clear that the pluralist route was a far more sensible and convincing 
answer to the teleological demands of astronomical cosmology. Flamsteed’s attitude towards astrology 
was ambiguous, and the motivations behind this polemic were complex, but he was assured in that 
stance by the possibility of an alternative teleology of the heavens. His example is further evidence of 
the utility of pluralism as a tool to undermine the metaphysical and theological foundations of astrology. 
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Flamsteed’s polemic was not published.50 The reformed content of his ephemerides as well as the anti-
astrological preface made it an ill fit for the marketplace of prediction-laden, astronomically-simple 
almanacs.51 For the majority of the seventeenth century the average person in England engaged 
themselves with the heavens by consulting such almanacs, or by reading astrological political 
propaganda, or perhaps by consulting an astrologer or astrological physician. Talk of ET life, while 
gaining footholds through the works of Wilkins and Borel, as well as the lunar voyages of Godwin and 
Cyrano, was largely confined to the learned elite in the coffee shops, or to vague and enigmatic mentions 
in dense cosmological publications such as we have dealt with in this discussion. This state of affairs 
was altered somewhat by the publication of two works: Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes 
(‘Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds’, 1686) by Bernard de Fontenelle (1657–1757) and 
Κοσμοθεωρος, sive de terris coelestibus, earumque ornatu, conjecturae (‘Cosmotheoros, or 
Conjectures on the Celestial Earths and their Furniture’, 1698) by Christiaan Huygens (1629–1695).52 
These works—the first an imagined conversation between the author and a marchioness over the course 
of several evenings, the second a series of theologically guided conjectures about life on the other 
planets—presented the plurality of worlds philosophy to a wider audience, and both were translated 
into English within a year.53 Fontenelle’s work was translated into English five separate times, and went 
through thirty-three French editions.54 
The contents of these works have been summarised and analysed extensively elsewhere, and so only a 
few comments will be made here. They both describe a universe made up of a network of sun-centred 
Cartesian vortices filled with habitable planets, although there are important and telling differences 
between their conjectures about the planetary inhabitants. Their popularity marked a new beginning for 
pluralism as a mainstream subject, and makes compelling the argument that Cartesian rather than 
Brunian philosophy had the largest impact on its growing acceptance.55 Huygens’ strong astronomical 
pedigree granted a level of scientific respectability, while the simplified theoretical content and the 
romantic, conversational style of Fontenelle allowed readers to bypass the technicalities and ‘jump 
directly to Enlightenment’, as Westman puts it.56 This is, of course, a loaded statement, but it is 
indicative of how we still today perceive the shift from an enclosed, anthropocentric cosmos to the 
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unbounded and inhabited universe of the Enlightenment as an intellectual and civilizational forward 
leap. 
The particularly unscientific nature of the argumentation in these two works has been commented on 
many times.57 The extent of observational and physical knowledge of the time was not sufficient enough 
to reach conclusions by an appropriate scientific method. Indeed, Fontenelle himself seemed to 
acknowledge as much. When, in one of their night time conversations, the author declares to his 
companion that the moon may be furnished with everything it needs to sustain life, the Marchioness 
replies: ‘That is to say... you know all is very well, without knowing how it is so; which is a great deal 
of ignorance, founded upon a very little knowledge.’58 The author is naturally unperturbed, having full 
faith in the legitimacy of his analogical reasoning. Astrology is not discussed at all in the week’s 
conversations, perhaps purposefully. In his summary of reasons to believe that the planets are inhabited, 
Fontenelle didn’t even consider astrology worth a mention: 
…you have all the proofs you could desire in our world. The entire resemblance of the planets with the 
earth, which is inhabited, the impossibility of conceiving any other use for which they were created, the 
fecundity and magnificence of nature, the certain regards she seems to have had to the necessities of their 
inhabitants, as in giving moons to those planets remote from the sun, and more moons still to those yet 
remote; and what is still very material, there are all things to be said on one side, and nothing on the 
other; and you cannot comprehend the least subject for a doubt, unless you will take the eyes and 
understanding of the vulgar.59 
That astrology formed part of this ‘understanding of the vulgar’ was hinted at in an earlier work of 
Fontenelle’s, his Nouveaux dialogues de morts (‘New Dialogues of the Dead’, 1683). In an imagined 
dialogue between the deceased Joanna I of Naples and her astrologer Anselm, the queen asks that he 
provide her a prediction about her future.60 He claims that he cannot, and says further that such anxiety 
about the future is a feature of the living, not the dead. ‘The future is the great lure of mankind’, he says, 
‘and we astrologers know this better than anyone.’61 Astrologers play on this desire for future 
knowledge and tell stories of zodiacal signs and planets that are hot or cold, male or female, good or 
bad. The queen points out the irony that the man who was once her astrologer is now speaking ill of the 
art. ‘Listen’, replies Anselm, ‘for a dead man does not like to lie. In truth, I deceived you with this 
astrology that you esteem so highly.’62 
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Huygens was more direct than Fontenelle in his juxtaposition of ET life and astrology. At the start of 
Book 2 of the Cosmotheoros, he described reading Kircher’s Itinerarium exstaticum and being amazed 
by the ‘heap of idle unreasonable stuff’ he found written therein.63 He didn’t quite understand how 
someone could describe a universe made up of multiple solar systems with earth-like planets and still 
maintain that the earth is the only abode of life:  
Since most of these Worlds are out of the Reach of any Man’s sight, as he owns they are, I cannot think 
for what purpose he makes so many Suns to shine upon desolate Lands (like our Earth in everything, he 
says, only that they have neither Plants nor Animals) where there’s no one to whom they should give 
light. And from hence he still falls into more and more Absurdities. And because he could find no other 
use of the Planets, even in our System, he is forced to beg help of the astrologers; and would have all 
those vast bodies made upon no other account than that the whole universe might be preserved and 
continue secure by their means, and that they might govern the mind of man by their various and regular 
influences.64 
Huygens may have found Kircher’s reasoning absurd, but his own methodology was hardly more 
‘scientific’. He criticised the way that Kircher tried to gratify astrology by painting the physical 
conditions of each planet in line with their astrological quality. Venus is a pleasant place, Mercury airy 
and brisk, Saturn is melancholic and dark. ‘All this and such like Stuff his Genius teaches him’, 
remarked Huygens wryly, although the same scepticism was not apparent in his own conclusion that 
each planet has ‘Fields warm’d by the kindly Heat of the Sun, and water’d with fruitful Dews and 
Showers’.65 Huygens’ universe has every planet filled with plants, animals and rational creatures, all 
functioning pretty much like they do on earth. His vision was quite drastic in its lack of 
anthropocentrism, based on the premise that the earth should have no advantage at all over any of the 
other planets, but it was also anthropo-normative, assuming that everything on earth, from the growth 
of plants in the soil to the practice of astronomy by upright-standing rational animals, is repeated 
throughout the solar system.66  
Fontenelle and Huygens also show us how a belief in ET life began to take over some of the functions 
of astrology beyond just that of teleology. Both works promoted pluralism as a way of encouraging a 
cosmic perspective. Advocates for astrobiology outreach do much the same today, and the form of the 
argument hasn’t changed much since Scipio had his dream in the first century BCE.67 Just as visions of 
flights through the celestial spheres once did, a reasoned awareness of the multiplicity of inhabited 
worlds simultaneously makes a person disdainful of worldly success and grateful for the amenities that 
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God has provided for his creatures.68 These works on pluralism also demonstrate how the belief 
provided an incentive to further develop the astronomical sciences. Instead of improving theorics and 
planetary tables in order to make more accurate predictions, Fontenelle and Huygens looked forward to 
improved telescopes and perhaps even space-travel in order to find out more about our celestial 
neighbours.  
The supposition of life on the other planets also began to give a new shape, order and logic to the solar 
system in a way which had been missing ever since the sun took the earth’s place in the centre. Both 
Fontenelle and Huygens postulated differences between the denizens of each planet based on the 
distance of the planet from the sun. For Huygens, this difference was ‘not so much in their Form and 
Shape, as in their Matter and Contexture’.69 According to Fontenelle, the inhabitants of Mercury are 
vivid and nimble, while those of Saturn are slow and deliberate. We here on earth, being situated in the 
middle between two extremes, are ‘a mixture of the several kinds which are found in the rest of the 
planets’.70 Humanity, rather than being the centre of the universe, became its measure—for Huygens 
we are the median; for Fontenelle the mean. Astrology, which had once reigned as the predominant 
cosmological paradigm and permeated all society, was by the end of the seventeenth century a minority 
interest, at least among the intellectual elite.71 Pluralism, while in no way solely responsible, at least 
played a contributory and enabling role in this marginalisation. In the final section, we will look at 
Newtonianism and Natural Theology, exploring how astrology was sidelined within a metaphysics that 
stressed God’s immediate action in the world, while the debate over ET life was framed in increasingly 
religious, non-naturalistic terms.  
 
Natural Theology and the De-Astrologisation of Generation and Providence 
‘In eighteenth-century Newtonian natural philosophy, the plurality of worlds tradition found its 
culmination and its triumph.’72 This was the assessment of Dick, and while its veracity depends on the 
weight you give to high-end natural philosophy in comparison to other cultural forms, it seems fair to 
say, with Crowe, that the combination of Newtonianism, Christianity and pluralism ‘would within a 
few decades become commonplace’.73 The vehicle for this combination was natural theology (often 
called physico-theology), a project which used knowledge of the natural world to construct a design 
and providential argument for God. In this regard, it was not a new enterprise, and instructive 
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comparisons can be drawn to the similar endeavours of Thomas Aquinas or Philip Melanchthon 
discussed in Chapter 1. The key difference with respect to our discussion is that the natural theologians 
around the turn of the eighteenth century de-emphasised the role of celestial influence in the process of 
generation and in God’s providential governance of the universe. The creation of living creatures in the 
first instance, as well as the continuity of species, was granted more directly to God’s design, rather 
than to any secondary instruments or mechanical operation of matter, and the possibility of any 
consequent spontaneous generation of life was denied. The function of celestial influence as an 
explanation of ‘what the celestial bodies are for’ was increasingly replaced by pluralism—God’s 
providence was demonstrated by the stable maintenance of a plurality of inhabited earth-like bodies, 
rather than by the maintenance of this earth via the combined operations of the celestial realm.  
This reversed the dynamic between astrology and pluralism that had largely held from late antiquity to 
the Renaissance. We mentioned in the introduction how Manilius’ astrological poem had opposed an 
ordered, unified and providential cosmos to the chaotic, mechanistic pluralism of Lucretius’ atomist 
verse. Throughout the Middle Ages and into the sixteenth century, celestial influence played a key role 
in support of a designed universe and in arguments against the perceived evils of Epicureanism. In the 
seventeenth century, astrology was seen by many as naturalistic, deistic and deterministic; attributes 
that associated it with the atheistic mechanism and materialism of Hobbes and Baruch Spinoza (1632–
1677).74 Indeed, Hobbes’ physical defense of celestial influence in his critique of White’s De mundo 
illustrates this connection. One solution to this was to take the atoms and multiple worlds of Epicurus 
and substitute divine governance for chance.75 In this context, the assertion that the celestial bodies were 
created to provide habitation for other creatures obviated the need to grant them power over the 
sublunary realm, and undermined the teleological foundation of ‘astrological atheism’. 
Peter Harrison’s suggestion, as mentioned in the introduction, was that the decline of astrological 
prediction and the associated belief in celestial influences made the problem of explaining the utility of 
the celestial bodies more acute. The following discussion will suggest a revision to that assessment. 
Many natural theologians were explicitly critical of an astrological tradition that was still prevalent in 
their society, and so they, like White, More, Flamsteed and Huygens, deliberately championed a 
principle of inhabitation in opposition to one of influence. The natural philosopher Thomas Burnet 
(c.1635–1715), for example, in his Telluris theoria sacra (‘Sacred Theory of the Earth’, 1681), 
expanded his naturalistic interpretation of the Biblical Flood and the future Conflagration to apply 
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likewise to the other inhabited planets.76 The second part of that work, published in a new edition of 
1689, criticised the opinion of some ‘astronomers’ that the end of the world could be brought about by 
a particular configuration of the heavens. ‘Pray what reason can you give’, he asked, ‘why the Planets, 
when they meet, should plot together, to set on Fire their Fellow-Planet, the Earth, who never did them 
any harm?’77 The ensuing censure of astrology claimed that the idolatrous origin of astrological beliefs 
had been undermined by the realisation that they are opaque terraqueous globes like the earth, and 
Burnet declared that it was high time ‘to sweep away these cobwebs of superstition, these reliques of 
Paganism’.78  
One of the most influential works for the Newtonian iteration of natural theology was The Wisdom of 
God Manifested in the Works of the Creation (1691) by the theologian and naturalist John Ray (1627–
1705). His separation of the design argument into two sections—one arguing from the structure of the 
heavens, the other from the structure of living organisms—would be copied by many later authors. In 
his discussion of the heavens, Ray argued that the planets are most likely furnished with as great a 
variety of corporeal creatures as the earth.79 The moon as well, while exerting useful influences upon 
the earth and supposedly affecting the growth of plants and animals, has a further use in maintaining 
the creatures ‘which in all likelyhood breed and inhabit there’, on which subject he referred the reader 
to the works of Wilkins and Fontenelle.80 Concluding his discussion of the utility of the celestial bodies, 
he mentioned that even eclipses of the sun and moon can be of great use to ‘knowing Men’, even though 
‘they be frightful Things to the superstitious Vulgar, and of ill Influence on Mankind, if we may believe 
the no less superstitious astrologers’.81  
This distaste for astrological thinking is evident throughout Ray’s botanical work as well.82 In The 
Wisdom of God, he attempted to demolish a doctrine that historically had been central to the relationship 
between biology and celestial influence: equivocal or spontaneous generation.83 His metaphysical or 
theological argument against this was that to bring forth a living creature out of inert matter requires an 
omnipotent agent, and so spontaneous generation is akin to Creation. For observational and empirical 
evidence to support this, he was able to cite the experiments of Marcello Malpighi (1628–1694), 
Francesco Redi (1626–1697) and Antonie van Leeuwenhoek (1632–1723), all of which seemed to 
                                                          
76 Thomas Burnet, The Theory of the Earth, 3rd ed. (London: Walter Kettilby, 1697), Bk 1, pp. 113–14. 
77 Ibid., Bk 3, p. 19. 
78 Ibid. 
79 John Ray, The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of the Creation, 6th ed. (London: William Innys, 1714), 
pp. 18–19. 
80 Ibid., pp. 66–67. 
81 Ibid., p. 68. 
82 Charles E. Raven, John Ray, Naturalist: His Life and Works (Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 98. 
83 Ray, The Wisdom of God, pp. 300–326. Ray had long been sceptical about spontaneous generation, and his 
strong assertion in the first edition of The Wisdom of God that there was no such thing drew an attack by an 
anonymous correspondent. This led to Ray expanding his refutation in the second and subsequent editions. See 
Raven, John Ray, p. 375. 
179 
 
suggest that instances of supposedly spontaneous generation were actually the result of invisible or 
unnoticed eggs or seeds.84 If equivocal generation could be disproved, Ray thought, then it would take 
away one of the main supports of atheism. ‘They cannot then exemplify their foolish Hypothesis of the 
Generation of Man and other Animals at first,’ he argued, ‘by the Like of Frogs and Insects at this 
present Day.’85 
It was exactly this objective—the combatting of atheism—that motivated Robert Boyle (1627–1691) to 
bequeath a certain sum of money for an annual series of public lectures. Boyle was quite enthusiastic 
about the benefits of a teleological consideration of nature for encouraging a belief in God, but he was 
unsure whether astronomy was the most appropriate field of study in this regard. In his A Disquisition 
about the Final Causes of Natural Things (1688), he suggested that the benefits which the celestial 
bodies bestowed on the earth did not rule out the possibility of other ends, but he urged discretion in 
light of our lack of exact knowledge about the system of the heavens.86 The bodies of animals and 
plants, he argued, could provide more ‘clear and cogent arguments’ for the wisdom and design of God.87 
In spite of this, the Boyle Lectures would become instrumental in the replacement of a teleology of 
influence with one of inhabitation, thanks in part to the relationship between the first Boyle Lecturer, 
Richard Bentley (1662–1742), and Isaac Newton. 
Newton himself said little about either ET life or astrology. There is a crossed-out passage in his 
manuscripts which asks why all the immense spaces of the heavens should be ‘incapable of inhabitants’. 
This remark was published, without reference to its deletion, by David Brewster (1781–1868), who 
invoked the support of Newton for his own pluralist theories.88 This possible private or tacit acceptance 
of pluralism was accompanied by a probable rejection of astrology, although this too was not discussed 
openly or at length.89 Bentley, however, engaged directly and publicly with both these subjects. A 
classicist by training, it has been suggested that Bentley first contacted Newton because he was working 
on an edition of Manilius’ Astronomica.90 He was assisted in this endeavour by Edward Sherburne, 
whose English translation, with its abundant notes and long scientific appendices, was undoubtedly a 
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major inspiration for Bentley. Newton was included as a worthy contemporary in the catalogue of 
astronomers that Sherburne appended to his translation, and thus it may have been that Bentley 
approached Newton with a view to similarly complement his Manilius with a modern astronomical 
perspective. 
It is also possible that Newton played a part in selecting Bentley to deliver the inaugural Boyle Lectures, 
although other trustees were familiar with the young scholar.91 The eight lectures, or sermons, that he 
gave in 1692 were printed in that and the following year as A Confutation of Atheism in three parts. The 
first part was (meta)physical, arguing, à la Digby and More, that the limitations of matter necessitated 
the existence of the soul. The second and third parts mirrored Ray’s biology/astronomy divide, arguing 
against atheism from the origin and structure firstly of the human body and then of the larger universe. 
When it came to opinions about the origin of mankind, Bentley divided the atheists into four rough 
categories: Aristotelian, Epicurean, astrological and mechanical. The first denies that the human race 
had a beginning, arguing that there has been an eternal succession of generations. The second group 
invokes a chance concourse of atoms. It is the latter two brands of atheism which concern us here. 
The ‘modern astrological atheist’, as Bentley described him, credits a particular extraordinary 
conjunction or aspect for the initial generation of humanity.92 To expurgate this notion, Bentley took on 
the entire astrological tradition, arguing that its main theoretical pillars—geocentrism and ensouled 
planets—had been obliterated.93 He could forgive ‘some great men of the last age’ for being addicted 
to astrology (and here we might think of Manilius), but maintained that ‘at this time of day, when all 
the general powers and capacities of matter are so clearly understood, he must be very ridiculous himself 
that doth not deride and explode the antiquated folly.’94 It was an unwelcome irony, he thought, that an 
art which was historically reliant upon idolatry had become ‘the tottering sanctuary of Atheism’.95 
Satisfied with his confutation of an astrological genesis of humanity, he then moved on to the 
mechanical theory. This also relies on celestial influence, albeit of a more general kind, ascribing the 
first generation of man to the action of the sun upon ‘duly prepared matter’.96 His approach to this 
problem involved a refutation of exactly that kind of generation that we saw described by Digby.97 Even 
theories like that of the Cambridge Platonists involving the action of a plastic spirit of nature were 
unacceptable. The only invocation of nature by Bentley was in regard to the ‘settled method’ of the 
propagation of mankind—and, by extension, other creatures—following an initial direct act of creation. 
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He thus argued similarly to Ray that nothing had given more support to atheism than ‘this unfortunate 
mistake about the equivocal generation of insects’.98  
There is an interesting letter from Bentley to Edward Bernard (1638–1697) which reveals some of the 
thinking behind the tactics of his refutation.99 Bernard, it seems, had suggested that a better target for 
Bentley’s sermons might have been deists or Jews, rather than atheists, who had few books published. 
Bentley denied that they have no written books, arguing that ‘not one English Infidel in a hundred is 
any other than a Hobbist’.100 Bernard also suggested that the idea of an astrological origin of mankind 
was Bentley’s own invention, and that no one ever believed it. Bentley’s reply is particularly germane: 
But 'tis your happiness, that you have not known by conversation what Monsters of Men have been of 
late days. You know the grounds of the old ones, that derived us out of the soil from mechanism or 
Chance, was, that equivocal generation of frogs and insects, and plants sine semine. So that they said, 
when the earth was fresh and vigorous the more perfect animals were produced out of her. Now, 
therefore, because the generations of Plants and insects are reduced to the starry influences, they carry in 
consequence the production of ourselves to the same Cause. Besides Cardan, Caesalpinus, and 
Berigardus, etc. do in express words ascribe it to planetary influences: and 'tis now the reigning opinion 
of the most learned living Atheists among us; and therefore ought not to be past by.101 
Bentley was of course right in saying that there were astrological theories about the origin of mankind, 
as indeed there were about the origin or creation of the world itself.102 We need just look to the sources 
that Bentley himself singled out to discover what troubled him.  
The sixteenth-century Pisan philosopher and botanist Andreas Cesalpino (1519–1603) discussed this 
subject in his Quaestionum peripateticarum libri V (‘Five Books of Peripatetical Questions’, 1571), 
under the purview of the following question: ‘Whatever is produced from a seed can likewise be 
produced without a seed’.103 This chapter contains an example of exactly that Averroist, astrologised 
Aristotelianism discussed in Chapter 1. Cesalpino referenced Aristotle for the theory that humans and 
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quadrupeds might originally have been born from the earth (GA, III.11, 762b28-30) and also that in 
nature, as in art, things that are produced as the result of some faculty can also occur by accident 
(Metaphysics, VII.7). Combining these with Aristotle’s theory that terrestrial change proceeds from the 
heavens as an efficient cause (GA, II.2-3; Meteorology, I.3), Cesalpino arrived at the following 
conclusion:  
We therefore conclude from these principles that all things were indeed produced in the beginning by 
intelligence as the first mover and by the heavens as an instrument, after which, those things that had 
obtained a more perfect nature were produced by turns from each other.104 
This is the method of reasoning that Bentley criticised, arguing from the role of the heavens in ongoing 
spontaneous generation to suggest an original equivocal generation of more perfect animals, including 
humans, brought about by the celestial bodies.105  
Cesalpino—along with Berigardus, Cardano, Vanini and the mechanical philosophers—had been the 
subject of an earlier assault against atheism by Samuel Parker (1640–1688), which may have been 
Bentley’s source.106 Whether this was the ‘reigning opinion’ among atheists of Bentley’s time is another 
matter, but there were similar iterations of this theory close to home. Burnet, for example, had suggested 
that the ether or the heavens could have supplied the ‘male’ influence in a spontaneous generation of 
plants and animals (not men) at the beginning of the world, citing Aristotle’s comparison of semen and 
pneuma in support.107 Here we see the conflation, which Bentley recognised, of astrological and 
mechanical or Lucretian theories of the origins of life.108 The combined threat of these atheistic notions 
led Bentley to refute not only an astrological origin of man but also to deny the reality of spontaneous 
generation, which seemed to support the idea that ‘starry influences’ have the ability to produce life out 
of non-living matter—in short, it led him to de-astrologise generation.  
In turning to the larger system of the universe, and specifically its origin, Bentley reassured the reader 
that the astrological atheists would not pose a problem, because the planets and zodiac signs could not 
logically be the cause of their own existence.109 The main targets, therefore, were the eternal world of 
the Aristotelians, the infinite chaos of the Epicureans, and the naturalism or deism of the mechanical 
philosophers. It is the Newtonian theory of gravity that takes centre stage in these discussions, not only 
in its power but in its limits. Gravity alone, Bentley argued, could not have produced the current system 
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of stars and planets out of an initial chaos of matter. Moreover, the continued operation of gravity relies 
immediately on God himself. As a force applicable to celestial motion, Newton’s theory of gravity was 
a development of Kepler’s celestial physics and Gilbert’s magnetic theory. Gilbert described magnetism 
as the earth’s astral virtue and believed it to be inherent to the earth’s substance, and Bentley’s 
description of Newtonian gravitation, while comparable, contains an important difference. He described 
gravity as ‘an operation, or virtue, or influence of distant bodies upon each other through an empty 
interval, without any effluvia, or exhalations, or other corporeal medium to convey and transmit it’. So 
far this looks similar to Gilbert’s effused forms, but Bentley concluded from these properties that this 
power ‘cannot be innate and essential to matter’, but is directly impressed and maintained by the divine 
power.110  
There is no time nor need here to delve into the intricacies of the debate about the nature and operation 
of gravity, but it is worth thinking about how this theory, much more so than the otherwise similar ideas 
of Gilbert or Otto von Guericke, de-astrologises the interaction between the celestial bodies. The order 
and motion of the heavens is not maintained mechanically or by any other variety of secondary natural 
cause, but rather by the immediate power of God. It is in light of these de-astrologising tendencies in 
Bentley’s sermons that we should view his enthusiasm for ET life. Discussing the ends and final causes 
of these higher, inanimate parts of the world, he pointed out the usefulness of some for humanity, but 
quickly concluded that most could not have been created for our sakes. His approach to pluralism and 
the nature of ET life is actually strikingly similar to that of Thomas White. Bentley stated that ‘all bodies 
were formed for the sake of intelligent minds’, and so the other planets serve as habitats for other 
rational creatures as the earth is for men. Theological concerns about the Fall or the Incarnation are 
unfounded, because the fact that these planetary inhabitants may be rational does not mean they are 
‘men’. As White had done, Bentley defined humanity not merely as the rational animal, but as a species 
within that genus, differentiated by its unique sub-class of soul and the particular structure of its organic 
body.111 After Bentley, this would become a common way of approaching the question of ET life.112 
Bentley didn’t give any specific details about these other potential species, but he did feel the need to 
address the possible objection that the inner- and outermost planets of our system would be too hot and 
cold respectively to support life. Part of his response is quite revealing: ‘the laws of vegetation, and life, 
and sustenance, and propagation, are the arbitrary pleasure of God, and may vary in all planets according 
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to the divine appointment’.113 This conviction, which separates the question of ET life from a belief in 
the uniformity of nature, is linked to the issue of voluntarist versus intellectualist theology. Newtonian 
natural philosophy was characterised by a theological approach which prioritised God’s will, as opposed 
to the approach which prioritised his intellect, usually associated with the continental mechanical 
philosophies.114 These theological differences were central to the issue of natural laws.115 An 
intellectualist might have felt justified in approaching this subject a priori, on the basis that God is 
restricted by certain logical and natural necessities in the creation and continued maintenance of the 
world. A voluntarist, on the other hand, considered God to be completely free in all his actions, and so 
the only way of discovering the method and laws that he did and does use was to do it a posteriori, 
through the accumulation of empirical and observational data.  
Bentley’s approach to pluralism was not intellectualist, but neither was it empirical. By invoking the 
arbitrary pleasure of God in this instance, he was effectively saying that life on earth provides no basis 
for extrapolating more general biological laws of nature. His belief in ET life had nothing to do with 
the universality of matter and the forces inherent to it or acting upon it; it was almost purely teleological. 
Herein lies the difficulty. Bentley’s voluntarist theology should, in theory, have prevented him from 
making conclusions about God’s actions in areas beyond the limits of empirical observation. In the case 
of ET life, it blatantly did not.116 His fear of astrology as a threat to religious belief may provide a clue 
in this regard. Astrological and mechanical explanations, in both celestial and terrestrial matters, granted 
too much power to nature at the expense of God, which Bentley saw as effectively atheistic. The 
replacement of celestial influence with celestial inhabitation and the stated dependence of life upon the 
arbitrary agency of God allowed Bentley to present a vision of the cosmos that kept both opponents at 
bay.  
In Bentley’s published sermons, Boyle’s warning about the teleological limits of astronomical 
investigations was ignored, and the young Newtonian filled the heavenly bodies with innumerable 
instances of ET life. Along with Fontenelle and Huygens, Bentley is an indication not only of how 
inhabitation was replacing influence as the answer to the question ‘what are the celestial bodies for’, 
but also of how pluralism was replacing astrology as the speculative or conjectural side of astronomy. 
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It is important to note, however, that natural theology was not a homogenous or static discipline. Certain 
writers were less favourable than Bentley towards pluralism, while others were not as reticent about 
celestial influence. There are many varied and interesting theories on display in the works of natural 
theology in this period, but as this dissertation reaches its conclusion there is only space to mention a 
few. 
The physician George Cheyne (1671/2–1743) endorsed pluralism based on the analogy between the 
earth and the planets and satellites, and, like Huygens, belittled an astrological interpretation of the 
utility of those bodies. He found it impossible to conceive that they were made ‘for no other use but to 
twinkle to us in Winter Evenings, and by their Aspects to forebode what little Changes of Weather, or 
other pitiful Accidents were to be expected below’.117 The botanist and physician Nehemiah Grew (bap. 
1641–d. 1712) also thought there was good reason to believe that the moon and the planets were 
inhabited, and that the fixed stars were other suns.118 He allowed more room than Bentley, however, for 
the role of secondary instruments in the administration of nature. One dimension of secondary causation 
was provided by the dominion of the celestial bodies, ‘both the Planets, and fixed Stars; but chiefly, the 
Sun and Moon’, over the earth. The subtlety of the intervening ether allowed for the transfer of light, 
heat and ‘other qualities’.119  
Robert Jenkin (bap. 1656–d. 1727) demonstrated less enthusiasm about inhabited planets in his work 
entitled The Reasonableness and Certainty of the Christian Religion (1696). ‘The Stars may be of great 
Benefit and Usefulness in the World,’ he suggested, ‘tho’ they neither have that Influence which 
Astrologers vainly suppose, nor are as Suns to other Earths.’120 His attempts to demonstrate this 
usefulness highlight some of the remaining possibilities for a teleology of influence within a Newtonian 
system. The first use that the stars have, he argued, is to ‘keep the circumjacent Air or Aether in Motion’, 
preventing it from stagnating, and maintaining ‘that perpetual Circulation of Fluid Matter, which passes 
from Orb to Orb, through the Universe, and gives Life to all Things’.121 So the motion of the celestial 
bodies propels the circulation of a Stoic pneuma that has vital properties. At the same time, their 
gravitational effects keep the different parts of the universe in equilibrium, ‘by Mr. Newton’s 
principles’.122 A passage added to later editions of the work expanded on more possibilities. According 
to these same principles of gravitation, the conjunction and opposition of planets should have some 
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effect on the earth. Comets, meanwhile, cannot be inhabited because they approach too close to the sun, 
and so their use must in some way involve influence.123 
Cometography was, in general, the main area where astrological influence persisted within the 
Newtonian system. Comets were naturalised by the demonstration that they are orbital bodies whose 
return can be predicted. Their highly eccentric orbits, however, and their uncertain material constitution, 
made it difficult to say exactly how they fit, teleologically speaking, into the celestial schematic, and so 
discussions about their role continued to include theories of influence. Newton’s own tentative theory 
was that comets restocked planets with fluid matter that they lost over time.124 Jenkin claimed that the 
philosophers of his time agreed ‘that the vast Quantity of Moisture in the Atmosphere of Comets, must 
cause Changes in our Air’.125 They may be a natural means of executing God’s providence, in the form 
of either blessings or punishments, and therefore planets may well serve the same purpose, obviating 
the need for them to be inhabited.126 
Daniel Sturmy (d. 1722) took up many of Jenkin’s objections in his own work on pluralism. He 
conceded that other orbs may influence our own in unknown ways ‘by Pipes and Channels, of very 
subtile Matter’, but rejected the implication that we should therefore limit them to human uses.127 He 
copied Jenkin word-for-word in places, such as in the case of the stars serving to keep the ether in 
motion, or of planetary satellites providing a possible method for determining longitude. These ‘wise 
ends’, however, hold true whether the planets are inhabited or not, and so rather than contracting our 
contemplation of providence, we should favour the option which enlarges our admiration of God.128 
Crowe has argued that isolated voices of opposition, like that of Jenkin, ‘had little effect in stemming 
the ever increasing enthusiasm for the pluralist message’.129 This message could still accommodate 
ideas of celestial influence, it seems, but an astronomical teleology built solely on influence was 
increasingly untenable. 
One of the more important natural theologians of the early-eighteenth century was William Derham 
(1657–1735), who, like Bentley, was a Boyle Lecturer. His Physico-theology (1713), arising out of the 
lectures he delivered at St Mary-le-Bow, London, throughout 1711 and 1712, contained a declaration 
that spontaneous generation was ‘a Doctrine so generally exploded,’ that there was no longer a need to 
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disprove it. This work on terrestrial natural theology was followed up by Astro-theology (1715), dealing, 
as one might suspect, with celestial bodies and phenomena. Both of these works went through many 
editions in the eighteenth century, and were translated into several different languages. Just as the 
question of equivocal generation was considered settled, so too, to a certain extent, was the question of 
pluralism. Astro-theology begins with a preliminary discourse on the world-system and the habitability 
of the planets intended as an aid to the reading of the main work. The upholders of the new system of 
the world, Derham maintained, conclude that ‘all the Planets of the Sun and of the Fixt Stars also’ are 
habitable worlds, ‘places, as accommodated for Habitation, so stocked with proper Inhabitants’.130 
Derham also dealt with the question of celestial influences. What exactly these influences were, he 
thought, was difficult to determine, ‘although vainly pretended unto by the judicial Astrologers’.131 His 
concern with astrological atheism, however, doesn’t seem as great as Bentley’s. In Derham’s Astro-
theology we see semblances of the symbiosis of influence and inhabitation characteristic of the previous 
century. He described ‘an admirable Oeconomy observable throughout all the visible Regions of the 
Universe, in the mutual Assistances, and Returns, which one Globe affords the other, even at the greatest 
Distance’.132 Such vague allusions to large scale mutual influences, however, were increasingly 
subservient to the teleology of inhabitation, and the ‘plurality of worlds’ philosophy began to cement 
itself as the dominant paradigm of astronomical cosmology.  
This was becoming the case in the universities as well. The Savilian Chair of Astronomy at Oxford, 
established in 1619, prevented its holders from practicing astrology. In 1718, the then-chair John Keill 
(1671–1721) published a set of lectures he gave on astronomy with the title Introductio ad veram 
astronomiam (‘Introduction to the True Astronomy’, English translation 1721). In the fourth lecture, 
Keill framed an ‘admirable magnificent Idea or Notion’ of the immense size of the universe. This 
admirable idea is reached by imagining the indefinite space filled by innumerable suns, each with its 
own planets, the combination of which ‘constitute so many particular Worlds or Systems’.133 Each sun 
performs the same office in its system as our sun does in ours: illustrating, warming and cherishing its 
attending planets. The Plumian Professorship of Astronomy at Cambridge, meanwhile, has a story about 
its inception which links it to pluralism. The second holder of that chair, Robert Smith (1689–1768), 
wrote a note on the fly-leaf of his copy of Huygen’s Cosmotheoros stating the following: 
I have been well informed that Dr Plume, Archdeacon of Rochester, was so pleased with this book, which 
the celebrated Mr Flamsteed had recommended to him, as to leave by his will £1800 to found the Plumian 
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Professorship of Astronomy and Experimental Philosophy, which I held many years after Mr Cotes’s 
decease.134  
There seems to be no independent corroboration of this story, although it was related by Crowe as fact. 
It is interesting in itself, however, that Smith associated the Plumian chair with Huygen’s theories of 
ET life, while his own works on optical and musical theory carry none of the astrological implications 
that so intrigued Kepler a century before. 
As the eighteenth century progressed, the number of works of astronomy, theology and natural 
philosophy that engaged with the question of ET life increased exponentially. Pluralism started to 
permeate all levels of society; from technical treatises to popular philosophy, from religious sermons to 
poetry and theatre. Astrology, meanwhile, became increasingly cut off from the top-end of that 
spectrum. The purpose of this chapter has been to suggest that the rise of pluralism and the 
marginalisation of astrology were linked in at least one important sense, and that is that important 
advocates of pluralism, such as More, Flamsteed, Fontenelle, Huygens, Ray and Bentley, consciously 
and deliberately opposed it to astrology. For these and other pluralist philosophers, the primary reason 
for God’s creation of the planets was to act as habitats for living creatures. The role of influence was 
generalised and localised to the various suns and satellites, or relegated to a secondary function of all 
celestial bodies. This reassessment was undertaken at a time when astrology was still highly visible in 
social and print culture, with links to the intellectual elite via medicine and the almanac trade. There is 
a tendency still to see the decline of astrology and the resurgence of pluralism as inevitable 
consequences of heliocentrism, mechanism and then Newtonianism. These examples demonstrate, 
however, that there was at least some degree of conscious effort to employ analogy and teleology in the 
service of one theory ahead of the other. 
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Thus, have we found a true astrology; 
Thus, have we found a new, and noble sense, 




This dissertation has aimed to present a conjoined and comparative history of astrology and pluralism 
in the early modern era. The approach taken has been to isolate the two fundamental ideas—celestial 
influence and celestial inhabitation—and trace the relationship and interactions between them in the 
works of individual natural philosophers throughout this period. The selection of individuals discussed 
has not been random, nor has it been completely representative. The varyingly detailed case studies in 
this paper were chosen in order to fill historical gaps, to challenge or complement certain aspects of the 
established narrative and interpretation, and especially to illustrate connections between the two 
histories. Some of these connections were recurrent enough to suggest trends, and two of these trends 
form the basis for the historical arguments advanced by this thesis. The first is that evolving theories of 
celestial influence formed part of the catalyst for thinking about ET life; the second is that by the second 
half of the seventeenth century, anti-astrological thinkers were using pluralism to negate the teleological 
claims of the astrologers.  
We began with Plutarch’s De facie, and from there proceeded to Nicholas of Cusa’s De docta 
ignorantia, via a discussion of the functions of celestial influence within the largely Aristotelian 
cosmology of the medieval and Renaissance periods. Plutarch and Cusa were the two most important 
pre-Copernican sources for ideas about life on other celestial bodies within our cosmos. In both cases 
celestial influence was involved. In Plutarch, this took the form of Stoic ideas about celestial bodies 
nourishing one another, and the suggestion that the earth may have a reciprocal influence on the moon 
which helps to support life. In Cusa, it took the form of a question: If the influences of the stars produce 
living creatures in the regions of the earth, and the stars receive influences from each other, why 
shouldn’t living creatures be produced in their regions as well? Both of these ideas suggest a universality 
or at least a commonality to the operations of nature, long before this would become a central tenet of 
the mechanical philosophies. 
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Cusa was exceptional in this regard, as, indeed, he was in many others. The Aristotelian/Ptolemaic 
cosmos instituted a strict ontological divide between the sublunary and superlunary regions, limiting 
the process of generation and corruption, and thus life as we now understand it, to the terrestrial, 
elemental sphere. Within this cosmos, the function of the heavenly bodies was understood in terms of 
their influence on the earth and therefore their usefulness to humanity. They constituted a celestial 
causal chain linking the central earth to the outermost primum mobile and empyrean heaven. The 
particular mechanisms of this causal chain in regard to biological processes were developed by 
Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Arabic philosophers into an astrologised version of Aristotle’s 
theories of generation and corruption, and from the Arabic sources and commentaries it was absorbed 
into Latin Christendom. Thus, the ‘science of the stars’ in medieval and Renaissance natural philosophy 
involved the study of both the motions of the celestial bodies as well as their effects. The Lutheran 
educational reformer Philip Melanchthon is an example of one particularly influential figure who saw 
the study of astrology as a religious endeavour; a way of understanding God’s providence through the 
study of his celestial instruments. 
The threat to astrology posed by Copernicus’ heliocentric theory was not as evident to people at the 
time as it was to Henry More and Richard Bentley in the following century. Figures like Rheticus,  
Philip van Lansberge and others understood and explained Copernicanism in astrological terms. The 
increased size of heliocentric systems, however, did lead some to introduce a teleology of inhabitation, 
at least in terms of spiritual or immaterial beings. Tycho Brahe’s published accounts of comets and a 
new star suggested that the heavens were not incorruptible, and so-called novatores like Telesio and 
Patrizi started to develop alternatives to Aristotle’s physics, abandoning the four elements and bridging 
the gap between the terrestrial and celestial worlds. Patrizi was critical of judicial astrology, but believed 
that stars and planets, as corporeal bodies, must have some active virtues. His endorsement of the 
‘Pythagorean’ theory that each star constitutes a world arose out of his conviction that these bodies must 
act within and amongst themselves with the purpose of creating and sustaining living (albeit ethereal) 
creatures. The mathematician and astrologer Benedetti took a different approach, but his theory about 
ET life was still tied to ideas about celestial influence. His interpretation of Copernicanism led him to 
suggest that the planets may be moons orbiting around other unreflecting bodies like the earth. These 
planets should therefore be understood as mirrors, directing sunlight onto their respective ‘earths’.  
An entire chapter was dedicated to the terrestrial and celestial physics of William Gilbert, in part 
because the level of appreciation and understanding of his philosophy does not match the level of its 
importance to the histories of astrology and pluralism. The astrological nature and implications of 
magnetism are very apparent in Gilbert’s own works, but his theory would later act as a stepping stone 
for the assimilation of occult action at a distance into a de-astrologised physics. The belief that the 
planetary forms, of which magnetism was just one example, were both influential and motive was 
crucial to the logic of Gilbert’s world-system. Their various influences contributed to the diversification 
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of the material and hence the generation of living creatures on the surfaces of each of the globes, and 
the motion of these globes could be understood as the attempt to constantly maintain an ideal mixture 
of influences. 
This combination of influence and ET life as a way of understanding celestial phenomena was replicated 
by Kepler. His analysis of the astrological import of the nova of 1604 led him to suggest that this 
celestial sign may be intended for the inhabitants of a completely different globe. His combination of 
harmonic theory with astronomy and astrology, meanwhile, led him to speculate about beings on the 
sun who alone could appreciate the harmonic ratios produced by the orbital velocities of its surrounding 
planets. Here again is an instance of influence and inhabitation combining as an explanation for celestial 
motion. In both cases, moreover, the action of celestial influence at places other than the earth was 
evidence for Kepler that those places should be inhabited. The importance given to Kepler in this 
dissertation is a result largely of the prominent place he holds in the histories both of astrology and 
pluralism. The productive connection between these ideas in his philosophy will hopefully be useful, 
therefore, in demonstrating the potential benefit of considering these histories together. 
In the fourth chapter, we reverted back to a broader survey of mid-seventeenth-century cosmologies 
with an eye on the symbiotic relationship between theories of influence and theories of inhabitation. By 
this point, thanks largely to the telescopic observations of Galileo and the work on lunar inhabitation 
by Wilkins, pluralism was founded upon more general ‘Copernican’ arguments, based on the analogy 
of the earth to the other planets and the difficulty of explaining the newly observed, far-distant celestial 
objects in terms of human utility. Still, varying conceptions of celestial influences, not limited to those 
of the sun and the moon, remained in these philosophies. For Borel, Otto von Guericke, Le Grand, 
Gadroys and Wittie, the reciprocal exchange of influences among the celestial bodies preserved a sense 
of harmonious cosmic unity in a system that risked becoming fragmented. There seemed to be a 
reluctance as well to conclude that distant celestial bodies had absolutely no relation to the earth. The 
desire for humanity to be connected to the larger cosmos, it seems, could not easily be brushed aside. 
The limited and, again, selective survey of seventeenth-century natural philosophies has hopefully 
demonstrated that there was nothing incompatible about a belief in astrological influence and a belief 
in ET life. The attempts of Kepler and Gadroys to construct functioning systems of astrological theory 
within systems otherwise inclined to pluralism proves as much. The more salient point for the history 
of pluralism, however, is that the (re-)emergence of this tradition took place at a time when the 
astrological paradigm, if we want to call it that, was still dominant, and so its growth should be 
understood as taking place within and alongside discussions of celestial influence. Sherburne’s 
translation of Manilius is a case in point. The appendices, which include references to pluralist and 
astrological theories taken from contemporary sources, demonstrate that the readership would have 
been interested in both subjects, and probably would not have perceived any ancient/modern divide 
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between them. The discussion of ET life and astrology by the same people and in the same contexts 
provides support for the argument that it was opponents of astrology who emphasised the dichotomy 
between the two, creating in the process the view that each was logically tied to its own system. 
We see this in the attacks by White, More, Flamsteed and Bentley, when they targeted the astrologers’ 
claim that the stars would have been created in vain if they didn’t exert significant influences upon the 
earth. Instead of relying only on other, non-astrological benefits for humanity, they all declared it 
arrogant to think that the entire universe has been created for us. They claimed that astrology relied 
either on an idolatrous belief in god-like planets, or a geocentric cosmology, or both; the belief in ET 
life, on the other hand, was associated with the Copernican system, the discoveries of the telescope, and 
a more mechanical understanding of the workings of nature. On the other side of the debate, figures 
such as Ross, Morin, Butler and Jenkin, in defending astrology or criticising pluralism, had to reassert 
an anthropocentric teleology—an approach that was less and less convincing to a late-seventeenth-
century readership. This antagonism began to erode the symbiosis of astrological and pluralist ideas.  
In the Newtonian cosmology of Bentley, this symbiosis was abandoned completely. The mutual 
exchange of celestial influence—a natural means by which celestial bodies maintain the stable yet 
varied conditions best suited to habitation—was too naturalistic, relying too heavily on secondary 
causes and an overly-mechanical conception of life. Unlike Digby, whose attempt to explain biological 
generation mechanically accentuated the uniformity of nature, Bentley’s emphasis on the immediate 
and arbitrary action of God shifted focus back to plenitude and teleology. Our discussion of the period 
finished with a review of Newtonian natural theology, looking not so much at the details of speculation 
about ET life, which has been covered more by other historians, but rather at the absence of astrology. 
Comparing this project with earlier syntheses of natural philosophy and theology, like those of Thomas 
Aquinas and Melanchthon, makes clear just how dramatic the teleological shift from influence to 
inhabitation was.   
The historical narrative presented in this thesis has something of an Oedipal theme. The marriage of 
astronomy to astrology contributed to the conception of pluralism. Pluralism then developed, and in 
doing so it facilitated the decline of astrology, eventually taking its place at astronomy’s side. It would 
be a mistake, however, to think of this as some sort of grand or self-standing narrative. The strands of 
natural philosophy reconstructed in this thesis are currents and eddies within the larger stream of the 
history of cosmology. The demarcation of these strands is intended to contribute to, rather than rewrite, 
the histories of astrology and the ET life debate in this period. For example, the close association of 
ideas about celestial influence—and the astrological tradition more broadly—with questions related to 
celestial physics and inhabitation is an important contextual and intellectual accompaniment to the 
histories of Dick and Crowe, as well as more recent article and monograph contributions that have been 
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spurred by the recent resurgence of interest in exoplanets and alien life.2 As for the history of astrology, 
the active and passive role played by cosmological pluralism should be counted alongside other 




On top of these somewhat modest objectives, there are other issues that a combined history of astrology 
and pluralism can help to elucidate. One of these issues involves the different attempts to develop a 
rationale for celestial measurements and motion within a non-Aristotelian/Ptolemaic cosmos. Earlier 
theories of solid celestial spheres or individual planetary intelligences were predicated on a teleology 
of influence and an ontological terrestrial/celestial divide: a hierarchical nesting of perfect bodies 
moving in perfect circular motion, acting via heat and light through a celestial medium as efficient 
and/or specific causes on the imperfect terrestrial world. In the philosophies of Bruno, Gilbert, Hill, von 
Guericke and, to certain extent, Hobbes, there was a resurgence of Stoic and Platonic concepts, 
preserved in a pluralist context by Plutarch, which depicted the celestial bodies as living creatures that 
move according to an intrinsic and biological inclination towards preservation and betterment. This 
combination of influence and inhabitation resulted in what Paul-Henri Michel called, in the case of 
Bruno, an astrobiology—a celestial ecosystem in which the spacings and motion of the primary globes 
could be understood as the result of those bodies mitigating and capitalising on environmental factors. 
This understanding was then overturned by Cartesian vortices, which explained the motion of the 
celestial bodies and the distances between them mechanically, and Newtonian gravity, which explained 
motion according to a physical force law, and distances according to a notion of divine providence 
premised on the idea of God’s absolute will. 
This dissertation did not spend much time on the particular nature of lunar or planetary inhabitants. This 
is partly because most pluralist writers in this period avoided speculating about the specific constitutions 
or appearances of ET beings, and partly because instances where they did, like in the fictions of Godwin, 
Cyrano and Kepler, have been well-studied.4 We did, however, encounter certain writers wondering 
about the general nature of ET life, specifically in regard to the question of rationality. As Dick 
                                                          
2 See, for instance, some of the articles on history published in the leading journals of astrobiology, such as Mark 
Brake, ‘On the Plurality of Inhabited Worlds: A Brief History of Extraterrestrialism’, International Journal of 
Astrobiology, 5 (2006): 99–107; Danielle Briot, ‘Elements for the History of a Long Quest: Search for Life in the 
Universe’, International Journal of Astrobiology, 12 (2013): 254–58. 
3 Discussions on these separate factors can be found in the various contributions in Dooley (ed.), A Companion to 
Astrology in the Renaissance (Leiden: Brill, 2014).  
4 It has also been argued that maintaining a sceptical or agnostic position regarding the specifics of ET life allowed 
these authors to adjust to the arguments of their critics. Anton Matytsin, ‘Scepticism and Certainty in Seventeenth- 
and Eighteenth-Century Speculations about the Plurality of Worlds’, Science et Esprit, 65 (2013): 359–72. 
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observed, most of the interest in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries concerned intelligent life, 
with more general biological debate arising in later periods.5 In the traditional understanding, however, 
humanity was an infima species, holding exclusive rights to the ‘rational animal’ branch of the 
Porphyrian tree. The potential theological problems arising from the possibility of ET life brought this 
question to the fore. Some thought that the planets may house beings that are superior to mankind; 
beings which fill up the great chasm in the chain of being between men and God. Others proposed that 
the planets may serve as settings for the different temporal stages of humanity’s soteriological journey. 
How astrology and pluralism relate to one another in terms of the temporal dimension of cosmology 
may be a promising area for future research. 
What we focused on here, however, were the theories of White and Bentley that widened out humanity’s 
step on the scala naturae, suggesting that man is just one species of rational animal, and that the planets 
are populated by others, distinguished by different combinations of rational soul and corporeal body. 
The growing engagement with the plurality of worlds philosophy led to dramatic developments in the 
definition of humanity and its place in the universe.6 It may also have impacted, or been influenced by, 
ideas about mankind’s relationship to the other forms of life on the earth itself.7 The question of whether 
the universe had been created to serve humanity involved those things ‘above’ mankind in the cosmos, 
as well as those things ‘below’ him. These discussions were taking place, moreover, at a time when 
European civilisation was discovering new areas of the globe, complete with people, animals and plant 
life different and yet similar to those closer to home.8 As knowledge of the terrestrial sphere increased 
and blank areas on the map were filled in, the heavens, which had seemed fully charted before the 
telescope, revealed further frontiers—locations that may be just as replete with life, albeit for now 
beyond the scope of observation. 
There were avenues for conjecture, however, and one of them related to astrology. It is not particularly 
surprising that early ideas about the nature of living beings on the other planets did not depart 
dramatically from the mythological and astrological associations of those planets. Fontenelle’s amorous 
Venusians and phlegmatic Saturnites vary only a little from the planetenkinder of medieval and 
Renaissance astrology.9 These associations lasted a long time, with the war-like nature of Martians 
being the most recurring and well-known example. In this dissertation, we have noticed that there were 
                                                          
5 Dick, Plurality of Worlds, p. 189. 
6 For more on this particular issue, see John Hedley Brooke, ‘“Wise Men Nowadays Think Otherwise”: John Ray, 
Natural Theology and the Meanings of Anthropocentrism’, Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London, 54 
(2000): 199–213; Steven J. Dick, ‘Anthropology and the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence: An Historical 
View’, Anthropology Today, 22 (2006): 3–7; Abou Farman, ‘Re-Enchantment Cosmologies: Mastery and 
Obsolescence in an Intelligent Universe’, Anthropological Quarterly, 85 (2012): 1069–88; Joseph Packer, Alien 
Life and Human Purpose: A Rhetorical Examination through History (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015). 
7 See Nathaniel Wolloch, ‘Christiaan Huygens’s Attitude toward Animals’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 61 
(2000): 415–32; Wolloch, ‘Animals, Extraterrestrial Life and Anthropocentrism in the Seventeenth Century’. 
8 See in particular Campbell, Wonder & Science. 
9 Fontenelle, Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds, pp. 78, 98.  
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in fact more logical motives to these speculations. Cusa suggested that solar beings were intellectual 
and fiery while lunar beings were watery and aerial, basing his belief on the influence of each of those 
bodies. The assumption was that one could make surmises about the nature of a celestial body based on 
the influence that that body emits. Plutarch had done something similar, arguing that there must be 
moisture present on the moon because the earth receives a moistening influence from it. Whereas 
astrologers, like Kepler, had once seen a planet’s colour as a clue to the quality of its influence, pluralist 
investigators saw it as an indication of material constitution, and drew inferences about its possible 
inhabitants. Exoplanet spectroscopy aims to do the same today. 
This brings us back to the question of the history of astrobiology. The second part to the title of this 
dissertation refers to a transformation of astrobiology in the early modern period. Most historians of 
astrobiology, of which there is a small but increasing number, would consider that astrobiology only 
emerged in this period. This is because, at the moment, the history of astrobiology is effectively the 
history of exobiology—that is, the history has not expanded to match the broader scope of the discipline. 
Astrobiology is the study of life on earth as well as ET life, with some advocates giving it the broader 
and more poetic objective of seeking to understand life in a cosmic context. This ambition is the 
common thread that unites all the individuals and texts examined in this thesis. Astrology was the pre-
modern astrobiology, if we care to think of it like that, uniting astronomy, biology and anthropology in 
order to understand life on this earth in relation to its celestial setting. It was over the course of the long-
seventeenth century that astrobiology transformed, turning away from the question of influence towards 
that of inhabitation. 
 
Is Astrobiology a New Astrology? 
This raises an interesting and yet difficult question. Taking as a starting point those lines from Edward 
Young’s Night Thoughts (1745), which describes the knowledge of an immense universe full of 
inhabited worlds as ‘a new Astrology’, we might ask to what extent, or in what ways, a belief in ET life 
replaced a belief in astrology from the eighteenth century onwards. The main concern of this dissertation 
has been teleology. It has hopefully been demonstrated by now that the answer to the question ‘what 
are the celestial bodies for?’ changed dramatically in this period. The standard answer before the 
seventeenth century was that they were created to govern the earth via their influences, while the 
standard answer from the eighteenth century onwards was that they were created to be habitats for other 
living creatures. There are, however, several important caveats to be made to this generalisation. One 
is that influence was not always their sole purpose, even within a Christian/Aristotelian cosmos, and 
there were always critics of astrology who tried to downplay the influences they might have. By the 
same token, inhabitation was not the only teleological principle within Newtonian cosmology. There is 
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the issue of primary and secondary uses, for example, and instances of celestial bodies and phenomena, 
like comets and of course the suns themselves, which existed purely to influence other bodies. It is 
perhaps better, then, to think of the balance of power shifting among multiple teleologies, rather than 
the hegemony of any particular one. 
It is fair to say, however, that inhabitation began to take over a conversation that was once dominated 
by influence. Another way we might think that pluralism replaced astrology is in its role as the 
conjectural or speculative side of astronomy. Huygens is an example of one professional astronomer 
who largely ignored astrology and then devoted a whole work to conjectures about planetary 
inhabitants. The research of Crowe on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has showed that many of 
the most famous figures in the history of astronomy were deeply concerned with, and wrote extensively 
on, pluralist questions. Moreover, he has argued that many such astronomers were first attracted to their 
field of study by pluralist writings, and that the motivation behind many examples of astronomical 
patronage and instrument building was the desire to investigate questions about ET life. ‘The 
attractiveness of some pluralist theories’, suggests Crowe, ‘may be attributed to their unfalsifiability, 
flexibility, and richness in explanatory power.’10 This statement could easily be made about astrological 
theories as well. Perhaps a helpful tool in this regard would be to think of them both as examples of 
themata, as Gerard Holton defines them: examples of ‘non-scientific’ commitments which underlie 
scientific practice.11 
There are several areas where a belief in ET life did not and could not replace astrology, and the most 
obvious one concerns utility. We have largely limited ourselves to the subject of astrology’s natural 
philosophical foundations, i.e. celestial influence, but astrology proper was a predictive art, and it was 
in this practical dimension that astrology permeated and influenced such large swathes of society and 
culture. While speculations about life on the other planets might have intrigued a new generation of 
astronomers, it in no way encroached upon astrology’s practical territory. As Anselm lamented in 
Fontenelle’s dialogue, people will never be disabused of things that regard the future, and so the 
astrologer’s trade will always hold good.12  
That is not to say that pluralism had no popular appeal. We have already mentioned the success of 
Fontenelle’s Entretiens, but many other pluralist works, both fiction and non-fiction, had a wide 
readership. What is quite interesting is that pluralist ideas started to seep into the mainstream at a time 
when popular astrology and the almanac trade, in England at least, were still near their peak. Anna 
                                                          
10 Crowe, The Extraterrestrial Life Debate, p. 548. 
11 Holton gives several examples of now discredited themata. See: ‘ideas such as macrocosmic-microcosmic 
correspondence, inherent principles, teleological drives, action at a distance, space-filling media, organismic 
interpretations, hidden mechanisms, or absolutes of time, space, and simultaneity’ (Holton, Thematic Origins of 
Scientific Thought, p. 14). Celestial influence and inhabitation are both implicated here, although only one is still 
of important scientific interest. 
12 Fontenelle, Nouveaux dialogues des morts, I, p. 258. 
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Marie Roos’ analysis of English works of popular science and subscription newspapers, such as the 
Athenian Mercury, reveals an interest both in astrological questions and in the possibility of a world in 
the moon.13 The general trend that she depicts, however, is one of ‘desacralization’, with astrology being 
increasingly socially discredited. Yet theories of ET life were not above criticsm in the public sphere 
either. Indeed, as astrologers painted pluralism as a modern conceit, and advocates of the new 
astronomy derided astrology as irreligious superstition, it seems that both at times were scoffed at by a 
public who didn’t see as strict a divide between the astronomer and the astrologer as we do today.14 
Pluralism, however, would eventually begin to take over as an important link between the new 
astronomical science and the wider, increasingly literate population. Indeed, Crowe has argued that 
embellishing texts with talk of ET life became a sure-fire way for authors to interest the public in 
astronomy.15 This state of affairs continues today. Astronomical discoveries are more likely to feature 
in the news if there is some connection to the search for ET life, and such articles are usually rife with 
exaggeration and hyperbole.  
The other major area of popular engagement is of course science fiction. The lunar fictions of Kepler, 
Godwin and Cyrano are either foundational texts or precursors of this genre, depending on the flexibility 
of your definition.16 More examples of extraordinary voyages followed in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, before Jules Verne and H. G. Wells took the genre to new heights, leading up to the ‘Golden 
Age’ of sci-fi in the mid-twentieth century. ET characters are in most cases a sufficient, if not necessary, 
condition for inclusion in the sci-fi genre, and here again we might draw a link back to astrology. 
Astrological types usually involved the isolation and exaggeration of a human personality trait, and it 
is in this guise of psychological archetypes that astrology was utilised in medieval and Renaissance 
literature.17 The figure of the alien often plays a similar role in sci-fi, being a physical embodiment of 
exaggerated aspects of the human.18 In the television series ‘Star Trek’, created by Gene Roddenberry 
                                                          
13 Roos, Luminaries in the Natural World, pp. 244–45. 
14 See, for instance, William C. Horne, ‘Curiosity and Ridicule in Samuel Butler’s Satire on Science’, Restoration: 
Studies in English Literary Culture, 1660-1700, 7 (1983): 8–18. On the increasing satirisation of astrologers, see 
Eileen Reeves, ‘Astrology and Literature’, in A Companion to Astrology in the Renaissance: 287–331. 
15 Crowe, The Extraterrestrial Life Debate, p. 556. 
16 Carl Sagan and Isaac Asimov reputedly considered Kepler’s Somnium the first work of science fiction, a title 
which has stuck. See Gale E. Christianson, ‘Kepler’s Somnium: Science Fiction and the Renaissance Scientist’, 
Science Fiction Studies, 3 (1976): 79–90; Roger Bozzetto and Arthur B. Evans, ‘Kepler’s “Somnium”; Or, Science 
Fiction’s Missing Link’, Science Fiction Studies, 17 (1990): 370–82. All these works are usually discussed in the 
opening chapters of histories of the genre, such as Brian Wilson Aldiss, Billion Year Spree: The History of Science 
Fiction (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973); Darko Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the 
Poetics and History of a Literary Genre (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2016); Roberts, The History of Science Fiction. 
Other works push the genre’s timeline even further back. See Brett M. Rogers and Benjamin Eldon Stevens (eds), 
Classical Traditions in Science Fiction (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Carl Kears and 
James Paz (eds), Medieval Science Fiction (London: King’s College, 2016). 
17 See, for example, Chauncy Wood, Chaucer and the Country of the Stars: Poetic Uses of Astrological Imagery 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); J. C. Eade, The Forgotten Sky: A Guide to Astrology in English 
Literature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). 
18 See Carl D. Malmgren, ‘Self and Other in SF: Alien Encounters’, Science Fiction Studies, 20 (1993): 15–33. 
198 
 
in the 1960s, the Vulcan and Klingon species, for example, are embodiments of logic and violence 
respectively. 
In this setting, the value of humanity lies in the fact that it embodies a balance of these extremes. A 
human is more passionate than a Vulcan and more compassionate than a Klingon. As we noticed in 
Fontenelle and Huygens, humanity went from being the centre of the universe to being its mean or 
median average. This idea was further developed in an early work by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). The 
third part of his Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels (‘General History of Nature and 
Theory of the Heavens’, 1755) contained an attempt to make reasonable conjectures about the nature 
of the inhabitants of the other planets in the solar system.19 He argued that intellectual capacities were 
dependant upon the relative density and coarseness of the fluids and fibres of the cerebral nerves. Seeing 
as how material increases in density as you approach the centre of gravity in the solar system, Kant 
concluded that the inhabitants of the outer planets would be much more intelligent and perfect than 
those on the inner planets.20 Humanity holds the middle rung in this particular scale of being, and Kant 
believed we should be grateful for it. Our view of the universe encourages both pride and humility, 
depending on which way you look.21  
Kant’s discussion of planetary inhabitants creates an intelligible order to our immediate celestial 
environment and helps us to understand our place within it. Again, we can think of this as fulfilling a 
function once filled by astrological ideas. In that case, the universe was thought to increase in perfection 
as it receded from a terrestrial centre of gravity, but at the same time the celestial hierarchy formed a 
causal chain proceeding from the highest heaven down to the earth. When humanity looked up it was 
inspired to humility and awe in the face of such perfect creations, but was also grateful for the care 
taken in the regulation of sublunary affairs. Celestial influence and celestial inhabitation are both modes 
of thinking that are employed to understand human nature and human concerns within a cosmic context. 
Even more specifically, they are both attempts to comprehend the chain of being. This chain not only 
depicted a succession of life-forms from the lowest to the most God-like, it also represented a hierarchy 
of forces that the knowledgable practitioner could manipulate. With the shift from influence to 
inhabitation, the chain of being largely lost this practical dimension, but the desire to see it filled in did 
not diminish. 
Within the works of individual thinkers, this dissertation has treated influence and inhabitation as unit-
ideas, reconstructing a history of ideas from the pre-Copernican to the post-Newtonian age. Now that 
we come to a broader comparison of these epochs, a more relevant historiographical foil is Kuhn’s 
                                                          
19 See Dick, Plurality of Worlds, pp. 165–74; Crowe, The Extraterrestrial Life Debate, pp. 47–56; Andreas Losch, 
‘Kant’s Wager: Kant’s Strong Belief in Extra-Terrestrial Life, the History of This Question and Its Challenge for 
Theology Today’, International Journal of Astrobiology, 15 (2016): 261–70. 
20 Kant, Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, p. 189. 
21 Ibid., p. 190. 
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theory of scientific revolution and paradigm shift. In a strict understanding of Kuhn’s usage, pluralism 
would probably be considered an offshoot of the Copernican paradigm, rather than a paradigm in itself. 
But it did play an important role in the building of heliocentric theories into complete cosmologies or 
conceptual schemes. Kuhn discussed the requirement that a cosmology supply both an explanation of 
observed phenomena and a ‘psychologically satisfying world-view’.22 We might draw a link here to 
Guthke’s emphasis on myth. Likewise Fernand Hallyn’s work on poetics in cosmology, and in 
particular his use of Ricoeur’s analogy between the role of myth and the role of heuristic fictions in 
science. ‘A new hypothesis’, Hallyn states, ‘as long as it is not sufficiently validated and accepted, is 
formally similar to a mythos, to the intrigue or plot of a tragedy.’23 Even today the existence of ET life 
has not been proven, but, like astrology, it is flexible, difficult if not impossible to falsify, and it can 
provide intrigue to cosmology and scientific research.  
Taking a wide view over the larger structures of the history of cosmology, the idea of a paradigm shift 
from influence to inhabitation looks similarly intriguing and richly explanatory. There is still need for 
some reservation, however. This dissertation has focused largely on the period of flux, when both these 
ideas were up for debate. The claim that either of these was widely accepted and deeply ingrained 
enough in its own period to be considered a paradigm relies on the work of other historians in each 
field. The problem is that historians of astrology and historians of pluralism in the twentieth century 
may have been liable to overstate the case for the importance of their field in the face of disdain or 
disregard from mainstream history of science. Dick, writing in 1982, bemoaned the fact that the ET life 
debate was usually viewed with ‘more disdain than objectivity, more amusement than serious 
scholarship’.24 This might explain the use of particularly grand and hyperbolic statements, e.g. that ‘the 
assertion of extraterrestrial intelligence may be considered a metaphysical completion of the scientific 
revolution’.25 The history of astrology has been making its case for even longer, and yet still there is the 
lingering feeling in that camp that the importance of astrology in medieval and Renaissance society is 
under-studied and under-appreciated.26 The entrenched self-image of these histories as correctives to a 
traditional historical narrative might caution us to think that the truth lies somewhere in the middle. 
This thesis, by inviting a comparison between the two, is vulnerable to attack from both sides. 
Nevertheless, when someone with such a comprehensive knowledge of the subject as Lynn Thorndike 
describes astrology as a widely-held, universal natural law, we are inclined to grant it credence. As for 
the dominance of pluralism in the post-Newtonian age, we can look to the testimony of the nineteenth-
                                                          
22 Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution, p. 7. 
23 Hallyn, The Poetic Structure of the World, pp. 13–14. 
24 Dick, Plurality of Worlds, p. 176. 
25 Ibid., p. 188. 
26 As just one example, note this line from the preface to Dooley (ed.), A Companion to Astrology in the 
Renaissance, p. xv: ‘To Renaissance studies as a whole we wish to add a key aspect which has too often been 
forgotten or neglected.’ 
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century scientist and historian of science William Whewell (1794–1866). When Whewell wrote an 
essay arguing against the belief that the planets were inhabited, he seemed well aware of the way that 
the cosmological landscape had changed over the preceding centuries. ‘It will be a curious, but not very 
wonderful event’, he wrote, ‘if it should now be deemed as blameable to doubt the existence of 
inhabitants of the Planets and Stars, as, three centuries ago, it was held heretical to teach that doctrine.’27 
The example of Whewell presents an opportunity to look once more at how theological approaches to 
cosmology shifted over long periods of time. We have discussed how the astrological vision of Manilius 
presented an ordered, providential system in opposition to the chaotic pluralism of Lucretian atomism. 
This position was maintained in the medieval and Renaissance periods, with Epicurus often represented 
as the most dangerous example of philosophical atheism. In the seventeenth century, however, More 
and Bentley presented pluralism as a theological antidote to the perceived deterministic naturalism and 
irreligion of astrology. 
In the context of nineteenth-century natural theology, the debate over ET life between Whewell and 
David Brewster saw earlier Newtonian positions reversed.28 Whewell took a scientific and theological 
position against the plurality of worlds philosophy in the face of its increasing naturalism in the context 
of the nebular hypothesis developed by Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749–1827). By this point a belief in ET 
life had again become associated with an anti-religious, or at least an anti-scriptural, position, in part 
due to the writings of Jérôme Lalande (1732–1807) and Thomas Paine (1737–1809).29 Darwin’s theory 
of evolution would exacerbate this further, meaning that it was possible not only to explain the 
formation of the solar system in completely mechanical terms, but also to understand the evolution (if 
not the ultimate origin) of life in naturalistic terms. 
It is a curious event (to borrow his words) that Whewell, an opponent of interest in ET life, was primarily 
responsible for the demarcation of the scientific disciplines, creating an institutional divide between 
astronomy and biology that astrobiology has only recently tried to bridge. The modern discipline of 
astrobiology is little more than twenty years old, but hopefully this anachronistic ‘long history’ of 
astrobiology and its transformation in the early modern period can help us to understand its current 
popularity on a historical, sociological and anthropological level. Astronomers and biologists no longer 
approach their specimens as bodies created by God for a particular purpose, but by prioritising some 
lines of enquiry above others, by making implicit judgments about what is interesting or worthwhile, 
we impose our own teleology on the world around us. In astrobiology, planets and moons are ‘for’ 
inhabitation just as they were in natural theology. In her ethnographic work within this discipline, the 
                                                          
27 William Whewell, Of the Plurality of Worlds: An Essay (London: J.W. Parker and Son, 1853), p. iii. On 
Whewell’s complex relationship with pluralism, see the chapter in Crowe, The Extraterrestrial Life Debate, pp. 
265–99. 
28 See John Hedley Brooke, ‘Natural Theology and the Plurality of Worlds: Observations on the Brewster--
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anthropologist Lisa Messeri talked about the transformation of planets into ‘places’—an act which 
facilitates a mode of connection and offers the possibility to know one’s own place in the universe.30 
Astrology is often understood as a semiotic practice, transforming the night sky into a canvas painted 
with signs and meanings. Messeri describes how, at a conference held at MIT in 2011 on ‘The Next 40 
Years of Exoplanets’, the astrobiologist Sara Seager showed a photo of two children pointing up at a 
twilight sky, with the following caption: ‘We want to show our children, grandchildren, nieces, and 
nephews a dark sky, point to a star visible to the naked eye, and tell them, “that star has a planet like 
Earth”.’31 This demonstrates the desire to be able to look at the night sky and anchor it with new points 
of meaning, instead of relying on old stellar constellations, long acknowledged to be figments of the 
human imagination. Astrobiology is in many ways an attempt to turn our modern astronomical 
cosmography into a true cosmology, using inhabitation as a determiner to superimpose order and 
meaning onto the fabric of outer space.  
This comparison of modern astrobiology with astrology is not meant as a criticism. It is intended to 
demonstrate that, in an instructive sense, our interest in ET life can be thought of as a modern 
incarnation of the astrobiological imagination. This functionalist approach, although it has obvious 
limits, may help to mitigate the seeming antiquarianism of the history of astrology as well as the 
presentism of the history of the ET life debate. Rather than thinking in normative terms of 
disenchantment or Enlightenment, we might instead view the decline of astrology and the rise of 
pluralism as a transformation of astrobiology—a shift from celestial influence to celestial inhabitation 
as the dominant paradigm for the scientific and poetic approach to an understanding of life in a cosmic 
context.  
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